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Crises are inevitable. There is no way to prevent all crises from happening. In 
fact, in today's business environment crises are an integral part of 
organizational life. Crisis situations are by nature novel, unstructured, and 
outside the organization's typical operating frameworks. Crises are sudden, 
acute, and demand a timely response. Most man-made crises are in principle 
preventable. Crisis management is a new field of research that addresses the 
problems of dealing with crises, and the stress that accompanies crises. Crisis 
management involves efforts to prevent crises from occurring; to prepare for a 
better protection against the impact of a crisis agent; to make for an effective 
response to an actual crisis; and to provide plans and resources for recovery 
and rehabilitation in the aftermath of a crisis. It is no longer enough to 
consider "if" a crisis will happen but rather "when" a crisis will occur, "which 
type", and "how". 
There is no doubt that the travel and tourism industry is especially susceptible 
and vulnerable to crises. It is argued that the hotel industry, given its 
operational characteristics, management practices (which is strongly 
influenced by long established traditions), and its operating environment, is 
even more prone to crises. However, very little has been done to understand 
crisis (that is, how a crisis evolves, crisis typology, anatomy, and management 
of crisis). 
This study describes and discusses all major relevant elements and issues to 
the emerging field of crisis management. Within the domain of crisis 
management theory, the study describes and elaborates on critical issues 
such as crisis typology, anatomy of crisis, crisis planning and training, crisis 
decision making, crisis communication, and crisis management. 
It is argued in this study that organizational culture is the most fundamental 
element in crisis preparedness. That is, organizational culture, not 
organization structure, size, financial history, etc., is the main determinant of 
crisis preparedness. The research also argue that stakeholders are 
fundamental in crisis prevention, crisis management and crisis recovery. 
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This study, in a first instance, examines the crisis preparedness of 33 of the 50 
top hotel organizations operating in the UK (HCIMA, 1995). Crisis 
preparedness is examined in the light of organizational culture. For that, top 
executives in those organizations were interviewed and responded to two 
questionnaires. A crisis preparedness framework (or continuum) was derived 
from the application of factor analysis on the questionnaire data. The results 
suggest that the hotel industry is not prepared for crises. Given that a crisis is 
a multi-stakeholder phenomenon (it inevitably involves other agents) this 
study also explores, building upon the results obtained from the crisis 
preparedness continuum, the notion of stakeholders relationships in crisis 
situations. More specifically, the research proposition states that organizations 
that are crisis "prepared" are more consistent on their opinions about 
stakeholders' role and behaviour in crisis situations than those organizations 
that are not prepared for crises. The study confirmed both the research 
question and proposition. 
The study also presents an operational definition of crisis management and 
proposes a model for crisis management. 
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G. Santana Ch. 1- Introduction 
1.1 -Introduction 
The purpose of this research is, through analysis, to gain insight into the crisis 
preparedness of hotel organizations and to explore stakeholders' 
relationships in crisis periods. The research has three broad objectives. The 
first is to describe and display the main element that constitute crisis 
preparedness. The description of the element that constitute crisis 
preparedness forms the material for analysis which embraces the variables 
that give rise to crisis preparedness pattern. The second is to examine crisis 
preparedness in hotel organizations in the United Kingdom. The third is to 
contrast the perceived differences (views) that hotel organizations have of 
their functional stakeholders in distinct crisis situations. This research has also 
the objective of developing a crisis management model that embraces and 
reflects all the major relevant concepts to the topic of crisis management. 
There are essentially four basic areas to this study, which are: first, the study 
makes a comprehensive review and description of crisis management theory 
and practice and discusses the relevance and applicability of crisis 
management to business organizations today. Second, a revision of the main 
component of crisis preparedness (organizational culture) is done, specially 
with regards to crisis and crisis management. Third, since crises are 
essentially a multi-stakeholder phenomenon (crisis never happens in 
isolation), the emerging stakeholder theory is reviewed. A discussion on the 
role' stakeholders can play in crisis and in crisis management is also 
presented. Finally, the hotel industry is examined in its main characteristics 
and vulnerabilities to crisis. 
The research attempts a comprehensive analysis of the crisis preparedness of 
the 50 top hotel organizations operating in the United Kingdom and explores 
hotel organization's views of their main functional stakeholders in crisis 
situations. In pursuit of its objectives the study uses new ways of examining 
crisis preparedness using rationalizations hotel executives use in relation to 
crisis and crisis management. Organizational culture is operationalized in 
terms of rationalizations. While not reducing organizational culture to the 
phenomenon of rationalization, rationalizations are manifestations of deeply 
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held basic assumptions. Rationalization represents one dimension through 
which organizational culture is manifested, and thus influences individuals 
and groups and behaviour. 
The research presented here represents the first of its kind to offer a detailed 
description and analysis of crisis management in the hotel industry. The study 
used qualitative and quantitative data to describe and analyze crisis 
preparedness and the main elements that dictate crisis preparedness. 
Quantitative data was used to investigate and describe hotel organizations' 
expectation of stakeholder's role and behaviour in a given crisis situation. 
1.2 - The Study in Context 
Tourism activities are not commonly associated with crisis. Pleasure, 
relaxation, safety and enjoyment are all embodied in the concept of tourism, 
whereas crises bring about anxiety, distress, fear, panic and trauma. However, 
crisis is an inevitable part of business today. In fact, crisis cannot be 
disassociated from any business activity. The potential for major crises to 
develop and escalate in business today is greaterthan ever. Given the nature 
of the tourism industry the issue of crisis management becomes even more 
relevant. Some authors argue that, not only is the tourism industry very 
vulnerable to crisis, but it also provides the right setting for some crisis to 
emerge and evolve (Ryan, 1993; Cassedy, 1992; Woods and Kavanaugh, 
1994; Kelly, 1993; Chesney-Lind and Lind, 1986). There is also evidence to 
support the view that the hotel industry is one of the most vulnerable to crisis 
(Barton, 1994; Brownell, 1990; Brewton, 1987; Harris, 1994; Lewis, 1994; 
Webster, 1990; Bell, 1990). For example, Brownell (1990) posits that the hotel 
industry is characterized by high levels of uncertainty, Olsen and Zhao (1997) 
suggest that management practices in the industry are influenced by long 
established traditions and that the industry is slow to adapt to new realities (is 
typically a re-active industry), and Lewis (1994) argues that the hotel industry 
leads the way in business failure. Yet, very little has been done towards 
understanding crisis and managing crisis in the hotel industry. 
The hotel industry has experienced in the last few years one of the most 
difficult periods ever. In fact, some analysts argue that the recession of late 
1980's and early 1990's, combined with the effects of the Gulf War on tourism 
and travel, was the worst period for the hotel industry since World War II. 
However, crisis for the hotel industry is not something new. Those were major 
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events (macro) that unsettled the world economy. Micro and other events also 
have, the potential to destroy whole sectors or individual hotel groups or 
properties. This research is mainly concerned with those events that conspire 
and escalate to an out of proportion situation - crisis. 
It is argued in this research that crises are inevitable. Crisis today happens to 
any industry, anywhere, regardless of industry structure, financial history, 
management style, and so forth. Moreover, industrial and commercial crisis 
today have the potential to rival natural disasters in both scope and magnitude 
(such as the Chernobyl, Bophal, and others). For these type of crises no 
geographical boundaries exist and potentially they can also have 
transgenerational consequences. A closer look at events in the last two 
decades suggests that crises are on the increase and not, unfortunately, on 
the decrease. 
Although natural crises are important for the hotel industry (natural 
crisis/disasters have received some attention by academics and professionals 
alike), this research examines man-made crisis only. One reason for that is 
that, in principle, they are preventable. Yet, time and time again history 
repeats itself as far as crisis is concerned. It seems that our cultural, 
educational, and social structures combine to "create" increasingly more 
complex and difficult to anticipate crises. It also seems that our ability to 
anticipate and manage crisis effectively is very limited. 
Hotels operate in a dynamic and sometimes hostile environment. The nature 
of hotel operations is characterized by a high level of uncertainty. It is argued 
that few other industries experience such a high level of continuous 
uncertainty. Having said that, the range of crisis the hotel industry is 
vulnerable to is very large indeed. Even though there is evidence to suggest 
that not only is the hotel industry more vulnerable to crisis than other 
industries but the industry also provides the right environment for certain 
crises to develop and escalate, very little has been done to understand crisis. 
That is, what constitutes a crisis, crisis typology, crisis patterns and behaviour, 
management of crisis, and so on. 
Crises are both organizational and inter-organizational phenomena. 
Whenever a crisis occurs it has the inherent potential to engulf and/or affect 
other individuals or institutions. Crises inevitably extend beyond the 
organization of origin to encompass a broad range of economic, social and 
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political agents and forces. These impacts on organizational stakeholders 
represent intermediate outcomes from the chain of events that constitute a 
crisis. Some of these outcomes change important contextual factors. They 
may lead to organizational bankruptcy, regulatory changes, or may threaten 
the legitimacy of an entire industry. (For the purpose of this study, 
stakeholders are all those vested interest groups, parties, associations, 
institutions, and individuals who exert a hold and a claim on organizations. 
Stakeholders are all those who either affect or are affected by an organization 
and its policies - i. e., its behaviour). 
Having said that, crisis management, organizational culture, and stakeholder 
management cannot be viewed separately. They are interlinked and 
interdependent. This study observe these elements in function in hotel 
organizations in the UK. 
1.3 - Contribution to Knowledge 
1.3.1 -A General Overview of Crisis Management Main Issues 
Crisis management is a very recent field of study. In fact, it is still in its infancy 
(Mitroff and Pearson, 1993a; Shrivastava, 1992; Janis, 1989; Perrow, 1984; 
Fink, 1986). There still exist fundamental problems in the field of crisis 
management associated with the evolution of a new field of research, as for 
example definition of the concept (in this case, crisis). The concept of crisis 
has evolved historically in many different disciplines and - fields. Every 
scientific field has its own definition and concept of crisis. An in-depth review 
of this abundant literature highlights the complexity of crisis as a phenomenon 
and'suggests the need for a theory in crisis management that addresses this 
complexity. In management science the definitions provided so far have not 
received enough empirical support. In many cases, where additional concepts 
were introduced they have been of a controversial nature viewed essentially 
from the point of interpretation of evidence, without outlining some of the 
critical issues surrounding its conception. 
Pauchant and Mitroff (1992) observed that the most erroneous misconception 
in management science is the refusal to see a crisis as a positive force, as a 
factor itself contributing to the very existence of an organization. Very few 
authors in management science emphasize this critical paradox (Miller, 1990; 
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Schwartz, 1990; Pauchant and Mitroff, 1992; Mitroff and Kilmann, 1984; Fink, 
1986; Janis, 1989). 
Considering that the concept is used in many different fields and disciplines, 
the definition of crisis as well as the attribution of crisis causes are highly 
diversified and strongly biased by the particular field in which they are studied 
(Pauchant and Douville, 1993). The problem of definition is further aggravated 
by the extensive use of synonyms in the literature, such as problems, turning 
point, jolt, disaster, catastrophe, etc. 
The problem of definition and misconception of the term hampers 
development in crisis management. It is argued that this fact may be 
responsible for the lack of preparedness of some organizations. 
In general, the literature does not provide a widely accepted definition of crisis 
and attempts to categorize types or forms of crises have been sparse. 
Approaches to crisis research have been quite different. Some researchers 
have explored multiple forms of crisis (Meyers and Holusha, 1986; Fink, 1986; 
Mitroff et al, 1989), others have examined crises as a single phenomenon 
(Nystrom and Starbuck, 1984; Smart and Vertinsky, 1977,1984) or have 
concentrated on only one manifestation of crisis (Billings etal_, 1980). 
Crisis research to date has relied heavily on a single method of study, the 
case study. While case studies provide substantial depth of analysis, they are 
usually difficult to compare. 
Crises do not limit themselves to negative effects. Research has shown that 
crisis can bring enormous. benefits to organizations (Rosenthal and 
Pijnenburg, 1990; Pauchant and Mitroff, 1992; Fink, 1986; Mitroff et al, 1992; 
Nystrom and Starbuck, 1984; Kerchner and Schuster, 1982; Mitroff and 
Pauchant, 1990). In some cases, researchers have formally suggested that 
crises are sometimes exactly what are needed for allowing organizational 
members to make long overdue strategic shifts (Nystrom and Starbuck, 1984; 
Pauchant and Mitroff, 1992; Fink, 1986; Mitroff and Pauchant, 1990). 
Kerchner and Schuster (1982, pp. 121) argued that for most managers, crisis 
"connotes a state of affairs to be avoided, for the outcome is risky and may 
very well be prejudicial to personal and organizational health. " However, ".... 
crises, although they are inherently risky, under certain conditions can be 
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transformed into instruments of organizational good. " Kerchner and Schuster 
(1982) also argue that the question for managers is to know "when to declare 
a crisis and how to utilize one. " Indeed, crises are neither inherently good or 
bad for an organization. Their impact may cut in either direction. But, and as 
pointed out by Fink e (1971, pp. 16), the declaration of a crisis may create 
an opportunity for organizational elan, teamwork, and a spirit of compromise, 
even sacrifice, on the part. of. individuals within the organization and its sub- 
units. In other words, crisis can become a "vehicle for organizational growth". 
Unfortunately, a great number of authors in crisis management still take only a 
reactive stance, viewing crisis management activities mostly as a means for 
coming back as soon as possible to "business as usual". By focusing on the 
need to restore the status quo before the emergence of a crisis, the 
opportunity to address the structural and systemic needed changes that a 
crisis can make visible is missed (Mitroff etpl, 1992). 
Researches by Mitroff and Pauchant (1990) revealed that managers that have 
engaged in crisis management, that is, managers that have allowed 
themselves to rigorously learn from their past crises and crisis management 
experiences and acted on the basis of the experiences, "have developed 
through crisis management substantial strategic advantages over their 
competitors". Mitroff and Pauchant (1990) also argue that the strategic 
advantages mentioned above not only positively affected the firms having 
developed them, but that they are also "societal advantages", diminishing the 
risks and/or impact of crises and of the current ecological and ethical decay (in 
Mitroff et al, 1992, pp. 255). 
Having said that, hotel organizations need to acknowledge that crises are 
indeed a part of their "normal" operations and need to orderly and 
systematically devise the mechanisms necessary to deal with crisis. Only with 
proper advance planning can there be a positive side to a crisis. 
1.3.2 - Contribution to Knowledge - Relevance of the Research 
The justification for the relevance of this research lies in two dimensions. The 
first is in crisis management research per se. With regards to the main body of 
crisis management theory, this present research attempts to move into the 
largely uncharted waters of measuring crisis preparedness in the context of 
the hotel industry. Moreover, the research examines and attempts to establish 
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a relationship between crisis preparedness and stakeholder relationships in a 
crisis period. 
The conventional approaches to assess crisis preparedness in the industry 
are set aside so that a more effective and *reliable measurement tool can be 
applied. This involves the realization and formulation of new ways and 
techniques to attempt crisis preparedness evaluation. As mentioned before, 
organizational culture was operationalized in terms of rationalizations. 
This research also attempts to encompass a broader (more realistic) set of 
stakeholders that affect organizations today. That is, the traditional 
stakeholders (those that represent the impact of impersonal forces external to 
the organization) are complemented by another set of stakeholders not 
normally addressed by the conventional literature. The "new" stakeholders 
represent the bizarre and abnormal characters that affect organizations. In 
principle, all stakeholders (both the external forces and the new set) are 
inseparable. They are in constant contact with one another. The assessment 
of stakeholder relationships in crisis situations also required innovative 
approaches. A different set of stakeholders (archetypal) was developed. 
The second justification of the relevance of this research lies in the attempt to 
expand the knowledge within hotel management theory to include the 
concepts of crisis and crisis management. In terms of research on hotel 
management this research represents an attempt at grafting factors onto a 
mode of thinking about crisis and crisis management in the industry which has 
been perceptualised by tradition and the insularity of the industry. It seems 
that everyone in the industry acknowledges the vulnerability of the industry to 
crisis but very little has been done towards understanding crisis and crisis 
management as a whole. There is negligible evidence on the topic specifically 
relating to the hotel industry. 
The research proposes both an operational definition of crisis management 
and a model for crisis management. 
1.4 - Why Crisis Management and the Hotel Industry 
In general, the case for arguing that the relevance of studying crisis 
management in the hotel industry lies in the economic and social importance 
of the hotel industry. This wider context, however, is not per se the only focus 
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of this research. The case therefore, also rests on the importance of a number 
of additional issues which warrant research into crisis management in the 
hotel industry. This research, then, contributes to some issues. 
First, crisis management is a fairly recent concept for the hotel industry. Some 
authors such as Brewton (1987), Barton (1994), Cassedy (1992), and others, 
have suggested that crisis management in the tourism and hospitality industry 
is still in an embryonic phase. 
Second, there is evidence to suggest that the hotel industry is not only one of 
the most vulnerable industries to crisis but it also provides the environment for 
certain crises to develop and escalate (Brownell, 1990; Barton, 1994; 
Brewton, 1987; Harris, 1994; Lewis, 1994; Sonmez and Backman, 1992; 
Webster, 1990; Bell, 1990). 
Third, researches have shown that in general managers are not prepared to 
deal with the challenges posed by a crisis (Mitroff and Pauchant, 1990; 
Shrivastava, 1992; Milburn gtal, 1983; Pauchant and Mitroff, 1992; Pauchant 
and Douville, 1993; Janis, 1989). A crisis inevitably brings an enormous 
emotional toll that trained people find difficult to tolerate. Management then is 
not prepared technically, emotionally and psychologically to deal with crises. 
Fourth, it seems that current educational, social, and cultural trends and 
values emphasize the "productive" side of organizations. However, previous 
studies argue that the destructive side of organizations can easily outweigh 
their potential productive side (Perrow, 1984; Mitroff and Kilmann, 1984; 
Mitroff and Pearson, 1993a; Shrivastava, 1992; Smith 1990; Weick, 1987, 
1988; Hedberg, 1981; Hambrick and D'Aveni, 1988; Miller, 1990; Shrivastava, 
1988). There is then a lack of balance in approach. 
Finally, as the world today is characterized by the interdependence and 
interconnectedness of systems, it is important to address the potential impact 
of adverse organizational events on business stakeholders. 
The points above, individually or combined, are a fundamental justification for 
the study of crisis management in the hotel industry. It is also important to 
notice that crisis management analysis and research is not purely of academic 
interest. Crises are a real part of life. The number of crises business 
organizations are exposed to is on the increase. Crises are becoming more 
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complex and difficult to anticipate and manage. In addition, current trends in 
designing organizations seems to increase their degree of complexity and 
fragility. Crises today are highly complex issues that require highly complex 
solutions. 
The justification for studying crisis management in the hotel industry in the UK 
lies in different aspects. The first is the representativeness of the industry in 
the UK. Most of the major hotel companies operate in the UK. The UK, 
specially London, is both a major tourism and business destination (therefore 
quite representative of the range of product supply in the hotel industry). 
Second, the hotel industry in the UK is very dynamic and competitive. Third, 
the industry has also, unfortunately, a long history of dealing with terrorism 
threats and other major potential crisis issues. Another reason for studying the 
UK industry lies in the fact that the researcher not only worked in the industry 
before but also had already conducted research on the industry for a Masters 
degree and therefore had some experience and knowledge of the industry. 
1.5 - Research Objectives 
The purpose of this research is to examine and analyze crisis preparedness in 
the hotel industry and to explore stakeholders relationships in crisis periods. 
The broad purpose of this study is to enhance understanding of crisis 
management and stakeholder relationships in the context of the hotel industry. 
This general purpose led to the formulation of specific objectives: 
1- To describe and discuss the fundamental issues surrounding the emerging 
field' of crisis management. 
2- To display and describe the main component of crisis preparedness. That 
is, to describe the main element responsible for organizational crisis 
preparedness as well as to display and explain its variables and their 
attributes which contribute effectively to organizational crisis preparedness. 
3- To examine and describe the organizational culture of hotel organizations 
in relation to crisis and crisis management - Crisis preparedness of hotel 
organizations. 
4- To assess stakeholders relationship in crisis situations. 
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5- To develop a crisis management model that would embrace and reflect all 
major relevant concepts to the topic of crisis management. 
This study can be viewed in two main parts, although they are interrelated. 
The first one is related to the issue of crisis management, and the second part 
is concerned with stakeholders relationship in crisis situations. 
Objectives 1 and 2 are concerned with a description of crisis management as 
a function and with crisis preparedness. Objective 3 represents the 
assessment of crisis preparedness of hotel organizations. These three first 
objectives then constitute the first part of the study. The overall objective of the 
first part of the study is to establish the cultural profile of hotel organizations in 
relation to crisis and crisis management. That is, to identify which 
organizations have a culture favourable to crisis management and which 
organizations do not have a culture favourable to crisis management. 
The analysis of the above points resulted in a crisis preparedness framework 
which provided the basis for the accomplishment of the second part of the 
research (objective 4). Objective 4 is concerned with stakeholders relationship 
in crisis situation. 
1.6 -The Structure of the Research 
Having introduced the research objectives and their rationale, the remainder 
of the study is divided into seven further chapters, which are organized in the 
following manner: 
Chapter two reviews the literature on crisis management. Because crisis 
management is a recent field of research there are many problems associated 
with its evolution. The problem of definition (defining crisis) is a serious and 
complex one in the subject of crisis management and it is argued that it 
hampers development in the field. The concept of crisis is reviewed and a 
description of the use of the concept in many disciplines is done. The 
implications relating to the diverse use of the concept are also emphasized. 
Crisis management is a new field of research which has implications for 
defining itself. Some definitions have been proposed but received little 
empirical support. An operational definition of crisis management is proposed. 
This chapter also discusses the major issues related to crisis management, 
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such as crisis typology and anatomy (the main phases in the evolution of a 
crisis). A crisis has many distinct consequences, to both the crisis sufferer and 
its stakeholders. A discussion on crisis consequences and decision making in 
crisis is also presented. Crisis management inevitably involves crisis decision 
making. However, a crisis is an ill-structured situation and there are many 
implications for the decision making process which are presented and 
discussed. This chapter also highlights the issue of crisis and crisis 
management in the context of the tourism and hotel industry. The purpose of 
this chapter is to illustrate the wider research field of, crisis management and to 
put it in the perspective of the hotel industry. 
Chapter three focuses on crisis preparedness. Essentially it reviews and 
explores organizational culture theory and establishes organizational 
culture's specific relations to crisis and crisis management. As a concept, 
organizational culture is relatively new. There is still much confusion and 
controversy surrounding the concept and its definition. Many definitions of the 
concept have been proposed, each reflecting a particular point of view. In 
organizational culture research the term is used indiscriminately. This chapter 
discusses and displays the main functions of organizational culture and the 
role it plays in crisis management. It is argued that the culture of an 
organization can be either an organization's own worst enemy or an 
organization's saviour, as far as crisis management is concerned. That is, the 
culture of an organization can serve to precipitate a crisis by providing the 
environment within which such an event can escalate rapidly, or, the 
prevailing culture can be central to an organization's ability to cope with 
threatening situations (anticipating and managing crises effectively). 
Organizational culture is also reviewed in terms of organizational adaptability 
to changes. The hotel industry and its main operating characteristics are 
discussed and the implications of the uncertainties surrounding its operations 
(e. g., service encounter and other issues) to change/adaptability in the 
industry are highlighted. The discussion in this chapter also explores the 
relationships between organizational culture, strategic management, and 
crisis management. It is argued that crisis management should be an integral 
part of strategic management. The general thrust of chapter three is to 
illustrate the role and importance of organizational culture in crisis 
management and to support the link and integration of crisis management and 
strategic management. 
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Chapter four deals with the issue of stakeholder theory and stakeholders 
roles in crisis and crisis management. The chapter begins with a review of the 
emerging theory of stakeholders. It is argued that the alternative to 
stakeholder theory (the stockholder theory, serving the shareowners) is 
morally untenable. The discussion centres on the question of to whom and for 
what ends is the modern organization responsible. As an evolving field, there 
are many controversies surrounding the issue. There are many operational 
problems such as lack of operational definition, the identification of 
"legitimate" stakeholders, and implementation of the concept which are 
displayed and discussed. This chapter highlights the implications and 
importance of stakeholder management in crisis management. Stakeholders 
are central to crisis prevention and management. Since crises are a multi- 
stakeholder phenomenon, stakeholders are inevitably directly or indirectly 
implicated by the occurrence of crises. Crises have implications for 
stakeholders. 
The chapter links stakeholder theory to crisis management. It is argued that 
anyone (individual or group) has the potential to affect or be affected by 
organizational action or inaction. Therefore, understanding stakeholder 
systems and dynamics is an essential element in effective crisis management. 
Stakeholders are key players in both preventing and contributing to crisis 
resolution. Chapter four introduces and discusses another set of stakeholders 
not usually covered by the conventional literature. The traditional literature 
refers to stakeholders that represent the impact of impersonal/institutional 
forces external to the organization. The new set of stakeholders represents 
another set of forces that today affect and interact with the modern 
organization. They represent the abnormal and bizarre characters that now 
affect organizations. They emanate from the sociopathic behaviour that has 
been increasingly directed at organizations, such as sabotage, executive 
kidnapping, terrorism attacks, product tampering, highjacks, etc. It is argued 
that the more conventional stakeholder -system is not wrong. Rather, it is 
incomplete. In principle both stakeholders systems are in constant contact with 
one another. They are inseparable. 
Given that the world today is characterized by the interconnectedness and 
interdependence of systems, the issue of stakeholders is central to crisis 
management. Crisis is both an organizational and interorganizational 
phenomenon. In attempting to understand stakeholder's roles in crisis 
management the concept of frame of reference is introduced and discussed. 
31 
G. Santana Ch 1- Irtrodixion 
Frame of reference refers to the analytical tool (method) that is used by people 
and organizations to select and process information. Frame' of reference is 
particularly valuable for understanding how and why organizations react to 
crises the way they do. 
The whole issue of stakeholders and crisis requires an understanding of 
assumptions and how assumptions are formulated and operate. This chapter 
also introduces the concept of assumptions and demonstrates the relevance 
of assumptions to the topic under investigation. Assumptions are at the centre 
of decision making in most circumstances and therefore are important 
variables in effective crisis management. 
Finally, chapter four introduces and discusses the concept of archetypes. Few 
studies link archetypes and organizational theory. Archetypal images emerge 
whenever an individual or group/institution interact with one another. As 
business operates in a system of interdependent and interconnected 
relationships, it can be assumed that archetypal imagery (consciously or 
unconsciously) is a vibrant part of organizational life. It is argued that 
archetypes are useful for understanding organizations and the impact of 
organizations on individuals or groups and vice-versa. Therefore, when 
considering stakeholder relationships in crisis situations, understanding 
archetypes becomes an important issue in crisis management. The issue of 
archetypes is introduced briefly to provide the basis for, and to justify, the use 
of archetypal stakeholders in the methodology of this study. The concept is 
introduced from an instrumental perspective. The main purpose of this chapter 
is to illustrate the importance and complexity of stakeholders relationship in 
the management of business and specifically in crisis management. 
Stakeholder management is an essential and crucial element in effective 
crisis management. 
Chapter five describes the hotel industry in general and specifically in the UK. 
It also discusses the hotel industry in the context of crisis management. The 
chapter starts with a general description of the international hotel industry 
describing its market structure and other issues that are characteristic of the 
industry, such as the problems of definition and classification, the difficulties in 
making comparisons in the industry, etc. The discussion of the industry is then 
narrowed to the European scene and is concentrated in the hotel industry in 
the UK. The chapter describes major trends and developments in the UK hotel 
industry and emphasizes the period of recession and the Gulf War and the 
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implications and impact of those events on the general "health" of the industry. 
Since this study was initiated in 1993 and the main study (data collection) took 
place between 1994 and 1995, the chapter describes and displays the 
industry structure and profile, and highlights the main events relevant to this 
research in that period. 
The main focus of the chapter refers to the hotel industry and crisis 
management. A general review of the social and economic role of the industry 
is provided. The chapter then focuses on the industry and its main operating 
characteristics, operating environment, stakeholders, etc., and the implications 
of the dynamics of the environment for crisis management. A review and 
discussion on management practices in the last ten years is also provided. It is 
argued that there is a great deal of interdependence between the hotel 
industry and its stakeholders. A link between what has been discussed in the 
previous chapter is then established. It has been argued that given the 
increasing rate of change in major environmental factors, hotels should be 
studied as a total organization and a system approach is necessary (Mullins, 
1992). This study also discusses some other forces (not only the impersonal 
external factors) that potentially affect hotel organizations, such as the ones 
described in chapter four. In fact, Freeman (1984, pp. 53) argues that 
"Some groups may have as an objective simply to interfere with the smooth 
operations of our business. For instance, some corporations must count 
'terrorist groups' as stakeholders. As unsavory as it is to admit that such 
'illegitimate' groups have a stake in our business, from the standpoint of 
strategic management, it must be done. " 
The chapter then discuss the vulnerability of the industry to crisis and 
concludes that the hotel industry is among the most vulnerable ones to crisis. 
Previous studies revealed that the tourism industry, in general, is not at all 
prepared to face the challenges posed by a crisis (Cassedy, 1992). A study by 
Lewis (1994) suggests that the hotel and catering industry in the UK leads the 
way in business failure, compared with other sectors. The range of crisis that 
the hotel industry is vulnerable to is very wide indeed. Crisis in the hotel 
industry can take many shapes and forms, from an airplane crashing on a 
hotel to executive crime, from sex harassment to food poisoning, from racism 
to terrorist attacks, and so forth. A discussion on some types of crisis is 
presented and special attention is given to the issues of crime and safety in 
the industry. 
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The chapter is closed with a discussion and link between crisis management, 
the hotel industry, and stakeholder management. The many potential ways 
hotels can affect or be affected by stakeholders are discussed. It is argued that 
the stakeholder concept is a valid one for the industry and should be 
addressed in all aspects of hotel operations. The main purpose of this chapter 
is to illustrate the general importance of hotels in a total system, to highlight 
the vulnerability of the industry to crisis, and to emphasize the importance of 
crisis management for the hotel industry. The chapter attempts to bring 
together the concepts of crisis management and stakeholder management 
and theory into the general context of the hotel industry and hotel 
management, emphasizing the importance of the integration of those issues. 
Chapter six presents the methodology used in this research. It begins with an 
outline of the procedure flow of the research. The chapter then presents and 
discusses the research design. A review and discussion of previous methods 
and models of measuring culture is presented and is followed by the rationale 
for the design of the questionnaires and interview. The objectives of this 
research demand that there are two phases to this study. One is the 
identification and establishment of hotel organization crisis preparedness and 
the other is the examination of stakeholder relationship in crisis situations. The 
chapter then proceeds to describe the pilot studies and results and the 
modifications required and implemented. 
The discussion then shifts to describe the subjects who comprise the sample 
and a discussion on the sample profile is then followed. Given that the study 
has necessarily two phases, the sequencing of the application of the 
instruments for data collection becomes an important point and a discussion 
on the issue is provided. This is followed by the main forms of analysis 
applicable to the data output. Finally, the problems of the methodology are 
discussed. The intention of this chapter is to illustrate the methodology of this 
research in order that the study could be replicated or developed for further 
analysis. 
In chapter seven the data analysis, findings, and discussion are presented. 
The chapter starts with a presentation of the procedure flow of data collection 
instruments and analysis. This is followed by a description of the sample and 
a discussion on the implications for the research and methodology. A detailed 
description of the approach to data analysis is presented followed by the 
results and implications. 
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As this study requires two stages in its analysis, the chapter then proceeds to 
discuss the findings related to the first stage and provides a framework of 
crisis preparedness of the sample under investigation. In creating and 
contrasting the profile of crisis prepared and crisis not prepared organizations, 
the chapter introduces qualitative data into the discussion to support and 
complement the findings. This is followed by a discussion on all aspects of 
crisis preparedness in the hotel industry and its implications. The chapter 
-then, building on the analysis and results of the first stage, is concluded with 
an analysis of the findings and discussion on the results of the stakeholder 
relationship analysis (the second stage). In this chapter conclusions are 
drawn from the findings and the presentation of findings and discussions are 
organized around the main objectives of the research. 
In chapter eight, the conclusions of this research are drawn and discussed. 
The chapter discusses first the main themes of the study in relation to the 
findings. In this chapter a crisis management model is also proposed. The 
chapter then discusses the methodological limitations and other problems and 
finally explores the direction of future research. In relation to this last point the 
chapter emphasizes the need to explore the topics discussed in the research 
from a conceptual, technical/operational, and theoretical perspective. 
35 
G. Santana Ch 2- Crisis Manacaemer t 
"There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in 
its success than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things". 
Niocob Machiavelli 
2.1 - Introduction 
Crisis Management is a recent research area of study. It still in its infancy, 
according to Mitroff (1994), Mitroff and Pearson (1993a), Pauchant and 
Douville (1993), Smith (1990), Pauchant and Mitroff (1988), Smith and Sipika 
(1993), Miller (1988), Fink (1986). 
Crises are an integral part of organizational life. No firm, regardless of its size, 
nature of operations, or type of industry, is immune to crises. Crises can be 
caused by a number of internal and external factors (Kuklan, 1986; Mitroff and 
Pearson, 1993a; Fink, 1986; Smith and Sipika, 1993; Booth, 1993). 
In this chapter the subject of crisis management will be discussed in general 
terms. The objective is to provide an overview of how it has evolved and to 
point out the relevance of crisis management to modern management of 
business. 
Specific areas within crisis management, such as the problem of construct, 
crisis typology, crisis anatomy and planning/preparing for crises, crisis 
consequences, and decision making in crisis situations, are highlighted in 
this chapter. The issue of crisis and organizational culture is dealt with in 
Chapter 3, while the issue of stakeholder and crisis can be found in Chapter 4. 
Traditionally, the literature related to crisis management is mainly based on 
the "heavy/hard" side of the economy (i. e., chemical, oil, manufacturing, etc. ), 
and very little has been done in the "soft" sector of the economy (service). 
Nevertheless, valuable concepts can be applied to any sector of the economy, 
and since the interest here is with organizational systems and not with end 
products or production processes in themselves, those studies are the most 
valuable source of information available. Moreover, many lessons can be 
learned from past success and failure of crisis management. 
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Crisis management is seen here from the perspective of man-induced crisis 
only. Natural disasters will not be discussed since the concern here is with 
management and the implications of crisis management to the management 
of business. 
2.2 - Crisis Management 
Human-induced crises today have the potential to rival natural disasters in 
both scope and magnitude. An increasing number of organizations 
incorporate technologies in which errors can lead to catastrophic 
consequences (Perrow, 1984; Klein e 1995). For example, considering 
only the financial variable, the cost of the Exxon Valdez oil spill crisis in 1991, 
two years after the disaster, was running at more than two billion dollars 
(Small, 1991), and it is estimated that the total costs of the operation have 
more than doubled since, and the crisis is not yet over. The consequences of 
this and other recent major crises were diverse and far-reaching. The 
devastation caused by some recent crises included the loss of hundred of 
human lives as well as immeasurable damage to future generations and to 
the environment. For instance, major crises such as Chernobyl and Exxon 
Valdez, as well as the oil spills and fires during the Gulf War, affected large 
regions of the globe. Previously, such effects could only have been caused by 
natural disasters (Mitroff and Pearson, 1993a). 
From 1900 to 1987, there have been 29 major industrial accidents in the world 
(Richardison, 1993; Smith and Sipika, 1993). Approximately 50 per cent of 
them have occurred since the late 1970s. A close examination of the events 
suggests that the scale of such crises also shows signs of increasing. 
Technological developments are evolving by the minute and multiplying. As 
our technology expands, as our wars multiply, and as we invade more and 
more of nature, we create systems - organizations - that increase the risks for 
operators, passengers, innocent by-standers, and for future generations 
(Chartrand, 1987). 
The 1980s will be marked for ever by the major commercial and industrial 
crises that took place during that decade. Considerable loss of lives were 
witnessed in major industrial and commercial disasters such as the Bhopal 
accident, Chernobyl, Mexico City, Tylenol, Hyatt Regency (Kansas - USA), 
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and the Piper Alpha oil platform. The transport industry also suffered serious 
accidents during the same decade which had the consequence of losing 
public confidence in this sector of the service economy. Most commonly 
exposed were the sinking of the Herald of Free Enterprise, the Challenger 
space shuttle, the King Cross underground station fire, the Exxon Valdez oil 
spill, and the Lockerbie/Pan-Am and Kegworth/M1 aircraft crashes. Lessons 
from the Herald of Free Enterprise disaster were not learned and yet again the 
world witnessed another tragic maritime accident in Scandinavia (the Baltic 
Ferry Estonia, 1994) in which the same faults identified with the sinking of the 
Herald of Free Enterprise were to blame. More than 900 people died on the 
Estonia. 
The tourism industry also was subject to a series of catastrophic incidents 
which raised public consciousness of the risks associated with activities and 
sectors within the industry. A closer look at one "product" of the leisure 
industry alone in the UK, football, can provide a series of accidents in recent 
years - Bradford City ground, the Heysel riot, and the Hillsborough stadium 
disaster where supporters were crushed to death following an overcrowding 
incident - (Smith, 1990; Mitroff and Pearson, 1993a). More recently and in 
another fashion, the cruising business has also been in evidence for its crises. 
Cunard, owners of the QE2 cruise ship, has been defending a US$ 62 million 
(£40m) claim filed in New York by aggrieved passengers who traveled in what 
they allege were "building site" conditions on a Christmas cruise (Financial 
Times, February, 8, pp. 8,1995). The crisis was aggravated by poor public 
relations. The QE2 crisis resulted in an immediate loss of £7.5 million for 
Trafalgar House, owner of Cunard (Hamilton, 1995). Crises come in many 
shapes and forms. In June 1996 the Protestant Church in the United States 
voted to boycott all firms, theme parks, and other Disney products, because 
they (the Church) considered Disney's policies towards homosexuals too 
liberal and that it undermined Christian values. The important point here is 
that the Southern Baptist Church alone has over 60 million members. Other 
well publicized tourism-related crises include the Los Angeles rioting (April, 
1992); numerous hostile takeovers in all sectors of the industry; terrorist 
attacks in tourism-related buildings or activities in Egypt, Sir Lanka, Peru, 
Northern Ireland, and other countries; tourism-related crime (both directed at 
tourists or corporate crime) in many parts of the world; tourist kidnappings; 
sex-related tourism crime in Asia, Latin America, and other areas; the 
explosion of the TWA (New York - Paris flight - July, 1996); among others. 
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2.2.1 - The Hospitality Industry and Crisis Management - An Introduction 
The hospitality industry is one of the most susceptible and vulnerable 
industries to crisis due to its nature and operating environment (Brewton, 
1987; Webster, 1990; Barton, 1994; Bell, 1990). High levels of uncertainty in 
its operations and service encounters characterize the industry. In fact, 
Brownell (1990) suggests that in the hospitality industry, uncertainty is the 
norm. Brownell (1990, pp. 197) goes further to state that "few other 
organizations experience the 'same high degree of continuous uncertainty. " 
Crisis in the hospitality industry can take many shapes and forms - from a 
jumbo jet crashing onto a hotel to a stock market crisis to rape or sexual 
harassment. In a study conducted by Barton (1993), of some 802 business 
disasters from 1980 to 1991, nearly 8 percent occurred in the hospitality 
industry. Among the crises events which captured world media attention were 
the fire of the MGM's Grand Hotel - 85 people were killed (Las Vegas, 1980); 
the Bombing of the Grand Hotel (Brighton, UK, 1984); the collapse of two 
skywalk bridges in the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Kansas City (1981) - 114 
deaths and more than 200 injured; the lethal outbreak of "Legionnaires' 
Disease" at the Philadelphia's Bellevue Stratford Hotel (1976); the murder of 
23 people at Luby's Restaurant in Killeen, Texas (1991); a US$ 1 million 
ransom paid to the kidnappers of a daughter of a Las Vegas hotel-casino 
owner (1993); the terrorist bombing of the New York's World Trade Center 
which made significant structural damage to the New York Vista Hotel (1993); 
and the list goes on and on. 
In the UK, apart from other types of crisis, the hospitality industry also 
experienced a crisis of confidence in the early 1990s after numerous 
corporate hostile takeovers, near collapses, and malpractices. Companies 
that promised much at their launch and gained the confidence of the financial 
markets and independent investors failed to fulfill expectations which had 
serious consequences for both investors and consumers. Among the troubled 
companies were Brent Walker, Kennedy Brookes, Pavilion Leisure, Baron 
Hotels, Penguin Hotels, and Leading Leisure. Other heavily publicized cases 
were the suspension of shares of the Queens Moat Houses and Resort Hotels, 
the takeover of Mecca Leisure by Rank, and more recently, the hostile 
takeover of Forte by Granada. 
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As mentioned above, crises are on the increase and not, unfortunately, on the 
decrease. Despite this evidence, the hospitality industry is far behind, with 
regard to crisis management, in comparison with other industries, such as 
airlines. For detailed discussion on the hospitality industry and crisis 
management please refer to Chapter 5. 
Table 2.1 below illustrates some major industrial crises up to 1984 (with one 
hundred or more fatalities). Table 2.2 shows some generic types of crises that 
took place in the period between 1982 and 1992 (most publicized crises). 
Table 2.3 displays a sample of recent and well publicized tourism and 
hospitality related crises. 
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Table 2.1 - Major Industrial Crisis (100 or more fatalities) 
Place Cause Deaths Other Damages 
1917 Petrograd Factory Explosion 100 
(URSS) 
1921 Oppau Fertilizer factory 561 1,900 casualties, 
(Germany) explosion damage to the town 
(ammonium nitrate) 
1942 Tessenderloo Explosion in a 200 1,000 casualties 
(Belgium) chemicals plant 
(ammonium nitrate) 
1944 Cleveland Explosion of 4,300 m3 136 350 casualties, streets 
(United States) of confined liquefied swept by burning gas, 
natural gas, fire ball windows broken; 79 
houses, 2 factories, and 
79 cars destroyed 
(S6.8 m) 
1947 Texas City Explosion of a ship 532 200 unaccounted for, 
(United States) with a cargo of 300 casualties, serious 
ammonium nitrate damage to city 
(1,750 tn) 
1948 Ludwigshafen Explosion of confined 245 3,800 casualties, damage 
(Germany) dimethyl ether at 8 km distance (French 
francs 80 m) 
1956 Minamata Mercury distarge into 250 Over 100,000 alleged 
(Japan) river and bay mercury-poisoning 
casualties 
1978 Los Alfaques Explosion of liquefied 216 200 casualties (French 
(Spain) propylene in transport francs 144 m 
by lorry compensation) 
1980 Norway offshore-rig collapse 123 
1982 Tacoa Oil explosion and fire 145 Fire in neighborhood, 
(Venezuela) at power station 1,000 casualties 
1984 Cubatäo Petrol explosion 508 Fire in a shanty town 
Sao Paulo following pipeline (3,000 inhabitants) built 
(Brazil) fracture illegally on Petrobras 
lands (Petrobras claimed 
no more than 90 deaths) 
1984 Bhopal Emission of 40 to of 2,500 About 180,000 other 
(India) methyl isocyanate casualties. 300,000 
people left the area 
voluntarily when the 
plant was 
recommissioned 
Source: Paul Shrivastava, Bhopal - Anatomy of a Crisis, 2nd Edition, pp. 9- 11, Paul 
Chapman Publishing Ltd, London, 1992 
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Table 2.2 - Some Most Publicized Crisis Between 1982 - 1992 
1982 Tylenol pills are poisoned, resulting in seven deaths 
1983 Brinks is robbed of 3.5 tons of bullion gold at Heathrow Airport 
1984 Bombing of IBM office in Purchase, New York 
1984 Bank of America unexpectably closes one hundred thirty-two branches 
employing 2,200 people in ninety California communities 
1985 Bank of Boston is accused of money laundering, complicity with organized 
crime 
1985 Belgium's Heizel Stadium soccer riots kill thirty-nine, wound four hundred 
and fifty spectators 
1985 Tampon makers Johson & Johnson, Kimberly-Clark, Procter & Gamble, and 
others face a toxic shock syndrome crisis 
1985 Walkway of Hyatt Regency Hotel In Kansas City collapses 
1985 Strike by Hormel workers; razor blades found in some products 
1985 A. H. Robins files for chapter 11 amidst claims that its Dalkon IUD caused 
miscarriages and deaths 
1986 False rumours that Procter & Gamble's logo reflects 
Satan-worshipping management 
1986 DuPont Hotel fire in Puerto Rico leaves ninety-five dead 
1986 Morton Thiokol struggles to explain company's role in NASA's Challenger 
disaster 
1986 Thousands are estimated to have been killed or injured in explosion at 
Soviet Chernobyl nuclear power plant 
1987 Texaco slapped with a $10.5-billion judgement in court battle with Pennzoil 
1987 10,000 cubic meters of contaminated water enters the Rhine River due to 
accident at Sandoz Chemical plant 
1987 Audi vehicles accelerate without explanation 
1988 Employee of ESL (Sunnyvale, California) kills seven, injuries five in office 
shooting 
1988 Hitachi officials indicted for stealing trade secrets from IBM 
1988 Explosion of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, caused by 
terrorist bomb 
1989 Massive oil spill from the Exxon Valdez along coast of Alaska 
1989 Dean Witter stockbroker charged with bilking investors of $2.6 million 
1990 Arrest of Michael Milken and the bankruptcy of Drexel Burnham Lambert 
1990 Perrier Water's benzene incident leads to product recall 
1991 Japanese stock market scandal creates crisis for hundreds of corporations 
implicated in schemes to cover up trade losses 
1991 Tweenty-four customers of Luby's Cafeteria in Killeen, Texas, are shot to 
death during a lunch-hour massacre 
Source: Barton, L- Crisis in Organizations: Managing and Communicating in the 
Heat of Chaos, South Western Publishing Co., Cincinnati, Ohio, 1993 
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Table 2.3 -A Sample of Recent and Well Publicized Tourism and Hospitality 
Related Crisis 
Recent Tourism and Hospitality Related Crisis 
" Heal h Related 
1996 Meningitis Scare - Spain 
Cancellation of thousands of holiday trips (June) 
1996 BSE (mad cow disease) Scare - Europe (March) 
Severe implications across the industry 
1996 McDonald's sued over the "burger bug" death. 
A bacteria found in a burger killed a6 years old girl and 
made many more severely ill (September) 
" Environment Related 
1996 Oil Spill in Penbroke - Wales (February/March) 
1996 Torrential rain caused sudden flooding in camp site in Biescas, Spanish 
Pyrenees. Over 70 people died (8/8/96) 
1993 Holbeck Hall Hotel -A cliff side hotel fell into the sea (June) 
" Terrori sm Related 
1996 IRA bombing of Hotel in Northern Ireland in the town of Enniskillen 
17 injuried (July) 
1996 Egypt - Terrorist attack on tourist bus 
1996 Spain - ETA Bombing of airports and hotels in the Costa Dourada (July) 
Basque Separatist Group planted 6 bombs in 2 days in hotels in the 
resort town of Salou, causing panic and terror among tourists and 
local residents. The bombing of Reus Airport in the same area 
injured more than 60 people, including 25 British tourists 
1996 Israel - Terrorist attack on tourist bus 
1996 Tourist kidnappings in Peru, Sri Lanka, India, Indonesia 
" Social/Civil Related 
1996 Boycott on all Disney's products by the Protestant Church in the USA 
The Protestant Church considered Disney Corporation's policy 
towards homosexuals "too liberal" (June) 
1996 Sex-tourism in Asia and Latin America 
Pressure by Interest Groups and Civil Liberty Groups. Legislation 
change in some Western countries to prosecute offenders. 
1992 Los Angeles rioting (April) 
" Industry Related 
1996 Hostile Takeover of Forte by Granada 
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2.2.2 - The Inevitability of Crisis and Management Ca ability 
An organizational crisis can occur today with little or no warning, anywhere, 
anytime. A crisis can also happen to any organization, large or small, public 
or private, regardless of its management style (Fink, 1986). Regrettably, the 
prospects for companies having to face some form of major crisis, more than 
one, are greater than ever before. Human error, lack of judgment, lack of 
anticipation, corporate greed, mechanical failure, all combine to guarantee 
that a major crisis will present itself to company executives sooner or later. 
Indeed, Mitroff and Pearson (1993a) suggest that the potential for large scale, 
human-induced crises is virtually built into the fabric of our times. They also 
argue that the potential negative effects of technology exceed the ability of our 
organizations and management structures to control them. Weick (1987, pp. 
112) argues that accidents occur because the humans who operate and 
manage complex systems are themselves not sufficiently complex to sense 
and anticipate the problems generated by those systems. He goes further to 
argue that this is , 
"a problem of 'requisite variety', because the variety that exists in the 
system to be managed exceed the variety in the people who must regulate 
it. When people have less variety than is requisite to cope with the system, 
they miss important information, their diagnoses are incomplete, and their 
remedies are short-sighted and can magnify rather than reduce a problem. " 
Moreover, and as noted by Pauchant and Douville (1993), most of the current 
knowledge in designing innovative and performing organizations tends to 
increase their degree of complexity and fragility. With all the complexities and 
uncertainties, it is apparent that any intervention in a crisis situation has the 
potential for creating other problems. As Weick (1988, pp. 308) has observed 
about crisis situations, 
"Our actions are always a little further than is our understanding of those 
situations, which means we can intensify crises literally before we know 
what we are doing". 
As mentioned before, crisis management is still in its infancy. Not many 
organizations are aware of crisis management as a business function. In fact, 
it represents a "counter-culture". It seems that the world is obsessed with the 
positive side of management, emphasizing the sole importance of production, 
technological progress, breakthrough, etc. To all that, there is, as there is in 
nature, the other side of those forces: the destructive potential of the very 
success they claim. Rosenthal and Pijnenburg (1990, pp. 277 - 278) argue 
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that crises (natural or man-made disasters) do forward the awkward 
dimension of "un-ness": unexpected, unscheduled, unplanned, 
unprecedented and definitely unpleasant. Unfortunately, crisis management is 
still being considered peripheral to the core activities of the day-to-day 
operations of businesses. Research on crisis management has been largely 
overlooked in comparison to other issues that promote "success". Managers 
are educated and trained to think success. That has been the focus of 
Business Schools. The net result of such emphasis is that managers are not 
prepared technically, psychologically, and emotionally to deal with a common 
feature of business operations and management of today: crisis. As suggested 
by Booth (1993), "most executives are not used to tacking the complex set of 
internal and external issues that are thrown up by crisis". Managers are often 
seen as not confident, pessimist, etc., when contemplating a downturn in their 
business. This view is supported by Meyers and Holusha (1988), who argue 
that "most chief executives don't like to think about crisis. They equate crisis 
with bad management; things that just don't happen on their watch". Indeed, 
research conducted by Mitroff, Pearson and Pauchant (1992, pp. 248 - 249) 
revealed that 
"managers and professionals had not the required and necessary 
emotional, ethical and existential strength to address the challenges posed 
by a potential crisis. " 
Having said that, it is evident that not only are crises increasingly more 
frequent and complex, but also our ability to deal with crises (at any level) is 
extremely limited. In a note of caution, when referring to industrial crisis, 
Shrivastava (1988) stated that 
"... industrial crises show us that organizations are not simply systems of 
production. They are also simultaneously, systems of destruction. Thus, it is 
not enough to manage organizations for greater productivity. They must 
simultaneously be designed, structured and managed, to reduce their 
destructive potential". 
The notion that the crisis events such as the ones cited earlier were somehow 
unforeseen is somewhat spurious, as academics have argued for many years 
that all systems have a propensity towards failure (Perrow, 1984; Fink, 1986; 
Weick, 1987). Indeed, there is evidence which indicates that each of the 
dramatic events of crisis that occurred in the 1980s could have been 
prevented if human operators and their managers had been crisis prepared, 
that is, equipped to anticipate, respond to, and learn from their crisis 
experiences (Mitroff and Pearson, 1993a; Smith, 1990). Therefore, 
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organizations should strive to have the frameworks and capabilities to cope 
with high levels of uncertainties and the seemingly increasing magnitude of 
crisis events. In a world of increasing technological complexity and 
interconnectedness brought about by this very technology, management can 
no longer afford to operate 21st century systems of vast complexity with 19th 
century management thinking (Mitroff et a, 1989). 
If management acknowledges that in these complex and unpredictable times 
in which we live and operate, anything is possible, including a major crisis that 
may prove devastating to their business, management will be in the "right 
frame of mind" to accept the contention that forms the basic foundation of crisis 
management: proper advance planning. Only then, there can be a positive 
side to a crisis. It is no longer enough for managers to consider "if" a system 
will fail but rather "when" that failure will occur (Fink, 1986; Smith, 1990). Most 
recently, Mitroff and Pearson (1993b) suggested that the question should be 
"when", "which type", and "how". 
Smith (1990) goes further to suggest that in the UK, where the concept of 
"corporate manslaughter" has been brought about by the courts (following the 
Herald of Free Enterprise sinking), responsible organizations will have to 
ensure that all necessary steps will have to be taken to prevent an accident 
occurring. More recently, legislation in the UK has been changing with 
considerable implications for businesses. Special interest groups have 
increased their power and influence over corporate affairs. Organizations 
have not only to deal with market forces, uncertainty, etc., but also the issue of 
morality and ethics which are getting new dimensions. Companies like Shell 
UK and British Aerospace, for example, spent millions of pounds in dealing 
with the demands and court actions of interest groups (Norman, 1995). Shell 
has adopted a more pro-active approach and now has in its board members 
of interest groups. Policies are now drafted in accordance with what the 
stakeholder advises and inputs. 
On July 1996 members of an interest group were acquitted of causing £1.5 
million of damage after they broke into a hangar at British Aerospace's factory 
near Preston, Lancashire, and attacked a Hawk warplane that they believed 
would be used against the civilians of East Timor (Craig, O. - in The Sunday 
Times, Focus, 4, August, 1996, pp. 15). The jury agreed with the argument that 
morally, their direct action was right. The defendants argued that the costs 
incurred by damage inflicted on the plane were secondary to preventing its 
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sale to the Indonesian government for use in the "genocide" in East Timor. 
They argued that they were preventing a much greater crime. In this sense, 
their actions were not against the law. The important issue here is that this 
verdict would have been unthinkable 10 years ago. 
With regards to the tourism industry, new legislation has been drafted which 
increases the possibilities for clients to sue tour operator and travel agents for 
"unsatisfied" holidays. Legal actions in the travel industry against providers 
went up 16.8% between June 1995 and June 1996 (The Times, 11, June, 
1996). The European Community Package Regulations, introduced in 1995, 
and the UK Package Travel Regulations of 1992 have both set out strict 
guidelines and forced tour operators to be more honest and accountable 
(Gardner, 1996; Richardson, 1993). An indication of this trend is confirmed by 
The Association of British Travel Agents (Abta) which received more than 
17,500 complaints in 1995 alone - up 17% on 1994. 
Having said that, if management accept the premise that all organizations will 
face a crisis at some stage in their life span, the question which needs to be 
addressed is: how to cope with events when they occur and what steps should 
be taken to prevent them from occuring in the first place? Again, only with 
proper advance planning can there be a positive side to a crisis. 
The Chinese have embraced this concept for centuries. The symbol for the 
word "crisis" - called "Wei-Ji" - is actually a combination of two words, "danger" 
and "opportunity" (Fink, 1986). 
2.2.3 - Defining Crisis and Crisis Management ment 
2.2.3.1 - Crisis - Towards a Definition 
Contrary to popular believe, a crisis is not necessarily bad. It is merely characterized by a certain 
degree of risk and uncertainty. 
- Fink 1986. 
Historically, the concept of crisis originated in the medical field. It referred to 
phases of an illness in which the body's self-healing powers became 
inadequate for recovery, even with external help from life-support systems and 
medicines. A medical crisis represents the advanced point of a progressively 
worsening illness, when the illness acquires an objective force against which 
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both patient and doctor are powerless. Such a crisis ends in a structural 
transformation of the body that may include permanent damage or death. 
Resolution of the crisis is a liberating experience that restores the physical 
powers of the patient. Both structural transformation and liberation are integral 
aspects of crisis resolution (Shrivastava, 1992). 
2.2.3.1.1 - Evolution of Concept 
The word "crisis" is derived from the Greek "Krisis", meaning "decision" 
(Pauchant and Douville, 1993). In ancient Greece, crises were "moments of 
truth when the significance of men and events were brought to light". Another 
meaning was the "turning point" of an illness. (as mentioned above) "in which it 
is decided whether or not the (individual) organism' self-healing powers are 
sufficient for recovery" (O'Conner, 1987, pp. 54 - 55). 
In economic theory, the word "crisis" was used in the "objectivist" sense in the 
late seventeenth century to refer to conditions of general market disequilibria. 
By the early nineteenth century, the word was widely employed to contrast 
"pathological" situations with more normal times. O'Conner (1987, pp. 55) 
illustrates further how crises were understood: 
"... While the most perceptive of all the classical political economists, 
Simonde de Sismondi, theorized that crises were inherent features of 
industrial capitalism, economic hard times in ancient society and feudalism, 
as well as in early modern Europe, were universally regarded as 
pathological in that they arose from 'external' causes, especially bad 
harvests and the politics of dearth. Or they were viewed as merchant- 
capitalist and financial 'excesses', 'panics' generated by wars and political 
forces and/or financial speculation external to material production, hence 
not 'normal' or regular events in economic life. Or crises were understood 
(as Hengel did) as what may be called 'sectoral crises' - the decline of 
particular industries or branches of production owing to changes in 
conditions of demand or the emergence of low-cost competition in the 
regions or countries - processes which remains highly relevant to modern 
economic conditions" (O'Conner, 1987, pp. 55). 
Webster's defines a crisis as a "turning point for better or worse", as a "serious 
or decisive state of things", as a "turning point when an affair must soon 
terminate or suffer a material change", as a "decisive moment" or "crucial 
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time". It also defines a crisis as "a situation that has reached a critical phase". 
A crisis is a "decisive or crucial time, stage, or event" (Webster's, 1979). 
Regardless of how a crisis is defined, it brings with it an inherited element. A 
crisis is invariably an unstable time or state of affairs in which a decisive 
change is impending - either one with the distinct possibility of a highly 
undesirable outcome or one with the distinct possibility of a highly desirable 
and extremely positive outcome. 
The fact that crisis management is a very new field of research, has also 
implications for its self-defining. Crisis research to date has relied heavily on a 
single method of study: the case study (Turner, 1976; Nystrom and Starbuck, 
1984). While single case studies do provide substantial depth of analysis, they 
are difficult to compare and there is a clear need to go beyond the case study 
approach (Booth, 1993; Reilly, 1993). This emerging academic specialization 
owns its theoretical roots to works undertaken largely in North America. Crisis 
management is one of the most interdisciplinary fields that exists (Smith, 
1990; Mitroff, 1994; Booth, 1993; Mitroff and Kilmann, 1984; Reilly, 1993; 
Pauchant and Douville, 1993). Mitroff (1988a) argues that "modern crises 
criss-cross not only whole industries, but also every conceivable specialty 
within an organization. Different parts of an organization tend to own different 
crises". That is, while one part will be most susceptible to terrorism, another 
may be vulnerable to product tampering, and another to faulty communication. 
However, any of these can easily spread to another part of the organization. 
The problem of definition is further complicated if one considers the stand 
point from where it is defined. Due to the fact that this field is "essentially 
multidisciplinary in nature" (Smith, 1990; Mittuff etl, 1992, pp. 241), drawing 
on 'research in the fields of economics, sociology, political science, 
demography, philosophy of science, psychology, psychiatry, theology, 
management, ecology, biology, physics, social theory, history, and others, the 
term is often defined quite differently depending on the academic context in 
which it is used. 
2.2.3.1.1.1 - Definition by Academic Context: Ambiguity and Bias 
Every scientific field of knowledge presents its own definition of a crisis. An in- 
depth review of this abundant literature highlights the complexity of crisis as a 
phenomenon and suggests the need for a theory in, crisis management that 
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address this complexity. Some perspectives used by different fields are 
presented here. 
O'Conner (1987, pp. 16 - 17) argues that crisis literature originally converged 
on problems of defining crisis and identifying crisis symptoms. Thus, 
economists defined the economic crisis in terms of inflation, unemployment, 
and stagnation; swollen government deficits, and high interest rates; high 
energy costs and productivy shortfalls; the decline of "smokestack" industries; 
the inability of national governments to control money supplies; international 
monetary disequilibria; explosively high Third World debt; and threats of a 
world credit collapse. Political scientists identified crisis sources in failures of 
political leadership; weakness in crisis management systems; 
"ungovernability" and "excessive democracy"; the inability of political party 
systems to channel and control social conflict; or the failure to develop an 
equitable international political system. Marxist political economic theory 
attributes crises to the contradiction existing between social classes and 
between the values of the exchange and the use of the production 
(Habermas, 1973). Sociologists discovered new and growing social 
inequalities; rifts in "structures of normative action"; challenges to traditional 
authority; "deficits" of motivations and incentives; "insufficiencies of social 
control"; and a revival of atomized individualism. Psychologists became 
increasingly alarmed by the. "crisis of the family", especially the plague of 
divorce, family violence, and child abuse, as well as others signs of social 
decadence such as violent pornography, widespread drug abuse, increased 
crime, and what is regarded as a trend toward mass personality disintegration 
and social and political fanaticism, the lack of spirituality. 
Historians often view crises as the result of a cumulative loss of harmony 
between the elements of a society, such as over-expansion in military power, 
technology, sexual behaviours, and so on (Kennedy, 1988 in Pauchant and 
Mitroff, 1992; Toynbee, 1972 in Pauchant and Mitroff, 1992). In chaos theory a 
crisis is defined as the breakdown of equilibrium, but views the cause of the 
crisis as itself an attempt to achieve a greater order (Gleick, 1987 in Pauchant 
and Mitroff, 1992; Prigogine and Stengers, 1984 in Pauchant and Mitroff, 
1992). 
In the management approach, unfortunately, most writers in management 
science do not embrace this multifaceted view of crises. Mitroff etsal (1992) 
suggest that in the organizational sciences the definition of a crisis most 
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commonly used is the one by Hermann (1972, in Mitroff ep1,1992, pp. 241), 
where crisis is defined as a "threat to a high priority goal, a time restriction and 
a surprise". However, these three concepts have not received empirical 
support in further studies in which researchers stressed that a "crisis" is by 
definition subjective and that' it belongs to the eyes of the human being or 
system experiencing the event. Another example of a limited view of crisis can 
be observed in the definition provided by Mulder fit (1971). Mulder defines 
organizational crisis as a "situation in which goals are at stake that are of high 
importance to the system when the probability that the goals will be achieved 
is small" (Mulder gam, 1971, pp. 21). In this case, only the first concept in 
Hermann's definition is considered. 
Perhaps, the most erroneous misconception in management science is the 
refusal to see a crisis as a positive force, as a factor itself contributing to the 
existence of an enterprise. By stating that a crisis has both a positive and a 
negative side, one is not only saying that a crisis is both a danger and an 
opportunity; one is also saying that the destructive side of a crisis is itself a 
sine qua non condition for the development of an organization (Pauchant and 
Mitroff, 1992). Very few authors in management emphasize this critical 
paradox (Miller, 1990; Schwartz, 1990; Pauchant and Mitroff, 1992). In 
essence, these authors are pointing to the fact that life and death, order and 
chaos, construction and destruction, order and disorder, "business as usual" 
and crisis, should not be seen as opposites but rather as a unified whole. 
Indeed, this misconception is so serious that authors like Pauchant and Mitroff 
(1992) single it out as the most important factor why so many organizations 
are not crisis-prepared. 
2.2.3.1.1.2 - Other Dynamics of Crisis Definitions: Causes, Sources, Nature 
Considering that the concept is used in many different fields, the definition of 
crisis as well as the attribution of crises causes are often highly diversified as 
well as strongly biased by the particular field in which they are studied 
(Pauchant and Douville, 1993). 
The literature is also split on the issue of crisis sources (Mitroff e1,1992). 
Some researchers have labeled crises as "normal accidents", that is, as 
emerging naturally from the complexity and tight-coupling embedded in 
modern technologies (Perrow, 1984); others have emphasized that crises are 
the results of "wrong" decisions made by policy makers (Janis, 1989); others 
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have suggested that the emergence of crises is to be seen in the complex 
interrelations existing between humans and technologies, embedded in the 
"causal texture" of both environments and organizations (Shrivastava, 1992; 
Pauchant and Mitroff, 1992); while others attribute crisis to repeated 
successes and gradual acclimatization (Starbuck and Milliken, 1988). As an 
example, Charles Perrow (1984), looked at the underpinnings which led some 
areas of activity to be more prone to crisis than others. Perrow identified two 
important axes he felt had a significant affect on the source of crisis. The first 
axis was the degree of coupling. Loosely coupled systems could operate even 
if one or two of the links were absent. Tightly coupled systems were those 
where only one small error in one small component could mean a critical 
breakdown to the whole system. The second axis was the degree of 
interactions. Where there are only simple linear interactions mistakes could be 
easily seen and dealt with. Where there were complex interactions it could be 
difficult to find errors and to trace the effect of errors elsewhere in the system. 
Perrow suggested that the combination of tight coupling and complex 
interactions could lead to situations in which small changes in either the 
interactions or coupling could lead to catastrophe. The classic example of this 
was the Challenger disaster. The development of the Challenger shuttle was 
a highly complex and tightly coupled system. 
The problem of definition is further illustrated when a closer examination of 
some different perspectives on the nature of a crisis is done. For instance 
Dyson (in Smith, 1990, pp. 265) argues that "Crisis is clearly a perceptual 
affair. Industrial crisis has different faces in the sense that a particular crisis is 
likely to consist of a set of interlocked crises". Smith (1990) suggests that even 
if the inherent ambiguity that exists within the use of the term is accepted, "it is 
necessary to assess what a crisis entails for those actors involved within it". A 
differentiation between those crises that are deemed to be intentional (war, 
civil disturbances, etc. ) and those which occur "accidentally" within the context 
of a community set was made by Quarantelli (1988). Events which are said to 
be "accidental" would include some of the ones cited earlier which resulted in 
considerable loss of life amongst local residents (for example, Bophal and 
Lockerbie/Pan-Am air crash). In his account of the Bhopal accident, 
Shrivastava (1992) further illustrates the previous definition as he defines 
crisis as "organizationally-based disasters which cause extensive damage 
and social disruption, involving multiple stakeholders, and unfold through 
complex technological, organizational and social process". Shrivastava here 
refers to crises that have the potential to affect a number of groups with which 
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the host organization interacts. This concept brings with it a whole new 
dimension. It has to be emphasized that in modern business operation 
virtually all crises have the potential to affect stakeholders regardless of their 
nature. Indeed, Mitroff and Pearson (1993a) argue that 
"It is no longer enough for any organization to consider merely its own crisis 
management interests in isolation from the environment. Organizations that 
are well prepared (for crises) recognize that a crisis has the potential to 
affect not only themselves and their products, but also the broadest array of 
potential stakeholders: consumers, competitors, suppliers, and members of 
the general environment". 
Stakeholders, as defined by Mitroff and Kilmann (1984, pp. 23) 
"are all those vested interest groups, parties, associations, institutions, and 
individuals who exert a hold and a claim on modern organizations. 
Stakeholders are all those who either affect or who are affected by an 
organization and its policies (i. e., its behavior)". 
The threat of a crisis striking any industry is also greater then ever before due 
to the evolving nature of the market environment. Considering customers as 
stakeholders alone, it has been noted that they are no longer buying products 
on the basis of prices or "value" alone. As buyers becomes more and more 
knowledgeable they now demand products from "responsible" organizations. 
A company has social responsibilities to the community in which it operates 
and to the larger environment. This is now part of the "deal" consumers want 
to take home with them. They buy "responsible products" or "politically correct" 
produced goods. Indeed, evidence shows that 77% of Americans consider a 
company's environmental reputation when buying goods (Small, 1991). 
Marconi (1993) suggests that during the 80s "... the whole point in investing 
was' to make money and that greed 'is good'. Most people have trouble with 
such a blatant regard for a questionable trait. Although in the 1980s such 
position was actually fashionable... "; it is no longer accepted per se. Investors 
do continue to want a good return on their investments, but society is now 
asking for "responsible" means. Lesly (1991) makes this point when arguing 
that the cost of the developments of the 80s will be high for business that does 
not follows the "human climate", as he puts it. This trend is nothing new, as it 
had been already identified over a decade ago by Mitroff and Kilmann (1984), 
when they argued that there is 
"a rising demand for a new kind of institution altogether -a corporation no 
longer responsible simply for making a profit or producing goods but 
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simultaneously contributing to the solution of extremely complex ecological, 
moral, political, racial, sexual, and social problems". 
It is also important to notice that, regarding public perception, there are also 
considerable differences between human-induced crisis and natural 
disasters. The public generally reacts more negatively to the effects of human- 
induced crisis then to natural disasters. While organizations may have little 
control over natural catastrophes, and this is understood by the public, 
human-induced crisis can devastate the long-standing 
, reputation of an 
organization. In principle, this type of crisis is preventable, given the 
appropriate means for designing safer systems and managing them better 
(Hale, 1989). For this reason, human-induced crises receive severe 
condemnation. 
One can then conclude that there is indeed a problem of construct. The 
literature provides no generally accepted definition of crisis and attempts to 
categorize types or forms of crises have been sparse. Although some 
researchers have explored multiple forms of crises (Meyers and Holusha, 
1986; Fink, 1986; Mitroff et at, 1989), others have examined crises as a single 
phenomenon (Nystrom and Starbuck, 1984; Smart and Vertinsky, 1977,1984) 
or have concentrated on only one manifestation of crisis (Billings DLaI, 1980). 
The issue of construct has been further complicated by the use of various 
different terms in the literature as a synonym for crisis, such as disaster 
(Gephart, 1984; Hale, 1989), catastrophe (Mitroff and Kilmann, 1984), jolt 
(Meyer, 1982), problem (Kiesler and Sproull, 1982), turning point (Milburn I 
. j, 1983). 
Finally, a general definition of crisis was developed by Pauchant and Douville 
(1993, pp. 45 - 46): 
"crises are disruptive situations affecting an organization or a given system 
as a whole and challenging previously held basic assumptions; they often 
require urgent and novel -decisions and actions, leading potentially to a 
later restructuring of both the affected system and the basic assumptions 
made by the system's members. " 
More specifically, Reilly (1993) defined crisis in a way that crisis is 
differentiated from its possible analogues, such as threat or decline. Figure 2.1 
below shows Reilly's approach to crisis definition. 
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Figure 2.1 - Reilly's Definition of Crisis 
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Source: Reilly, A. H. - Preparing for the Worst: The Process of Effective Crisis 
Management - Industrial and Environmental Crisis Quarterly, V. 7 (2), pp. 115 -143,1993 
Reilly (1993, pp. 116) defined crisis as 
"a situation which is harmful and disruptive (versus a turning point or an 
opportunity); is of high magnitude (versus a threat or a problem); is sudden, 
acute, and demands a timely response (versus decline); and is outside the 
firm's typical operating frameworks (versus routine, such as fire to 
firefighters)". 
Reilly emphasizes that this definition includes situations which stem from 
within the organization (e. g., criminal top management) as well as 
precipitating events arising from outside the organization (e. g., terrorism). 
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2.2.3.2 - Crisis Management Defined 
The fact that crisis management is a very new field of research, has also 
implications for its self-definition, as discussed in the last section. Moreover, 
crisis management is one of the most interdisciplinary fields that exists. The 
ability to manage a crisis starts with management's ability to "interpret" and 
define a crisis. Misdefinition of crisis is not uncommon in business. Booth 
(1993) outlines that facts or signals that define a crisis may be ignored, 
repressed, or misinterpreted by organizational leadership. Even when there 
are clear indicators there may be serious disputes about the nature of the 
crisis as organizations will try to protect their own interests. With respect to the 
question of definition, it is important to take an interpretative approach which 
utilizes and values the relevant information. Kouzmin and Jarman (1992, in 
Booth, 1993) indicate that for some of the more complex crises a whole series 
of competing definitions of the crisis may be found in each of the different 
public and private agencies. involved. Each may have some evidence to 
support their definition but none is adequate on its own as a complete 
definition (this issue is further discussed in Chapter 4). More importantly, by 
adhering to their own definitions the root causes of the crisis may simply not 
be addressed. As a result, the organizations involved claim to be handling the 
crisis but in reality their activity actually exacerbates the crisis. 
Kerchner and Schuster (1982, pp. 122) citing Kupperman (1975) suggest that 
"Crises are matters of degree, being emotionally linked to such subjective 
terms as 'calamity' and 'emergency' ... Crises are generally distinguished 
from routine situations by a sense of 'urgency' and a concern that problems 
will become 'worse' in the absence of action". 
Action in this sense can then be seen in a broader way, not only reactive. 
Indeed, crisis management starts well before any event boils into a full-blown 
crisis (Fink, 1986; Mitroff and Pearson, 1993a). Indeed, Rosenthal and 
Pijnenburg (1990, pp. 279) argue that crisis management involves efforts: 
" to prevent crises from occurring, 
" to prepare for a better protection against the impact of a crisis agent, 
" to make for an effective response to an actual crisis, 
" to provide plans and resources for recovery and rehabilitation in the 
aftermath of a crisis. 
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It is important to understand that unlike risk, uncertainty can never be 
completely controlled or eliminated. As the external environment (and to a 
certain degree the internal environment) becomes increasingly uncertain, the 
ways organizations minimize the risks of, and capitalize on the opportunities 
presented by that uncertainty becomes correspondingly important. 
Crisis situations are by nature novel, unstructured, and outside the 
organization's typical operating frameworks. Each crisis is different, and thus 
requires a non-programmed decision response. As mentioned previously, 
crises are highly uncertain and complex situations. It is also important to 
remember that because of the constraints of bounded rationalities, those 
executives nominated to cope with organizational crises must learn strategies 
for simplifying these complex judgment tasks. Another characteristic of crisis 
situations is that they are often overload by incomplete, and conflicting 
information. Therefore, given crisis and crisis situation characteristics, effective 
crisis management must rely on at least three processes: problem perception, 
analysis, and decision making (Reilly, 1993). 
Crisis management was defined by Mitroff (1994, pp. 102) as 
"a series of ongoing, interrelated assessments or audits of kinds of crises 
and forces that can pose a major threat to a company's main products, 
services, manufacturing processes, employees, environment, and the 
communities. Crisis management also consists of a series of activities for 
the design, redesign, and implementation of key plans, procedures, and 
mechanisms for crisis detection, prevention, preparation, containment, 
recovery, and learning. " 
For the hotel industry, which will be discussed in a later chapter, the purpose 
of crisis management planning was defined by Brewton (1987, pp. 10) in the 
following terms: 
"The purpose of crisis management planning is to enable management to 
make qualitative decisions under pressure of time, while avoiding or 
minimizing injury to guests and danger to hotel assets". 
This definition is, for the purpose of this study, a very limited/narrow statement 
since it does not take into account the broad array of hotel stakeholders and 
considers only "physical" crisis consequences (i. e., terrorist attack, fire, etc. ). 
Issues such as psychological impact to guests and stakeholder and other 
consequences are very much overlooked. A more appropriate view would 
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address other subtle crises, where all stakeholders are considered and 
accounted for. This issue is discussed further in the following chapters. 
Having said all that, an operational crisis management definition for the 
purpose of this research is proposed: Crisis management is an ongoing 
integrated and comprehensive effort that organizations effectively 
put into place in an attempt to first and foremost understand and 
prevent crisis, and to manage effectively those that occur, taking 
into account in each and every step of their planning and training 
activities, the interests of their stakeholders. Figure 2.2 below 
summarizes the operational definition of crisis management. 
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Figure 2.2 - Crisis Management - An Operational Definition 
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2.2.3.3 - Crisis Management Development and its Implications for this 
Research 
Given that crisis management is an emerging field of research there are 
inevitably clear implications for this study. The main implication is that there is 
not yet a paradigm. Crisis research to date has relied heavily on a single 
method of study, the case study. Clearly, there is the need to go beyond this 
approach, if only for the effect of comparison. 
The issue of crisis definition and bias is a serious one. The literature provides 
no generally accepted definition of crisis. This fact is hampering development 
in the field of crisis management as attested to by many authors. Crisis 
classification, categorization, and typology still need to be developed furtherto 
ensure a more uniform system so that a coherent framework could be derived 
and applied across industries, sectors, and even disciplines. Given that crisis 
management is in essence inter-disciplinary, any search for an understanding 
of the topic inevitably implies in-depth review of many disciplines, subjects, 
and different contexts. Some disciplines have traditionally dealt with the issue 
of crisis, such as the ones in the medical field, environment, biology, 
economics, etc. Unfortunately, the management area is the least developed 
one, as discussed above. Having said that, a working definition of crisis 
management had to be developed, based on research, to serve the purpose 
of this study. 
2.3 -T pologY of Crisis 
The types of crises encompassed by the field of crisis management is very 
large: they range from "traditional" business crises, such as cash-flow 
shortage, market fluctuation, bankruptcy, leadership crises, etc., to less 
"common" or less traditionally addressed crises in standard business training, 
such as terrorist attacks, environmental disasters, psychopathic behaviours, 
malicious rumors or ecological crisis of the planet (Pauchant and Douville, 
1993). 
In today's environment, the total set of potential crises that could affect any 
organization is too large to prepare for, even with the best of budgets. This 
point is illustrated in Table 2.4. It shows a list of some situations that could turn 
into full-blown crises. 
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Table 2.4 - Some Situations that Could Turn into Full-Blown Crises 
Abortion Embezzlement Leverage buyouts 
Accidents Employee injure Liquidations 
Activist action Equipment Lying 
Acts of God malfunction Mergers 
Adverse government Exposure Multiple-use issues 
action Exortion New-product failures 
AIDS Falling reputation New-product 
Aircraft crashes False accusations introduction 
Aircraft safety Falsification No comment 
Airport safety Fire Noise 
Airport security Foreclosure Nuclear emissions 
Ambush interviews Government Political problems 
Analyst presentations intervention Premature disclosure 
Annual meetings Government spending Product recall 
Anonymous accusers cuts Product tampering 
Bad debts Government Proxy contests 
Bankruptcy investigations Public testimony 
Chemical abuse Grand jury Quote in context 
Chemical dependency investigations Quote out of context 
Chemical spills Grass-roots Rationalization 
Civil unrest demonstrations Reclamation 
Competitive Hazardous-material Rumors 
misinformation accidents Sabotage 
Contamination Hostage taking Scandal 
Corporate campaigns Hostile takeover Security leaks 
Corporate control Image distortion Seepage 
Corporate governance Inaccessibility Sexual addiction 
Cost overruns Inconsistency Shifts in value 
Counterespionage Indictment Special-interest groups 
Crashes Insider activities Strikes 
Customer misuse International Takeovers 
Death (customer) accidents Tax shifts 
Death (employee) International Technology transfer 
Death (key executive) competition Television interviews 
Demographic changes International issues Terrorism 
Depositions Irradiation Traffic 
Deregulation Irritated reporters Transplants 
Discrimination judicial conduct Transport accidents 
Disparagement Labour problems Uncontrolled exposure 
Divestiture Landfill siting Unethical behaviour 
Downsizing Lawsuits Vandalism 
Drug and Chemical Layoffs Visual pollution 
abuse Leaks Whistleblowers 
Source: Lukaszewski Group, in Mitroff, Ian, I. and Pearson, C. - Crisis 
Management A Diagnostic Guide for Improving Your Organization's 
Crisis-Preparedness, Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco, 1993, 
pp. 25 
As seen above, an organization is vulnerable to limitless types of crisis. Since 
the number of potential crises seems endless, no organization, regardless of 
its budgets, could plan for all possible contingencies, therefore, the question is 
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for what crises should an organization prepare for. Meyers and Langhoff 
(1987) suggest that a crisis audit that evaluates a company in terms of nine 
crisis types could determine what kinds of crises the organization is likely to 
face. The audit proposed by Meyers and Langhoff would also assess 
management's ability to respond by examining the time available for action, 
the dimension of potential disruption, management's degree of control, and 
available options. The authors argue that there are nine generic types of 
crisis: 
1- Public perception 
2- Product failure 
3- Hostile takeover 
4- Sudden market shift 
5- Adverse international event 
6- Labour relations 
7- Cash 
8- Regulatory 
9- Management succession 
Although most industries are exposed to those "generic" types of crisis, the 
degree to which some industry is more susceptible to one or other type may 
vary drastically. Moreover, while many other types of crisis may fall into those 
generic types, it seems that one type, which also can be considered "generic", 
and that can not be discarded by any organization today, has been left out: 
terrorism. 
Another issue that is normally overlooked and one that is becoming 
increasingly important is white-collar crime. Haas (1994), argues that issues 
like price fixing conspiracy, bribery, fraud, and business collusion occur more 
often than is permissible to gain the level of public trust and support that 
business requires to thrive. What is most puzzling about instances of business 
wrongdoing is that they contradict both the values that are held by most 
individuals and the collective standards established for appropriate business 
behaviour. According to the Institute of Crisis Management (USA), more than 
half of the crisis cases filed in 1993 were crises brought on by the 
questionable judgment of management. Coverage of these types of corporate 
misdeeds (white-collar crime) has risen 55% since 1989 in the USA. This 
problem, however, is not exclusive of that country. The Barings Bank (UK) 
collapse is a well known case. In Germany, a country that prided itself on its 
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honesty and efficiency, executive crime is becoming a common practice. 
While some white-collar crime is relatively petty, large-scale corruption cases 
are also on the increase (Franchetti, 1996). The trend has alarmed the 
German government and experts alike. In a fraud survey compiled by a group 
of auditors, 60% of German managers said they had been victims of economic 
crime by their employees. Police statistics record more than 700,000 cases of 
fraud and embezzlement in 1995, a 40% increase since 1993. 
A recent survey published by Ernst & Young entitled "Fraud - the Unmanaged 
Risk", revealed that nearly 90%, of the 805 top executives interviewed in 11 
countries, believe their organizations are as much or more at risk than five 
years ago. Some 25% had lost more than US$1 million in fraud over the same 
period, and 40% suffered more than five frauds. More than half were 
discovered by chance, and three quarters were committed by employees. The 
survey estimates that fraud is costing business more than US$10 billion (£6.6 
billion) per year worldwide (Kane, 1996). In the UK in 1995, more than two- 
thirds of Britain's leading finance directors said their companies have been 
victims of serious fraud by employees (Burrell all, 1995). 
There are grave consequences for ignoring ethical problems, and there is 
increasing evidence from academic studies (Haas, 1996) that show positive 
correlations between responsible business behaviour and return-on- 
investment, stock price, consumer preference, and employee loyalty. There 
are commercial benefits to be gained from managing a business in a 
responsible, ethical way that best serves an enterprise's long term interests. 
The incidence of violence in the work, place is also another issue that is 
hampering the development of organizations today. It is on the increase in all 
developed and developing countries (Morrissey, 1996; Weide and Abbott, 
1994; Cawood, 1991; Thornburg, 1992). In the United States, according to the 
Department of Labour, more than 1,000 people are murdered each year on 
the job. In addition, two million are attacked, six million threatened and 16 
million harassed. 
In the hospitality industry, the issue of violence in the kitchen of hotels and 
restaurant, specially in five star establishments, has been under scrutiny after 
a television documentary which showed the level of violence top chefs subject 
their apprentices and inferiors to (The Big Story, A Carlton Programme for IN, 
10, October, 1995). Also, although no precise figure is available, it is 
63 
G. Santana Ch. 2- Crisis Managemert 
estimated that the annual cost of fraud to hoteliers in the UK is in millions. 
Fraud in the hospitality industry ranges from the straight "walk-out", where a 
guest simply leaves without paying the bill, credit card fraud, theft by guests, 
theft by staff, etc., to the more sophisticated corporate white-collar crime 
(Harris, 1994). 
The list of types of crisis can be endless, depending on the nature of the 
industry, the nature of the organization's culture, operations, etc. Mitroff 
(1 988a) identified other major types that are listed bellow as an illustration: 
- Major product defects 
- Major plant/equipment defects 
- Major industrial accidents 
- Major computer breakdowns 
- Hostile takeover 
- On-site sabotage/product tampering 
- Off-site sabotage/product tampering 
- Counterfeiting 
- False rumors, malicious slander 
- Bribery 
- Price fixing 
- Sexual harassment 
- Terrorism 
- Executive kidnapping 
- Poor or faulty operator training 
- Copy cat threats 
- Recalls 
- Boycotts 
- Loss of proprietary information 
- Misinformation/miscommunication 
etc. 
Another comprehensive list of crises that an organization may be vulnerable 
to has been elaborated by different authors. For example, Weiner (in 
Reinhardt 1987) compiled a list of more than 50 (fifty) disasters that can strike 
an organization. 
The literature reveals that some attempts have been made to classify crises. 
While Mitroff eLal (1988a) and Shrivastava et al (1988) have focused on 
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problems with psychological roots, Perrow (1984) and Shrivastava (1992) 
have concentrated on the various types of technological crises that result in 
harm to the environment, and Meyers and Holusha (1986), Marcus and 
Goodman (1989), and Siomkos (1992) have looked primarily at financial and 
business crises. These three basic crisis "classifications" have different 
outcomes. A financial crisis can jeopardize the survival of an organization - 
and thus the returns to shareholders and the job security of its managers and 
workers. An extreme example would be the bankruptcy of the organization, 
but others such as hostile takeovers, liquidity crises, and depleted capital 
reserves can also be included. A crisis can also have psychological 
outcomes. This can endanger the mental and physical health of managers 
and employees by creating stress, conflict, extreme apathy, disenchantment, 
alienation, and even depression in the work environment. These kinds of 
outcomes are crises in themselves as they can engender illness and much 
suffering. Moreover, they can also lead to carelessness, even sabotage, which 
can result in accidents in the workplace and inferior products. Finally, the 
environmental crisis is self-explanatory, but it may range from noise pollution 
to the endangerment of future generations. The issue of crisis outcome is 
discussed in a later section (Section 2.5). 
The long list of potential crises (such as in Table 2.4) presents considerable 
difficulty to organizations in formulating strategies and dedicating resources, 
precisely because no one can predict which events or situations will or will not 
escalate into major crises. It is also true that every crisis involves an element 
of uniqueness. However, this does not mean that there are no general or 
generic features of crises or effective procedures for handling them 
whatsoever. 
While Meyers and Langhoff (1987) suggested "generic types of crisis", Mitroff 
(1988a) and Mitroff and Pearson (1993a, 1993b) created a systematic and 
comprehensive framework of crisis "clusters" and types. The main question 
here can be summarized as: which crises should an organization prepare for 
and manage? Mitroff went a step further and put it in another way: "Is there 
any way to select in a rational, systematic, and comprehensive way which 
crises an organization should prepare for, and which it can 'safely' neglect? " 
The answer is that crisis planning can indeed be managed more rationally. 
Mitroff developed two frameworks, one based on the idea of a "crisis portfolio", 
the other on the idea of a "process model of crisis management" which are 
discussed below. 
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Source: Mitroff, Ian, I. and Pearson, C. - Crisis Management: A Diagnostic Guide for Improving 
Your Organization's Crisis-Preparedness, Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco, 1993, pp. 18 
Figure 2.3 shows that crises can be grouped according to their shared 
characteristics. The members of a particular "cluster', according to Mitroff and 
Pearson (1993a), bear more than just a surface similarity to one another (for 
example, take the group "Breaks": all of those crises consist of defects or 
breakdowns in products, plants, equipments, etc. - e. g., operators). 
The dimension measured on the horizontal axis refers to how crises are 
initiated. Types of crisis on the left-hand side have aberrant or deviant causes 
as their sources. They fall outside the range of normal, rational behaviour. 
Pathological explanations of human behaviour, as in the case of a 
psychopathic saboteur are an example. The left quadrant also represents 
severity. The "Mega Damage" type can occur either as a result of intentional 
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environmental abuse or neglect (the cause ), or as the effect of a more 
normal "break". This dual characteristic is indicated by the cause/effect arrow. 
Those on the opposite quadrant (right) are more easily understood and can, 
generally, be handled by existing institutions (for example: the legal system), 
or technical knowledge (for example: plant design). 
The dimension on the vertical axis refers to the differentiation between crises 
that are perceived to be primarily technical/economic in origin or nature 
versus those that are primarily human/social, such as organizational 
miscommunication, employee sabotage, etc. That is, crises located in the 
upper quadrant occur because of breaks in technical procedures or 
information systems. Crises in the lower quadrants refer to breakdowns in 
human behaviour or social systems. 
The "Occupational Heath Diseases" type lies between "technical/economic" 
and "human/social" categories because it reflects both technical and 
human/social error or shortcomings (for example: food industry - diseases 
derived from technical shortcomings - lack of hygiene - as well as human 
errors - such as unwillingness of affected employees to report their 
conditions). 
Finally, the type "Perceptual" refers to those crises in which the initial cause is 
a threat to reputation. Every type of crisis could potentially result in negative 
perception by stakeholder (Mitroff and Pearson, 1993a; Mitroff and Kilmann, 
1984; Small, 1991). Examples of this kind can be when organization 
executives engage in behaviour such as industrial "espionage" - Lopez case, 
Volkswagen/GM, or the so called "Dirty Tricks Campaign", British 
AirwaysNirgin Atlantic (Taylor III, 1993; Parkes, 1993; Gregory, 1994). 
67 
1 
G. Santana Ch 2- Crisis Management 




Internal Plant Design 
Product Packaging 
Inspection 





Reduction of Inventories 
Environmental Impact 
















Source: Mitroff, Ian, I. and Pearson, C. - Crisis Management: A Diagnostic Guide for Improving 
Your Organization's Crisis-Preparedness, Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco, 1993, pp. 
19 
The second framework (Figure 2.4 above) developed by Mitroff is the "Process 
Model of Crisis Management" or preventive actions portfolio. In the same way 
that types of crises can fall into one category, preventive actions tend also to 
cluster into distinct types. Mitroff suggests that organizations can benefit by 
preparing across a "portfolio" of crisis. That is, to spread crisis risk, 
organizations need to minimize their vulnerability by planning across crisis 
types. 
It is important to note that, from preparing for one specific crisis, the learning of 
this preparation is transferable to other crises within the same type. For 
example, common issues must be faced, and decision making and action 
plans are similar within each type. If at least one type of crisis from each of the 
crises category is chosen, - and planned for, it will also provide some 
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preparation for each of the others, since the other members of the group are 
related to one another. Indeed, Mitroff and Pearson (1993a) argue that a 
sensible way of controlling one's risk without having to prepare for every kind 
of crisis is to spread one's crisis preparation evenly across the portfolio of 
potential crises. In another words, while it may be virtually impossible to 
prepare for every conceivable kind of crisis, it is possible to prepare for at least 
one type in each of the various groups; further, if each of the types within a 
cluster are somewhat similar, then preparation for one constitutes some 
preparation for the others (Mitroff, 1994). 
Finally, the issue of crisis types adds another dimension to the importance of 
crisis preparation. The study of major human-caused crises reveals that 
virtually no crisis ever happens in isolation. If handled improperly, every crisis 
can set off a chain reaction of other crises. Therefore, it is crucial to always 
think of crisis preparation across different classes of crises. Mitroff (1994) 
argue that this interconnectedness between potential crises also explains why 
the best organizations think systemically in their crisis preparation. 
The purpose of crisis planning/preparation is not the preparation of a thick set 
of plans that could be never used or applied. Crisis planning is a process of 
continually asking "What If" a set of crises hit the organization simultaneously. 
The purpose of crisis management is to teach an organization to confront, in 
advance, the stress that will arise when a crisis happens (Mitroff and 
Pauchant, 1990; Mitroff, 1988a). Indeed, Mitroff (1994, pp. 105) argues that 
"since no crisis ever happens exactly as it is represented in crisis plans, the 
'true' purpose of crisis planning is to 'think about the unthinkable' prior to its 
occurrence. By 'thinking about the unthinkable', the emotional trauma that 
accompanies all major crises, as well as the resulting inability to act, is 
thereby lessened. " 
Fink (1986, pp. 66) states that 
"the better your crisis management plan, the better your tools. And superior 
tools in the hands of a skilled artificer will go a long way towards ensuring 
opportunity instead of danger". 
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2.4 - Planning for Crisis 
For better understanding of crisis management, it is necessary to explore the 
distinct phases of a crisis. It is appropriate, therefore, to discuss crisis planning 
and preparation in the context of crisis anatomy, that is, in the context of the 
many phases and stages in the evolution of a crisis. 
2.4.1 - Anatomyof a Crisis 
A crisis has some distinct phases that in turn require distinct approaches of 
management. Different authors identified or/and used different denominations 
for distinct phases (see Smith and Sipika, 1993; Mitroff and Pearson, 1993a; 
Brewton, 1987; Meyers and Langhoff, 1987; Nunamaker, Weber, and Minder, 
1989). Regardless of the names given to each phase, it is evident from the 
work of the authors above that a crisis follows a consistent pattern of at least 3 
(three) distinct phases: Pre-crisis period, the crisis itself, and the post-crisis 
period. While some authors identified those 3 main phases, others considered 
more than those 3 phases, or identified "sub" phases within the ones cited 
above. For the sake of illustration, a comparison of different approaches is 
done here. The first phase of a crisis, the pre-crisis, has been called "Crisis of 
Management" (Smith and Sipika, 1993), "Signal Detection" (Mitroff and 
Pearson, 1993a), and "Prodromal Crisis Stage" (Fink, 1986). The crisis itself, 
has been called the "Operational Crisis" (Smith and Sipika, 1993), 
"Containment/Prevention" (Mitroff and Pearson, 1993a), "Acute Crises Stage" 
(Fink, 1986). The post-crisis period has also received different names such as 
"Crisis of Legitimation" (Smith and Sipika, 1993), "Recovery Period" (Mitroff 
and Pearson, 1993a), "Crisis Resolution" (Fink, 1986), and so on. 
Nearly all crises pass through all those phases - from early warning signals to 
prevention, through damage containment and business recovery, to 
organizational learning. Different dangers and opportunities are inherent in 
each phase. However, and as Fink (1986) suggested, a crisis does not 
necessarily follows all the crisis phases. A crisis can occur without warning 
(reason enough to be prepared), or if you are prepared, a crisis can go direct 
from the warning signal phase to the learning phase. The learning phase, 
however, should be a continuum. Organizations can only increase their ability 
to manage crisis if they properly understand and manage each phase of the 
process. 
70 
G. Santana Ch. 2- Crisis Management 
Figure 2.5 - Crisis Management Phases 
Source: Mitroff Ian, I. and Pearson C. - From Crisis-Prone to Crisis Prepared: A Framework for 
Crisis Management, Academy of Management Executive, V. 7 (1), pp. 48 - 59,1993, pp. 53 
Figure 2.5 above, lays out in a systematic fashion the phases that need to be 
managed before, during, and after any major crisis. 
2.4.1.1 - Crisis Warning Signals and Preparation and Prevention Phases 
The first phase is where warning signals can be detected. In many instances, 
this is a real turning point. If the turning point is missed, the next phase (crisis 
itself) can strike with such swiftness that the so called crisis management after 
the fact is, in reality, merely damage control. However, if it is identified, 
corrective action (preparation) can be put into place. 
Usually crises leave a trail of early warning signals (Brewton, 1987; Mitroff 
1988a; Booth, 1993; Mitroff and Pearson, 1993a; Smith and Sipika, 1993, 
Fink, 1986; Nunamaker et al, 1989). Many organizations, however, respond 
differently to warning signals (a detailed discussion on why organizations 
react - if at all - differently can be seen in Chapters 3 and 4). Crises often occur 
because warning signals were not attended to. As the Challenger disaster 
(explosion) illustrates, the immediate "cause" of the disaster was a faulty 0- 
Ring, a poor engineering design that led to a catastrophic technical break. 
However, the real precipitating cause of the accident was a bureaucratic 
organization that deliberately blocked repeated warning signals. These were 
in form of memos, which are reproduced at the back of the Report of the 
President's Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident. The 
signals said in no uncertain terms that unless the O-Ring was corrected, a 
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tragedy was virtually guaranteed (Starbuck and Milliken, 1988; Shrivastava, 
Mitroff, Miller, Miglani, 1988; Regester, 1987; Mitroff, 1988a; Fink, 1986; Smith, 
1990; Small, 1991). 
More recently, February 1995, the collapse of the Barings Bank (the UK's 
oldest merchant bank) illustrates yet again the failure of top management to 
act upon crisis warning signals. The Barings Bank was the most famous 
banking institution in the UK. It took, however, not long for it to fall 
catastrophically when warning signals were consistently ignored, threatening 
the very foundations of the world money markets. Barings Bank top executives 
failed to act upon the content of the notification given by the official body that 
regulates traders and issues licences, The Securities and Futures Authority, 
about Nick Leeson and to follow their advice. Nick Leeson was refused a 
license by the SFA on the ground that he did not behave honestly in the past, 
and therefore was not fit to have a licence. Although Mr. Leeson could not 
trade in the London market, the bank sent him to Singapore. 
Among the many early warning signs that the Barings Group and its top 
executives had prior to the collapse of the institution, it became evident later 
that the authorities in Singapore had also warned Barings about the dangers 
of their proposed business structure in which Leeson would have total control 
over his activities, with little or no supervision over his trading activities 
(Financial Times, Weekend Money, 4 March, 1995, pp. 1,2,3,8,9). As it 
turned out, Mr. Leeson controlled both front and back office. In another words, 
he was responsible for settling his own tradings. Moreover, it was also 
revealed (as early as 25 March 1992, before Leeson arrival in Singapore), 
that Leeson's powerful position was questioned by the local Barings manager. 
In fact, Barings manager warned that 
"... we are in danger of setting up a situation which will subsequently prove 
disastrous and with which we will succeed in losing either a lot of money or 
client goodwill or probably both" (Panorama, BBC Television, 13/3/1995). 
Despite these warnings, the directors in London allowed Leeson to settle his 
own tradings. In August 1994 auditors from Barings London went to 
Singapore and also showed the same concerns in their report, that Leeson 
was the key manager in both front and back office. The report stated that 
"... there is a significant general risk that the controls could be overridden by 
the general manager ... this represents an excessive concentration of 
power. " 
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After the collapse of Barings, the head of the Securities and Futures Authority, 
Christopher Sharples, commented that 
"any firm that is given warnings by their auditors, particularly in an area as 
dangerous as derivatives market can be in the wrong hands, ought to take 
actions immediately, otherwise I would argue they have been extremely 
irresponsible. It would certainly seem that someone, somewhere, has 
certainly failed to carry out even the most elementary types of appropriate 
supervision and ensuring the demarcation between the different jobs that 
people should be doing. The whole question of the difference between the 
back and front office may seem arcane but is terrible important. " 
(Panorama, BBC Television, 13/3/1995). 
The immediate losses to Barings was over £830 million (Jay and Kane, 1996). 
The damage to the City of London has been immense. Barings Bank was sold 
for £1 (also Gapper and Wighton, 1995; Lewis and Burns, 1995). 
Another example of inadequate response to warning signals, lack of actions 
taken, and the consequences, can be seen in the Three Mile Island episode 
(Pennsylvania, USA, March 28,1979) where memos were written warning of 
the danger as early as 13 months before the Three Mile Island accident 
(Matthies, 1985; Fink, 1986). In the case of Three Mile Island, the Report of the 
President's Commission on the Accident of Three Mile Island concluded that 
"a series of events - compounded by equipment failures, inappropriate 
procedures, and human error and ignorance - escalated (the accident) into 
the worst crisis yet experienced by the nation's nuclear power industry" (in 
Fink, 1986). 
As discussed previously, crises are a result of a combination of factors. Mitroff 
(1988a, pp. 17) indeed suggests that "virtually all major crises are caused by a 
mixture of human and technical elements". Smith (1990, pp. 265) in the same 
line argues that 
"the configuration of individual crisis events can be seen as a function of the 
interactions between a number of smaller events which conspire to 
generate the main crisis event. " 
Crises occur because of the simultaneous breakdown of technical, 
organizational, and human systems. It makes no sense to analyze, for 
instance, the systems comprising an organizational's core technology in 
isolation from the human and organizational systems that implement the core 
technology. Technological systems neither exist nor operate in a vacuum 
(Mitroff and Pearson, 1993b) 
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In any case, and as Brewton (1987, pp. 10) stated, "the best time to manage a 
crisis is before it occurs". Fink (1986, pp. 7) goes further to suggest that "... you 
and your managers should understand that anytime you're not in a crisis, you 
are instead in a pre-crisis, or prodromal mode". That is, if you are not now in a 
crisis situation you are instead in a pre-crisis situation and should make 
immediate preparation for the crisis that looms on the horizon (also Fink in 
Kuklan, 1986). 
The reasons why it is so important to identify the warning signals is that it is so 
much easier to manage a crisis in the first stages (Signal Detection, 
Preparation/Prevention - these two phases should take place simultaneously). 
If early warning signals are identified and acted upon, many crises can be 
prevented before they occur - the best and most effective kind of crisis 
management. Even though it is possible to manage a crisis after it has 
erupted, it is much safer and more reliable to address the problem before it 
escalates, before it develops and causes possible complications. It is also 
important to recognize that if warning signals are detected and management 
is unable to dispose of it for whatever reason, just knowing or having a sense 
(idea) of what is about to happen will help to prepare for the next stage. 
Therefore, the aim in this stage is not the prevention of all crises; they cannot 
all be prevented (Hambrick and D'Aveni, 1988; Booth, 1993; Shrivastava, 
1992; Brewton, 1987; Mitroff, 1988a; Mitroff and Kilmann, 1984; Smith, 1990). 
The aim is to do as much as possible to prevent crises from occurring in the 
first place and to effectively -manage those which still happen despite best 
efforts. In other words, the degree to which management heeds the warning 
signals and prepares the organization will determine how well it responds to 
the coming crisis. 
Having said all that, this stage is where one of the most important functions of 
effective crisis management takes place: crisis avoidance. Only in this stage 
can a crisis be averted, and it is only here that management is in a truly 
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In these stages of crisis management, specially in the Prevention/Preparation 
stage, crises teams as well as training and simulations are created and put 
into place. 
2.4.1.2 - Crisis Containment/Damage Limitation Phase 
Regardless of how well the signal detection and preparation programmes are, 
some crises will inevitably occur. Mitroff (1994) argues that crises are 
inevitable, amongst other reasons, because of the complexity of systems and 
the impossibility of perfect control. In many ways, this point is one of no return. 
Once the warnings have ended and the transition from one crisis stage to 
another is consummated, it is virtually impossible to recover the ground 
already lost. At this point, some damage has already . been done; 
how much 
additional damage occurs depends on management. The intention of this 
phase is to limit the effects. 
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As already mentioned, there is no way that all crises can be averted. 
Limitation mechanisms prevent the damage from engulfing other parts of the 
organization or its environment. That is, effective management of this phase 
will keep the crisis localized. 
Most of the public, when speaking of a crisis, will have in mind this phase. For 
instance, if the Three Mile Island crisis is considered, most people would say 
that the "crisis" began on March 28,1979, and ended a week later. That is 
incorrect. Fink (1986) argues that the Three Mile Island crisis began at least 
13 months before March 28,1979 (the warning, or prodrome - memos - as 
cited before) and, he argues that the crisis is still continuing. Fink strongly 
argues that although the Three Miles Island accident was not the biggest one 
in human history, people, and for that effect the media, still have it (the crisis) 
as a reference. So, whenever another crisis of its kind happens the media will 
refer back to that accident, keeping alive the crisis. In Fink's words, 
"... the invidious comparisons - perhaps due to our insatiable appetite for 
superlatives - may continue long after the recovery phase, depending of 
course on the crisis. And it is typically the news media that perpetuate the 
crisis in the public's mind. The news story comparison is the part of the story 
that says, for instance, 'The worst nuclear accident since the Three Mile 
Island'... ". 
However, the damage limitation phase of the Three Mile Island did begin on 
March 28,1979, and did end about a week later. 
Damage containment mechanisms and activities are virtually impossible to 
invent during the heat of crisis (Barton, 1993; Shrivastava, 1992; Starbuckel 
. al, 
1978; Siomkos; 1992, Smith and Sipika, 1993). Therefore, planning is 
paramount. While the warning signal phase alerts that a crisis is impending, 
the Containment phase shows that a crisis has erupted. With proper advance 
planning damages can be mitigated. With proper advance planning it is 
possible to choose when and where management want the crisis to erupt, 
giving management not only valuable time to prepare, but also more ability to 
control the flow, and speed, the direction, and the duration of the crisis. Going 
back to the definitions of crisis management: "... it is the art of removing much 
of the risk and uncertainty so that one will have more control over its own 
destiny" (Fink, 1986, pp. 15). The purpose of crisis management is "to 
confront, in advance, the stress that will arise when a crisis happens. Crisis 
planning teaches an organization to roll with the punches" (Mitroff, 1988a, pp. 
17). 
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One of the major difficulties. in. managing a crisis during this phase - even if it 
had been planned for - is the avalanche-like speed and intensity that often 
accompany and characterize this stage. The speed is dependent primarily on 
the type of crisis, while the intensity is usually determined by the severity or 
value of the possible outcome(s) (Fink, 1986). 
To illustrate further the need to be vigilant and prepared for when the 
unexpected happens, Exxon's management of the Exxon Valdez oil spill is an 
example of what not to do in crisis management. The tanker Exxon Valdez 
struck Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound off the Alaska coast on March 24, 
1989. It was found that lack of appropriate oil skimming procedures and 
equipment and time wasted in trying to convey information through ineffective 
communication channels significantly diminished Exxon's management 
capabilities (see, for example, the work of Williams and Olaniran, 1994; Small, 
1991). The handling of the crisis by Exxon received severe condemnation 
from all quarters. The following is a passage of an article in the New York 
Times (in Small, 1991): "The Exxon Valdez episode will become a textbook 
example of what not to do when an unexpected crisis thrusts a company into 
the limelight". The article was referring to the overall handling of the crisis itself 
and to the Exxon's disastrous public relations campaign. 
The point here is that, by contrast, organizations that are better prepared for 
crisis devote time and resources to assure that damage containment 
mechanisms and procedures are in place and effective. 
This phase is characterized by disruption and confusion. Usually a single 
dramatic event signals the onset of the crisis and draws increased attention to 
the problem, but it is too late to do much about it. As Meyers and Langhoff 
(1987, pp. 21) put it, "... at this stage, the old rules of business and behavior no 
long apply. The degree of damage depends on management's preparation to 
the crisis". 
Finally, Fink (1986) observes that this phase is the shortest of all. However, 
because of its intensity, it often feels as though it is the longest phase. 
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2.4.1.3 - Crisis Recovery Phase 
It is during this phase that the organization seeks to repair the damage to its 
"image" (and very likely its financial well-being) caused by the crisis. This is 
sometimes called the clean-up phase, or post-morten. As Fink (1986, pp. 23) 
suggests, "... it is during this phase that the carcass gets picked clean. 
Assuming, of course, that a carcass remains to be picked". This is when the 
organization picks up the pieces and attempts to return to business as usual. 
But, "business as usual" is not always possible, depending on the nature of 
the crisis and also on the effectiveness of the planning and handling of the 
crisis. Nevertheless, the main purpose of the Recovery Stage is to recover 
normal business operations as soon as possible so that key customers will not 
be lost (Mitroff, 1994). 
In many instances the organization is also occupied in fending off the 
onslaught of the media who are hungry for news and, perhaps more 
importantly, evidence of crisis causality (depending, of course, on the nature 
of the crisis). If there is to be a government investigation, or an audit, or a 
newspaper expose, or a long period of interviews and explanations, this is 
when all of it takes place. 
It is also in this phase that all the blame and search for scapegoats happens, 
often in an attempt to legitimize organizational procedures and management 
style. Smith (1990) calls this phase "Crisis of Legitimation" as, he argues, an 
organization seeks to restore external confidence in both its managerial 
structure and operating systems. 
Depending on the nature of the crisis, it can also be a time for upheaval, 
management shake-ups, hostile takeover attempts, or bankruptcy. 
Just for the sake of illustration, a survey of the "Fortune" 500 Chief Executives 
revealed that those companies without a crisis management plan suffered 
lingering effects in this phase, as much as two and a half times longer than 
those companies that were prepared with a crisis management plan. It is then 
possible to shorten this phase with effective crisis management planning 
(Fink, 1986). 
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It is important to notice that crises historically evolve in a cyclical fashion, and 
a crisis sufferer almost never has the luxury of dealing exclusively with one 
crisis at a time. 
2.4.1.4 - The Learning Phase 
As a species, humans have survived because of their skill in acquiring and 
using information to adapt to and exploit their environment (Nunamaker etal, 
1989). In an increasingly knowledge-driven, complex, turbulent world (Mitroff 
and Kilmann, 1984; Fink, 1986; Smith, 1990), the ability to learn becomes 
even more crucial to survival. Researchers in cognitive psychology have 
studied the individual knowledge-acquisition process and have identified 
powerful learning-to-learn strategies that individuals can acquire and then use 
to design, implement, motivate, and monitor their knowledge-acquisition and 
decision making activities (Holsti, 1978; Janis, 1989; Garvin, 1993). 
Organizations wanting to improve the effectiveness with which they function in 
a crisis must understand and be able to use their learning capability. 
Organizations must learn how to learn, teach individuals and groups how to 
learn and share their knowledge, and discover ways to use their expertise in 
acquiring expertise to make and implement creative decisions (Nunamaker M 
al, 1989). Peter Senge (1990, pp. 1) described learning organizations as 
"where people continually expand their capacity to create the results they 
truly desire, where new and expansive patterns of thinking are nurtured, 
where collective aspiration is set free, and where people are continually 
learning how to learn together. " 
Although organizational theorists have studied organizational learning for a 
longtime, there is still considerable disagreement in defining it (Garvin, 1993). 
However, most scholars view organizational learning as a process that 
unfolds over time and link it with knowledge acquisition and improved 
performance. For example, Argyris (1977) defines organizational learning as 
"a process of detecting and correcting error. " For Fiol and Lyles (1985), 
"Organizational learning means the process of improving actions through 
better knowledge and understanding"; while Levitt and March (1988) argue 
that "Organizations are seen as learning by encoding inferences from history 
into routines that guide behavior". 
Although the definitions above agree on the issue of knowledge acquisition 
and improved performance, a more complete definition was provided by 
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Garvin (1993, pp. 80): "A learning organization is an organization skilled at 
creating, acquiring, and transferring knowledge, and at modifying its 
behaviour to reflect new knowledge and insights. " What differentiates this 
definition from all others, as argued by Garvin, is that it begins with a "simple 
truth": new ideas are essential if learning is to take place. Garvin (1993) 
argues that learning organizations are skilled in five main activities: systematic 
problem solving; experimentation with new approaches, learning from their 
own experience and past history; learning from the experiences and best 
practices of others; and transferring knowledge quickly and efficiently 
throughout the organization. He goes further to suggest that by creating 
systems and processes that support these activities and integrating them into 
the fabric of daily operations, companies can manage their learning more 
effectively. 
Learning is one of the fundamental issues in crisis management. Learning 
does not have to be from your own mistakes, or "fate", as noted previously. 
Being crisis "prepared" means that one learns from other organizations' 
crises, other industries' crises, and so on. Learning from others' mistakes is an 
effective principle in crisis management (Gonzalez-Herrero and Pratt, 1995). 
As put by Nadler (1989), 
"At the core of effective organizational learning is a mind-set that enables 
learning-efficient companies to recognize the value of productive failure as 
contrasted with unproductive success. " 
One cannot disassociate the fact that organizational capacity to learn is 
inherently linked with people's capacity to act in the organization. Research by 
Argyris and Schön (1978), Hedberg (1981), Hedberg et at (1976), Schein 
(1983), Schein (1990a), Shrivastava and Mitroff (1983), Starbuck (1983), 
Starbuck aLa! (1978), Makridakis (1991), Garvin (1993), Gonzalez-Herrero 
and Pratt (1995), Rosenthal and Pijnenburg (1990), Nunamaker e (1989), 
Jarman and Kouzmin (1990), Starbuck, Greve, and Hedberg (1978), Booth 
(1993), and others, are part of an ever growing body of knowledge that 
addresses the issue of organizational learning (and its importance and 
implications for crisis management) and that support this view. 
The literature on crisis management reveals different views with regard to 
when the Learning phase should take place. While Fink (1986) thinks that the 
Recovery phase should also be the time for the "Learning stage", it appears 
that Mitroff and Pearson (1993a) and Mitroff (1988a) prefer to have a learning 
stage separately. These two views are both justifiable. Fink argues that since 
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this phase can linger indefinitely these two phases (recovery/learning) must 
be considered together, one as part of the other. Mitroff (1988a, pp. 19) 
considers that the last phase is "continued learning and reassessment to 
improve what has been done in the past". 
However, it has to be stressed, learning is a continuous process. Therefore, 
while the recovery takes place, it is also the time to assess what happened; a 
period of self-analysis. It is also a time for further crisis management planning 
- analyzing what went right and/or what went wrong and taking appropriate 
actions. 
Ideally, the primary goal of the Learning stage should be to review and 
critique, without assigning blame, so as to learn what was done well and what 
was done poorly so that the organization can handle crises better in the future. 
2.4.1.5 - Summary 
Planning for crisis is the only way management can hope to be successful 
when a crisis occur. The issue of luck is totally irrelevant where crisis 
management is concerned. A crisis follows a pattern of development, and by 
exploring and understanding this pattern, management can become aware of 
the potential effect of each phase on their business and on their operating 
environment and therefore can design the prevention and preparation 
mechanisms needed for the inevitable. 
Finally, and as discussed above, organizations, and for that matter 
management,. can only increase their ability to manage crisis if it properly 
understand and manage each individual phase of the process. Unfortunately, 
in many instances management still takes only a reactive position, viewing 
crisis management activities mostly as a means for coming back as soon as 
possible to "business as usual". By focusing on the need to restore the status 
quo before the emergence of a crisis, the opportunity to address the structural 
and systemic needed changes that a crisis can make visible is missed (Mitroff 
et. l1,1992). This "defensive crisis management" style, as termed by Mitroff gt 
JJ (1992, pp. 252), often advocates a number of quick-fix and manipulative 
financial, legal, political or public relations strategies, avoiding the double- 
loop learning potential offered by crises and crisis management activities. By 
contrast, "creative crisis management" involves the triple activities of 
"proactive crisis management", that is, attempting to diminish the likelihood or 
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the impact of crises before they happen; "reactive crisis management", that is, 
addressing crises when they have happened; and "interactive crisis 
management", that is allowing the double-loop learning potential imbedded in 
both the experience of crises and crisis management activities to emerge. 
Figure 2.7 below shows the types of crisis management and their phases. 
Figure 2.7 - Crisis Management Types and Crisis Phases 
The Three Essential Types of Crisis Management and 
The Five Phases of Crisis Management 




Signal Preparation/ Damage Recovery 
Detection Prevention Limitation 
H 
Learning 
Interactive Crisis Management 
Source: - Pauchant, T.; Mitroff, I. - Transforming the Crisis-Prone Organization: Preventing 
Individual, Organizational, and Environmental Tragedies, Jossey-Bass Publishers, San 
Francisco, 1992 
2.5 - Crisis Consequences and Crisis Decision Making 
2.5.1 - Crisis Consequences 
Since crises are inevitable it is important to analyze some of the most common 
effects or outcomes crisis can bring once they happen. Early research into the 
effects crises had on managers by Holsti (1978) already pointed to two 
important stress-induced influences. The first identified by Holsti was the 
"reduction in span of attention". As a crisis develops, management usually has 
to work at a faster pace in the face of sudden changes. This increases the 
volume of information in the communication systems and leads to information 
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overload. Accordingly, this leads to managers filtering information by 
unsophisticated means, leading to the loss or overlooking of vital information 
(more detailed aspects of information process and decision making in crisis 
situations are discussed in the next section - Crisis Decision Making). It also 
leads to them ignoring information that does not support their existing belief 
system. Managers revert to "seat of the pants" decision making basing 
decisions not on rationality but on intuition and past experience. They lose the 
strategic dimension and increasingly becomes obsessed with the detail of day 
to day decisions made on a one-off basis. The second identified by Holsti was 
the "increase in managerial inflexibility". Increasing stress tends to make 
individuals extremely inflexible. Their ability to cope is reduced. This leads to 
a reduction in an individual's tolerance for ambiguity and the development of 
one dominant view of the world which is maintained despite information which 
throws it in doubt. Linked to this is a tendency towards more autocratic 
behaviour. 
Experiencing a major crisis - even merely thinking about it - unleashes 
powerful feelings of anxiety. This anxiety is not rational in the traditional sense 
of the term, but it is very real. Pauchant and Mitroff (1992) argue that 
executives and professionals when faced with deep existential questions that 
arise during a crisis or its aftermath, resort to various defensive strategies. For 
instance, some explain the crisis away, pointing to factors that make it 
"different", so that it no longer challenges their overall perspective. Others 
blame other people, shifting the fault of a crisis to someone else. Some feel 
the urge to act quickly or to make hard and fast decisions, to keep themselves 
from reflecting on the crisis's deeper meaning. Still others develop chronic 
anxieties that paralyze their abilities to act. And others seem to shut down 
completely. Further discussion on defensive mechanisms can be found in 
Chapters 6 and 7. 
Unfortunately, the defensive- mechanisms mentioned above tend only to 
aggravate the problem, leading to further crises, setting off the need for more 
powerful defensive mechanisms, triggering even more crises, and so on 
(Booth, 1993; Janis, 1989; Stubbart, 1987; Smart and Vertinsky, 1977; Dutton 
et p1,1983; Dutton and Duncan, 1987; Mulder et al, 1971; Dutton, 1986; Janis 
and Mann, 1977; Staw, Sandelands and Dutton, 1981). As mentioned earlier 
in this chapter, managers today are mainly trained to deal with "success" (or at 
least to generate it). Very few managers are equipped psychologically, 
emotionally, and technically to handle the stress that accompanies a crisis. 
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Our inability to handle the severe emotions unleashed by a crisis comes not 
only from our limited abilities to think and process information, nor is it strictly 
due to a quality called "bounded rationality" (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; 
March and Simon, 1958, in Pauchant and Mitroff, 1992, pp. 4), the basic 
human limitation to apprehend cognitively the many facets of an issue. It has 
also to do with deep defects in the "feeling" capacity of individuals managing 
organizations. Pauchant and Mitroff (1992, pp. 5) call this quality "bounded 
emotionality". 
Crises are ill-structured situations, that by nature pose difficulty in predicting 
their outcomes. At most one can speculate about different scenarios. 
Moreover, the outcome of a crisis is always very difficult to guess since a crisis 
never happens as it has been planned for. 
As already mentioned, Mitroff et al (1992, pp. 241) argue that a crisis is by 
definition subjective and that it belongs to the eyes of the human being or 
system experiencing the event. They go further to suggest that the experience 
of crises or their potential act as "'frame-breakers' for individuals and groups, 
not only in the cognitive domain but in the emotional or existential domains as 
well. In this sense, crises are also 'emotionally exhausting'. Thus, crises are 
not only potentially disturbing the 'technical core' of an organization ... they 
also disturb the 'existential core' of individuals as well as the perceived 
'existential core' of organizations" (Mitroff et p1,1992, pp. 248). Indeed, one of 
the worst consequences of any crisis is the emotional toll that is exacted, not 
only on the organization, but also on the individuals involved. For example, a 
number of the executives associated with the Johnson&Johnson Tylenol crisis 
had and continue to experience nightmares on the anniversary of the attacks. 
As part of our complex makeup, our emotional psyches are left with scars by 
the emotional trauma that accompanies any major crisis. Another example of 
the emotional stress that a crisis can bring can be seen on the aftermath of the 
NASA's Challenger disaster. NASA had to set up an emergency medical 
hotline when the seven astronauts were killed in the tragic explosion of the 
Space Shuttle Challenger. Upon returning home, a number of employees 
who were associated with the mission were confronted by their families, 
especially their children, with seemingly innocent questions as to whether 
they were responsible for the deaths of the astronauts. Even under the best of 
circumstances, untrained human beings cannot cope with such questions. As 
a result, a number of NASA's employees experienced severe emotional 
distress (Mitroff and Pauchant, 1990). Pauchant and Mitroff (1992) argue that 
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in this sense crises disturb people's subjective world: the way they perceive 
the world and themselves; their inner sense of self-worth, power, and identity; 
their inner cohesion. 
The consequences of a crisis can indeed be very traumatic. The Hyatt skywalk 
disaster (1981), a technical failure, still has enormous repercussions, not 
technical, but both psychological and emotional. Wilkinson's (1983) research 
on psychiatric symptoms reported by 102 persons who had experienced the 
collapse of two skywalks in the lobby of the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Kansas 
City, revealed that all subjects had psychiatric symptoms; only slight 
differences were found among those who were victims, observers, or 
rescuers. Here it also shows that victims of a disaster are not only those 
directly involved. 
It is not difficult to understand how a major crisis drains the physical and 
human resources of an organization: resources that normally go into the 
production of products and services have to be diverted to handle the crisis. 
This leads to conflicts between forces whose resources are being limited by 
budget tightening and other efficiencies and those dedicated to identifying 
resource requirements, determining the best allocation of resources, and 
giving greater amounts to groups involved in crisis issues (Nunamaker et al. 
1989). However, a major crisis also exacts a severe emotional toll, and this 
can be more difficult to grasp. As mentioned above in some examples of past 
crisis experiences, those people who are involved or affected either directly or 
indirectly suffer from what is known as post-traumatic stress. They relive the 
crisis over and over again in memories, dreams, and nightmares. They exhibit 
general nervousness, anxieties, loss of sleep, decreased sexual energy and 
interest, and in many cases noticeable depression. This is one poignant 
manifestation of the second condition for the development of a crisis - the 
disturbance of the basic assumptions of the members of a system 
(Shrivastava, 1992; Staw gel, 1981; Wilkinson, 1983; Mitroff and Pauchant, 
1990). 
The literature reveals that some attempts have been made to classify crises, 
as discussed earlier in this chapter. While Mitroff et al (1988a) and 
Shrivastava at-al (1988) have focused on problems with psychological roots, 
Perrow (1984) and Shrivastava (1992) have concentrated on the various 
types of technological crises that result in harm to the environment, and 
Meyers and Holusha (1986), Marcus and Goodman (1989), and Siomkos 
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(1992) have looked primarily at financial and business crises. These three 
basic crisis "classifications" have different outcomes. A financial crisis can 
jeopardize the survival of an organization - and thus the returns to 
shareholders and the job security of its managers and workers. An extreme 
example would be the bankruptcy of the organization, but others such as 
hostile takeovers, liquidity crises, and depleted capital reserves can also be 
included. As crises can also have psychological outcomes, this can endanger 
the mental and physical health of managers and employees by creating 
stress, conflict, extreme apathy, disenchantment, alienation, and even 
depression in the work environment. These kinds of outcomes are crises in 
themselves as they can engender illness and much suffering. Moreover, they 
can also lead to carelessness, even sabotage, which can result in accidents at 
the workplace and inferior products. Finally, the environmental crisis is self- 
explanatory, but it may range from noise pollution to the endangerment of 
future generations. 
Different crises bring different outcomes. The term "different" in this case 
should be better understood: even a crisis that is under the same 
"classification" (say, a financial crisis) can, and usually does, have different 
outcomes. One reason for that can be attributed to the fact that degrees of 
severity may vary, as well as time (duration of the crisis), thus having different 
consequences on the crisis sufferer. Another reason is that crises never 
happen as they are planned for, therefore even if preparations are in place the 
outcome can be quite different from the expected. It is important to recognize 
that each crisis has a degree of uniqueness. 
It is also important to emphasize again that crises historically evolve in cyclical 
fashion, and a crisis sufferer almost never has the luxury of dealing 
exclusively with one crises at a time. 
One of the most difficult aspects of a crisis is understanding its existential 
dimensions. A crisis can threaten the legitimacy of an entire industry. 
Examples of that can be seen in the cases of Barings Bank collapse, 
Chernobyl, Bhopal, Herald of Free Enterprise, - banking/financial markets, 
nuclear energy, chemical, and transport (maritime), respectively. All those four 
crises brought about new regulations in their industry that changed the way 
business operates in many parts (if not all) of the globe. It is also known that 
the public's perception of an industry seriously affects how they relate to that 
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industry in the future. A crisis more than often destabilizes or "destructures" 
this perception (Pauchant and Mitroff, 1992; Fink, 1986). 
A major crisis can also reverse the strategic mission of an organization. 
Pauchant and Mitroff (1992, pp. 15) illustrate this point giving the example of 
the Tylenol crisis. They argue that in that case the product (Tylenol) was 
originally designed to "do good" (alleviate pain), but when cyanide was 
placed in Tylenol capsules it completely reversed the properties of the drug, 
converting it from an agent of good into an agent for accomplishing evil. They 
go further to suggest that in this case "the basic strategic purpose of both the 
organization and the product-was flipped on its head". Another example was 
the Perrier crisis of 1990. A beverage strongly linked with "nature's purity and 
goodness" (via Perrier's advertising strategy) was suddenly associated with 
poisoning. 
2.5.2 - Crisis Decision Making 
It is impossible to think about crisis management and not include decision 
making. Decision making is an integral part of crisis management process. 
One problem with decision making is that its often viewed as an ad hoc event 
rather than an ongoing process. Decision making is "about shaping the 
future". It is important to distinguish between decision per se and the decision 
making process. The decision making process concerns events leading up to 
the point of choice and beyond, whereas a decision means 'to cut', that is, to 
resolve to take a specific course of action (Drummond, 1992, pp. 5). 
Crisis decision making refers to the strategic selection of policy decisions 
made by the organization to alleviate the problem and restore public 
confidence (Williams and Olaniran, 1994). Crisis decisions differ from routine 
decisions in their uncertainty, their complexity, their potential to invoke 
conflicting interest and the likelihood of decision maker ego involvement 
(Stubbart, 1987; Dutton, 1986). When faced with a corporate crisis, crisis 
management personnel will also have to face finding their decision making 
abilities challenged by the need to react quickly, the scrutiny of the press and 
public interest groups, and the threat of negative consequences resulting from 
poor decision making. This pressure can erode the abilities of one who is a 
competent decision maker under normal conditions. 
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Although decision making is a well developed field and well documented, 
specially in strategic management (Schwenk, 1989; Child, 1972; Dutton et p1, 
1983; Dutton and Duncan,. 1987; Lyles and Mitroff, 1980; Fahey and 
Narayanan, 1989; Janis, 1989; Hedberg and Jönsson, 1977; Ford, 1985), 
research is much less specific in explaining the complexities of crisis decision 
making (Williams and Olaniran, 1994). 
Crises are characterized by low probability/high consequence events that 
threaten the most fundamental goals of an organization (Weick, 1988). The 
first feature of a crisis is the evidence of either an external or internal threat, 
loss, or challenge. These constitute the weak or strong signals or indicators of 
potential crisis. As mentioned before, a crisis seldom occurs without warning 
signals. The ability to manage a crisis depends a great deal on the ability to 
identify and interpret the warning signals. A logical development would be to 
take action upon the information obtained at this stage. This inevitably 
involves decision making. Any crisis management process involves a great 
deal of decision making. 
Booth (1993) argues that if warning signals are not attended, by the time the 
triggering event is fully recognized there is already a lack of time to consider 
all the alternatives in a rational manner. In this sense, decision makers would 
not be able to make optimal decisions based on perfect rationality and 
information but sub-optimal ones based on limited knowledge and uncertain 
information are possible. As uncertainty increases and time and options 
become more limited, decision makers increasingly rely on personal 
information rather than information which is provided. Moreover, as numerous 
authors have attested, organizations and the decision makers within them 
frequently exhibit rigid and maladaptive decision making (Smart and 
Vertinsky, 1977; Janis and Mann, 1977; Staw, Sandelands and Dutton, 1981). 
This pathological behaviour is due, in part, to the bounding qualities of 
information, beliefs and values which restrict the potential actions considered 
by decision makers. 
2.5.2.1 - Crisis Decision Making and Information 
The quality of decision depends greatly upon the quality of information 
available to the decision process (Smart and Vertinsky, 1977; Dutton et al" 
1983; Dutton and Duncan, 1987; Janis, 1989; Mulder et al, 1971; Dutton, 
1986; Janis and Mann, 1977; Staw, Sandelands and Dutton, 1981; Booth, 
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1993). However, a typical feature of crisis is information overload (Janis, 1989; 
Stubbart, 1987; Dutton, 1986; Williams and Olaniran, 1994; Nunamaker et at, 
1989). The quality of information input into the decision process depends on 
the ability of the system to effectively absolve information flow, thus preventing 
overloads. Information overload results in dysfunctional selective attention, 
retention of information, and delays and subversion of communication flows 
(Smart and Vertinsky, 1977). Indeed, earlier research by Mulder mal, (1971) 
revealed that in a crisis situation there is often a time pressure and because of 
that, the basis of information for far-reaching decisions is, in principle, 
insufficient. They go further to argue that in crisis situations, it is less feasible 
for the leadership to create elaborate information and persuasion-processes; 
also it is far less possible to refer to other subsystems of the total system (such 
as regulations for programme activities, other persons or departments). 
Information overload and the need to act quickly cause decision makers to 
use fewer communication channels for the collection and dissemination of 
information (Nunamaker et at, 1989). Limiting the search for information can 
be disastrous. Divergent searching increases the variety and quantity of 
alternative solutions, and is essential in poorly structured circumstances in 
which fluency and flexibility of thought are vital. 
Even on those occasions when the search for information is increased, 
decision makers rarely learn something new because of their reliance on 
standard operating procedures, previous ways of understanding, and 
communication that is relatively low in complexity (Smart and Vertinsky, 1977; 
Booth, 1993; Janis, 1989). At the same time, the information content of the 
messages received is frequently distorted, with intermediate message- 
handling units omitting, delaying, filtering, and sometimes processing 
incorrect information (Nunamaker et at, 1989). As a result, the decision group 
not only has fewer creative solutions available to it, but it is also more likely to 
fashion flawed solutions from the information they have. 
Having said that, even if the complex issues of information discussed above 
are resolved, the ability of management to act (decision making) upon them is 
questionable. Stubbart (1987, pp. 90) suggested that 
"thinking about a crisis rapidly becomes enormously complex. Variables, 
explanations, consequences, causes, relationships, alternatives, 
participants, goals, and potentials form a dense mass". 
As also discussed previously, decision makers in a crisis experience a high 
level of emotional and physical stress. During a crisis stress is of such 
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magnitude that it promotes dysfunctional behaviour (Smart and Vertinsky, 
1977). Holsti (1971, in Smart and Vertinsky, 1977) suggested that an 
increasingly severe crisis tends to make creative policy both more important 
and less likely. One reason for this is that under the stress of a crisis decision 
makers perceive fewer environmental cues (Nunamaker et at, 1989). When a 
crisis deepens, decision makers become more concerned with immediate 
tactical problems than with long term issues. They lose the strategic 
dimension and increasingly become obsessed with the detail of day to day 
decisions (Holsti, 1978). Fewer options are considered (Staw et at, 1981; 
Dutton, 1986; Stubbart, 1987). Decision makers find it harder to reason 
abstractly (Nunamakeretal, 1989). Decision makers may also be less able to 
predict the consequences of various alternative courses of action (Janis, 
1989; Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth, 1979). All this contributes to a restricted 
and distorted understanding of the decision situation. As a result, unaided 
crisis decision makers tend to make and implement inferior decisions. 
Another problem identified by (Stubbart, 1987) is that managers command 
limited mental capacity for noticing and attending to information available to 
them. A crisis decision maker can only attend to a slight fraction of the tidal 
wave of potential information that a crisis unleashes. 
2.5.2.2 - Crisis Decision Making and Formalization 
In the wake of a crisis, the power to act and the ability to act quickly are critical 
requirements for diverting, minimizing or resolving a crisis. Dutton (1986, pp. 
507 - 508) suggested that in this process organizations undergo a type of 
"mechanistic shift" where a restriction in the participation in decision making, 
an increase in formalization and a greater standardization of procedures 
occur. This reduction in participation is the result of both top level decision 
makers taking control, and lower level members in an organization voluntarily 
giving up their autonomy (Dutton, 1986; Staw et al, 1981). On the one hand, 
top decision makers want to enhance their ability to act quickly and decisively 
in the wake of a crisis. On the other hand, lower level members want to 
disassociate themselves with any responsibility or blame in case resolution 
attempts fails (also Nunamaker eLa1,1989). Thus the simultaneous taking of 
control at the top and giving up of control at the bottom of the organization 
produces centralization of decision-making during crises. 
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Research by Booth (1993, pp. 156) revealed that during a crisis decision 
making is indeed concentrated to a "central core". Booth identified that the 
reason behind the increased centralization of decision making during a crisis 
was the need to "drop the inessential and concentrate the efforts of senior 
management on organizational survival". Mulder et p1, (1971) argued that in 
crisis situations the responsibilities for decisions cannot be shared equally; 
therefore, some kind of powerful leadership is functionally required, and will 
occur more often, or will be more often considered necessary by group 
members, than in non-crisis situations. Presumably, this shifting of decision 
making responsibility to higher levels is because the decisions of top 
managers are less likely to- diverge from the organization's basic goals 
(Nunamaker et al, 1989). Booth (1993) goes further to suggest that during a 
crisis decision makers will be supported in their perceptions (of the crisis 
issues) by the dominant organizational culture. Those, Booth argues, who still 
take a different view tend to be ignored or even dropped from the decision 
making group. Conformity or dynamic conservatism increases in proportion to 
the threat. 
Centralization, however, can lead to certain decision pathologies. The 
principal decision group tends to be cohesive, homogeneous, insulated from 
divergent perceptions, and dominated by a single individual (Stubbart, 1987; 
Smart and Vertinsky, 1977; Dutton et al, 1983; Dutton and Duncan, 1987; 
Janis, 1989; Mulder at, 1971; Dutton, 1986; Janis and Mann, 1977; Staw, 
Sandelands and Dutton, 1981; Booth, 1993; Nunamaker etw, 1989). This, in 
addition to such pressures as the need to appear in control and the need to 
take effective action, can lead to a group-think condition in which decision 
makers lose their vigilance, become overoptimistic, and make defective rather 
than creative decisions (Janis, 1989; Nunamaker et al, 1989; Stubbart, 1987; 
Smart and Vertinsky, 1977; Booth, 1993). 
Preparation, yet again, seems to be the best option. When an event is 
unexpected or novel, making an intelligent decision - let alone implementing it 
- can be an almost impossible task. If this were not enough, lack of decision 
readiness induces stress. The less familiar the crisis and the less ready 
decision makers are to contend with it, the greater the stress that they 
experience (Meyers and Holusha, 1986; Booth, 1993; Mitroff, 1994; Mitroff and 
Pearson, 1993a, 1993b; Mitroff gel, 1989; Pauchant and Mitroff, 1988,1992; 
Gonzalez-Herrero and Pratt, 1995; Fink, 1986), and the more likely they are to 
fall back on well-learned, routine responses (as discussed above). With luck, 
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their behaviour may fit the situation. More often, though, it does not. The 
unexpected occurrence of familiar situations may lead to stress, but it is less 
intense and less lasting than the stress induced by individuals' lack of 
decision readiness in novel situations (Stawet al, 1981; Smart and Vertinsky, 
1977; Janis, 1989; Pauchant and Mitroff, 1992; Nunamaker gam, 1989). Thus, 
decision makers who have not anticipated a threat or practiced their response 
are likely to make and implement ineffective and inopportune decisions. 
2.5.3 - Potential Crisis Consequences: Affected Players. Effects. and 
Remedies 
Having said all that, crisis consequences affect both the organization and the 
individuals within it. Figure 2.8 below summarizes the most common and 
important effects of crisis at an organizational level. Figures 2.9 and 2.10 
summarize the effects a crisis can have on the individual at both the 
practical/decisional level and at the psychological and emotional level. As 
discussed previously, a crisis also can have strong impact on an industry or 
sector, threatening its legitimacy, and Figure 2.11 summarizes the most 
common effects. Figures, 2.8,2.9,2.10, and 2.11 also carry a summary of the 
most common and practical remedies for each potential situation. Figures 2.8 
and 2.9 are based on the work of Nunamaker gtl (1989). Figures 2.10 and 
2.11 are developed and inspired on Figures 2.8 and 2.9 of Nunamaker et at 
(1989). 
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Figure 2.8 - Summary of Crisis Consequences at an Organizational Level 
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Figure 2.9 - Summary of Crisis Consequences on an Individual at a 
Practical/Decisional Level. 
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Figure 2.10 - Summary of Crisis Consequences on an Individual at a 
Psychological and Emotional Level 
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2.6 - Crisis, Tourism, and The Hospitality Industry: The Ambiguity 
Factor 
As discussed in previous sections, it is not common to think about tourism and 
disaster/crisis in the same light. Enjoyment, pleasure, relaxation, and safety 
are embodied in the concept of tourism, whereas crisis/disasters bring 
distress, fear, anxiety, trauma, and panic. Unfortunately, the issues of crisis 
and disasters are real ones and have to be acknowledged by all involved in 
any tourism activity (promoters or consumers). Regardless of the 
unpleasantness of the topic, it has to be acknowledged that crises (brought 
about by nature or man-made) have been and continue to be a part of life and 
affect directly or indirectly all concerned (communities, visitors, regulators, 
promoters, and so fourth). Since this research is dealing with man-made 
crises only, it is important to remember that a man-made crisis receives more 
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severe condemnation than crisis brought about by natural disasters. In 
principle, as discussed earlier, human-induced crises are preventable. 
Where tourist destinations and/or communities have considerable economic 
dependence on tourism related activities, their vulnerability to crisis 
occurrence is significantly increased, given that they need to maintain a 
positive image of attractiveness and safety for continued success. 
The tourism industry, and for that matter the hospitality sector, is not different 
from other industries. As mentioned previously, the hotel industry is very 
susceptible and vulnerable to crisis. In fact, the operational nature of hotels 
and their operating environment makes them more exposed to a wider range 
of crisis than other industries. Given this scenario, responsible management 
have to be aware of their increasing vulnerability to crisis and make the 
necessary efforts to create mechanisms that first and foremost prevent crisis, 
and for those that do occur to have in place capabilities to address the 
different stages of a crisis. The issue of crisis and crisis management and the 
hotel industry is furthered discussed in Chapter 5. 
2.7 - Summary 
This chapter explored and elaborated on the issue of man-made crisis. 
Organizational crisis is on the increase. As technology expands, as the drive 
to improve the ways business operates and functions increases, managers 
also increase the fragility and complexity of organizational systems. In this 
way, business not only becomes an increasingly complex system of 
production but also its destructive potential takes new dimensions. Thus, 
contemporary organizational systems become systems that increase the risks 
for its operators, passengers, by-standers, and future generations. Many 
authors have identified the issue of human limitation to deal with complex 
situations under the stress of a crisis and pressure of time. Indeed, and as 
pointed out by Mitroff et al (1992), managers and professionals lack the 
required and necessary emotional, ethical and existential strength to address 
the challenges posed by a potential crisis. Indeed, management is not 
prepared technically, emotionally, and psychologically to deal with crisis. 
Crisis management is a new field of research and this fact has implications for 
defining itself. One of the problem of definition is that crisis is defined 
differently, depending on the stand point from where it is defined. As 
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extensively discussed earlier in this chapter, due to the fact that this field is 
"essentially multidisciplinary in nature", drawing on research in the fields of 
economics, sociology, political science, demography, philosophy of science, 
psychology, psychiatry, theology, management, ecology, biology, physics, 
social theory, history, and others, the term is often defined quite differently 
depending on the academic context in which it is used. Moreover, considering 
that the concept is used in many different fields, not only the definition of crises 
but also the attributions of their causes are often highly diversified as well as 
strongly biased by the particular field in which they are studied (Pauchant and 
Douville, 1993). The problem is further complicated when attempts to identify 
the source or nature of a crisis are made. 
There is indeed a problem of construct. The literature provides no generally 
accepted definition of crisis and attempts to categorize types or forms of crises 
have been sparse. Crisis research to date has also relied heavily on a single 
method of study, the case study. While the case study method provides 
substantial depth of analysis, case studies are difficult to compare and there is 
a clear need to go beyond the case study approach. The problem of definition 
has been identified by many scholars as an element that is hampering the 
development of crisis management theory. Given the complexity and difficulty 
involved in the issue, this chapter provides and proposes an operational 
definition for crisis management. 
No industry is immune to crisis. Crises are inevitable. Having said that, it 
seems that the only way to fulfill the strategic objectives of an organization is 
to be prepared for the unexpected. There is strong evidence to suggest that 
most, if not all major crises witnessed in the recent past, if they could not have 
been avoided entirely, they could at least have been better managed, 
minimizing the impact on the business itself, communities, stakeholders, and 
in some cases, future generations. Unfortunately, the number of and potential 
for organizational crises is on the increase. A crisis comes in many shapes 
and types. The range of crises is also on the increase. In fact, the list of 
potential crises a company is susceptible to is endless. Preparation, 
prevention, mechanisms to deal with crisis that could not be avoided, prior 
planning for recovery, and a system that continually learns how to learn is the 
only way one can ensure to take advantage of a potentially disastrous 
situation. A crisis offers, if preparation is in place, more opportunities than 
threats. 
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Most crises evolve in a common pattern of phases. For better understanding of 
crisis behaviour and management of crisis, understanding of crisis 
evolution/development is essential. In general, a crisis never happens without 
first sending warning signals, indicating its potential, timing, severity, etc. This 
warning signals phase is so important because it is much easier to manage a 
crisis at this stage. By identifying the warning signals a crisis can also be 
avoided. However, for those crises that do occur, despite best efforts, 
management already know what is about to happen and can put the 
preparation and more preventive mechanisms into place. The next phase is 
the containment/damage limitation phase. Limitation mechanisms are 
important because they prevent the damage from engulfing other parts of the 
organization or its environment. In this sense, this phase keeps a crisis 
localized. Damage limitation mechanisms are impossible to be invented 
during the heat of a crisis, prior preparation is the only way to secure a 
successful management of a crisis. Indeed, and as discussed previously, with 
proper advance planning it is possible to choose when and where 
management want the crisis to erupt, giving management not only valuable 
time to prepare, but also more ability to control the flow, and speed, the 
direction, and the duration of the crisis. 
With those measures in place, the recovery period can be less traumatic and 
can minimize the uncertainty that characterizes this phase. Public confidence 
can be restored at the same time that the vulnerability of the organization can 
be diminished, avoiding internal problems, such as upheavals and further 
management shake-ups, as well as external threats, such as hostile takeover 
attempts. 
One of the key elements of survival is learning. Without the ability to learn 
nothing can evolve. Organizational processes are no different. Organizations 
have to learn how to learn, and this process should be a continuous one. The 
ability to learn from others as well as from one's own development and 
experience is a fundamental and effective principle in crisis management. The 
organizational capacity to learn is inherently linked with peoples capacity to 
act in the organization, thus making learning an essential element in crisis 
management. 
The consequences of a crisis can be dramatic and lasting. It can disturb not 
only the technical dimension of a system but also the emotional and 
psychological dimensions as well. People who are exposed to the experience 
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of crises can acquire lasting and disturbing effects. Preparation and training, 
yet again, is the only way that these effects can be minimized. Crises also 
have the potential to drain the resources (both physical and human) of an 
organization, having an enormous impact on those directly and indirectly 
involved or dependent on it. Different crisis have different outcomes. One 
reason for that is that a crisis never happens as it has been planned for, 
therefore even if preparation is in place the outcome can be very different. 
This is mainly due to the fact that each crisis carries a degree of uniqueness. 
Thus, crisis training and preparation is essential, since preparation alone 
cannot cover all the surprises presented by a major crisis. Moreover, a crisis 
sufferer seldom has the luxury of dealing with one crisis at a time, they evolve 
in a cyclical fashion. 
Decision making is an integral part of crisis management. However, the effects 
of crises on both organizations and on the individuals within the organizations 
disrupt their functions, making quality decision making a very difficult task. 
Crisis are ill-structured situations. They bring much stress and disruptions to 
"normal" procedures. The ability of organizational decision makers is then 
challenged by the need to react quickly, the scrutiny of regulators, the press, 
and the public opinion and interest groups, and the threat of negative 
consequences resulting from poor decision making, among others. The 
quality of decisions depends on the quality of information that is filtered into 
the decision process. However, a typical characteristic of crisis is information 
overload. Information overload results in dysfunctional selective attention, 
retention of information, and delays and subversion of communication flow. All 
this contributes to a restricted and distorted understanding of decision 
situations. As a result, unaided crisis decision makers tend to make and 
implement inferior decisions. As mentioned before, under the pressure and 
stress of a crisis, decision makers frequently exhibit rigid and maladaptive 
decision making. 
Having said all that, planning in advance is the only way responsible 
organizational leaders will have an "upper hand" on the challenge posed by a 
potential crisis. By crisis planning and crisis training in advance, the negative 
effects of a crisis on the organization, on the people inside the organization, 
and on the stakeholders, can be immensely reduced, and the opportunities 
that a crisis provides can, at the same time, be enjoyed and utilized by all 
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ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
THE CRISIS FROM WITHIN 
The fundamental difference between a crisis prone organization and a crisis prepared one lies 
in the concept of responsibility, in the existential sense of the term. Individuals who manage 
crisis prepared organizations are more able to confront the anxieties triggered by crises and to 
act decisively. Being less bounded emotionally, they are more able to be ethically, emotionally, 
and cognitively 'responsible' toward themselves, their employees, their business partners, and 
their surrounding environment" 
Pauchant and Mltroff (1992) 
By failing to prepare, you are preparing to fail" 
Mark Twain 
3.1 - Introduction 
Organizational culture as a concept has a fairly recent history (Schein, 1990a; 
Ott, 1989; Klein et al, 1995; Pheysey, 1993; Sparrowe, 1995; Cooke and 
Rousseau, 1988). There is still some controversy about its definition. However, 
there is broad agreement in relation to its origins, and to some extent its main 
functions. Edgar Schein provided the three-levels model of organizational 
culture in the early 1980s. Schein's typology is now widely used and accepted 
and is discussed in this chapter. 
Also in this chapter the origins of culture are explored, accounting for the 
origin forces that shape organizational culture. Schein's three-level culture 
model is also used to illustrated and distinguish between the more superficial 
manifestation of culture and the deeper, taken-for-granted, forces that govern 
people and organizational behaviour, attitudes, and policies. The issue of 
culture change is also discussed and special attention is given to the 
implications of changing processes. 
Evidence has shown that organizational structure and culture play an 
important part both in creating/causing their own crises and in crisis 
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management (Klein et al, 1995; Shrivastava, 1988; Schein, 1990a; 
Shrivastava et al, 1988; Smith, 1990; Janis, 1989; Mitroff et al, 1989; Perrow, 
1984; Smith and Sipika, 1993; Pauchant and Mitroff, 1988; Miller, 1988; Mitroff 
and Pearson, 1993a; Nunamaker et al. 1989). This chapter also establishes 
the relationship between organizational culture and crisis management. One 
of the purposes of this part of the study is to explore those organizational 
characteristics that most affect management in their effort to manage crisis 
effectively. It is argued that organizational culture is the most decisive element 
in determining an organization's crisis preparedness. 
In Chapter 2, the external forces that may act upon an organization and 
develop to a crisis situation have been analyzed. The crisis from within, if one 
may put it in this way, is discussed in this chapter. 
The hospitality industry has been found to possess some distinct 
characteristics that influence and impair strategic change implementation in 
hospitality organizations, making managing change effectively more 
challenging for those in the industry. 
Finally, an analysis of the links between crisis management and strategic 
management is made. There is evidence to support this view in the work of 
many leading scholars, and it is suggested that crisis should be managed 
more strategically. It is observed that there is a growing demand to integrate 
crisis management and strategic management. 
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3.2 - Organizational Culture: Origins and Development 
3.2.1 - Organizational Culture Origins 
There are basically three generic sources or determinants of organizational 
culture: 
" The Broader Culture - The broader culture refers to the broader societal 
culture in which the organization operates or resides. 
" Nature of Business and/or Environment - This refers to the nature of an 
organization's business or the environment in which it operates. 
" Basic Assumptions, Values, and Beliefs - The beliefs, values, and basic 
assumptions held by the founder(s) or other early dominant leader(s). 
3.2.1.1 - The Broader Culture 
The broader societal culture exerts such a strong influence on organizational 
culture that it can be easy to overlook its importance (Pheysey, 1993). The 
beliefs, values, and expectations held by an organization's important internal 
and external constituencies are formed in the broader culture (Ott, 1989). 
Changes in societal norms, beliefs, values, and lifestyle patterns - such as 
sexual equality - inevitably find their way into organizations. 
In general, the most general cultural beliefs, values, and assumptions are very 
stable. Those fundamental cultural expectations are neither discussed nor 
debated but are taken for granted by all those that interact with an 
organization in a cultural context (potential employees, current employees, 
their families, managers, customers, bankers, government agencies, directors, 
investors, business school professors, and textbooks). For example, Japanese 
companies are expected to be paternalistic and compassionate sources of 
lifelong employment. In turn, employees are expected to be loyal, 
noncompetitive internally, and relatively unquestioningly responsive to their 
employer's decisions (Ouchi, 1981; Pascale and Athos, 1981, in Ott, 1989). 
Having said that, even though the general societal culture has a strong 
influence in shaping organizational culture, and-the cultures are inter-twined, 
the general culture is only one of the three major influencing forces and far 
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from being the sole determinant of organizational culture (Schein, 1990a; 
Pheysey, 1993; Ott, 1989). 
3.2.1.2 - Nature of Business and/or Environment 
The second grouping of important determinants of organizational culture are 
the types of business in which organizations engage themselves and their 
general business environment (Ott, 1989; Pheysey, 1993; Schein, 1990a). As 
with the general societal culture, the external environment by itself cannot 
shape organizational culture. Rather, and as argued by Schein (1990a), it is 
the experiences organization members have had in developing solutions for 
coping with the environment (and problems of internal integration) that shape 
organizational culture. 
Although the area culture has a substantial impact on the culture of an 
organization, it has been argued that organizations in a given sector (say, 
hospitality) have more cultural traits in common among themselves than with 
other organizations that operate in other sectors. For example, Chatman and 
Jehn (1994) found that fewer variations in organizational culture occur among 
firms working on the same tasks, using similar procedures, and experiencing 
similar opportunities to grow. There is, however, no existing body of empirical 
research that can explain or be used to predict similarities and differences 
among organizational cultures resulting from the nature of business or the 
general business environment (Pheysey, 1993; Ott, 1989). Having said that, 
three important reasons can be speculated. 
3.2.1.2.1 - The Influence of Profession 
The fact that many organizations are dominated by people from certain 
professions might explain some similarities among organizations within an 
industry. Professions attract people who are predisposed to being socialized, 
and they consciously socialize new entrants into their system of values, 
beliefs, and assumptions (Schein, 1990a; Ott, 1989). 
3.2.1.2.2 - The Nature of Business and Business Interactions and 
Relationships 
With whom and how an organization interacts and does business is 
determined by the nature of an organization's business. For example, a 
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governmental regulatory agency interacts regularly with the organizations it 
regulates. The regulatory agency's role and the types of organizations it 
regulates influence the nature of its interactions (Ott, 1989; Schein, 1990a). 
3.2.1.2.3 - The Market-Place Influence 
Deal and Kennedy (1982, in Ott, 1989, pp. 81) claim that general types of 
organizational cultures are determined by just two market-place factors: "the 
degree of risk and the speed at which companies - and their employees - get 
feedback on whether decisions or strategies are successful". Ott (1989) gives 
the examples of different kinds of organizations and their nature in relation to 
the two market-place factors above. For instance, the culture of a regulated 
monopoly cannot resemble the culture of a television network (degree of risk). 
Considering the speed of feedback, the culture of a public health agency that 
inspects and cites nursing homes for code violations will not resemble the 
culture of a center that prepares people with developmental disabilities to live 
independently. 
3.2.1.3 - The Influence and Impact of Founders in Shaping Organizational 
Culture 
Organizations are goal-oriented and have specific purposes, they do not form 
spontaneously or by accident. Basically, organizations are developed, or 
created, because one or more individuals perceive that the coordinated and 
concerted action of a number of people can accomplish something that 
individual action cannot (Bass and Avolio, 1994; Pheysey, 1993; Schein, 
1990a). The founder (or founders) usually begins with a theory of how to 
succeed that originates in the societal culture in which they were raised and in 
their prior work experiences. Founders seek out and attract people who share 
their views, values, beliefs, and assumptions and, through the force of their 
personalities, further shape the culture (Schein, 1990a; Ott, 1989; Bass and 
Avolio, 1994). Newcomers that share the same values and theory move into 
management and executive positions and bring in subsequent generations of 
new members that also share the same theory and values. 
Founders usually have a major impact on how the group defines and solves 
its external adaptation and internal integration problems (Schein, 1990a; Bass 
and Avolio, 1994). Through organizational socialization processes, new and 
older upwardly mobile members learn and relearn what it takes to get along 
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and to get ahead in their organization (Pheysey, 1993; Mitroff and Kilmann, 
1984; Ott, 1989; Schein, 1990a). This inevitably implies that those members 
who do not come to share the cultural assumptions lose influence and/or 
depart. Therefore, the unique cultural imprint of the founder(s) is pervasive 
and remains long after they leave or die (Ott, 1989). 
Having said that, there is a great deal of interdependence between the three 
main sources of organizational culture. They are by no means independent of 
one another. For example, the broader culture strongly influences or shapes 
the founder's basic assumptions. In turn, the choice of which business to 
engage in by the organization is usually influenced by the founder's 
assumptions, and the business environment both affects and is affected by the 
societal culture. 
Ott (1989) observed that even though many authors on the origin of 
organizational culture have placed more emphasis on one or other sources 
and used different groupings, there is nevertheless remarkably little conflict 
among their views and findings. Having said that, the best way to approach 
organizational culture's origins or sources is to view them as the unique sum 
of the composite blending of the three main general sources above rather 
than viewing the sources as individual competitors to shape an organizational 
culture. 
3.2.2 - Levels of Organizational Culture 
Organizational culture has some well defined important elements and 
functions, referred to as the levels of culture. "Artifacts" is the most visible and 
concrete level whereas "Basic Assumptions" is the most abstract level. 
"Values" is placed between these two levels. Schein (1990a pp. 13 - 14) 
considers basic assumptions to be the "essence" of culture ("what culture 
really is") and treats values and behaviours as the observed manifestations of 
the cultural essence. These levels of culture need to be carefully distinguished 
to avoid conceptual confusion. Schein's three-level model provides the most 
useful typology published to date for classifying elements of organizational 
culture into usable groupings (Ott, 1989). Figure 3.1 below represents the 
levels of culture and their interactions. 
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Figure 3.1 - Levels of Culture and Their Interactions 
Artifacts and Creations 
Technology Visible but often 
Art not decipherable 
Visible and Audible Behaviour Patterns 
Values 
Testable in the Physical Environment Greater level of 
Testable only by Social Consensus awareness 
Basic Assumptions 
Relationship to Environment Taken for granted Nature of Reality, Time and Space Invisible 
Nature of Human Nature Preconscious Nature of Human Activity 
Nature of Human Relationships 
Source: SCHEIN, E., H., (1990), Organizational Culture and Leadership, 
San Francisco, Jossey-Bass Publishers, pp. 14 
3.2.2.1 - Level 1- Artifacts 
Artifacts include material and nonmaterial objects and patterns that 
intentionally or unintentionally communicate information about the 
organization's technology, beliefs, values, assumptions, and ways of doing 
things. Artifacts are the most visible level of the culture. It is its constructed and 
social environment. Artifacts include everything from the physical layout, the 
dress code, the manner in which people address each other, the smell and 
feel of the place, its emotional intensity, and other phenomena, to the more 
permanent archival manifestations such as company records, products, 
statements of philosophy, and annual reports (Ott, 1989; Schein, 1990a). 
Not all artifacts are tangible things. Behavioural patterns can be an artifact and 
thus a symbolic representation of the culture (Ott, 1989). Organizational 
language, jargon, metaphors, stories, myths, and jokes can also be artifacts. 
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Patterns of administrative behaviour and organizational leadership are 
beginning to be described as cultural artifacts rather than expression of 
individual leadership styles or patterns of behaviour (Sergiovanni, 1984, in 
Ott, 1989). 
Symbols and signs may also be artifacts. When artifacts are nothing more 
than signs, they serve rational-functional purposes (for example, computers 
process information). When artifacts are symbols, they serve symbolic 
purposes first and rational-functional purposes only secondarily or not at all. 
Ott (1989) argues that it is in this manner that symbols and symbolism are 
crucial to the organizational culture perspective. They help to create, maintain, 
and transmit shared meanings and perceptions of truths and realities within 
organizations (Cooke and Rousseau, 1988). However, it must be understood, 
from the organizational culture perspective, meaning reality, and truth are 
social constructions - they exist as meanings, truths, and realities only 
because members of the organization collectively have defined them as such. 
If truth, meaning, and reality were absolutes, there would be no organizational 
culture perspective (Ott, 1989; Cooke and Rousseau, 1988). 
Some writers, such as Martin and Siehl (1983), after adopting Schein's 
typology of organizational culture, have included in this level some other 
elements of organizational culture such as habits, patterns of behaviour, 
norms, rites, and rituals. These elements are consistent with the concept of 
organizational culture and do not appear to violate Schein's 
conceptualization. 
While artifacts are "palpable"/"visible", they are difficult to decipher. It is easy to 
observe even the most subtle artifacts, such as the way in which status is 
demonstrated by members. The difficulty is in understanding what the artifacts 
mean, how they interrelate, and what deeper patterns, if any, they reflect 
(Schein, 1990a). Thus, even though artifacts are "passive" products or results 
of an organizational culture, they are easily identified, they are unreliable 
indicators of the organizational culture (Schein, 1990a; Ott, 1989). It is 
dangerous to rely on artifacts for inferring an organization's values, beliefs, or 
basic assumptions. "There are too many opportunities to misinterpret the 
relationship between artifacts and the higher levels of organizational culture" 
(Ott, 1989, pp. 36). 
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3.2.2.2 - Level 2- Values 
From the organizational culture point of view, beliefs, values, ethical codes, 
and ideologies have the same meaning (Ott, 1989). Beliefs and values are 
absolutely central to organizational culture. Research by Deal and Kennedy 
(1982) revealed that organizations only become institutions when they are 
ingrained with values. Beliefs and values (and the broader system of ethical or 
moral codes in which they are embedded) are often referred to as the 
organizational culture, reflecting its importance. Shared beliefs and values by 
members of an organization provide the reasons why the members behave in 
a certain way. 
Even though beliefs and values are usually referred to as having the same 
meaning, there are clearly some distinctions between them. Values are 
defined by Ott (1989, pp. 39) as "conscious, affective (emotion-laden) desires 
or wants". Ott goes further to suggest that values are the things that are 
important to people, such as the "shoulds, should nots, and ought-to-be's of 
organizational life. " Beliefs, on the other hand, are what "people believe to be 
true or not true, realities or nonrealities - in their minds. " Values are the things 
that are important to people (including their beliefs) - what people care about - 
and thus are the recipients of their invested emotions. 
Schein (1990a, pp. 15 - 16) explains how values become beliefs and 
ultimately assumptions. Schein argues that in a sense, all cultural learning 
ultimately reflects someone's original values, their sense of what "ought" to be, 
as distinct from what is. For example, when an organization is faced with a 
problem, because there is not as yet a shared basis for determining what is 
factual and real, the first solution to deal with the problem can only have the 
status of a value. In most cases, the founder has convictions about the nature 
of reality and how to deal with it, and proposes a solution based on those 
convictions. The group cannot feel that same degree of conviction presented 
by the founder. It will only occur when the group collectively share and 
experience successful problem solving, even though the founder may regard 
the proposed solution as a belief or principle based on facts. For example, if 
sales begin to decline in a young company, a proposal to increase the level of 
advertising may be suggested by the founder "believes" that advertising 
increase sales. Never having experienced that situation before, the group 
takes that assertion as the founder's values. That is, when faced with a decline 
in sales always increase advertising. 
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If the proposed solution to the problem is successful, and is perceived by the 
group as a success (shared experience), the value gradually starts a process 
of cognitive transformation into a belief and, finally, an assumption (Schein, 
1990a, pp. 16). Provided that the proposed solution continues to work 
successfully, the group members will tend to forget that originally the 
proposed solution (values) was debated because they were not so sure about 
the possible outcome (now that it is working successfully, there is a sense that 
it is "correct" and reflects reality - advertising increases sales). 
Therefore, as the values begin to be taken for granted, they gradually become 
beliefs and assumptions and drop out of the consciousness, just as habits 
become unconscious and automatic (Schein, 1990a). 
To undergo the transformation into assumption, solution based on a given 
value need to work consistently. Values that become assumptions are only 
those values that are susceptible to physical or social validation, and that 
continue to work reliably in solving the group's problems. 
Thus, values and beliefs have an important function in organization: they 
influence patterns of organizational behaviour. Ott (1989) argues that the 
contents of the different levels of organizational culture are linked (artifacts, 
patterns of behaviour, and values and beliefs). Ott goes further to suggest that 
believes and values are the shaping forces and energy sources for the other 
two levels. Beliefs provide cognitive justification for organizational action 
patterns, and values provide the emotional energy or motivation to enact 
them. Therefore, beliefs and values provide the justification for organizational 
actions. "Beliefs and values also are the birthplaces of basic assumptions" 
(Ott, 1989, pp. 47). 
Beliefs and values are then, the sense of "what 'ought' to be, as distinct from 
what is". Level 2 reveals how people communicate, explain, rationalize, and 
justify what they say and do as a community (Sathe, 1985, in Ott, 1989, pp. 
59). Ott (1989) adds to this level the elements of ethos, philosophies, 
ideologies, ethical and moral codes, and attitudes. Although this level is very 
important and is often referred to as the organizational culture, the elements in 
this level alone are not in themselves sufficient to be trusted to provide 
accurate information about a true organizational culture (level 3- basic 
assumptions) because of what Argyris and Schön (1978, in Schein, 1990a, 
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pp. 17; Ott, 1989, pp. 60) have termed "espoused values" and "values in use" 
(the prevalent incongruency between the two). Schein (1990a, pp. 17) 
suggests that "espoused values" predict well enough what people would say 
in a variety of situations but which may be out of line with what they actually 
do. For example, an organization may state that it values people, but its record 
in that regard may contradict what it says. Ott (1989) argues further that 
although espoused values are incongruent with values-in-use, they often 
serve important symbolic functions and can remain in an organization for a 
long time. 
Research on level 2 elements of organizational culture usually yield what 
people will say (espoused values), rather than values-in-use, which can be 
used to predict what people will do. Having said that, the elements of level 2 of 
organizational culture (values and beliefs) are better predictors of 
organizational behaviour than artifacts (level 1). The reason for that is that 
they are closer to Schein's true organizational culture (basic assumptions - 
level 3). 
3.2.2.3 - Level 3- Basic Assumptions 
Basic assumptions is the highest level of organizational culture. Basic 
assumption is a relatively new concept that only recently began to receive 
attention in the literature. Edgar Schein first defined organizational culture as 
its basic assumptions in 1981 (Ott, 1989). After 1981 some organizational 
theorists have "pushed" the concept, including Schein himself (1990a, first 
edition 1985), Ott (1989), Mitroff and Kilmann (1984), among others. Despite 
the fact that materials on basic assumptions are sparse, some organizational 
theorists are now defining organizational culture as its basic assumptions (Ott, 
1989). 
As observed in Level 2 above, when a solution to a problem works repeatedly, 
it comes to be taken for granted. That is, what was initially a hypothesis, 
comes gradually to be treated as a reality (Schein, 1990a). Thus, basic 
assumptions have moved out of member's consciousness into their 
preconsciousness, for they have yielded successful results repeatedly over 
time (Ott, 1989). Ott (1989) illustrates this point by comparing it with applying 
the brakes while driving a car. After years of applying the brakes and the car 
slowing down as a consequence, no thinking is necessary in relation to 
brakes and braking: one applies the brakes assuming the car will slow down. 
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In this sense, our belief in the relationship between braking and slowing turns 
into a basic assumption. 
Schein (1990a), argues that a basic assumption is something that becomes 
so taken for granted that one finds very little variation within a cultural unit. In 
fact, he goes further to suggest that if a basic assumption is strongly held in a 
group, members would find behaviour based on any other premise 
inconceivable. Basic assumptions tell group members how to perceive, think 
about, and feel about things. They guide behaviour. Another characteristic of 
basic assumptions is that they tend to be nonconfrontable and nondebatable 
(also, Kekäle and Kekäle, 1995; Ott, 1989; Cooke and Rousseau, 1988). 
There are two important distinctions that need emphasis between beliefs and 
basic assumptions. First, and as mentioned previously, beliefs are conscious 
and as a result can be easily identified (for example by interviewing people or 
employing diagnostic instruments). Basic assumptions, on the other hand, are 
likely to be dropped out of awareness - they have moved back to the recesses 
of the mind. Second, beliefs are cognitions, whereas basic assumptions 
include not only beliefs but also perceptions (interpretations of cognitions) and 
values and feelings (affects) (Ott, 1989; Schein, 1990a). Thus, basic 
assumptions can be thought of as a comprehensive, potent, but out-of- 
conscious system of beliefs, perceptions, and values (Ott, 1989). 
Because basic assumptions are not part of the conscious system they are 
passed to other members not by conscious or explicit teaching; rather, the 
"enculturation" of its new members by organizations is accomplished 
somehow unconsciously, through stories and myths and by modeling patterns 
of behaviour that members must piece together like jigsaw puzzles in order to 
discover the basic assumptions lying beneath them. Ott (1989) suggests that 
the ever-present discrepancies between the morals of stories and modeled 
patterns of behaviour, and the stated organizational beliefs and values, aid 
significantly these processes of teaching and learning. Therefore, given the 
discrepancies, new members are forced to look beyond the stated beliefs and 
values for underlying patterns of unspoken basic cultural assumptions. 
Having said that, organizational culture can only be viewed as basic 
assumptions (rather than beliefs and values). Basic assumptions are not 
rational (in the classical sense of the word). They are "secret coping devices" 
that help organizations to deal with problems of external adaptation and 
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internal integration. Research conducted by Ott (1989) revealed that basic 
assumptions are so powerful that people act on them even against the stated 
values and beliefs of the organization. Because it is unconscious (members 
are not aware of them) executives in his research initially denied emphatically 
the existence and validity of the basic assumptions in operation in their 
organizations. 
"Beliefs and values are what people will admit to. Basic underlying 
assumptions are what people actually believe. and feel and what determine 
their pattern of behaviour, whether or not they are aware of them" (Ott, 
1989, pp. 44). 
Basic assumptions are nonconfrontable and unquestioned perceptions of 
truth, reality, ways of thinking and thinking about, and feeling that developed 
through repeated successes in solving problems over extended periods of 
time. They are beliefs, values, ethical and moral codes, and ideologies that 
have become so ingrained that they tend to drop out of consciousness. The 
ways organizations pass on important basic assumptions to new members are 
often unconscious. 
3.3-organizational Culture - Concept and Definition 
As mentioned previously, organizational culture is a relatively new field, and 
much of the confusion about organizational culture is caused by the use of 
different concepts and definitions of organizational culture (Kekäle and 
Kekäle, 1995; Allcorn, 1995; Ott, 1989). The term "culture" has attracted 
attention and became fashionable in organizational research during the 
1980s and 1990s. 
In trying to understand the essence of organizational culture it is important to 
realize that culture is a concept rather than a "thing". A "thing", according to Ott 
(1989, pp. 50 - 51), can be discovered and truths established about it, for 
example, through empirical research. A concept, however, is created in 
people's minds. That is, it 
"must be conjured up, defined, and redefined. Thus ultimate truths about 
organizational culture (a concept) cannot be found or discovered. There is 
no final authoritative source or experiment to settle disagreements about 
what is or what comprises it. " 
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The general concept of culture is a long standing "dispute" between well 
established fields of research such as anthropology, archeology, and cultural 
anthropology, and these arguments clearly mirror the organizational culture's 
definitional problems (Ott, 1989; Schein, 1990a; Pheysey, 1993; Cooke and 
Rousseal, 1988; Sparrowe, 1995). 
In fact, there are very few areas of general consensus about organizational 
culture, and they are restricted to the facts that, organizational culture does 
exist; it is relatively unique (to each organization); it is a socially constructed 
concept; organizational culture provides organization members with a way of 
understanding and making sense of events and symbols; and it is a powerful 
lever for guiding organizational behaviour (Schein, 1990a; Ott, 1989) 
The concept "culture" has numerous meanings and by 1952 Kroeber and 
Kluckhorn had identified 164 (one hundred and sixty four) different definitions 
of culture (Kekäle and Kekäle, 1995). The situation does not improve when 
attempts are made to identify organizational culture definitions. Ott (1989) 
provides a compendium of organizational culture definitions from the literature 
(from fifty-eight books and articles) on organizational culture and closely 
related topics. From his work on the issue of the definition of the concept, Ott 
observed that no words or phrases related to the sources, functions, 
transmittal, change, or maintenance of organizational culture were used or 
applied. References were made only to what it is, and what constitutes it. It can 
then be said that although the concept has been mentioned several times it 
has not been substantiated. 
in organizational culture research, the term "culture" is used indiscriminately 
referring to two different meanings. First, it refers to the coherent system of 
assumptions and basic values distinguishing a group and directing its 
choices. Second, it refers to a group's distinct set of features or traits, which 
means not only its basic values but also its beliefs, models of behaviour, 
technology, symbols, and artifacts (Kekäle and Kekäle, 1995). 
Culture is a deep phenomena, it is complex and difficult to understand. Schein 
(1990a, pp. 6) proposes that the term "culture" should be reserved for the 
deeper level of basic assumptions and beliefs that are shared by members of 
an organization, that operate unconsciously, and that define in a basic "taken- 
for-granted" fashion an organization's view of itself and its environment. 
Indeed, many organizational culture researchers have distinguished in their 
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models of culture the surface level from the deeper level of culture (Ott, 1989; 
Cooke and Rousseu, 1988; Mitroff et al, 1989; Klein et al, 1995; Kekäle and 
Kekäle, 1995; Bennett et al, 1994; Brownell, 1990; Bourgeois and Brodwin, 
1984; Nutt, 1986; Wilkins and Ouchi, 1983). Even if one wants to use the term 
"culture" in its second meaning above (broader sense - so that all the relevant 
traits and features of organizational culture are covered), one has to 
distinguish carefully between the basic cultural elements which tend to be 
enduring (basic assumptions), and secondary cultural elements (artifacts) that 
change more easily (Gagliardi, 1986, in Kekäle and Kekäle, 1995). 
As mentioned above, these assumptions and beliefs are learned responses to 
a group's problems of survival in its external environment and its problems of 
internal integration. The reason why they come to be taken for granted is 
because they work successfully and repeatedly in solving the group's 
problems. This deeper level of assumptions is the essence of culture, and is 
distinguished from the most superficial manifestations of the other levels 
(artifacts and values). 
In referring to the basic assumptions, Schein (1986, pp. 96) states that 
"culture can't be manipulated like other matters under the control of 
managers. Culture controls the manager - more than the manager controls 
the culture - through the automatic filters that bias the manager's 
perceptions, thoughts and feelings. As culture arises and gains strength, it 
becomes pervasive and includes everything the manager does, even his 
own thinking and feeling. " 
Schein (1990a, pp. 9) defines culture as 
"a pattern of basic assumptions - invented, discovered, or developed by a 
given group as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and 
internal integration - that has worked well enough to be considered valid 
and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, 
think, and feel in relation to those problems. " 
The definiton of culture is a difficult issue because it also implies the word 
"organization", which is in itself ambiguous. Organization, that by implication is 
the locale of a given culture. According to Shein (1990b, pp. 111), one cannot 
start with some "cultural phenomena" and then use their existence as 
evidence for the existence of a group or organization. Organizations are not 
easily defined in time and space. Organizations are mutant systems, they are 
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open systems in constant interaction with their many environments, and they 
consist of many subgroups, occupational units, hierarchical layers, and 
geographically dispersed segments. Having said that, a culture will only exist 
where it can be specified that a given group or set of people has had enough 
stability and common history to have allowed a culture to form. That is, where 
it can be demonstrated that a given set of people, through the process of 
solving external and internal problems, have shared a significant number of 
important experiences. Only where that is the case, it can be assumed that 
those shared experiences have led them, over an extended period of time, to 
a shared view (perception) of the world around them and their place in it. 
Moreover, this shared perception (view) has to have worked for long enough 
to have come to be taken for granted and to have dropped out of 
consciousness. Therefore, culture is a learned product of group experience 
and is, therefore, to be found only where there is a definable group with 
significant history. This means, by implication, that some organizations, for 
reasons such as constant and frequent turnover of members, will have no 
overarching culture because they have no common history. By the same 
token, other organizations, given that they have a long shared history or 
because they have shared important intense experiences (such as a severe 
crisis), can be presumed to have a "strong" culture. (If culture is understood 
from this perspective, it becomes clear why it is so difficult to change). 
However, and as noted by Ott (1989) and Schein (1990a, 1990b), the content 
and strength of a culture cannot be presumed from observing surface cultural 
phenomena, they have to be empirically determined. In fact, Schein (1990a, 
pp. 7) argues that culture "should be viewed as a property of an independently 
defined stable social unit. " 
Culture, then, is what a group learns over a period of time. Such learning is 
simultaneously a behavioural, cognitive, and an emotional process. From a 
functionalist anthropological point of view, the deepest level of culture will be 
the cognitive in that the perceptions, language, and thought processes that a 
group comes to share will be the ultimate causal determinant of feelings, 
attitudes, espoused values, and overt behaviour (Schein, 1990b). 
It can be concluded, then, that any definable group with a shared history can 
have a culture. It is also possible to have within an organization many 
subcultures. Provided that the organization as a whole has had shared 
experiences, there will also be a total organizational culture. It is also possible 
for coexisting units of a larger system to have cultures that not only are 
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independent but also in conflict with each other (Kekäle and Kekäle, 1995; 
Cooke and Rousseau, 1988). _However, within any given unit, the tendency 
for 
integration and consistency will be assumed to be present (Schein, 1990b; 
Ott, 1989). In fact, Schein (1990b) argues that it is perfectly possible for a 
group to hold conflicting values that manifest themselves in inconsistent 
behaviour while having complete consensus on underlying assumptions. 
Equally, it is also possible for a group to reach consensus on the level of 
values and behaviour and yet develop serious conflict later because there 
was no consensus on critical underlying assumptions. 
Finally, Schein (1 990b, pp. 111) claims that once a group has learned to hold 
common assumptions, 
"the resulting automatic patterns of perceiving, thinking, feeling, and 
behaving provide meaning, stability, and comfort; the anxiety that results 
from the inability to understand or predict events happening around the 
group is reduced by the shared learning. The strength and tenacity of 
culture derive, in part, from the anxiety-reducing function. One can think of 
some aspects of culture being for the group what defense mechanisms are 
for the individual" (also Schein, 1990a, pp. 178). 
Indeed, Allcorn (1995) argues that organizational culture contains 
psychosocial defenses against the experience of anxiety in the workplace. 
3.4 - The Functions of Organizational Culture 
One way of defining a concept is to define it functionally. By stating the 
functions that the concept being defined performs, one is defining the concept 
functionally. The functions an organizational culture performs are among the 
points in which there is agreement in relation to organizational culture in the 
literature. The review of the literature suggests that the reason why there is 
general agreement about actual functions is because they are the same 
regardless of how culture is defined formally. That is, whether organizational 
culture is defined as artifacts, values and beliefs, or basic assumptions, there 
is no difference between actual functions. 
Four functions of organizational culture in particular represent a wide 
consensus in the literature and can be seen as the core of a functional 
definition of organizational culture (Ott, 1989). 
117 
G. Santana Ch. 3- Organizational Cufture and Crisis Management: The Crisis From Within 
Organizational culture: 
" Provides shared patterns of cognitive interpretations or perceptions, so 
organization members know how they are expected to act and think. 
" Provides shared patterns of affect, an emotional sense of involvement and 
commitment to organizational values and moral codes - of things worth 
working for and believing in - so organizational members know what they are 
expected to value and how they are expected to feel. 
" Defines and maintains boundaries, allowing identification of members and 
nonmembers. 
" Functions as an organizational control system, prescribing and prohibiting 
certain behaviours. 
Having said that, organizational culture was defined functionally by Ott (1989, 
pp. 69) as 
"a social force that controls patterns of organizational behavior by shaping 
members' cognitions and perceptions of meanings and realities, providing 
affective energy for mobilization, and identifying who belongs and who 
does not. " 
Although a functional definition of organizational culture provides important 
understanding about the functions organizational culture performs and why 
organizational cultures continue to exist, it provides no direction for managing 
it, changing it, or studying organizational culture. 
Apart from those fundamental functions, researchers and practitioners have 
also provided evidence of organizational culture operational functions. For 
example, organizational culture strongly affects and influences organizational 
long-term effectiveness and performance (Bates et al, 1995; Bennett et al. 
1994; Deal and Kennedy, 1982; Allen, 1995; Peters and Waterman, 1982); it 
impacts the well-being of business organizations (Wilkins and Ouchi, 1983; 
Dennison, 1984); and it plays an important role in the strategic implementation 
process (Brownell, 1990; Bourgeois and Brodwin, 1984; Nutt, 1986; Kekäle 
and Kekäle, 1995). Culture is also assumed to act as a determinant of strategy 
(Ackerman, 1982), and to influence strategic decison implementation 
(Schwartz and Davis, 1981). There is also evidence to support the view that 
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culture influences what organizational strategies are selected and whether 
they are successful (Wilkins and Dyer, 1988; Cartwright and Cooper, 1993; 
Marcoulides and Heck, 1993); and that culture plays a critical role when 
dramatic, significant strategic change is mandated (Bennett el_W, 1994; Klein 
et at, 1995). 
3.5 - Organizational Culture and Crisis Management 
It is widely accepted that complex system problems require complex solutions. 
There is no more place for the simplistic approach of "quick fix" for the solution 
of complex problems. Today, more than ever before, organizations, private 
and public, are facing a new class of problems caused by the harmful effects 
of their own operations or the effect of environmental forces in their activities. 
Some of those problems are serious enough to assume crisis proportions for 
societies, and threaten the very survival of implicated organizations. 
The way by which organizations anticipate and respond to an impending 
crisis does not depend on, nor is it determined by, the personality and/or 
intellectual capacity of its leaders. Also, organizational responsiveness to 
crisis does not primarily depend on, nor is it determined by, the structure of the 
organization, organizational business policies, incentive systems, etc., which 
make up an organization's visible features. Rather, every organization also 
has an invisible quality, a certain style, a character, a way of doing things that 
may be more powerful than the dictates of any one person or any formal 
management system. To properly understand the essence or soul of an 
organization requires a deeper look far beneath formal organizational charts, 
rule books, employee manuals, machines, and buildings, into the 
underground world of organizational culture. According to Mitroff and Kilmann 
(1984, pp. 63), "... this is where we will find the basis for an organization's 
stance towards the unthinkable". 
Organizational culture is one of the most important variables in crisis 
management. As evidenced in previous sections, apart from the most 
conscious factors that influence an organization's behaviour, such as the 
firm's environment, the structure of the industry in which it competes, its 
financial history, its capital requirement, and so forth, there are more 
unconscious factors (less observable) that exert a strong, decisive effect on 
the behaviour of organizations. These factors are referred to as the "culture of 
an organization" (Cooke and Rousseu, 1988; Allcorn, 1995; Bennett et al" 
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1994; Kekäle and Kekäle, 1995; Cooke and Szumal, 1993; Bates et p1,1995; 
Sparrowe, 1995; Klein et al, 1995; Schein, 1990a, 1990b, 1986; Wilkins and 
Ouchi, 1983; Ott, 1989; Pheysey, 1993; Mitroff and Kilmann, 1984; Smith, 
1990; Mitroff gam, 1989). 
The culture of an organization is akin to a force field of energy. It is not 
mechanical, chemical, or electrical energy. Culture is best thought of as a 
social energy which has an existence and life all its own. The culture of an 
organization is distinct from its mission, technologies, formal reward systems, 
explicit policies, and written job descriptions. While all these things may have 
been instrumental in shaping the initial culture, once formed, the culture 
becomes a separate force, or social entity, independent of the initial reasons 
or motifs that formed it, that controls members' behaviour and attitudes at the 
work place. As Schein (1986, pp. 96) stated, "Culture controls the manager- 
more than the manager controls the culture - through the automatic filters that 
bias the manager's perceptions, thoughts and feelings. " Therefore, culture 
allows organizations to be examined as a community, as a unique 
embodiment of such things as family conflict, gang welfare, crowd behaviour, 
and alienation. Only a cultural concept comes close to capturing these 
dimensions of organizational life along with the more rational and mechanical 
aspects. 
Thus, organizational culture is "the set of rarely articulated, largely 
unconscious beliefs, values, norms and fundamental assumptions that the 
organization makes about itself, the nature of people in general and its 
environment" (definition of organizatioanl culture by Mitroff, Pauchant, Finney 
and Miller, 1989). That is, culture is the set of "unwritten rules" that govern 
"acceptable behaviour" within and outside the organization. Organizational 
culture thus prescribes rules such as: "if you want to succeed here, don't 
disagree with the boss". On the positive side, innovative organizations often 
have such norms as: "The best ideas are those that 'rock the boat"'. 
The culture of an organization also affects social habits, that is, what it 
considers to be "acceptable". For instance, how one socializes and with 
whom; talk; body language; styles of dress; who is and is not considered a 
hero, villain or victim; who's "in", who's "out"; where to live; whom to marry; 
with whom to eat lunch; where to go to school; what -to read; and so forth 
(Mitroff '1989). 
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3.5.1 - Organizational Culture and Crisis Management - The Crisis from Within 
The culture of an organization is often held as being of critical importance to 
corporate strategic decision making (Bates gta[, 1995; Bennett fit, 1994; 
Deal and Kennedy, 1982; Allen, 1995; Peters and Waterman, 1982), 
particularly in terms of its perceived ability to respond to a crisis event (Mitroff 
and Kilmann, 1984; Allcorn, 1995; Williams and Olaniran, 1994; Klein et al 
1995; Kekäle and Kekäle, 1995; Janis, 1989; Dutton, 1986; Bennett et al. 
1994; Dutton ell(, 1983; Fink, 1986; Smith, 1990; Johnson and Scholes, 
1988; Mitroff, Pearson and Pauchant, 1992; Schein, 1990a; Ott, 1989). The 
culture of an organization represents both an opportunity and a threat for crisis 
management. There is a consensus among writers that, on the one hand, the 
culture of an organization can serve to precipitate a crisis by providing the 
environment within which such an event can escalate rapidly (Klein et al. 
1995; Mitroff, Pearson and Pauchant, 1992; Pauchant and Mitroff, 1992; 
Kekäle and Kekäle, 1995; Allcorn, 1995; Mitroff et al, 1989; Smith, 1990; 
Pauchant and Mitroff, 1988; Fink, 1986; Mitroff and Kilmann, 1984; 
Nunamaker et at, 1989). Conversely, the prevailing culture can be central to 
an organization's ability to cope with a threatening situation (Klein et at, 1995; 
Mitroff, Pearson and Pauchant, 1992; Allcorn, 1995; Kekäle and Kekäle, 1995; 
Cooke and Rousseu, 1988; Pauchant and Mitroff, 1992; Mitroff et at, 1989; 
Smith, 1990; Pauchant and Mitroff, 1988; Fink, 1986; Mitroff and Kilmann, 
1984; Nunamaker et at, 1989). 
One simple example of a situation in which an organization's culture can be 
its own worst enemy can be observed when changes are necessary. An 
existing culture may be quite supportive of the mission and success of an 
organization at a particular point, however, this may not be true at all when 
significant strategic change becomes necessary (Klein et al, 1995). It has 
been found that while companies may be able to devise sound strategies to 
suit their changing environment, they are unable to implement those 
strategies because the strategies require assumptions that differ from the 
existing ones (Kekäle and Kekäle, 1995), leaving the company vulnerable to 
crises. On the other hand, in his research on "High Reliability Organizations" 
(HROs), Weick (1987) has argued that organizational culture was the source 
of reliability in organizations. Allcorn (1995) posits that organizational culture 
encourages members to cope effectively with or defend against their anxiety. 
In this sense, culture manifests itself in organization members' behaviour in 
relation to crisis and crisis management. 
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The issue of crisis puts organizational culture in this perspective. The ability to 
anticipate and cope with crisis is directly related to the organizational culture 
of a company. Indeed, Mitroff g (1989) conducted a study where they 
identified organizations which are "crisis-prone" and/or "crisis prepared". The 
resultant model of crisis management from their study (called the "onion 
model") has four layers which moving from the centre, are: core beliefs, 
organizational beliefs (culture), organizational structure, and, finally, 
organizational behaviour and plans. These elements of an organization 
contribute towards its ability to cope with a crisis event. The surface layers of 
their model (organizational behaviour and plans - layer four; and 
organizational structure - layer three) are those aspects of the organizations 
that are more easily observable. They are closest to consciousness. They 
represent the formal actions and policies of an organization with regard to 
crisis management. Layer four (organizational behaviour and plans) 
comprises an organization's strategies for crisis management, for instance, 
existing programmes, procedures, and mechanisms specifically developed to 
deal with crises. This surface is the most easily seen. Layer three 
(organizational structure) shows how well the everyday operating structure of 
an organization either contributes to or inhibits crises. Pauchant and Mitroff 
(1992) argue that the structure of an organization is often "invisible" to those 
who work inside the organization. That is, people who work in the 
organization are frequently unaware of how the structure of their own 
organization affects their way of working and interacting in general and crisis 
management efforts in particular. 
Conversely, the other layers (organizational culture - layer two; and core 
beliefs - layer one), particularly the core beliefs, are the most difficult ones to 
observe directly. These two layers constitute the largely unconscious, invisible 
aspects of an organization. Layer two addresses an organization's cultural 
aspects (basic underlying assumptions). As discussed before, it is the 
unwritten and unspoken rules, codes of conduct, beliefs systems, etc. Basic 
assumptions tell group members how to perceive, think about, and feel about 
things. They guide behaviour. Another characteristic of basic assumptions is 
that they tend to be nonconfrontable and nondebatable (Schein, 1990; Kekäle 
and Kekäle, 1995; Ott, 1989; Cooke and Rousseau, 1988). Although all the 
other layers are important, and to some extent complementary to the total 
organization's preparedness to crisis (ability to anticipate and cope effectively 
with a crisis event), the culture of an organization is the most decisive one and 
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the one that determines whether or not an organization is prepared for crisis. 
Using the descriptions in previous sections, it can be said that layers 4 and 3 
represent the artifacts and values of an organization, and layer 2 represents 
the basic underlying assumptions ("Beliefs and values are what people will 
admit to. Basic underlying assumptions are what people actually believe and 
feel and what determine their pattern of behaviour, whether or not they are 
aware of them" (Ott, 1989, pp. 44). 
Research by Pauchant and Mitroff (1988,1992), Booth (1993), Mitroff, 
Pauchant, Finney and Pearson (1989), Klein et al (1995), Allcorn (1995), 
revealed that from the organizational culture aspects it is indeed possible to 
identify an organization's position in relation to crisis and crisis management 
(whether a given organization is "crisis-prone" or "crisis-prepared"). There is 
little doubt that organizational culture is the most decisive element that 
governs organizations. As seen in previous sections it influences all aspects 
or organizational decision making, strategic action, and implementation. 
There is also evidence to support the view that culture influences which 
organizational strategies are selected and whether they are successful. 
Organizational culture also plays a critical role when dramatic, significant 
strategic change is mandated. Organizational culture strongly affects and 
influences organizational long-term effectiveness and performance, and it 
determines the well-being of business organizations. Organizational culture 
also directly affects the degree and manner in which organizations adapt and 
respond to changes. 
Layer one (core beliefs) of the Mitroff et al (1989) model addresses the 
subjective experiences of the individuals who form an organization. These 
include factors such as their propensity to use different defense mechanisms 
in relation to crises, or the degree of their existential anxiety. These factors 
exert a strong influence on the kind of crisis management efforts developed in 
an organization (Pauchant and Mitroff, 1992). 
Mitrofft (1989) argue that the factors which constitute the core are often the 
most decisive. That is, if the core of an organization is in trouble, then the 
surface activities (behaviour, policies) of an organization are ineffective and 
will not be of much use. They also argue that when that is the case, even if an 
organization can put together a formal crisis manual, no matter how many 
times, and issue directive after directive, positive results would be scarce. At 
best, they argue, an organization will have the illusion of preparation and 
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control. Thus, the health of an organization is often no better than that of its 
core. 
In general, not much attention is given to layers 1 and 2 in management of 
organizations, yet, these two aspects of organizational life are precisely the 
most important factors that run any organization (Pauchant and Mitroff, 1992; 
Schein, 1990; Allcorn, 1995; Ott, 1989; Kekäle and Kekäle, 1995; Cooke and 
Rousseau, 1988; Bates 1.1995; Sparrowe, 1995; Klein et at, 1995; Cooke 
and Szumal, 1993). 
An interesting conclusion of the Mitroff et al (1989) model is that successful 
crisis management cuts across or involves all the layers. That is, successful 
crisis management is a matter of performing well across all the levels. Mitroff 
gel (1989) also concluded that the suboptimization of any one layer at the 
expense of the others may lead to disaster, i. e., major crisis for the 
organization and consequently its stakeholders. This last point becomes 
clearer if the causes of crises are analyzed. Crises occur because of the 
simultaneous breakdown of technical, organizational, and human systems 
(Mitroff, 1994; Mitroff and Pearson, 1993a; Shrivastava, 1992; Klein et al. 
1995; Mitroff, 1988a; Shrivastava, 1988; Weick, 1987; Fink, 1986; Kuklan, 
1986; Perrow, 1984). It makes no sense to analyze, for instance, the systems 
comprising an organization's core technology in isolation from the human and 
organizational systems that implement the core technology. Technological 
systems neither exist nor operate in a vacuum (Mitroff and Pearson, 1993b; 
Kekäle and Kekäle, 1995). Mitroff (1988a) indeed suggests that "virtually all 
major crises are caused by a mixture of human and technological elements". 
Smith (1990, pp. 265) in the same line argues that "the configuration of 
individual crisis events can be seen as a function of the interactions between 
a number of smaller events which conspire to generate the main crisis event. " 
Therefore, since most crises are not only multiple, but are due to interactions 
between the technologies of an organization, its structure, human error, the 
effects of organizational culture, and the attitudes of key executives and 
managers, unless one has the understanding of a broader system, actions 
intended to prevent or respond to one crisis can set off a chain reaction of 
other crises (Mitroff, 1994). 
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3.5.1.1 - Some Cultural Traits that Characterize "Crisis-Prone" and "Crisis- 
Prepared" Organizations 
As mentioned earlier, there is strong evidence to support the view that 
organizational culture is the main element in determining whether an 
organization is prepared or not for crisis. Research by Mitroff (1994), 
Shrivastava (1992), Pauchant and Mitroff (1988), Kekäle and Kekäle (1995), 
Mitroff and Kilmann (1984), Smith (1990), Dutton (1986), Mitroff et al (1989), 
Booth (1993), Dutton et al (1983), Klein at-BI (1995), Mitroff, Pearson and 
Pauchant (1992), Schein (1990a), Ott (1989), Fink (1986), and others, 
revealed that there are many striking cultural differences between "crisis- 
prone" and "crisis-prepared" organizations. These differences have some very 
direct and real consequences for crisis management. In general, the very 
definition of what is a crisis varies considerably between these two different 
kinds of organizations. For a crisis-prone organization, a crisis is something 
which happens mainly to them (i. e., product, plants, their top executives). That 
is, a crisis is equated with them and their structure, and not with the outer 
environment. Conversely, for an organization which is crisis-prepared a crisis 
is something that happens not only to them but also to their stakeholders (i. e., 
customers, all their employees at all levels, and their general environment). 
Mitroff et al (1989, pp. 275) argues that, in this perspective, 
"... definitions are not only social instruments in that they spell out (specify 
the characteristics and the boundaries of) some phenomenon of interest, 
but they are also the expressions of the social character of an organization". 
Definitions, therefore, tell us as much about the nature of the definer as they 
do about the thing being defined. A reflection of the organizational culture of 
crisis-prone organizations is that they (organizations) 
". '.. redefine reality to suit their fantasies and beliefs about themselves. ... the 
misconception of reality by prone organizations is not motivated primarily 
by blocks or impairment to rational thinking". Rather, "the misconception of 
reality was blocked through emotional factors, i. e., by executives not having 
the emotional resources to face up to critical situations realistically" (Mitroff 
gam, 1989, pp. 275; Pauchant and Mitroff, 1988, pp. 58). 
Identifying "health" problems in an organization is not an easy task. Defining 
the "health" of an organization is more difficult than that of an individual. First, 
organizations are more complex (i. e., they are composed of innumerable 
individuals spread out in space and time, and in many cases literally over the 
entire globe). Second, organizations are composed of a highly complex 
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interplay between people, technology, plants, products, facilities, marketing 
(research, selling, distribution, etc. ), financial systems, and so on. Pauchant 
and Mitroff (1988) argue that all these various factors are themselves a 
complex blend of known and unknown, conscious and unconscious, and 
rational and irrational forces. The unknown, unconscious, and irrational forces 
form the culture of an organization. Pauchant and Mitroff (1988, pp. 54) go 
further to suggest that 
"roughly, culture is to an organization what personality is to an individual. 
The parallel is even more striking. Freud and a host of other significant 
social scientists have shown that some of the most important aspects of 
personality are unconscious. ... the same holds true for organizations: some 
of their most important aspects are unconscious". 
Therefore, organizations are largely unaware of some of the most important 
forces influencing their actions (Klein gel, 1995; Mitroff, 1994; Allcorn, 1995; 
Weick, 1987,1988; Mitroff, 1988a; Shrivastava, 1992; Smith, 1990; Schein, 
1990a; Dutton, 1986; Mitroff et al, 1989; Booth, 1993; Dutton PA-al . 
1983; 
Mitroff, Pearson and Pauchant, 1992; Ott, 1989; Pheysey, 1993, Starbuck el 
j, 1978; Staw et al, 1981). 
Studies consistently have shown that the culture of an organization plays a 
decisive role in their approach to crisis management (Klein et. 1,1995; Reilly, 
1993; Booth, 1993; Mitroff and Pearson, 1993a; Siomkos, 1992; Mitroff and 
Pauchant, 1990; Miller, 1988; Fink, 1986; Allcorn, 1995; Pauchant and Mitroff, 
1988; Smith, 1990; Shrivastava et al, 1988; Shrivastava, 1992; Regester, 
1987; Smith and Sipika, 1993). What makes one organizational culture 
different from others (crisis-prone vs crisis-prepared organizations) can be 
observed in terms of the differences in the assumptions that constitute an 
organizational culture (Klein et at, 1995; Pauchant and Mitroff, 1988; Schein, 
1990a; Smith and Sipika, 1993; Booth, 1993; Allcorn, 1995; Ott, 1989; Smith, 
1990; Mitroff and Pearson, 1993a; Mitroff et al, 1989; Miller, 1988; Fink, 1986; 
Pheysey, 1993; Mitroff and Kilmann, 1984). In the past, the basic assumptions 
an organization made about itself and the other factors in its environment had 
little importance. An organization could easily "get by" by not knowing or 
examining its assumptions very deeply or systematically because most of the 
time they operated in what was considered "normal or good times". However, 
and as observed by Pauchant and Mitroff (1988, pp. 54) 
"... these are not normal times. All organizations everywhere today face 
enormous pressures from worldwide global competition. In addition, they 
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face a whole new series of threats not experienced on any previous scale 
before". 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the prospect of organizations experiencing a 
major crisis today is greater than ever before, and the types and range of crisis 
one is vulnerable to today is overwhelming. Having said that, what 
differentiates organizations with weak or strong efforts in crisis management is 
the nature of "organizational identity". 
Organizations that are crisis-prone tend to see themselves and the 
environment in which they operate (stakeholders) in very different ways from 
organizations that are crisis-prepared. For example, studies by Reilly (1993), 
Booth (1993), Pauchant and Mitroff (1988), Mitroff e1_W (1989), Miller (1988), 
Fink (1986), Mitroff and Pauchant (1990), Mitroff and Kilmann (1984) have 
revealed that organizations that are crisis-prone exhibit a greater degree of 
narcissism or self-centeredness than do crisis-prepared organizations. As 
mentioned earlier, a crisis for a prone organization is something which 
happens mainly to them, and not to its surrounding environment. Conversely, 
for a prepared organization a crisis is something that happens not only to 
them but also to the wider environment in which they operate (customers, 
community, employees, and the general environment). Mitroff (1994) , argues 
that the failure of many organizations to consider how a broad range of 
stakeholders will react to their actions, beliefs, and performance is often 
responsible for their getting into major crisis. Crisis-prone also differ from 
crisis-prepared organizations in the sense that they use a great number of 
defensive mechanisms to avoid having to face the reality of crises (Pauchant 
and Mitroff , 1988; 
Mitroff ßl,. 1989). Among those, Mitroff et al (1989, pp. 274) 
identified: 
a) Denial: the expressed refusal to acknowledge threatening realities. 
b) Disavowal: acknowledgment of threatening realities but the discreditation of 
their importance. 
c) Fixation: rigid commitment to a particular course of action or attitude. 
d) Grandiosity: feeling of omnipotence. 
e) Idealization: feeling of omnipotence through the idealization of another 
person, object or organization. 
f) Intellectualization: the elaborate rationalization of an impulse. 
g) Projection: the attribution of unacceptable impulses to others. 
h) Repression: the pushing down of threatening/unacceptable impulses into 
unconsciousness. 
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i) Splitting: the extreme isolation of different elements, extreme 
dichotomization, fragmentation. 
Allcorn (1995, pp. 74 - 75) also identified organizations with a "psychologically 
defensive culture". Elements such as denial, splitting, projection, and 
introjection were found in those organizations. Organizations develop a 
defensive culture as a result of continuous stress and anxiety experienced by 
its members. Management and workers alike are continuously subjected to 
anxiety and frequently resort to the unconscious use of similar psychological 
defense mechanisms. Allcorn (1995) argues that these temporary individual 
and group psychological defenses may, under continued pressure, become 
rigid and enduring patterns of adjustment which include losses of reality 
testing, self-integration, and organizational adaptiveness. These rigidities, if 
abundant, may create a psychologically defensive culture. 
Organizations that nurture feelings of self-esteem, participation, 
empowerment, and effectiveness create a sense of security and confidence 
for their members. Allcorn (1995) found that as a result, members of such 
organizations have little need to rely on unconscious psychological defenses 
to cope with workplace anxiety. Organizational members were found to 
respond intentionally and assume personal responsibility and perceive 
change as an opportunity. In contrast, it was observed that in organizations 
that deskill and alienate their members, employees generally feel misled, 
suspicious, helpless, and uncontrollably anxious when faced with internal and 
external problems that require change. These employees experience the 
need to change as a threat, and then defend against their anxieties by using 
reality-distorting unconscious psychological defenses. It was also suggested 
that' a dysfunctional senior executive may have his or her behaviour ignored 
and rationalized by subordinates who fear taking corrective action (Kets de 
Vries, 1980, in Allcorn, 1995). 
Another way in which prone organizations differ from prepared ones is that 
they use what Mitroff et al (1989) call "fatalism". This is the mechanism by 
which prone organizations avoid guilt. The main point with regard to this 
mechanism is that it reduces the guilt and responsibility associated with a 
company's actions and also provides justification for a company's doing 
nothing. Thus fatalism strategy is a dangerous one. 
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3.6 - Organizational Structure. Culture, and Crisis Management 
With regard to organizational structure, there can also be found differences 
between crisis-prone and crisis-prepared organizations. Organizations that 
are crisis-prepared have been found to possess some distinct characteristics 
in their effort to crisis management. 
Mitroff 9LB1 (1989) have also observed that there are striking differences 
between crisis-prepared organizations and crisis-prone organizations with 
regard to their underlying basic assumptions, fears and anxieties concerning 
crisis management. Moreover, and more importantly, these differences have 
significant consequences on their overt actions. That is, organizations that are 
crisis-prepared are more likely to have tested, in-place early warning systems 
to warn of impending crises; they are also much more likely to have designed 
their everyday functions, work routines and roles to match those they will need 
during a crisis; they are much more flexible in their operation and 
organization; they share more resources across and within groups; and they 
are much more likely to have top management support, everyday involvement 
and commitment in crisis management. 
Klein et al (1995), in their research into organizational culture in High 
Reliability Organizations (HROs) obtained similar results. It has been revealed 
that because HROs are different from other organizations due to their 
requirement for reliability as the primary outcome, their cultures were similiar 
to each other and different from those manifested in other organizations, and 
this fact was reflected in the attitude and perceptions of its members. 
Moreover, since no organization is immune to crisis, it was also observed that 
given the inherent vulnerability to accidents in HROs, managers devote much 
more effort in avoiding such accidents than those in other organizations. Thus, 
what differentiates organizations with weak or strong efforts in crisis 
management is the nature of "organizational identity". That is, how executives 
"feel" about themselves and their organization is strongly related to their 
company's involvement in crisis management. In fact, Weick (1987) has 
suggested that organizational culture was the source of reliability in 
organizations. 
Miller (1988) identified different types of "pathological" organizations and how 
they contribute to the development of different types of crises. Miller's study 
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emphasizes the importance of organizational structure in relation to crisis 
management. Organizational structure was defined by Miller (1988, pp. 67) as 
"the set of administrative procedures - the hierarchy, the allocation of 
responsibility and authority, the nature and membership of committees 
(integrative devices) - that are used to implement strategies". 
Miller argues that organizational structure, together with some other aspects of 
organizational elements such as executive personality and organizational 
culture, combine in a mutually reinforcing way to form an extremely durable 
and change-resistant configuration. Miller describes five types of 
"pathological" organizations (the suspicious, the compulsive, the dramatic, the 
depressive, and the detached organization) and how they engender three 
different types of crises: financial, psychological, and environmental. Miller's 
findings suggest that the pathologies of the five types of organizations 
described above are very deeply ingrained and their component problems are 
highly interdependent and mutually supportive. Thus, they form unified 
gestalts that resist alteration to the point of bouncing back to the original 
configuration whenever a small change is made (Miller, 1988). Therefore, only 
by revolutionary change (or a major crisis), rather than incremental and 
piecemeal adjustments, can the organization move towards a more "crisis- 
prepared" configuration. 
It can be concluded, then, that organizations that are crisis-prone . are more 
likely to exhibit those characteristics which impair successful performance in 
crisis management. In this sense, if prone organizations do not actually create 
the crises or disasters they face, they are much more likely than prepared 
organizations to exacerbate their effects. In this sense, they create further 
crises for themselves (Mitroff, 1994; Mitroff et at, 1989; Klein gam, 1995; Weick, 
1987,1988; Mitroff, 1988a; Shrivastava, 1992; Smith, 1990; Schein, 1990a; 
Dutton, 1986; Booth, 1993; Dutton et al, 1983; Mitroff, Pearson and Pauchant, 
1992; Ott, 1989; Pheysey, 1993, Starbuck eil, 1978; Staw et al, 1981). 
3.7 - Organizational Culture and Change 
it is clear that organizations with a long and successful history and relatively 
permanent personnel, which have faced external threats and internal 
problems of adaptation together, tend to have a strong culture based on 
shared basic assumptions. It is also clear that these kinds of deeply-rooted, 
shared basic assumptions are difficult to change (as already noted in previous 
sections). These strongly held assumptions while holding the organization 
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together may also hinder the organizations' ability to change (Schein, 1990a; 
Ott, 1989; Kekäle and Kekäle, 1995; Bass and Avolio, 1994; Klein et al, 1995; 
Allcorn, 1995; Cooke and Rousseu, 1988; Weick, 1987,1988; Mitroff, 1988a; 
Shrivastava, 1992; Smith, 1990; Pauchant and Mitroff, 1988; Smith and 
Sipika, 1993; Booth, 1993; Mitroff and Pearson, 1993a; Mitroff et al, 1989; 
Miller, 1988; Fink, 1986; Pheysey, 1993; Mitroff and Kilmann, 1984). 
The ability to change and adapt in today's world is a requisite for survival and 
prosperity. Organizations undergo significant strategic change for a number of 
reasons. For example, risk reduction (Bromiley, 1991); environmental 
turbulence (Koberg, 1987); poor performace (D'Aveni, 1989); resource shifts 
(Castrogiovanni, 1991); or managerial preference (Hambrick and Mason, 
1984). Regardless of the need for change, it is important to observe that 
culture plays a decisive role not only in the choices of strategies, but also in 
the success of their implementation, overall performance, and indeed survival 
of the organization. As Wilkins and Ouchi (1983) attested, organizations when 
confronted with diversification opportunities, changes in strategy, rapid 
growth, subculture conflict, and retrenchment, should give serious attention to 
their cultures. 
Change requires sound strategic decisions, however, implementing them is 
not a simple task. Schein (1986) demonstrates that whenever an organization 
that has been successful in its mastery of a given technology changes the 
technology used, the organization not only must learn new practices but must 
also redefine itself in ways that involve deep cultural assumptions. Indeed, 
and as noted before, even where organizations are able to devise strategies 
to cope with a rapidly changing environment (strategies that make financial, 
product, marketing, etc., sense), they are unable to implement those strategies 
because they require assumptions, values and ways of working that differ from 
the organization's prior assumptions. An existing culture may be very 
supportive of an organization's mission and success at a particular point, but 
may not be at all appropriate when significant strategic change becomes 
necessary (Klein et al, 1995). In other words, either the existing culture is 
complementary to the changes imposed by new strategies or some cultural 
change may be deemed necessary in order to affect and maintain 
organizational effectiveness (BennettaLaI, 1994). 
Changing the deeper levels of a culture is a tough task. Kekäle and Kekäle 
(1995, pp. 213) suggest that changing the culture of an organization takes so 
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much that "more often than not, may not be worth the while, especially in 
cases where it is not obligatory for the sake of organizational survival". The 
problem, though, is that more often than not today, it is the case of 
organizational survival. The market, uncertainties, operating environment, 
competition, marketing, internal adaptation, external threats of all kinds, etc., 
all call for constant drastic changes at all levels. 
Having said all that, one has to recognize that changing the culture of an 
organization takes more than courage alone. The implementation of any new 
working practices (for example, implementation of new management concepts 
such as Total Quality Management, etc. ) which are on the surface of 
consciousness, by implication requires changes in the culture of an 
organization, which is embedded in its unconsciousness. As Kekäle and 
Kekäle (1995, pp. 213) present this issue, implementing a concept into a 
culture "might call for blood, sweat and tears because of the clash of two 
different cultures: the organization's cultural assumptions and the background 
assumptions of the approach to be implemented. " 
This point can be further enhanced if one considers an organization that 
operates globally (i. e., has different businesses on different continents). If a 
catastrophe happens anywhere in the world due to a technical problem (say a 
machine, or process failure) changes might be further complicated and difficult 
to accept due to cultural differences. As Mitroff and Linstone (1993) pointed 
out, "technology is not transferable in isolation - it takes place from one 
societal/cultural setting to another". In other words, technical perspective 
alone is not enough. Considering the implementation of safety standards in 
different countries (as well as changing organizational cultures) is extremely 
difficult. Shrivastava (1992) argues that even companies that do have uniform 
worldwide safety policies are unable to carry them out practically. One of the 
reasons for that difficulty is that in each country local conditions and resources 
create significant differences in levels of safety. Other reasons for these 
implementation failures may be lack of local regulatory pressures, 
miscommunication between parent and local company managers, different 
safety expectations, and different organizational cultures that put different 
emphases on safety. Indeed, research by Hofstede (1984) - into 
organizational values in the subsidiaries of one multinational company with 
operations in forty countries - identified elements of a common organizational 
culture, but also, predictably, there were distinct organizational subcultures in 
each country. Most important for this discussion, Hofstede found that the basic 
132 
G. Santana Ch. 3- Organizational Culture and Crisis Management: The Crisis From Within 
characteristics of the organizational subcultures could be explained by 
(correlated with) dominant values of the national culture. Thus, the issue of 
changing organizational culture for worldwide corporations is indeed a very 
complex problem. Wilkins and Dyer (1988) argue that each culture has 
idiosyncratic qualities and must be modified uniquely. Cultural change cannot 
occur as though it were independent of the particular traits of a culture being 
changed. 
More often than not, a change, in many cases, is likely to occur only after 
organizations have to face a major crisis. Only then may there be the will and 
opportunity for a change. In fact, as Fink (1986) and Pauchant and Mitroff 
(1988) found out in their research, the vast majority of companies in their 
survey acknowledged that their involvement in crisis management was based 
on reactions to crisis as opposed to pro-action (preparedness). 
Considering the cultural differences between crisis-prepared and crisis-prone 
organizations discussed earlier, to change the culture of an organization that 
is crisis-prone to one that is crisis-prepared requires that an organization 
manage the organizational and individual anxiety of its members. Pauchant 
and Mitroff (1988) labeled this process "management of self". This process 
attempts to diminish the "self-inflated" behaviours that go against efforts in 
crisis management and increase positive self-regard behaviours that allow 
appropriate programme of crisis management (Pauchant and Mitroff, 1988, 
pp. 61). The authors go further to suggest that it is necessary to replace 
anxiety with fear. Their survey identified that what paralyzed crisis-prone 
organizations from taking appropriate crisis management actions was the 
existence of "diffuse, subjective, vague, non-articulated anxiety". They also 
observed that this anxiety was "not consciously acknowledged", and that what 
emerged from their interviews conducted with executives was not the anxiety 
itself, but "the defensive mechanism executives used to manage it". 
Anxiety differs from fear in that the first "lacks a specific object while fear is 
something which is experienced and directed towards specific object" (May, 
1958, in Pauchant and Mitroff, 1988). That is, one is not anxious of something. 
Pauchant and Mitroff (1988) argue further that not having any specific object to 
be anxious of, no strategic action is possible to reduce its cause(s), except the 
defensive mechanisms mentioned earlier (i. e., denial, feeling of grandiosity, 
etc. ). Conversely, fear has a specific object. Fear then allows the development 
of strategic action, attention being narrowed to a specific object. 
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Indeed, many organizations are making use of fear to change their 
organizational culture. In a Fortune article (June, 28,1993) with the 
provocative title "Times are Good? Create a Crisis", Dumaine (1993) outlined 
pro-active steps taken by "smart" organizations. Dumaine described the 
approach taken by Pepsi-Cola to change its culture. Although Pepsi-Cola's 
earnings were 10% up and business was more profitable in the United States 
than for its main competitor Coca-Cola, the president of a division of Pepsi 
with sales of over US$ 7 billion, feared that the soda market would turn flat 
and that the competition would intensify in a few years. Faced with the 
dilemma of how to convince his 30,000 highly successful, hardworking people 
that they need to tear apart that money machine and rebuild it, the only 
plausible answer to the "problem" was to create a crisis. In a three-day 
meeting with top executives, he convinced them that 10% was not enough 
and if 15% could not be achieved they would go "out of business". Over the 
two years that followed the meeting, the team restructured the organization, 
redesigned how it did its work, and redefined jobs. The change included 
breaking the division into 107 customer-focused units and dramatically 
revising processes like beverage delivery and special sales promotions, 
moves that ended up saving Pepsi-Cola tens of millions. The division was 
expected to reach the target (15%) three years after the crisis was declared. 
This kind of strategy was called "Doomsday Management" (Dumaine, B., 
1993), and as he defines it 
"doomsday management is a strategy leaders can use to radically 
transform a successful and profitable company before its success - and 
overconfidence and complacency and bloat - catches up with it". 
This idea is based on a familiar phenomenon: Most organizations, like most 
people, will not change fundamentally until they absolutely have to. Indeed, a 
study of 40 companies-found that "before any could change, each first had to 
hit bad times and, in many cases, call a new CEO to bail itself out" (Dyer, G., in 
Dumaine, 1993). 
The point here is that for many organizations today, business as usual, as with 
for Pepsi, may look like a certain death. Therefore, it is necessary to create a 
sense of urgency inside the organization. Another American company, 
Ameritech, was in the same "uncomfortable" position as Pepsi: high margins, 
high profit, and a strong corporate culture that would not change easily. 
Certain to face stronger competition and new technologies in the future, its 
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CEO had no option but to create a crisis. William Weiss, CEO of Ameritech, 
justifies his crisis: "... our culture was so strong and severe that without radical 
change, our culture would never change" (in Dumaine, 1993). 
Crises do not limit themselves to negative effects (Rosenthal and Pijnenburg, 
1990; Fink, 1986). Indeed, research has shown that crisis can bring enormous 
benefits to organizations. For instance, Mitroff .( 
(1992, pp. 255) argue that 
the experience of crises and "existential anxiety is often precisely what human 
system needs in order to shake itself of its dangerous basic assumptions". In 
the same line, others such as Nystrom and Starbuck (1984), Fink (1986), 
Mitroff and Pauchant (1990) have formally suggested that crises are 
sometimes exactly what are needed to allow organizational members to make 
long overdue strategic shifts. (For that matter, Mitroff and Pauchant (1990, pp. 
117) suggest that "crisis-prepared" organizations are constantly surfacing and 
testing their most cherished beliefs and assumptions with regard to their 
continuous validity). Further, research by Mitroff and Pauchant (1990) 
revealed that managers that have engaged in crisis management, that is, 
managers that have allowed themselves to rigorously learn from their past 
crises and crisis management experiences and acted on the basis of the 
experiences, "have developed through crisis management substantial 
strategic advantages over their competitors". They also argue that the strategic 
advantages mentioned above not only positively affected the firms that 
developed them, but that they are also "societal advantages", diminishing the 
risks and/or impact of industrial disasters and of the current ecological and 
ethical decay (in Mitroff eilt, 1992, pp. 255). 
The argument above was defended more than a decade ago by Kerchner and 
Schuster (1982, pp. 121). They argued that for most managers, crisis 
"connotes a state of affairs to be avoided, for the outcome is risky and may 
very well be prejudicial to personal and organizational health. " However, ".... 
crises, although they are inherently risky, under certain conditions can be 
transformed into instruments of organizational good. " Kerchner and Schuster 
(1982) also argue that the question for managers is to know "when to declare 
a crisis and how to utilize one. " Indeed, crises are neither inherently good nor 
bad for an organization (as also discussed in Chapter 2). Their impact may cut 
in either direction. But, and as pointed out by Fink et al. (1971, pp. 16), the 
declaration of a crisis may create an opportunity for organizational elan, 
teamwork, and a spirit of compromise, even sacrifice, on the part of individuals 
within the organization and its subunits. In other words, crisis can become a 
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"vehicle for organizational growth". Unfortunately, a great number of authors in 
crisis management still take only a reactive stance, viewing crisis 
management activities mostly as a means for coming back as soon as 
possible to "business as usual". By focusing on the need to restore the status 
quo before the emergence of a crisis, the opportunity to address the needed 
structural and systemic changes that a crisis can make visible is missed 
(Mitroff gtpl, 1992). 
There are also other mechanisms that can be used to move a corporation from 
anxiety to fear in relation to crisis management. Each organization, depending 
on the situation of its organizational identity will prefer some. For instance, one 
strategy may be to expose executives and non-executives to have a direct 
experience with the phenomenon of crises. That can be achieved by using 
organizational crisis simulation workshops. Another strategy could be to 
sensitize executives to the deeper psychological issues at stake that crises 
raise (Fink, 1986; Mitroff and Kilmann, 1984; Mitroff and Linstone, 1993; 
Regester, 1987). Also, it is possible to allow organization members to 
conceptualize the dimensions and complexity of crises. For that computerized 
simulation models could be used (Pauchant and Mitroff, 1988; O'Sullivan, 
1992; Klein and Newman, 1980; Hamilton, 1991; Wilkenfeld et al, 1995; 
Morentz, 1987). Yet another strategy is to attempt to diminish anxiety through 
different stress management workshops, specially targeted at the 
phenomenon of crisis management. The use of scenario is becoming 
increasingly important in the development of strategies to deal with 
uncertainty (Wack, 1985; Barton, 1991). 
3.7.1 - The Hospitality Industry. Strategic Change. and Organizational Culture 
-A Review of Relevant Practical Points 
Although culture change has been broadly considered as part of an overall 
implementation effort, little conceptual literature to date has presented an 
integrative literature review and synthesis of the cultural variables which 
impact the implementation of sizable strategic change (Bennett et at, 1994). 
Moreover, and as argued by Lewisl_ (1992), organizational research in the -ei 
service industry has been largely underrepresented. This is particularly true 
with respect to the hospitality industry. 
Any proposed change in an organization will have to be "approved" by the 
system of assumptions currently held in a given time. Basic underlying 
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assumptions, as discussed previously, is an evolutionary learning process 
over the shared experiences of a group of people. They are also extremely 
difficult to change. 
Given the operational nature and environment of the hospitality industry, the 
management practices in the industry (influenced by well established 
traditions), some additional constraints exist in making (implementing) change 
effectively. As discussed in Chapter 2, the hospitality industry is one of the 
most vulnerable and susceptible industries to crisis (the hotel industry and the 
issues of crisis, crisis management, and crisis vulnerability in the industry are 
discussed in detail in Chapter 5). A review of management practices in the 
industry and other characteristics revealed that the industry is typically and 
traditionally re-active and slow to adapt to new realities (Olsen and Zhao, 
1997). High levels of uncertainty in its operations and service encounters also 
characterize the industry. In fact, Brownell (1990) suggests that in the 
hospitality industry uncertainty is the norm. Brownell (1990, pp. 197) goes 
further to state that "few other organizations experience the same high degree 
of continuous uncertainty. " Regardless of the uncertainties (major disaster, 
change in weather conditions, internal adversities, external and internal 
threats of all nature, and so forth), when the customers call, hospitality 
organizations are expected to respond. 
Given this scenario, it is expected that hospitality organizations would be 
designed to absorb uncertainties and plan for the unexpected. This would call 
for strategic change, which requires a fundamental rethinking of the beliefs by 
which organizations define and carry out their business. As seen in previous 
sections, organizational culture significantly influences an organization's 
ability to move through transition processes. In fact, the culture of an 
organization not only determines and influences the design of strategies, but it 
also determines the success of its implementation. The culture of an 
organization must also be supportive of change; if not, the failure of strategic 
change attempts is certain, generating anxiety and confusion in the 
organization. 
Change does not occur without pain (Kekäle and Kekäle, 1995; Bennett et at, 
1994; Klein BLW 1995; Schein, 1990a, 1990b; Ott, 1989; Mitroff and Pearson, 
1993b; Pauchant and Mitroff, 1988; Fink, 1986; Miller, 1988). Planned 
strategic change is also bound to find a certain degree of resistance from 
organizational members. The reasons for resistance to change can be of a 
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different nature but have the same effect - hinder or make difficult the transition 
process. Resistance to change such as ignorance of the implications of the 
change; ignorance in relation to the urgency of the proposed change; 
ignorance about the role one will play after the change; fear of losing 
privileges, status; general misunderstanding of the change or not 
understanding its necessity; etc., are the most commonly found. This 
resistance is in part caused by bad communication, one of the variables 
management must be preoccupied with in planning change. In an industry 
where a high degree of turnover and part-time employment is the norm (the 
workforce in general envisage few, if any, long-term career opportunities) 
resistance to change is even stronger (members cannot see themselves 
"benefiting" from changes). 
The hospitality industry is also characterized by organizations with well- 
established histories and long traditions. Not surprisingly, Zeira and Avedisian 
(1989, in Brownell, 1990) found the process of changing underlying 
assumptions in those organizations to be particularly problematic. Some 
additional features of the hospitality industry also contribute to the difficulties 
in implementing change. Brownell (1990) proposes that apart from those 
factors that make transition difficult, other factors that function as a barrier to 
change in the hospitality industry should also be considered: (1) the customer 
as partial employee, (2) the increasingly diverse workforce, and (3) the rapid 
pace of innovation and subsequent uncertainty. 
3.7.1.1 - Service Delivery Process - The Encounter 
Hotels, restaurants, health centers and other businesses that rely heavily on 
the customer's participation for the delivery of service is said to be the most 
challenging for implementing and managing organizational change. The main 
reason is the nature of the service delivery process. Customers have a direct 
and active role in the "creation" of the product. The service experience, and for 
that matter the perception clients have of a service organization, is largely 
developed through the interactions between the client and the service 
provider, particularly "front line" service employees. This interaction inevitably 
brings difficulties for organizational control of service quality. Control in the 
service sector is often more difficult to exercise because managers have to 
rely on social mechanisms "- such as shared cultural values - to direct 
organizational members actions (O'Reilly, 1989). Since these shared values 
are internalized, they can apply to a broad range of appropriate behavioural 
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responses that are difficult for managers to anticipate and formalize in 
unsupervised situations (Chatman and Jehn, 1994). The service encounter 
then inevitably leads to high degrees of uncertainty and poses a challenge for 
hospitality professionals to manage quality efficiently. As an example, 
customer participation, specially in high contact situations, influences many 
perceived aspects of the service "quality" such as the exact nature of the 
service, the length of the encounter, the timing, and therefore the perceived 
quality of the service itself. Moreover, perceived service satisfaction depends 
upon specific tasks being required, which in turn depends on the customer's 
communications skills, his or her motivation to ensure that the transaction 
goes smoothly, and in this context, inevitably, the individual personality 
characteristics of the client. Thus, a great deal of the "experience" and 
"perceived quality" is rendered to the customer by the nature of service 
operation. 
Brownell (1990) goes further to attest that inherent in the customer/service 
provider relationship is a set of mutual expectations in relation to individual 
parties' rights, privileges, and' obligations. While some service encounters are 
straightforward (every participant knows exactly what role to play), others are 
more difficult and ambiguous. Either way, the participants in the service 
encounter must observe each other's behaviour in order to make appropriate 
choices. 
Therefore, the service encounter experience implies that service organization 
employees are not influenced by the organization alone at the interaction 
time; rather, the delivered service is the result of the interaction of employee's 
skills and the behaviour of the customer. Given those distinct characteristics, 
effective implementation and management of change in service organizations 
is indeed a complex issue. 
3.7.1.2 - Increasing Diversity of the Workforce - Implications for Change 
The hospitality industry is also characterized by the diversity of its workforce. 
This reality also influences change in organizations. Section 3.2.1.1 in this 
chapter discussed the importance and influence that the larger societal culture 
exerts on organizations. All the beliefs, values, and expectations held by an 
organization's important internal and external constituencies are formed in the 
broader culture (Ott, 1989). Changes in societal norms, beliefs, values, and 
lifestyle patterns - such as sexual equality - inevitably find their way into 
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organizations. Another characteristic of hospitality organizations today is that 
they are becoming increasingly multi-national and their workforce, as a 
consequence, is also becoming more and more diverse. Minorities, women, 
the handicapped, and others, are increasingly assuming a predominant role 
in the service delivery process both as the service provider and as customers. 
This fact asks for a style of management that is sensitive to the diverse needs 
of all its publics (internal and external). Moreover, the service employee must 
also be sensitive to the distinct assumptions and values of its various publics. 
As also mentioned in this and previous sections, the particular geographical 
location of a property determines to a great extent the characteristics of its 
workforce. In general, most general cultural beliefs, values, and assumptions 
of a broader society are very stable. Those fundamental cultural expectations 
are neither discussed nor debated but are taken for granted by all those that 
interact with an organization in a cultural context (potential employees, current 
employees, their families, managers, customers, bankers, government 
agencies, directors, investors, business school professors, and textbooks). 
Managers of multi-national organizations who come with different sets of 
assumptions and professional conduct soon discover that other populations 
have different attitudes, expectations, and level of job commitment. As referred 
to before, research by Hofstede (1984), into organizational values in the 
subsidiaries of one multinational company with operations in forty countries, 
identified elements of a common organizational culture, but also found, 
predictably, that there were distinct organizational subcultures in each 
country. Moreover, Hofstede found that the basic characteristics of the 
organizational subcultures could be explained by (correlated with) dominant 
values of the national culture. 
From the customer point of view, increasingly the publics of hospitality 
organizations are becoming more diverse, not only in terms of different 
nationalities and backgrounds, but also more and more demographic 
changes, life-styles, etc., are playing a major role in the service delivery 
process. The fact that the workforce is already diverse further increases the 
degree of complexity of the service encounter (regardless of their personal 
response to a customer, they - employees - are expected to provide service 
that meets the organization's standards). 
Brownell (1990) suggests that to facilitate transition, organizations must 
accommodate their minority members by adopting values that support the 
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greater flexibility and adaptability required to respond to those new realities of 
service operations. It is important to emphasize, once again, that cultural 
change cannot occur as though it were independent of the particular traits of a 
culture being changed. Each culture has distinctive qualities and must be 
modified uniquely (Wilkins and Dyer, 1988). 
3.7.1.3 - Rapid Pace of Innovation and Change 
As Schein (1990a, 1990b), Ott (1989), Klein et al (1995), Pauchant and Mitroff 
(1988), and many other authors demonstrated, culture is a learning process 
that takes a long time to evolve. However, the internal and external 
environments are evolving at a high pace and organizations do not have the 
desired time to "learn" each individual change and "ways of doing things". 
Change today, as stated earlier, is a matter of survival. Organizations that are 
highly adaptive to change have a greater chance of survival and prosperity. 
Change must be perceived as a permanent organizational reality. Brownell 
(1990) posits that organizations will only be able to anticipate and respond 
appropriately to shifts in both internal and external environment when change 
itself becomes an accepted and valued norm in the organization. In other 
words, only when it becomes a basic assumption. 
The hospitality industry at all levels has been subjected to a great number of 
change demands, not only from its internal and external publics, but also from 
developments in other sectors (specially in information technology). For 
example, the introduction of advanced information technology in hospitality 
operations has had a major impact on the ways organizations are managed 
and services are delivered (the introduction of automated systems - check-in 
and' check-out, order taking, information request, information processing, etc. 
-, has major effects and affects expectations, assumptions, and beliefs about 
the nature of work and quality of the service provided). Well established 
routines that perpetuated in the hospitality working environment for many 
generations are now relinquished. More sophisticated and efficient systems 
are taking over. Both the internal and external publics are now required to 
constantly adapt to an increasing number of new and unexpected routines 
and rituals (Brownell, 1990). 
Misunderstandings about the need for change, about organizational 
objectives, etc., by hospitality industry employees may have severe 
implications for effective planned strategic change and implementation. 
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Disruption of services then will be inevitable, generating frustration and stress 
among the workforce and a reduced level of satisfaction among customers. 
Having said that, in addition to the inherent difficulties in managing change in 
organizations, the hospitality industry possesses some distinct features that 
create additional challenges far those who manage the transition process. It is 
clear that organizational culture directly influences an organization's ability to 
change. It has a direct impact on the degree and manner in which 
organizations adapt and respond to change. 
3.8 - Exploring the Relationships Between Organizational Cultures 
Strategic Management and Crisis Management 
The discussion in this chapter made it clear that organizational culture is the 
most decisive element in determining, whether an organization is prepared or 
not for crisis. The discussion so far also made it clear that strategy and culture 
are inseparable - one is not independent of the other. When a reference is 
made to strategic management, implicitly, reference is also being made to 
culture. As mentioned previously, the culture of an organization influences the 
way strategies are designed, how they are implemented, and the impact they 
will have. Culture manifests itself in all aspects of organizational life. It guides 
behaviour, it governs all organizational attitudes and policies. 
Johnson and Scholes (1988) explored the relationship that exists between 
organizational culture and strategic management. They used the term "recipe" 
for the set of assumptions and beliefs that form part of an organization's 
culture. The recipe, for Johnson and Scholes (1988, pp. 39 - 40), is 
"the set of beliefs and assumptions held relatively commonly throughout the 
organisation, taken for granted in that organization, but discernible to the 
outside observer in the stories of organisational history and explanations of 
events. The recipe makes sense of the situation managers find themselves 
in and provides a basis for formulating strategy. " 
The assumptions and beliefs represent the collective managerial experience 
that is important in the formulation of strategy. Having said that, there is a need 
to clarify the relationship and-distinction that exist between what Johnson and 
Scholes (1988) called "recipe" and organizational strategy. In this sense, 
organizational capability and environmental forces do not in themselves 
create strategy. Rather, it is the people inside the organization who create 
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strategy. As mentioned previously, organizational culture (basic underlying 
assumptions) helps people to make sense of the world around them. Through 
this filter (culture), organizational members make sense of the forces at work 
in the environment and of the organizational capabilities coping with them, 
and in this way strategy is formulated. Humpden-Turner (1990, pp. 229) 
indeed posits that "strategy must be a natural expression of the potential latent 
in a culture". 
This notion of "recipe" was developed by Johnson and Scholes (1988) lying at 
the heart of the cultural web of an organization, which creates the climate 
within which strategic decisions are taken (See Figure 3.2 below). 









Source: JOHNSON, G.; SCHOLES, K. - Exploring Corporate Strategy, 2nd Ed., USA, Prentice Hall, 1988 
If one accepts that a crisis in business today is something unavoidable, and if 
one also accepts the notion of organizational culture discussed in this chapter, 
there can then be explored some practical/operational relationships between 
the elements that comprise the culture of an organization and crisis 
management. 
Johnson and Scholes (1988, pp. 46) argue that 
"the cultural web of an organisation - its political structures, routines, and 
rituals and symbols are likely to exert a preserving and legitimizing 
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influence on the core beliefs and assumptions that comprise the recipe and 
hence make strategic change the more difficult to achieve". 
In other words, if the culture of an organization is not supportive of change, it 
creates the right environment and the various conditions for crises to develop. 
If the culture does not facilitate change, the elements that surround the culture 
(like the cultural web above) may host different types of crisis. If one also 
considers what has been discussed earlier regarding crisis-prone and crisis- 
prepared organizations, the relationship between crisis management and the 
various elements of the cultural web is even more striking. 
The crisis-prone organization was found by Booth (1993), Mitroff etal (1989), 
Pauchant and Mitroff (1988), Mitroff and Kilmann (1984), Fink (1986) to 
possess some distinct characteristics such as an excessive degree of 
narcissism or self-centeredness and the fact that they use a great number of 
defensive mechanisms to - avoid facing the reality of crises. Those 
mechanisms, such as denial, can find room to develop in an organization in 
the "routines" of the cultural web. 
It has also been said that the crisis-prone organization has an inflexible 
organizational structure. Organizational structure is an important element in 
the development of a flexible approach towards the demands of a crisis event 
(Smith, 1992). However, and as noted before, Miller (1988) argues that 
organizational structure, together with other aspects of organizational 
elements - such as the executive personality - combine in a mutually 
reinforcing way to form an extremely durable and change-resistant 
configuration. Miller's study revealed that rigidity of organizational structure 
leads to what was termed "pathological" organizations and that those 
organizations engender three types of crises: financial, psychological, and 
environmental crises. 
Crisis-prone organization was also found to deny that a crisis can strike and 
to make attempts to rationalize away its potential problems. The power 
structure and organizational rituals/myth often manifest themselves in the 
development of a powerful and controlling technocracy within the organization 
(Smith, 1992). The interaction between power structure and organizational 
ritual/myth generates the rationality element. 
Control systems in general manifest themselves in the form of contingency 
plans. These give management the false impression that they are prepared for 
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crises. As extensively discussed in Chapter 2, a crisis, by its very nature, is an 
ill-structured event, and never occurs as it has been planned for. However, 
managers in crisis-prone organizations are often satisfied with hiding behind 
their contingency planning and work under the assumption that the normal 
operating structure of the organization will be enough to address the added 
and unpredictable demands of a- crisis event. If anything, this gives 
management the illusion that they are immune to certain types of crisis, 
generating complacency among management at all levels, and is one of the 
main precipitating factors in crisis generation. 
Having said that, there is a clear correlation between organizational culture 
and crisis management. Organizational ability to anticipate and cope with 
crisis lies in its culture. As Johnson and Scholes (1988, pp. 41) stated, 
"The recipe is likely to be associated with the control systems, routines and 
rituals of the organisation which will tend to preserve the status quo: and 
here the sorts of myths and stories and the types of language used will tend 
to reflect and support the core beliefs that exist. The point is that the recipe 
is not just a set of beliefs and assumptions; rather it is embedded in a set of 
organisational-specific cultural web which legitimizes and preserves the 
assumptions and beliefs in the organisation. " 
Organizational rigidity, as discussed and exemplified above, provides the 
conditions for crisis to evolve within the elements that form and govern 
organizations. 
3.9 - Integrating Crisis Management and Strategic Management 
The discussions in Chapter 2 and in this chapter underline the inexorable link 
that, binds crisis management and strategic management. But, as Smith (1992, 
pp. 261 - 262) emphasized, and given the relative immaturity of both fields - 
which "beguile attempts at integration", it is still possible to identify certain 
elements in the strategy process that are of importance within crisis 
management. Indeed, one can argue that many crises occur because of 
earlier failures in an organization's strategic management process. 
In Chapter 2 the inevitability of crisis was discussed. Thus, in today's world, it 
is no longer a question of whether a major crisis will strike any organization; it 
is only a matter of when, which type, and how. Therefore, there is no 
alternative but to prepare for crises, which are increasing, not decreasing. The 
relative lack of attention devoted to crisis management by strategists has been 
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highlighted by some writers, and can easily be identified in most of the work 
by Mitroff et at (1992), Perrow (1984), Janis (1989), Smith (1992), Fink (1986), 
Shrivastava (1992), Booth (1993), Smart and Vertinsky (1977), Pauchant and 
Mitroff (1992), Weick (1987) and many others used in the process of this 
present research. Mitroff at-W (1992, pp. 241) suggest that writers as early as 
Henry Fayol advocated the links between strategic management and crisis 
management, but his teaching has unfortunately been "forgotten" by those in 
the field of strategic management. Fayol is regarded as one of the "fathers" of 
the field of business policy and planning, and among the many classical 
management scholars, it seems that Fayol's work has been "misinterpreted" 
(Aktouf, 1990, in Mitroff et at,. 1992, pp. 241). Mitroff et at (1992) argue that 
although Fayol's work is remembered by his four LAST functions of general 
management (organizing, directing, coordinating and controlling), it should 
also be remembered that Fayol explicitly mentioned FIRST the function of 
"prevoyance", by which he meant, on one side, to "forecast" and "foresight", 
and on the other, to "secure", to "make safe" and to "make reliable" (Fayol, 
1916, in Mitroff et a1.1992, pp. 241), therefore stressing that activities in crisis 
management were an integral part of the general administrative functions. 
Early research by Greiner (1972, in Smith, 1992) called attention to the 
inevitability of crisis. His studies show that organizations inevitably pass 
through a series of evolutionary phases and that progression from one phase 
to another is marked by the organization's ability to overcome the demands of 
a crisis, or revolutionary event. These developmental periods are determined 
by the age, size, and growth rate of the organization and will be marked by a 
crisis event as the organization evolves to cope with a new series of demands: 
"The critical task for management in each revolutionary period is to find a 
new set of organization practices that will become the basis for managing 
the next period of evolutionary growth. Interestingly enough, these new 
practices eventually sow their seeds of decay and lead to another period of 
revolution. Companies therefore experience the irony of seeing a major 
solution in one time period becoming a major problem at a later date" 
(Greiner, 1972, pp. 377, in Smith, 1992, pp. 262). 
There are however, many dynamics that need careful attention in adopting a 
strategy to solve or alleviate pressure (a crisis). A good illustration of this 
process can be observed in a Sears (USA) experience in an episode that 
attracted great attention. Sears was facing sharply falling revenues (an initial 
crisis), and introduced a bonus plan designed to bring more business (and 
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hence more revenues) into its auto repair facilities. The bonus plan indeed 
brought more revenue, however, not in the ways intended. Management and 
workers collected the bonuses by bilking consumers for unneeded auto 
repairs. Thus, a reasonable intervention or business strategy (the bonus plan) 
designed to respond to a crisis, (the financial crisis), created a worse one: 
incalculable damage to the reputation of a venerable American institution. 
Sears failed to identify the potential for unintended effects of the interaction of 
their initial intention (the bonus plan) with their defective culture and structure 
(Hoffman and Siguaw, 1993; Driscoll, 1994). The lesson in this case is that the 
value or desirability of an action cannot be judged in isolation from its effects 
on the whole system of which it is an integral part. 
One can then conclude that given the inevitability of crises, management 
would have to develop a culture that acknowledges the potential for such 
events and facilitates a flexible response to the changing demands of a crisis 
situation. As observed in previous sections, the culture of an organization is of 
critical importance to corporate strategic decision making, particularly in terms 
of its perceived ability to anticipate and respond to a crisis event. However, 
much of the effort by organizations to date, unfortunately, has been diverted 
into the development of contingency plans (what happens if? ) and is often 
limited to the process of damage limitation (a reactive approach) instead of 
crisis prevention (a proactive approach). The main objective of organizations 
should be one of crisis prevention rather than response (Klein et al, 1995; 
Fink, 1986; Weick, 1987; Perrow, 1984; Mitroff and Pearson, 1993a, 1993b; 
Smith, 1990). Smith (1992, pp. 262) argues that in such a case, management 
will be seeking "control" of the situation rather than letting the situation control 
them. Smith also posits that "such an approach necessitates a strategic view 
of the problem". Indeed, and as also discussed in this chapter, the culture of 
an organization represents both an opportunity and a threat for crisis 
management. On the one hand, the culture of an organization can serve to 
precipitate a crisis by providing the environment within which such an event 
can escalate rapidly (Klein et at, 1995; Mitroff, Pearson and Pauchant, 1992; 
Pauchant and Mitroff, 1992; Kekäle and Kekäle, 1995; Mitroff et al, 1989; 
Smith, 1990; Pauchant and Mitroff, 1988; Fink, 1986; Mitroff and Kilmann, 
1984; Nunamaker et al, 1989). Conversely, the prevailing culture can be 
central to an organization's ability to cope with a threatening situation (Klein PA 
al, 1995; Mitroff, Pearson and Pauchant, 1992; Kekäle and Kekäle, 1995; 
Cooke and Rousseu, 1988; Pauchant and Mitroff, 1992; Mitroff et al, 1989; 
Smith, 1990; Pauchant and Mitroff, 1988; Fink, 1986; Mitroff and Kilmann, 
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1984; Nunamaker ems, 1989). Therefore, many crises are incubated within 
the organizations that play host to them. In those cases, the culture of an 
organization can then be its own worst enemy. 
There is a strong argument that crisis management should be integrated into 
the field of strategic management. Given the increasing incidence of "human- 
induced crisis", Mitroff et-al (1992) propose that the theory and practice of 
crisis management and strategic management should be incorporated "in an 
effort to modify some of the current corporate philosophies and strategies" 
(Mitroff et al, 1992, pp. 236). The main premise of their argument is that crisis 
management and strategic management share six basic characteristics: (1) a 
focus on environmental relations; (2) dealing with a complex set of 
stakeholders; (3) an involvement of top management; (4) a concern for the 
whole organization; (5) the expression of a consistent pattern; and (6) the 
presence of an emergent process. 
Mitroff et al (1992) have identified some links between strategic management 
and crisis management in the work of some leading researchers. If one 
considers the similarities above, it is not by chance that some of the most 
influential researchers associated with the field of strategic management and 
business policy have already discussed or studied some issues surrounding 
the field of crisis management. For example, Dutton (1986) has studied the 
process of strategic issues when these issues were perceived as a crisis or as 
a noncrisis event; Hambrick and D'Aveni (1988) conducted research on the 
causes underlying 'bankruptcy in large private-sector corporations; Janis 
(1989) has discussed some of the interrelationships existing between 
decision making, policy and crisis management; Miller (1988) has identified 
and, described four configurations potentially leading to the decline and 
downfall for large and private organizations; Mitroff and Kilmann (1984) and 
Mitroff and Pauchant (1990) have discussed the links between corporate 
strategies and tragedies; Reilly (1993,1987) has studied the degree of 
preparedness of organizations in what she calls "strategic crisis 
management"; Smart and Vertinsky (1977,1984) or Nystrom and Starbuck 
(1984) have discussed different strategic responses for coping with crises; 
Shrivastava (1992), Shrivastava et al (1988) and Shrivastava (1986) have 
proposed that the field of strategic management is ideological and did not 
allow for a full recognition of the realities of industrial crises. 
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Finally, Mitroff et al (1992, pp. 241) argue that while many authors have 
provided legitimization of the links existing between crisis management and 
strategic management ("they have often made links implicitly"), for the most 
part they have not provided a clear conceptual definition of what is meant by a 
"crisis". Thus, as discussed in Chapter 2, the problem of construct and 
definition (or lack of conceptual delineation) is one that still hinders 
development in the field of crisis management (one of which being the 
integration of crisis management into strategic management). 
Having said that, the intention of the discussion in this section is to illustrate 
recent development in this area. This section does not claim to be an 
exhaustive discussion and clearly more research is needed to explain or 
explore the benefits and challenges of the integration of crisis management 
into strategic management. 
3.10- Summary 
This chapter explored and elaborated on the issue of organizational culture. It 
also established the links between organizational culture and crisis 
management. The chapter drew from research on the origins of crisis, its 
evolution, levels, and functions, and established the relevance of all aspects 
that constitute organizational culture to crisis management. 
Organizational culture has its origins in the broader society, the nature of 
business and environment in which one operates, and in the basic 
assumptions held by the founder or other dominant leader. While those 
generic sources of organizational culture can be explained separately, there 
is a, great deal of interdependence between them. Instead of looking at each 
individual source that shapes organizational culture independently, the best 
way to approach organizational culture is to view it as a result of the unique 
blending of the three general sources. 
Organizational culture has some well defined elements and functions, referred 
to as levels of culture. Schein's three-level model provides the most useful 
typology published to date for classifying elements of organizational culture 
(Schein, 1990). "Artifacts" is the most visible and concrete level, whereas 
basic assumptions is the most abstract level. Values is placed between those 
two levels. "Basic assumptions" is considered the essence of culture. The 
other levels are the observable manifestations of the cultural essence. 
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Artifacts manifest themselves in material and nonmaterial objects that 
communicate, voluntarily or involuntarily, information about all aspects of the 
organization. They include everything from the physical layout, the dress 
code, the manner in which people address each other, the smell and feel of 
the place, its emotional intensity, to the more archival manifestations such as 
company records, products, mission, etc. Organizational language, jargon, 
stories, myths, and jokes, symbols and sings can also be artifacts. Although 
artifacts are "visible" they are difficult to decipher and are unreliable indicators 
of organizational culture. 
Values and beliefs are central to organizational culture. Shared beliefs and 
values by members of an organization provide the reasons why the members 
behave in a certain way. Values are the "shoulds, should nots, and ought-to- 
be's of organizational life" (Ott, 1989). They are conscious, affective desires or 
wants. On the other hand, beliefs are what is perceived to be true, reality or 
unreality. Beliefs and values are then, the sense of "what 'ought' to be, as 
distinct from what is". Level 2 (Values) reveals how people communicate, 
explain, rationalize, and justify what they say and do as a community. Values 
and beliefs have an important function in an organization, since they influence 
patterns of organizational behaviour. Although this level is very important and 
is often referred to as the organizational culture, the elements in this level 
alone are not in themselves sufficient to be trusted to provide accurate 
information about a true organizational culture (level 3- basic assumptions). 
Although "artifacts" and "values" are important levels of the organizational 
culture, organizational culture truly manifests itself through the underlying 
basic assumptions. "Basic assumptions" is a relatively new concept. The 
concept, as it is widely used today, was introduced by Edgar Schein in early 
1980s. Basic assumptions are unconscious. They are values that have 
undergone an evolutionary process to a higher level. To undergo this 
transformation into basic assumptions, solutions based on a given value need 
to work consistently. The only values that become assumptions are those that 
are susceptible to physical and social validation, and that continue to work 
reliably in solving a group's problems. In this way, they come to be taken for 
granted in the organization. They move out of members' consciousness into 
their preconsciousness. Basic assumptions tell an organization's members 
how to perceive, think about, and feel about things. They guide behaviour. 
They are a comprehensive, potent, but out-of-conscious system of beliefs, 
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perceptions, and values (Ott, 1989). However, basic assumptions are very 
difficult to change. 
Basic assumptions are "secret coping devices" that help organizations to deal 
with problems of external adaptation and internal integration. Research 
conducted by Ott (1989) revealed that basic assumptions are so powerful that 
people act on them even against the stated values and beliefs of the 
organization. Ott (1989, pp. 44), argue that 
"Beliefs and values are what people will admit to. Basic underlying 
assumptions are what people actually believe and feel and what determine 
their pattern of behaviour, whether or not they are aware of them". 
Organizational culture as a concept is relatively new. There is still much 
confusion in relation to the concept and its definition. Many definitions of the 
concept, each reflecting a particular point of view, have been proposed. In 
organizational culture research, the term "culture" is used indiscriminately 
basically referring to two different meanings; first, to the coherent system of 
assumptions and basic values distinguishing a group and directing its 
choices; and second, to a group's distinct set of features or traits, which does 
not only mean its basic values but its beliefs, models of behaviour, technology, 
symbols, and artifacts (Kekäle and Kekäle, 1995). However, and as proposed 
by Schein (1 990a, pp. 6), the term "culture" should be reserved for the deeper 
level of basic assumptions and beliefs that are shared by members of an 
organization, that operate unconsciously, and that define in a basic "taken-for- 
granted" fashion an organization's view of itself and its environment. 
Organizational culture is the most important variable in crisis management. 
Research by leading scholars supports the view that organizational culture is 
the most decisive element in determining an organization's crisis 
preparedness. Organizational culture represents both an opportunity and a 
threat for crisis management. On the one hand, it can serve to precipitate a 
crisis by providing the environment within which a crisis can evolve. On the 
other hand, it can provide an organization with the right conditions for its 
members to anticipate, prevent, and, should crises occur, manage crisis 
events effectively. The culture of an organization is the most decisive element 
in determining whether an organization is prepared or not for crisis. The 
culture of an organization governs and directs all aspects of organizational 
life. It influences the decision making process (what strategy to follow), the 
success of their implementation, and it dictates whether an organization is 
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able or not to adapt and respond to changes emanated both in the internal 
and in the external environment. Organizational culture also influences the 
long-term effectiveness and performance of organizations, and determines 
organizational well-being. Previous research has identified fundamental 
cultural differences between an organization that is "prepared" for crisis and 
one that is not. They display very contrasting cultural traits and assumptions, 
which reflect in their ability to anticipate and manage crisis effectively. 
The ability to change and adapt to new demands in the environment is a 
requisite to survival in business today. Change requires that an organization 
not only learn new practices but that it also redefine itself in ways that involve 
deep cultural assumptions. The culture of an organization must be supportive 
of change. If not, even when organizations can devise sound strategies to 
cope with change demands, their implementation will not be successful. As 
mentioned above, deeply held assumptions are very difficult to change. 
However, the reality of business today (constant change in the external and 
internal environments) requires appropriate strategic responses, which in turn 
depend on the organizational culture's ability to devise and implement them 
effectively. Given the difficult and complex task of changing culture, in many 
cases changes will occur only after an organization suffers a major crisis, 
when there will then be the opportunity to "shake" the basic assumptions. 
For the hospitality industry, and in addition to the already discussed aspects 
and role culture plays in organizational life, some other features of the 
hospitality industry have been identified that contribute to the difficulties of 
implementing and managing change effectively. This is mainly due to the 
nature of the hospitality industry and its operating environment. 
Having said that, there is a clear link between organizational culture and crisis 
management. Organizational culture is of critical importance to the 
organizational strategic process, and in this way it determines an 
organization's ability to respond to a crisis event. Organizations that are prone 
to crisis exhibit cultural characteristics (assumptions, believes, values, 
structure, and so forth) which impair successful performance in crisis 
management. In this sense, if those cultural characteristics do not create their 
own crisis and disasters, they are likely to exacerbate their effects, instead of 
combating them. 
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Finally, since there is no place in modern business management for the quick- 
fix and incremental adjustment to the solution of complex problems, and once 
there has been established the inexorable link between organizational culture 
and crisis management, there is growing demand to integrate crisis 
management and strategic management. Evidence already exists to support 
this view in the work of many leading scholars and practitioners. 
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STAKEHOLDERS AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
Crises show us that organizations are not simply systems of production. They are, 
simultaneously, systems of destruction. 
Shrivastava, 1988 
4.1 - Introduction 
The issue of stakeholder relationship is viewed here in the context of this 
research, that is, in relation to crisis and crisis management. However, a 
revision of the literature on the concept and evolution of the stakeholder 
theory is also presented. 
The first sections concentrate on the development and evolution of the 
stakeholder concept, definition of the concept, and controversy surrounding it. 
The discussion centres on the question of "to whom and for what ends is the 
corporate management responsible? " (Maitland, 1994). The traditional view of 
organizational responsibility (responsive only to its owner - the stockholders - 
interests) is challenged by the concept of stakeholder. It is argued that other 
interest groups (stakeholders) are entitled to participate in determining the 
future direction of an organization in which they have a stake. In another 
words, it is fair that people whose livelihoods are affected by organizational 
decisions have the right to a say in them, or at least, to have their interests 
taken into consideration. 
The stakeholder theory is a relatively new concept. According to the literature, 
stakeholder theory is based on the principle that the organization takes into 
account all those groups that can affect, or are affected by, the 
accomplishment of organizational purpose. As has any new concept it has its 
limitations and controversies. With special respect to the stakeholder theory, 
there is very little empirical evidence in the literature and the stakeholder 
theory, in general, has been presented and used in many different ways which 
involve very distinct methodologies, types of evidence, and criteria of 
appraisal (leading to the diverse and sometimes confusing uses of the 
concept). This fact is one of the reasons why the stakeholder concept has not 
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attracted much attention. Thus, a lot of what has been done so far has been 
more controversial than helpful in settling some fundamental questions. 
However, the researcher agrees with Goodpaster and Holloran (1994, pp. 
423) that "some paradoxes are better preserved from rather than guided 
towards resolution. " 
The application of the stakeholder theory has serious managerial implications. 
Special difficulty is encountered in identifying stakeholder. The identification 
of "legitimate" groups is very controversial with scholars and professionals 
disagreeing in respect to methodologies and typologies/frameworks designed 
for this end. Lack of operational definitions for some concepts has also 
contributed to the confusion. 
Stakeholders play a major role in crisis and crisis management. Stakeholders 
are central in organizational crisis prevention and management. In dealing 
with the issue of crisis it is important to understand the concepts and 
implications of the stakeholder theory in order to plan effectively for crisis 
management. Examples of stakeholder management are presented in both 
crisis prevention and crisis management situations. Examples are also given 
on the implications of stakeholder "mismanagement". 
This chapter also introduces another set of stakeholders not covered by the 
traditional external impersonal/institutional forces described by the literature. 
This new set of stakeholders is more relevant to the present research in that it 
covers a broader range of characters that can potentially affect the modern 
organization. They are derived from the sociopathic behaviour that has been 
directed towards organizations (such as terrorist attacks, highjacks, executive 
kidnapping, sabotage, contamination/poisoning, etc. ). 
The whole issue of stakeholders and crisis requires an understanding of 
assumptions and how it operates. Assumptions are essential in planning, and 
since this research is concerned with crisis management, and stakeholders 
relationships, it is important to understand how stakeholders view each other 
in a system and what assumptions they make about each other. Equally, it is 
important to understand how stakeholders view themselves. This is specially 
true in crisis situations. In the event of a crisis, it is crucial to know and 
understand how stakeholders view the event itself and what assumptions they 
make about it. In fact, one way to understand crises is through understanding 
how stakeholders view reality. Those issues are critical in crisis management. 
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Successful response to crisis, as will become clear, depends greatly on the 
concerted effort of stakeholders (since one lives and operates in an 
interconnected and interdependent world). Assumptions make planning 
possible. Without assumptions it would be all but impossible to undertake any 
planning. Assumptions are also at the centre of decision making in most 
common circumstances. This chapter also discusses how assumptions are 
formulated. 
Finally, since stakeholders make assumptions about future events, the 
position and possible moves of other stakeholders, etc., they inevitably project 
images of one another. Those images are referred to as archetypal images. 
Since the research methodology for this research makes an instrumental use 
of a set of "archetypal stakeholders", the issue of archetypes is briefly 
reviewed. The study and applicability of symbolism and archetypes into 
organizational studies has been scarce. However, there is a growing need to 
understand more about archetypes and their relation to organizational 
management. Some of the few studies -relating archetypal studies and 
management theories are interesting and provocative. The brief discussion of 
this subject in this chapter relates basically to the work of Turner (1992), and 
Mitroff (1989). 
No evidence of studies or research could be found directly relating 
stakeholders, assumptions, or archetypes, with respect to the hotel industry. 
Knowles (1996) introduces the concept of stakeholders in a very generalized 
manner as it relates to strategic planning but does not substantiate it with any 
empirical or theoretical evidence. More research is needed in those areas in 
the field of hospitality. 
4.2 - Stakeholder Theory and Concept 
Organizations operate in an interdependent and interconnected web of 
relationships. These relationships occur and exist irrespective of whether or 
not an organization agrees with them. It is a fact. The individuals, groups, 
institutions, governments, etc., with whom an organization deals in the course 
of conducting its business are referred to as "stakeholders". Freeman (1984, 
pp. 46) defines stakeholders as "any group or individual who can affect or is 
affected by the achievement of the organization's objectives. " This definition, 
from the perspective of this research, should be looked at with a degree of 
caution. Freeman refers to "achievement" and it is easy to assume 
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"successful" achievement. As observed in previous chapters, organizations 
have also embedded in their makeups a destructive potential. In this sense, 
organizations sometimes also may "achieve" undesirable "objectives". 
Clarkson (1995, pp. 106) provides a more specific definition in that 
stakeholders 
"are persons or groups that have, or claim, ownership, rights, or interests in 
a corporation and its activities, past, present, or future. Such claimed rights 
or interests are the result of transactions with, or actions taken by, the 
corporation, and may be legal or moral, individual or collective. 
Stakeholders with similar interests, claims, or rights can be classified as 
belonging to the same group: employees, shareholders, customers, and so 
on. " 
The issues and implications of this and the previous definition are further 
developed in the course of the following sections in this chapter where also 
other definitions of stakeholder are presented and discussed. 
Stakeholders group have a diverse range of expectations, needs, and values 
(Greenley and Foxall, 1996; Freeman, 1984,1994; Clarkson, 1995; Langtry, 
1994; Wicks et p, l_, 1994; Rivoli, 1995; Johnson and Scholes, 1993; Maitland, 
1994). Organizations find it difficult to address the diverse interest of their 
stakeholders (Letang, 1995; Greenley and Foxall, 1996; Freeman, 1984, 
1994; Clarkson, 1995; Langtry, 1994; Wicks et , 1994; Rivoli, 1995; Johnson 
and Scholes, 1993). However, as it will become clear later, failure to satisfy 
the interests of particular stakeholders may be very detrimental to 
organizational general performance (Greenley and Foxall, 1996; Donaldson 
and Preston, 1995; Mitroff and Kilmann, 1984; Freeman, 1984; Johnson and 
Scholes, 1993; Letang, 1995; Clarkson, 1995). It is not claimed here that all 
stakeholder interests should be satisfied simultaneously. There are practical 
constraints such as restriction on organizational resources and managerial 
capabilities that should be considered (Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; 
Freeman, 1984; Johnson and Scholes, 1993). Having said that, there is no 
empirical evidence concerning the relative attention that organizations give to 
stakeholder groups (Greenley and Foxall, 1996). Nevertheless, the strategic 
support of stakeholders is essential in all aspects of organizational operations 
(Freeman, 1984; Langtry, 1994; Wicks BLaI, 1994; Clarkson, 1995; Johnson 
and Scholes, 1993; Rivoli, 1995). MacMillan and Jones (1986, in Greenley 
and Foxall, 1996, pp. 105) argue that "stakeholders support is essential, or 
their opposition must be negated, if a major strategic change is to be 
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successfully implemented. " This support is even more crucial in crisis 
situations (Stubbart, 1987; Schwenk, 1989; Mitroff and Linstone, 1993; 
Shrivastava, 1992; Shrivastava, 1988; Mitroff and Pearson, 1993a; Mitroff, 
1994; Mitroff and Kilmann, 1984; Baker, 1991; Vincent, 1990). 
Stakeholders can be divided into two categories: primary stakeholders and 
secondary stakeholders. Primary stakeholders are those that without their 
continuing support the organization cannot survive. They are for example, the 
shareholders and investors, employees, customers, and suppliers, as well as 
the public stakeholder group: the governments and communities that provide 
infrastructures and markets, whose laws and regulations must be obeyed, and 
to whom taxes and other obligations may be due. A high level of 
interdependence exists between the organization and its primary 
stakeholders (Clarkson, 1995; Freeman, 1994; Maitland, 1994; Greenley and 
Foxall, 1996; Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Mitroff and Kilmann, 1984; 
Freeman, 1984; Johnson and Scholes, 1993; Letang, 1995). 
As mentioned above, failure. to take into account the interests of particular 
stakeholders can have devastating effects on the organization. Clarkson 
(1995) provides some examples of situations where the interests of 
stakeholders were neglected or unattended. In the United States in 1991, the 
leader in the market of breast implants, a division of Dow Corning, failed to 
keep its customer and public stakeholder groups satisfied with the safety of 
one of its products. The net result was the collapse of the stakeholder system 
for that product and the complete withdrawal of that division from its leading 
position. Another example was the breakup of AT&T in the 1980's which is 
attributed to the inability of the company to satisfy two primary stakeholder 
groups (customers and the public), whose interests were represented by the 
Department of Justice. In Chapter 2 and 3 some other examples of business 
failure or collapse of organizations were discussed and which can also be 
attributed to the mismanagement of the stakeholder system. 
Those groups who influence or affect, or are influenced or affected by, the 
organization but are not engaged in direct transactions with the organization 
and are not essential for its survival, are defined as secondary stakeholders 
(Clarkson, 1995; Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984,1994; 
Maitland, 1994; Langtry, 1994; Wicks et al, 1994). The media and other 
special interest groups are considered as secondary stakeholders. However, 
the "power' of those secondary interest groups cannot be underestimated as 
158 
G. Santana Ch. 4- Stakeholders and Crisis Management 
will become clear when the issue of crisis and stakeholders are considered 
together. The media, for example, has the ability and capacity to mobilize 
public opinion in favour of, or in opposition to, an issue, organization's 
performance, etc., as demonstrated in crisis cases such as the Tylenol 
(favourable) and the Exxon Valdez oil spill (unfavourable) described in 
previous chapters. 
Although Clarkson argues that an organization's survival does not depend on 
secondary stakeholders for its survival, this may not be always the case. 
Indirectly, organizations do depend on the support of all involved in the 
stakeholder system. The cases mentioned above are just two of the best 
known cases of this interdependence between players in a system. 
Donaldson and Preston (1995, pp. 86) suggest that it is important to make a 
distinction between "influencers" and stakeholders. It is argued that some 
groups such as large investors, can be both, but some other recognizable 
stakeholders (such as job applicants) have no influence, and some other 
influencers (e. g., the media) have no stake. This argument may be technically 
correct but fails to address the fundamental issue of the implications of not 
satisfying or taking into account the demands, expectations, etc., of those 
groups. The organization may not depend directly on the inputs of those 
secondary stakeholders for its immediate survival but as discussed in 
previous chapters, those groups can cause significant damage to 
organizations. As Freeman (1984, pp. 53) stated, 
,, Some groups may have as an objective simply to interfere with the smooth 
operations of our business. For instance, some corporations must count 
'terrorist groups' as stakeholders. As unsavory as it is to admit that such 
'illegitimate' groups have a stake in our business, from the standpoint of 
strategic management, it must be done. " 
For the purpose of this study, and as will be discussed in detail later, all 
stakeholders should be regarded as important and attention should be taken 
to consider and respect their "demands" in decision making. They are all 
(certainly not equally, but to a certain degree) important in preventing and 
managing crisis. 
The stakeholder theory was "popularized" in the 1980s by Edward Freeman 
when it was suggested that a new theory to reduce uncertainty in the turbulent 
times of the 1980s was needed (Freeman, 1984). Freeman's main argument 
was that management ignored. the external forces and changes in the 
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environment. It has been suggested that there was a need for incorporating 
"external" change into the more traditional internal management model 
(supplier - firm - customer relationship). External change can be understood, 
in Freeman's words, 
"in terms of the emergence of several new groups and the restructuring of 
old relationships of lesser importance, who have come to have a stake in 
the actions or inactions of the corporation" (Freeman, 1984, pp. 13). 
By incorporating this groups it is argued that uncertainties derived from 
external changes can be reduced (since they can be readily assimilated). 
Also, in this way, events and pressure groups that could become crises 
because their existence had been neglected and not incorporated into daily 
routines, would become familiar and "manageable". 
The range of stakeholders interests encountered by most companies was 
develop by Freeman (1984) and was denominated "stakeholder map". 
Freeman describes the range of groups as: government, political groups, 
shareholders, financial community, activist groups, consumers, consumer 
advocate groups, unions, employees, trade associations, competitors, and 
suppliers. It has to be noticed, however, that this list is not exhaustive and is a 
very general one. Within each group there can be many others stakeholders. 
This list of groups also does not apply to all organizations uniformly. This 
issue is discussed further in a later section when crises and stakeholder 
relationship are addressed. 
4.2.1 - History and Evolution of the Stakeholder Theory 
The word "stakeholder" was first used in a memorandum at the Stanford 
Research Institute (SRI), in 1963, generalizing the notion of stockholders as 
the only group to whom management need to be responsive. The stakeholder 
concept was then defined and referred to as "those groups without whose 
support the organization would cease to exist" (Freeman, 1984, pp. 31). SRI 
researchers argued that unless executives understood the needs and 
concerns of stakeholders (their model originally included shareholders, 
employees, customers, suppliers, lenders, and society), executives would not 
be able to formulate corporate objectives which would receive the necessary 
support for the continued survival of the organization. 
Second to Freeman (1984, pp. 31 - 32), the stakeholder concept after 
originating from the SRI took many directions. It was embraced and used in 
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the corporate planning literature, by systems theorists, appeared in the 
literature on corporate social responsibility, and was used by organization 
theorists. Figure 4.1 below represents the history of the stakeholder concept. 
Figure 4.1 -A History of the Stakeholder Concept 
00, History of Idea 
Adam Smith (1759) 
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Source: - Freeman, R., E. - (1984), Strategic Management -A Stakeholder Approach, 
Massachusetts, Pitman Publishing Inc., pp. 32 
In late 1970s and early 1980s the stakeholder concept began to receive 
attention in the literature on strategic planning. A compilation and review of 
the most relevant works during that period can be found in Freeman (1984). 
However, and as mentioned above, the stakeholder concept was really 
"popularized" in middle 1980s by the work of Freeman, specially his 1984 
book (Strategic Management -A Stakeholder Approach, Massachusetts, 
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Pitman Publishing Inc. ) linking the stakeholder concept to strategic 
management. 
Freeman (1984) argues that while the history of the stakeholder concept is a 
recent one it can, nevertheless, be used to tie together a rich body of literature 
(also Greenley and Foxall, 1996; Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Johnson and 
Scholes, 1993; Langtry, 1994; Mitroff and Pearson, 1993a; Maitland, 1994). 
The main argument used by Freeman is that the major concerns of each area 
of research are not mutually exclusive. Freeman (1984, pp. 43 - 44) argues 
further that 
"The concerns with formulating plans and systems of plans for business 
level entities, with understanding the role of corporation in social systems, 
with the social responsibility of business and the need for integrative 
theories to explain the behavior of a large population of organizations and 
their environment are of vital importance to managers and organizational 
researchers. " 
Therefore, the stakeholder concept can be useful in integrating some of these 
issues around the concept of organizational strategy, that is around the issues 
of how organizations can configure themselves and take actions to align 
themselves with the external environment. The stakeholder concept can be 
used to enrich management's understanding of strategic directions and tasks 
in light of the internal and external changes in the environment. 
Greenley and Foxall (1996) review the literature on marketing and strategic 
management and how these two fields address the issue of stakeholder 
interests. Their conclusion is that in the marketing literature the consumers 
constitute the central group. Greenley and Foxall (1996, pp. 106) claim further 
that 'in marketing 
"the emphasis is not only orientating corporate decision-making in general 
to the consumer, but also on giving specific priority to satisfying consumer's 
needs in preference to those of other stakeholder group. " 
However, a different picture was identified in the strategic management field. 
The literature in the field of strategic management generally assumes that in 
order to be successful organizations should satisfy the interests of all their 
stakeholder groups (as also discussed above). Having said that, there is 
negligible published empirical evidence that shows what attention 
organizations in fact give to potentially conflicting stakeholder interests. This is 
a field of ever growing practical importance and yet one that has been largely 
overlooked. 
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4.2.1.1 - Evolution of the Stakeholder Theory - Recognition and Controversy 
Management literature today, both academic and professional, addresses the 
issue of stakeholders. The fact that organizations have stakeholders is a 
recognized factor and attempts have been made to incorporate the 
stakeholder concept in both theory and practice of the management world. As 
the stakeholder theory is an evolving field, it is bound to have controversy in 
its evolutionary process. Indeed, recent work by Donaldson and Preston 
(1995, pp. 66) suggest that the 
"concepts of stakeholder, stakeholder model, stakeholder management, 
and stakeholder theory are explained and used by various authors in very 
different ways and supported (or critiqued) with diverse and often 
contradictory evidence and arguments. " 
In addition, Donaldson and Preston (1995) go further to state that the 
implications of those diversities are seldom discussed and possibly not even 
recognized. 
One indication of that diversity can be observed in the very definition of the 
term itself. The previous definition of stakeholder (section 4.2), "A stakeholder 
is any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of 
the organization's objectives", is argued by Langtry (1994, pp. 432) to be a 
"morally neutral definition". Langtry (1994) identifies some practical difficulties 
with the definition. For example, it is argued that "affect" and "affected by" are 
weak conditions because an organization may "affect" an individual or group 
by merely coming to one's notice ("altering one's cognitive state"), however, 
this does not make one an interesting stakeholder in any sense. Moreover, it 
is argued, any individual or group determined to destroy the corporation and 
thereby prevent it from achieving its purpose is counted as a stakeholder, 
even though the individual or group may not own shares and is out to destroy 
it by illegal means. An extreme example of this kind of "stakeholder" is a 
terrorist group. Langtry (1994, pp. 433) provides then a more "complete" 
account of the term stakeholder to resolve some of the difficulties encountered 
in previous attempts: 
"Stakeholders are groups or individuals who either are such that the firm's 
decisions to act, or decision to not act, have been or will be to a significant 
extent causally responsible for their level of well being, or else have some 
independently identifiable moral or legal claim on the firm which the firm's 
actions violate or respect. " 
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Although the definition abandons moral neutrality it is still very much open to 
subjectivity. For instance, the interpretation of organization's responsibility 
("the firm's decisions to act, or decision to not act, have been or will be to a 
significant extent causally responsible for their level of well being") is a matter 
of great subjectivity and in many cases will have to be left for other 
"stakeholders" to pass "judgment" (moral reasoning). This is often the situation 
when major crises occur (such as the Union Carbide crisis in Bophal) which 
involved multiple stakeholders, other international corporations, international 
law, governments, different geographical locations, etc., and for that reason 
are subject to different degrees of interpretation. Those types of crises are 
characterized by unresolved fundamental problems lingering for many years. 
(This issue is discussed in more detail in the following sections). Langtry 
(1994, pp. 433) nevertheless introduces the term "respect", which should not 
be confused with "not violate". In this matter, if an organization does not violate 
the rights of other people in other regions of the world, for example, that does 
not mean it respects them. Respecting the rights of other people "involves 
taking them into account". 
The stakeholder theory (as with any new field) has not evolved without 
controversy. It has many detractors. In early days Ansoff argued for a rejection 
of the theory. Ansoff adopted the view which separated organizational 
objectives into "economic" and "social", with the latter being a "secondary 
modification and constraining influence" on the former. Ansoff (1965, in 
Freeman, 1984, pp. 33) states that 
"While as we shall see later, 'responsibilities' and 'objectives' are not 
synonymous, they have been made one in a 'stakeholder theory' of 
objectives. This theory maintains that the objectives of the firm should be 
derived balancing the conflicting claims of the various 'stakeholders' in the 
firm: managers, workers, stockholders, suppliers, vendors. " 
More recently Goodpaster (1991) challenged the stakeholder concept by 
diagnosing a "stakeholder paradox". Goodpaster's "attack" on the theory 
provoked a response from Freeman (1994) which is briefly discussed here. 
Goodpaster (1991) argued that stakeholder theory has two conflicting 
interpretations: the strategic interpretation and the multi-fiduciary 
interpretation. The first argues that managing stakeholder relationships makes 
good business sense, since it provides the organization and its members with 
a clear understanding of its economic objectives. That is, managing 
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stakeholders is a means to achieve stockholders or managerial ends 
(business without ethics). The latter, states that managers and directors have 
fiduciary obligations to stakeholders, one of which is stockholders, and that 
managing stakeholder relationships is non-optional, it is morally required 
(ethics without business). This argument has been rebuffed by Freeman 
(1994) where it is argued that there is no stakeholder paradox, "just difference, 
to be resolved by way of justification" (Freeman, 1994, pp. 410). In justifying 
the stakeholder concept, Freeman (1994) discusses in depth fundamental 
questions around the subject and provides good evidence of the relevance 
and importance of the stakeholder concept. For instance, Freeman (1994, pp. 
411) even questions "what is a stakeholder". Freeman's premise is that 
business organizations have a "moral/ethical" obligation to all the groups they 
affect or are affected by (not only a financial one to its "owners") and should 
address the demands of all the other groups. 
Critics have also questioned the need (altogether) of a new concept such as 
the stakeholder concept. To that, Freeman (1984, pp. 44 - 45) argues that the 
word itself ("stakeholder") is powerful enough to make a difference and to 
justify the existence of the concept. 
"By using 'stakeholder' managers and theorists alike will come to see these 
groups as having a 'stake'. 'Stakeholder' connotes 'legitimacy', and while 
managers may not think that certain groups are 'legitimate' in the sense that 
their demands on the firm are inappropriate, they had better give 
'legitimacy'to these groups in terms of their ability to affect the direction of 
the firm. Hence, 'legitimacy' can be understood in a managerial sense 
implying that it is'legitimate to spend time and resources' on stakeholders, 
regardless of the appropriateness of their demands. " 
4.2.1.1.1 - The Difference *Between the Stakeholder Theory and Other 
Concepts 
The very idea of stakeholders connotes an understanding and recognition of 
what Langtry (1994, pp. 432) phrased "morally valid claims". The concept and 
evolution of stakeholders can in fact be observed through the various 
explanations or definitions of the term stakeholder. Langtry (1994) provides a 
good insight into this perspective by exploring some definitions and 
conceptualizations of the term. For example, in early work, Evan and Freeman 
(1988, in Langtry, 1994, pp. 432) explained the concept as 
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"those groups who have a stake in or claim on the firm. Specifically we 
include suppliers, customers, employees, stockholders, and the local 
community, as well as management in its role as agent for these groups". 
This conceptualization was revisionary in that it extended recognition to a 
considerably wider range of people as having claims ("morally valid claims") 
on the firms, as opposed to prior views about claims and stake (e. g., banks 
had claims due to loans to an organization). The important point is that it 
recognized individuals and groups that are not recognized by the stockholder 
theory. In fact, Freeman (1994, pp. 413, quoting Tom Donaldson and Lee 
Preston, 1994), concludes that the stockholder theory "is an idea whose time 
has come and gone", and that the "stakeholder theory is consistent with a 
modern view of property" (also Donaldson and Preston, 1995). Freeman 
(1994, pp. 413) also argues that "the stockholder theory is or at least should 
be intellectually dead. " Most business ethicists condemn the stockholder 
theory as morally indefensible because it fails to respect the right of other 
organizational constituencies (stakeholders) to self-determination (Maitland, 
1994; Rivoli, 1995). Indeed, research by Clarkson (1995) on corporate social 
performance reveals that the measurement of corporate performance based 
on wealth creation for only one stakeholder (shareholder) is self-defeating. It 
is further argued by Clarkson (1995) that the economic and social purpose of 
an organization is to create and distribute increased wealth and value to all its 
primary stakeholder groups, without favoring one group at the expense of 
others. Donaldson and Preston (1995, pp. 68) also argue that 
"all persons or groups with legitimate interests participating in an enterprise 
do so to obtain benefits and that there is no prima facie priority of one set of 
interests and benefits over other. " 
Having said that, Figure 4.2 below represents the stakeholders' relationships. 
The arrows between the firm and its stakeholders constituents run in both 
directions. 
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Figure 4.2 - The Stakeholder Model 
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Source: - Donaldson, T.; Preston, L. - (1995), The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: 
Concepts, Evidence, and Implications, Academy of Management Review, V. 20 (1), pp. 69 
The whole conceptualization about the stakeholder theory had its origin in the 
unsatisfactory results of the stockholder theory (management is the agent of 
the owner - the stockholders - and, as such, has a fiduciary duty to manage 
the corporation in their best interests). Given that the stockholder theory 
proved unsatisfactory, a radical shift in thinking and practice was then 
proposed. Two main fundamental principles were advanced by Evan and 
Freeman's (1988): 
1- The Principle of Corporate Legitimacy 
"The corporation should be managed for the benefit of its stakeholders: its 
customers, suppliers, owners, employees, and local community. The rights 
of these groups must be ensured, and, further, the groups must participate, 
in some sense, in decisions that substantially affect their welfare. " 
2- The Stakeholder Fiduciary Principle 
"Management bears a fiduciary relationship to stakeholders and to the 
corporation as an abstract entity. It must act in the interests of the 
stakeholders as their agent, and it must act in the interests of the 
corporation to ensure the survival of the firm, safeguarding the long-term 
stakes of each group. " (Evan and Freeman, 1988, in Langtry, 1994, pp. 
433) 
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Given the discussion so far, the stakeholder theory differs from other 
approaches in very fundamental ways. The main intention of the stakeholder 
theory is to both explain and guide the behaviour of organizations (its 
attitudes, structure and operation). The stakeholder theory is general and 
comprehensive, it goes well beyond the descriptive acknowledgment that 
organizations have stakeholders (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). 
Criticism of the stakeholder theory has come from many quarters but it seems 
that a great number of the critics concentrate on the fact that stakeholder 
theorists have not provided a totally acceptable argument in defense of their 
theory. For example, Langtry (1994) argues that although the stakeholder 
theory contributed positively to recent work on strategic management, the 
normative ethical stakeholder theory offers a controversial revisionary account 
of the nature and ends of the firm and of moral claims to which it is subjected. 
Langtry's main argument is that the theory attracted the support of those 
dissatisfied with the dominant traditional stockholder theory but failed to 
provide a reasonably balanced argument which could function effectively (and 
have a wider acceptance). Langtry (1994, pp. 434 - 435), in this matter, 
proposes a new, supposedly more balanced concept which is referred to as 
the "tinged stockholder theory". The tinged stockholder theory states that 
"firms should be run to maximize the interests of stockholders, subject not 
only to legal constraints but also to moral or social obligations. These might 
be, for example, grounded in moral rights possessed by people generally 
or by specific categories of people such as employees of the firm; or there 
might be the moral duties of beneficence not grounded in rights of the 
recipient. Different tinged stockholder theories will identify these moral or 
social obligations in different ways. " 
Langtry's premise is that this is an alternative approach that avoids objections 
to the simplified and pure stockholder theory and that at the same time is 
consistent with the "contractarian foundations for morality" (Langtry, 1994, pp. 
441). 
Donaldson and Preston (1995, pp. 73) also identify the problem of justification 
of the theory and point to the fact that the confusion surrounding the theory 
("The muddling of theoretical bases and objectives") has led to less rigorous 
thinking and analysis than the stakeholder concept requires. In this respect, 
Donaldson and Preston (1995, pp. 73) go as far as to suggest (in line with the 
above discussion) that 
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"the underlying epistemiological issue in the stakeholder literature is the 
problem of justification: Why should the stakeholder theory be accepted or 
preferred over alternative conception? " 
Clarkson (1995), Freeman (1994), Langtry (1994), Donaldson and Preston 
(1995), and others, have identified that in general, one reason why the 
stakeholder concept has not attracted more attention is due to the fact that 
much of what passes for stakeholder theory in the literature is implicit rather 
than explicit (leading to the diverse and sometimes confusing uses of the 
concept). As already mentioned previously, the stakeholder theory has been 
presented and used in many different ways . which 
involve very distinct 
methodologies, types of evidence, and criteria of appraisal. However, there 
are three main types of uses of the theory: descriptive/empirical, instrumental, 
and normative. Donaldson and Preston (1995) argue that the theory is used to 
describe, and sometimes to explain, specific corporate characteristics and 
behaviours. The descriptive aspect of the theory reflects and explains past, 
present, and future states of affairs of corporations and their stakeholders. The 
theory is instrumental in identifying the connections, or lack of connections, 
between stakeholder management and the achievement of traditional 
corporate objectives (e. g., profitability, growth). Instrumental uses normally do 
not go as far as to explore specific links between cause (i. e., stakeholder 
management) and effect (i. e., corporate performance) in detail, however, such 
linkage is certainly implicit. Finally, the theory is used to interpret the function 
of the corporation, including the identification of moral or philosophical 
guidelines for the operation and management of corporations. Donaldson and 
Preston (1995, pp. 72) state that in normative uses, 
"the correspondence between the theory and the observed facts of 
corporate life is not a significant issue, nor is the association between 
stakeholder management and conventional performance measures a 
critical test. Instead, a normative theory attempts to interpret the function of, 
and offer guidance about, the investor-owned corporation on the basis of 
some underlying moral or philosophical principles. " 
Donaldson and Preston (1995) observe that most of the stakeholder literature, 
including the contributions of both proponents and critics, is clearly normative. 
As noted previously in this section, the normative ethical stakeholder theory 
perspective offers a controversial account of the nature and ends of the 
corporation and of the moral claims to which it is subjected (Langtry, 1994). 
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4.2.1.2 - Stakeholder Theory -A Managerial Perspective 
4.2.1.2.1 - Stakeholders as a Measure of Management Performance 
Evaluation 
As is evident, the theory of stakeholder is in the process of evolution and in 
this process is not immune to contrary arguments. The arguments are rich and 
contribute positively to development of the stakeholder theory. Those 
proposed practices were a radical departure from the dominant business and 
management thinking of the time (they still are in some sectors or 
geographical locations). Since then much evolution has taken place for 
different reasons, and today there is clear evidence that some large 
organizations are taking into account stakeholders' interests. One example is 
Shell UK, which has on its board representatives of interest groups such as 
environmentalists. Although there is no published evidence that assesses the 
amount of influence, and indeed how this influence is exercised, the fact is 
that stakeholders are now part of the daily business of some corporations and 
directly influence strategic decisions of organizations. It can be argued that 
Shell had no option (after many confrontations with interests groups 
defending the interests of other people on the other side of the world, and 
disastrous public relations campaigns), but to bring these people in. The fact 
of the matter is that they are there and they have clearly radically changed the 
way decisions are taken. Evidence is also needed as to whether their 
influence has improved the quality of the decision, the impact on the culture of 
the organization (introduction of new values, assumptions, etc. ), and of 
course, how performance has changed and is measured in the light of this 
new reality. 
Other well known companies that have adopted a similar approach are 
Johnson&Johnson, The Body Shop, Procter & Gamble, Lever Brothers, and 
Pitney Bowes (Dechant et al, 1994). Dechant et al (1994) argue that 
environmentalism in leading companies has become an integral part of 
organizational strategy. 
Vincent (1990, pp. 32) indeed argues that in today's business reality if 
organizations want to be successful in the long term "they must focus outward 
on the needs of the corporation's stakeholders, and all other parties with a 
stake in the success of the corporation". Chakravarthy (1986, in Greenley and 
Foxall, 1996, pp. 106) posits that a necessary condition for "excellence" is the 
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continued cooperation of all stakeholder groups. In the same line of argument, 
Evan and Freeman (1988, in Langtry, 1994, pp. 433) state that "The very 
purpose of the firm is, in our view, to serve as a vehicle for co-ordinating 
stakeholder interests. " 
Another example of the stakeholder theory in practice can be illustrated by the 
experience of Eastman Chemical Company. Deavenport (1996, pp. 1), 
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Eastman Chemical Company, 
explaining the philosophy of Eastman states that 
"aligning . the interests of all stakeholders to form a 
balanced, 
interdependent network is a stronger approach to maximizing the value of 
the company than a more traditional, 'single-stakeholder' approach. " 
That is, Eastman adopts a 'holistic' approach where alignment and 
interdependence are the key for its success. In this way Eastman is making 
sure that the interest of each stakeholder is aligned so that the success of one 
is interdependent upon the success of the others. Deavenport (1996), 
analyzing Eastman's experience reveals that "when success is matrixed into a 
tight, interdependent network, each stakeholder champions on the success of 
the others. " 
This new reality is also being reflected in the evaluation of executive 
performance in some countries. In the United States, for example, the National 
Association of Corporate Directors issued in 1994 a comprehensive set of 
recommendations for evaluating the performance of chief executive officers, 
boards of directors, and individual members of boards. It was recommended 
that performance should be evaluated in the light of integrity, vision, 
leadership, ability to meet corporate performance objectives, succession 
planning, shareholder relations, stakeholder relations, and CEO-board 
relations (Anonymous, in Directors & Boards, 1995). This is a radical 
departure from the way organizational leaders have been traditionally 
evaluated. Research commissioned by CFO magazine (Birchard, 1995) on the 
opinion of CFOs in large companies in relation to stakeholder management, 
revealed, contrary to traditional training, that the vast majority of CFOs not only 
plan for, but also measure company performance in meeting stakeholder 
goals. The research also supports the notion that the quality of relationships 
with stakeholders drives financial performance. Indeed, Donaldson and 
Preston (1995, pp. 71), list a number of recent pieces of research which 
measure the "achievement of traditional corporate objectives (e. g., profitability 
growth)", and reveals that the studies 
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"tended to generate 'implications' suggesting that adherence to stakeholder 
principle and practices achieves conventional corporate performance 
objectives as well as better than rival approaches. " 
Having said that, the issue of measuring "corporate social performance" is 
also a matter of great controversy. Although there have been some attempts to 
develop this field, there are very basic problems as for example in agreement 
on operational definitions. In fact, Clarkson (1995, pp. 92) argues that in the 
field of business and society there is no available definition for the concepts of 
corporate social performance, corporate social responsibility, and corporate 
social responsiveness. The main consequence of this lack of definition and 
proper understanding of the concepts is that. a framework or model for 
systematic collection, organization, and analysis of corporate data relating to 
the concepts above has not yet been developed. 
Clarkson (1995) conducted a ten year research project (between 1983 - 1993) 
on the subject of corporate social performance which revealed that corporate 
social performance can be analyzed and evaluated more effectively by using 
a framework based on the management of a corporation's relationships with 
its stakeholders rather than by using models or methodologies based on 
concepts relating to corporate social responsibility and responsiveness. 
Clarkson's research, therefore, supports the corporate practices mentioned 
above (methods used by companies in evaluating their executives 
performance). 
The stakeholder concept has also been applied lately by both public and 
private contractors and agencies to obtain approval for public-works projects. 
Martin and Green (1995) argue that by hearing and addressing all 
stakeholder concerns early in a project development, organizations can avoid 
many adversities in the long term (even when the final plan contains aspects 
that some stakeholders find disagreeable). 
4.2.1.2.2 - Managerial Implications for Identifying "Legitimate" Stakeholders 
The application of the stakeholder theory, however, has many managerial 
implications. The most obvious ones are the issues of identifying stakeholders 
and the role of managers. Those issues are discussed in the following 
sections in the context of this research. However, it is worth mentioning that 
controversy and confusion also exist surrounding these subjects. The 
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question of who is a legitimate stakeholder is a very complex and difficult one 
for management. The literature provides conflicting views. While some 
suggest a narrow approach to identify stakeholders others present some very 
broad frameworks that are almost functionally unrealistic. For example, the 
firm-as-contract approach states that the legitimate stakeholders are identified 
by the existence of a contract, expressed or implied, between them and the 
firm (Maitland, 1994; Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Greenley and Foxall, 
1996; Freeman, 1994; Langtry, 1994; Wicks et al, 1994). Although this 
approach is not wrong it is clearly incomplete (Donaldson and Preston, 1995, 
pp. 85). As will become clear later in this chapter when the issue of crisis and 
stakeholders is discussed, some relationships between an organization and 
the "community", for example, do not require a contract so that the 
"community" could then be taken into account. 
The opposite situation (a very broad view for identifying stakeholders) arises 
from situations where such definitions as "A stakeholder in an organization is 
(by definition) any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of the organization's objectives" (Thompson, 1967, in Freeman, 
1984, pp. 46) are used. This kind of definition broadens the spectrum of 
"legitimate" stakeholders that indeed might have some impact on 
organizational activities, but that have no specific stake in the organization 
itself. That is, they stand to gain no particular benefit from the organization's 
successful operation. Some aspects of this problem can be resolved by 
adopting the view of "primary" or "secondary" stakeholders discussed earlier. 
However, and as observed already in section 4.2 in this chapter, irrespective 
of the arguments, it is important to understand that all stakeholders, directly or 
indirectly, have the potential to be affected by organizational crisis or inflict 
damage to an organization. Moreover, in the context of this research all 
stakeholders should be regarded as important and attention should be taken 
to consider and respect their "demands" in decision making. They are all 
(almost equally) important in preventing and managing crisis. 
Indeed, and in those lines, Donaldson and Preston (1995, pp. 85 - 86) posit 
that stakeholders are identified 
"through the actual or potential harms and benefits that they experience or 
anticipate experiencing as a result of the firm's actions or inactions. In 
practice, and in addition to legal requirements, appraisal of the legitimacy of 
such expectations is an important function of management, often in concert 
with other already recognized stakeholders. " 
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Managerial role is also a subject of contradiction in the literature. Some 
authors do not even consider managers as stakeholders (Aoki, 1984, in 
Donaldson and Preston, 1995). Others argue that managers are one of the 
most important and powerful constituencies (Williamson, 1985, in Donaldson 
and Preston, 1995). It is however prudent, given the relevance and 
implications of the stakeholder theory in practice today, to observe that 
management should acknowledge the validity of diverse stakeholder interests 
and respond to them. Donaldson and Preston (1995) argue that this 
proposition is "moral" and legitimizes the management function. It could be 
added then, that the consequences of not doing so can be devastating to all 
involved, and in many cases the relationships can be (if attention and action 
are not taken to stakeholder interests) damaged beyond repair with long term 
implications. 
4.2.2 - Stakeholders and Strategy Development 
Individuals both inside and around an organization will have their attitudes 
strongly influenced by the cultural context in which they belong (as discussed 
in Chapter 3). Very few individuals have sufficient power to determine 
unilaterally the strategy of their organization. Johnson and Scholes (1993) 
argue that influence occurs because individuals share expectations with 
others by being part of a stakeholder group. That being the case, individuals 
would then need to identify themselves with the aims and ideals of these 
stakeholder groups, and this may occur within departments, at different 
geographical locations, at different levels in the hierarchy of the organization, 
etc. As also noted in Chapter 3, it is possible, and is often the case, that most 
individuals will belong to more than one stakeholder group. 
Organizations face pressures from a variety of external stakeholders. 
Schwenk (1989) suggests that the degree of pressure exercised by 
stakeholders depends on the power of these external influencers and the co- 
ordination among them. Organizations will generally comply with 
stakeholders' demands to the extent that they (organizations) are dependent 
on the stakeholders group. Henry Mintzberg (1983) devised a summary of the 
types of stakeholders that may directly influence the strategic management of 
an organization. Stakeholders have been categorized into four major sets: (1) 
owners of an organization, (2) associates who deal with it, associations which 
represent (3) employees, and the various (4) publics which surround the 
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organizations. Governments are also specially important stakeholders for 
many companies. Again, the above groups are not exhaustive and within 
each group there might be many subgroups which may have different degrees 
of influencing power on organizational decision making. They also do not 
apply to all organizations uniformly. 
Organizational culture is an important element for understanding the interests 
of stakeholders (Greenley and Foxall, 1996; Schwenk, 1989; Stubbart, 1987; 
Langtry, 1994; Mitroff and Kilmann, 1984; Fink, 1986). There is evidence to 
suggest that in organizations where the personal values, beliefs, and 
assumptions of managers are openly discussed, within the context of 
organizational culture, there are opportunities where the diverse interests of 
stakeholder groups can be discussed and compared with the interests of the 
company, at both the corporate and individual levels (Greenley and Foxall, 
1996). Having said that, and as discussed in Chapter 3, the culture of an 
organization not only determines and influences the design of strategies, but it 
also determines the success of its implementation. Organizational culture in 
fact guides all processes of strategic planning and in this sense it also 
determines the behaviour of an organization in relation to its stakeholders. 
The stakeholder concept described above is meant to be an introduction to 
the theory of stakeholder. The discussion of the stakeholder concept provided 
here is a brief account of its history, evolution, and contemporary issues 
surrounding the theory. It has been described here in preparation for a more 
focused discussion on those very important business relationships in times of 
crisis. The discussion illustrated that the stakeholder theory carries 
managerial implications and goes beyond the observation that organizations 
have stakeholders. It has also shown that stakeholder management 
contributes to successful performance. In this light, the stakeholder theory is 
extremely relevant to the issue of crisis and crisis management. Stakeholders 
play a very important role in both preventing and managing crisis. The 
following sections deal with the issues of crisis, crisis management, and 
stakeholder relationships in times of crisis. 
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4.3 - Crisis Management and Stakeholder System - Implications 
4.3.1 - Stakeholder System: Organizational Interdependency and 
Interconnectedness 
Critics' corporation perceptions are totally different from what it used to be a 
few years ago. That is, organizations/corporations are not seen only as 
economic entities. As an economic entity alone, criticism would be focused on 
economic issues only (i. e., underpaying workers, overcharging customers, 
forming cartels to fix prices, making shoddy goals, etc. ). Today, organizations 
are accountable for much more than just their economic performance. Critics 
hold corporations increasingly responsible for its side effects' on everything 
from air pollution to executive stress. As has been seen in the past, 
corporations were assailed for using poor population of guinea pigs in drug 
testing, for distorting the development of the non-industrial world, for racism 
and sexism, for secrecy and deception. They were condemned for supporting 
unsavory regimes or political parties, from the fascist regime in Chile and the 
racist regime in South Africa to the Communist Party in Italy. The point here is 
not whether such charges are justified. What is far more important is the 
concept of corporation they imply. As observed by Mitroff and Kilmann (1984, 
pp. 23), there is an increasing demand for a 
"new kind of institution altogether -a corporation no longer responsible 
simply for making a profit or producing goods but for simultaneously 
contributing to the solution of extremely complex ecological, moral, political, 
racial, sexual and social problems. " 
In trendy words, the responsible organization. The discussion on stakeholders 
in previous sections advocate this claim. 
The recognition (around the 1950's) that organizations operate in a complex 
system of interconnected elements, and not one of large independent entities, 
was a major step allowing organizations to find a new identity and broader 
goals (Mitroff and Kilmann, 1984). Moreover, organizations could no longer 
deny the sheer reality of what was going on in the surrounding environment. 
The recognition dawned that the modern corporation was increasingly acted 
upon by a growing number and constantly shifting set of multiple players in a 
complex system. This broader set of players, as observed earlier in this 
chapter, are called stakeholders. In line with what has been argued in 
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previous sections, Mitroff and Kilmann (1984, pp. 23) argue that in contrast to 
the single class stockholders, which are still important, 
"stakeholders are all those vested interest groups, parties, associations, 
institutions, and individuals who exert a hold and a claim on modern 
organizations. Stakeholders are all those who either affect or who are 
affected by an organization and its policies (i. e., its behaviour)". 
Mitroff and Kilmann (1984) developed a systematic view of the evolution of 
organization and the systems in which they operate. They explored three main 
images to account for the multitude of ways the modern corporation has been 
viewed. Their study does not advocate that there have been only three major 
conceptions of the modern corporation throughout history. Ratherthey explore 
three images to show the incredible complexity and unpredictability of the 
forces that now act upon the modern organization. Their main premise is that 
"the phenomenon of corporate tragedies forces us to acknowledge that our 
earlier images of the corporation and its relationship to the surrounding 
world are no longer sufficient to make sense of and to cope with the world 
in which we now live" (Mitroff and Kilmann, 1984, pp. 18). 
Those three images are: "The world as a simple machine"; "The world as a 
complex system"; and "The world as a complex, social network". Each of them 
imply a different relationship of the corporation to its environment and, as a 
result, a different way of examining the nature of modern corporation. For the 
purpose of this research, an analysis of the last two systems proposed by 
Mitroff and Kilmann (1984) will be done in order to provide the basis for the 
discussion on the issues of stakeholder interests, crisis, and crisis 
management. Figure 4.3 below represents "The World as a Complex System", 
as seen by Mitroff and Kilmann, 1984. 
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News Media Suppliers 
Management Customers 
Govemamental 
Unions, Labor Regulatory 
Sales Force Agencies 
Source: Mitroff, I.; Kilmann, R., (1984), Corporate Tragedies - Product Tampering, Sabotage, 
and other Catastrophes, New York, Praeger, pp. 24 
Figure 4.3 above, represents the most common external forces that act upon 
any organization. It is not an exhaustive list, nor is it applied to any 
organization. Figure 4.3 illustrates and represents the most common forces an 
organization faces in their daily operations. Also, it is important to note that 
those forces have to be dealt with, regardless of whether the host organization 
likes or agrees with them (as already discussed in previous sections in this 
chapter). It has been found in many situations that organizations are not 
always prepared to face those forces with an understanding and pro-active 
approach (Polonsky, 1995; Johnson and Scholes, 1993; Greenley and Foxall, 
1996; Freeman, 1984,1994; Langtry, 1994; Wicks etw, 1994; Rivoli, 1995; 
Clarkson, 1995; Maitland, 1994) . Rather, they most too often react in a non 
"productive" manner, which turns against their own organization in a matter of 
time. The point here is that organizations are not prepared to look into their 
"operations" (factioning) and to consider the impact it has on their 
stakeholders. As the case of the Ford Pinto shows, too often organizations 
prefer to blame stakeholders instead of dealing seriously with the fact that the 
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world in which they now operate has changed dramatically - in this case, Ford 
decided to blame customers and government only to have to recall the cars 
later at a greater cost (Siomkos, 1992; Smith and Sipika, 1993). In the same 
fashion, Audi decided to blame the customers instead of looking into the 
problem, having of course, to deal with the problem later (recalls) and also at 
a much higher cost (Versical, 1987). The QE2 case is another typical example. 
Cunard, owners of the QE2 cruise ship, completely misjudged stakeholders 
power and made the mistake of blaming the passengers and contractors for 
their own crisis. Cunard has been defending a US$ 62 million (£40m) claim 
filed in New York by aggrieved passengers who traveled in what they allege 
were "building site" conditions on a Christmas cruise (Financial Times, 
February, 8, pp. 8,1995). The crisis was aggravated by poor public relations. 
The QE2 crisis resulted in an immediate loss of £7.5 million for Trafalgar 
House, owner of Cunard (Hamilton, 1995). The costs referred to here are not 
just numerical, as organizations in such cases also lose public confidence, 
government support, the reputation of the company can be seriously 
damaged, etc. (Fink, 1986). 
Stakeholders "belong" to the entire system of which they are part and in 
principle cannot be described independently from that system. Having said 
that, what each stakeholder does and is like affects all other stakeholders and 
in turn is affected by all other stakeholders. The properties (e. g., the 
behaviour) of each stakeholder are not self-contained. Indeed, Mitroff and 
Kilmann (1984) argue that different stakeholders not only influence more and 
more on the behaviour of one another but increasingly they also intrude more 
deeply into the internal behaviour of all stakeholders. What the stakeholders 
external to the organization are like affects more and more what the 
stakeholders internal to an organization are like. (For details about 
stakeholder properties, see Appendix 1). For example, what Hyatt Hotels does 
in the field of hospitality affects what Hilton does and is like and vice versa. 
Thus, an organization is the entire set of relationships it has with itself and its 
stakeholders. An organization is not a physical "thing" per se but a series of 
social and institutional relationships between a wide series of parties. As 
these relationships change over time, the organization itself may be thought of 
as changing, as becoming a different organization. The failure to understand 
this essential fact has prevented many an organization from seeing that it is 
not the same because its environment, i. e., its external stakeholders, has 
changed even though internally it looks the same to itself. Since one is 
dealing with a system, a change in any part potentially affects all other parts 
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and the whole system itself (Mitroff and Einstone 1993; Sttubart, 1987; 
Schwenk, 1989; Shrivastava et al. 1989; Polonsky, 1995; Johnson and 
Scholes, 1993; Greenley and Foxall, 1996; Freeman, 1984,1994; Langtry, 
1994; Wicks et p1,1994; Rivoli, 1995; Clarkson, 1995; Maitland, 1994; Mitroff 
and Kilmann, 1984). 
To illustrate the extreme interconnectedness between stakeholders one only 
need observe what happened in the Tylenol case: The Tylenol case cost 
America's federal, state, and local government well over US$ 3 million. Law 
enforcement officials spent thousand of hours in tracking down leads all over 
that country related to the poisonings. Over US$ 2 million were spent in 
testing capsules and in investigating deaths and illnesses by The American 
Food and Drug Administration alone. 
If anything, this also illustrates that in a highly interconnected and complex 
world, no single stakeholder has all of the necessary skills and resources to 
go it entirely alone. Every single stakeholder is dependent upon countless 
other stakeholders to share a critical part of the burden. In the case of Tylenol, 
if the company had to do everything by itself, McNeil and its parent company 
Johnson&Johnson would have to have the necessary resources to train and 
maintain their own national police force. Nothing so far has shown that the 
company had to pay anything (of the US$ 3 million) back to state and 
government agencies for the assistance they had. 
The Chernobyl disaster also illustrates how interconnected the world has 
become. For instance, it is said that it took about two weeks for the "physical" 
cloud of radiation from Chernobyl to encircle the earth and contaminate fish 
on opposites sides of the globe. But it took only a half a day for the financial 
markets to react to Chernobyl. The financial markets reacted almost 
instantaneously to Chernobyl because the world is literally wired 
electronically to every event on the whole planet. Events like the one in 
Chernobyl are capable of affecting the whole planet not only physically, but 
also electronically and financially (Mitroff, 1988b). 
Finally, the interaction of stakeholders. in "The world as complex system" 
seems to be rather rational (governed by their self-interests). Mitroff and 
Kilmann (1984, pp. 27) argue that the "transactions or exchanges between 
stakeholders are largely conceived to be economic and political; in short, 
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dollars and power'. This conception is broadened in the next "image", "The 
World as Complex Social Network", represented. in Figure 4.4 below. 
Figure 4.4 - The World as Complex Social Network 
Source: Mitroff, I.; Kilmann, R., (1984), Corporate Tragedies - Product Tampering, Sabotage, 
and other Catastrophes, New York, Praeger, pp. 28 
Figure 4.4 above is developed from Figure 4.3. In the view of Mitroff and 
Kilmann (1984) this new system contains a number of additional stakeholder 
characters that the previous system does not have. These additional 
characters derive from the sociopathic behaviour that has been directed 
towards corporations in the past, such as the poisoning of Tylenol, airplane 
highjacks, executive kidnapping, etc. Those authors go further to argue that 
the "traditional view of stakeholders is too limited to capture the range of evil 
and bizarre characters that now potentially affect the modern corporation" 
(Mitroff and Kilmann, 1984, pp. 27). The difference between the two systems is 
that while the first one (Figure 4.3) represents the impact of impersonal 
institutional forces external to the corporation, the second one (Figure 4.4) 
represents another set of stakeholders who emanate from "some of the 
deepest and darkest impulses that are rooted in man's psyche" (Mitroff and 
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Kilmann 1984, pp. 27). Having said that, it is not claimed that the first is wrong, 
it is just incomplete. Figure 4.4 also indicates that all stakeholders in Figure 
4.3 and 4.4 are potentially in contact with one another. 
Interactions between people or institutions have a deeper significance than 
the mere surface practical exercise of exchanging goods, services, etc. Apart 
from that, whenever any two people or institutions interact with one another 
they also form mental images of one another. In this sense, they project their 
hopes, their fears, their dreams, wishes, doubts, worries, joys, and anxieties 
on to one another. An illustration of this interaction pattern can be seen in the 
recent case of British Airways attempt to steal secrets ("Dirty Tricks 
Campaign") from Virgin Atlantic (Gregory, 1994).. This particular case is a gold 
mine from a psychoanalyst's standpoint. It shows that whenever two 
competitors interact, they form a distorted picture of one another. They 
inevitably see the other as more evil than the other really is; or stronger, wiser, 
braver, etc. 
The last Figure (4.4) shows -only the generic types of rational and bizarre 
characters that now affect the modern corporation. It is totally outside the 
scope of this work to specify in detail the particular properties of specific 
people who commit such acts. Nor is it the purpose here to demonstrate 
directions to cope with tragedies of such nature before, during, and after they 
happen. Rather, this part is meant to show the interdependency and 
interconnectedness of the world in which business operates and the 
vulnerability of affecting or being affected by one another. As Mitroff and 
Pearson (1993a) pointed out, 
"it is no longer enough for any organization to consider merely its own crisis 
interest in isolation from the environment. Organizations that are well 
prepared recognize that a crisis has the potential to affect not only 
themselves, but also the broadest array of potential stakeholders: 
consumers, competitors, suppliers, and the members of the general 
environment. " 
As already well documented and discussed in previous sections, the 
interconnectedness and interdependence of organizational life today is 
indeed very high. Failure to manage stakeholder relationships can have 
devastating effects on both organizations and its stakeholders. Long term 
success depends greatly on the effective management of those relationships. 
Vincent (1990, pp. 32) indeed argues that in today's business reality if 
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organizations want to be successful in the long term "they must focus outward 
on the needs of the corporation's stakeholders, and all other parties with a 
stake in the success of the corporation". Chakravarthy (1986, in Greenley and 
Foxall, 1996) posits that a necessary condition for "excellence" is the 
continued cooperation of all stakeholder groups. In the same line of argument, 
Evan and Freeman (1988, in Langtry, 1994, pp.. 433) state that "The very 
purpose of the firm is, in our view, to serve as a vehicle for co-ordinating 
stakeholder interests. " 
The traditional literature on stakeholders focuses on the external forces that 
interact with the organization. To some extent, as mentioned above, other 
"legitimate" stakeholders are neglected by this approach. As also already 
mentioned, and again quoting Freeman (1984, pp. 53), 
"Some groups may have as an objective simply to interfere with the smooth 
operations of our business. For instance, some corporations must count 
'terrorist groups' as stakeholders. As unsavory as it is to admit that such 
'illegitimate' groups have a stake in our business, from the standpoint of 
strategic management, it must be done. " 
Having said that, stakeholders do have also a "destructive" potential. Chapters 
2 and 3 evidenced that the majority of past industrial and commercial crises of 
the past decades were "caused" by humans. That is, they were man-made 
crises. In this sense, and considering the context of this study and the 
discussion so far in this chapter, this new set of stakeholders are extremely 
important and relevant. The next section deals with the issue of crisis and 
stakeholders. Traditionally, when the issue of crisis and stakeholders are put 
together, stakeholders are often seen or considered in the position of "victims" 
(or potential victim) of organizational action or inaction (affected by). However, 
stakeholders also play different roles in crises. Stakeholders can be both an 
element that contributes towards crisis escalation and/or an element that 
contributes towards crisis prevention. Between this scale, stakeholders can 
also assume different positions. Effective stakeholder management is a key 
element in crisis prevention and management. 
4.3.2 - Crisis and Stakeholders 
Organizational activities have a number of potentially damaging side-effects 
on their stakeholders and on the natural environment. This can be more 
clearly understood if one considers industrial crises. Industrial crises are 
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"situations in which organized industrial activities are the source of major 
damage to human life, and natural and social environments. They often 
occur in an environment of economic crisis characterized by insufficient 
growth, unemployment, fiscal deficits, budgetary and competitive pressures 
on individual organization, and an inadequate industrial infrastructure. 
Crises inevitably extend beyond the organization of origin to encompass a 
broad range of economic, social and political agents and forces. They may 
also possess elements of rationality and legitimacy crises, and eventually 
threaten social structures and institutions" (Shrivastava . 
(, 1988, pp. 
287). 
The effects of an industrial crisis on its stakeholders is of a very different 
nature than the effects of a natural disaster. While the latter is localized to a 
geographic region and specific time period, the impacts of industrial crises 
can easily transcend geographic boundaries and can even have trans- 
generational effects (for instance, the effects of the radiation from the 
Chernobyl Nuclear Power accident was felt in a number of countries and is 
expected to cause an unknown number of increased cancer deaths for the 
next 30 years - Shrivastava ýI_, 1988). Moreover, and as mentioned before, 
a natural disaster is a single event over which no human being has control. 
However, a man-made crisis is a complex system of interdependent events 
and involves multiple, conflicting stakeholders (Shrivastava, 1992). 
Crises also have the potential to make an indirect impact on stakeholders. 
These impacts represent intermediate outcomes from the chain of events that 
constitute a crisis. Some of. these outcomes change important contextual 
factors. They may lead to corporate bankruptcies, regulatory changes, or 
changes in insurance rates (Shrivastava et al, 1988). As Fink (1986) pointed 
out, a crisis in a company can have the impact of changing forever the 
business reality and context of an industry's operations. For example, after the 
Bhopal accident, insurance companies in the United States of America 
sharply reduced coverage for toxic waste sites, while increasing the 
premiums. Since federal laws in that country required toxic-waste operators to 
demonstrate financial responsibility, many dumpsites were threatened with 
closure (Shrivastava, 1992). In the UK, the concept of "corporate 
manslaughter" has been brought about by the courts following the Herald of 
Free Enterprise sinking. This accident in one industry (transport) had an 
impact on the operations of all other sectors of the economy (apart from those 
that directly affected the shipping industry such as severe scrutiny, new 
regulations, new safety procedures, new design and fitting requirements, 
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change in international law, and so forth). Following the ruling by the courts, 
organizations (more than ever before) must ensure that all 'necessary steps 
are taken to prevent an accident occurring (Smith, 1990). 
Crises are both organizational and inter-organizational phenomena. They are 
caused by human, communication and technological failures within and 
among organizations (Shrivastava, 1988; Starbuck and Milliken, 1988, 
Nunamakergt al, 1989; Siomkos, 1992; Quarantelli, 1988; Smith and Sipika, 
1993; Perrow, 1984; Fink, 1986; Smith, 1990). They are constituted of 
interdependent events that take place in geographically dispersed locations 
and at different times. Typically, simultaneous chains of events occur in 
different arenas - for example, the relief arena, the technological arena, and 
the legal arena (Shrivastava, 1992). 
Industrial crises are also characterized by the presence of multiple 
stakeholders. They are inevitably involved in causing, communicating, and 
mitigating the effects of industrial crises. For instance, corporations, such as 
Union Carbide, which own or manage the industrial plant where the triggering 
event of a crisis take place, are always major stakeholders. Usually, those 
corporations are legally liable for damages caused by their products, 
accidents, or hazards emanating from their premises. The interconnectedness 
of organizations can be clearly seen when one considers a crises in a country 
such as the United States. In such a country, legal liability extends well 
beyond the organization itself to other corporations, such as equipment 
manufacturers, design and engineering consultants, and raw material 
suppliers, who are jointly liable for damages caused by their products or 
designs. Insurance companies, and industry/trade associations are also 
affected (Shrivastava, 1992). 
Another set of stakeholders is the public and public interest groups. They 
provide relief services and exert pressure on corporate and government 
organizations to aid victims in recovering from damages. Crisis problems 
which are not resolved and the persistent failure of existing organizations to 
cope with them, usually erode mass loyalty to the state, and make people lose 
faith in establishment organizations. Autonomous public groups emerge to 
mitigate the crisis and put pressure on state and international agencies to 
resolve problems. One example of these groups is the rise of social 
movements such as environmentalism and consumerism groups in the 1970s. 
The emergence of these groups can be seen as a manifestation of eroding 
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mass loyalty, particularly since the existence of such organizations has been 
fueled largely by crises surrounding environmental degradation and product 
harm (Shrivastava, 1992). Mitroff (1989) argues that it is important to consider 
non-obvious stakeholders. Mitroff calls those stakeholders "snaildarters" after 
the endangered species of fish that held up a proposed hydroelectric project 
for years. In all their rational plans the designers of the dam failed to take into 
account the snaildarter. As a result, one class of stakeholders, the 
environmentalists, acted on behalf of another stakeholder, the snaildarter, that 
could not act in its own behalf. Mitroff (1989 pp. 45), in his account of this 
episode, points out that 
"just beneath the surface of the best laid and most rational plans swim 
forces of which people are entirely unaware and do not wish to consider. 
These seemingly tiny and insignificant forces, however, have a strange way 
of wrecking the most well-conceived plans and policies. " 
The media, while not one of the primary stakeholders, is nevertheless one of 
the most important stakeholders and plays an important role in communicating 
crisis events to the public. It shapes public perceptions and responses to 
crises. But despite its enormous resources, the media's coverage of crisis 
events is most often fragmented and equivocal and frequently lacks objective 
data. This is a result of both stakeholders' attempts to control communication 
and a genuine lack of information about the cause of the crisis. Such partial 
and distorted coverage gives rise to myths, false alarms, and heightened 
perceptions of harm (Pincus and Acharya, 1988; Reilly, 1991; Barton, 1993; 
Fink, 1986; Shrivastava, 1988 and 1992; Nunamakerl, 1989). 
The most profoundly affected stakeholders are the victims who suffer damage 
to life and property - and ironically, sometimes the most easily forgotten 
because of their powerlessness. These includes workers in production 
facilities, consumers, and communities in which hazardous facilities are 
located. Sometimes even remote observers of crisis events suffer significant 
effects. Because of genetic or delayed medical effects even unborn children of 
persons affected by crises are potentially victims. An example of this kind of 
victim is the children who watched the space shuttle Challenger blow up on 
the television. They were found to have suffered psychological trauma 
(Goleman, 1986, in Shrivastava, 1992). 
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4.3.3 - Frame of Reference 
Accidents become crises when subsequent events and the actions of people 
and organizations with a stake in the outcome combine in unpredictable ways 
to threaten the social structures involved (Shrivastava, 1992). Shrivastava 
(1992) argues that the Bhopal accident escalated into a crisis because of the 
actions of the government of India, Union Carbide, and many other 
stakeholders, both before and after the accident. 
To understand any crisis, the concept of frame. of reference, which is a key 
analytical tool commonly used in the subject, is most valuable. A frame of 
reference can be defined as a method people and organizations use to select 
and process information (Shrivastava and Mitroff, 1983; Shrivastava, 1992). It 
reflects their biases, attitudes, and models for making judgments. It is the lens 
through which an individual or organization views the world (Shrivastava, 
1992). Frame of reference analysis is particularly valuable for understanding 
how and why organizations react to crises the way they do. Whether it is a 
government, a corporation, or a community group, every organization 
develops institutionalized procedures for processing information in response 
to changes in their external environment. These procedures inevitably reflect 
the management's frame of reference. Therefore, frame of reference is a 
critical determinant of whether, and how, an organization will respond to crisis 
and helps to explain why organizations often take actions that seem to the 
outside observer obviously wrong, tactless, or ill informed. 
Shrivastava (1992, pp. 71) argues that "perceptual differences among 
stakeholders in any crisis arise because crises are, by definition, ill-structured 
situations and, thus, susceptible to many different interpretations". Shrivastava 
goes further to suggest that 
"... even in a crisis - perhaps especially in a crisis - self-interest behaviour 
dominates. Each point of view serves the narrow interests of one 
stakeholder or another and suggests different solutions to crisis problem". 
In this sense, stakeholders devise strategies to put their point across to the 
public and compete with one another to have their viewpoint accepted by the 
public as the "truth". 
The establishment of one view as more "real" than the others is essentially a 
power game that involves adopting a set of partial solutions that benefit one 
stakeholder. Shrivastava (1992) suggests that one way to "cut through" this 
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power game is to use multiple-perspective analysis, which involves 
understanding and describing events from the perspective of all key 
stakeholder groups. To do multiple-perspective analysis one has to primarily 
acknowledge that social events are subject to multiple conflicting and 
disparate interests, assumptions, values, and interpretations, and then use 
those interests, values, and interpretations as a basis for building an 
understanding of events. Multi-perspective analysis is particularly useful in 
examining the causes and consequences of industrial accidents. 
In his account of the Bhopal crisis, Shrivastava (1992) makes the point that 
stakeholders had completely different views of what took place in Bhopal. For 
example, Union Carbide referred to what happened in its technical report as 
an "incident". The government of India in its report called it an "accident". The 
injured victims called it a "disaster". And the social activists called it a 
"tragedy", and even "industrial genocide". These facts reveal the great 
differences in stakeholder's frame of reference. Stakeholder's frame of 
reference dictated their goals as they responded to the accident, and hence 
their different, sometimes conflicting, courses of action. For example, for the 
parent company, Union Carbide, the "incident" was a technical malfunction 
that required correction without causing major financial damage to the 
company. It was an "accident" that required relief without damaging the 
political position of the ruling regime for the government. However, to the 
victims, it was a disaster that changed their lives for ever; it required grief and 
anger and beginning the slow process of putting the pieces together again. 
And finally, to the activists who sympathized with the victims, it was an 
unnecessary tragedy for which a negligent company and a culpable 
government ought to be taken to task (Shrivastava, 1992, pp. 71). 
If the stakeholders could have seen and understood each other's frame of 
reference, they might have been able to work together to achieve all their 
goals, but they did not. They worked independently to achieve their own 
objectives. While their actions made sense from an individual point of view, 
when they interacted with each other they created a series of secondary 
effects that only served to deepen the crisis. As Mitroff (1989, pp. 5) puts it, 
"... different stakeholders do not share the same definition of an organization's 
'problem', and hence, they do not in general share the same 'solutions'. " (This 
illustrates quite well what was mentioned before regarding perceptual 
difference among stakeholders). 
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Shrivastava (1992) points out that when a triggering event occurs, 
spontaneous reactions by different stakeholders solve some of the immediate 
problems, but they also create new problems - thus prolonging the crisis and 
making it worse. The crisis expands to affect people and organizations in 
remote locations. It spawns new conflicts. Crisis responses by organizations 
and citizens deal, for the most part, with symptoms of a crisis without 
eliminating its fundamental causes. Hence, crisis potential continues to exist. 
Achieving a multiple-perspective understanding of crises requires 
understanding of how various frames of reference differ. Each frame of 
reference can be broken down into a number of component parts, all of which 
have to do with the processing and filtering of information. They include: Data 
Element; Cognitive Maps; Reality Tests; and Domains of Inquiry and 
Articulation. A short description of each follows. They were extracted from the 
work of Paul Shrivastava (1992). 
1- "Data Elements. These consist of the basic assumptions, concepts, or units of 
information that individuals or organizations use to construct reality. In other words, they 
represent information considered admissible for decision making and reflect a bias toward 
certain kinds of information. Some organizations prefer to use only information that is 
quantified and objective. Others willingly use quantitative and descriptive information - "soft" 
Information - from personal source. " 
2- "Cognitive Maps. Every person or organization has a particular way of arranging 
information into cause-effect relationships in order to make sense of that information and 
reach meaningful conclusions. Cognitive maps are conceptual schemes used to do this 
arranging, and, as such, they often guide organizations in defining and solving problems. 
These maps vary greatly. Some consist of a logically integrated set of casual relationships, 
while others are vaguely intuitive images of problems. " 
3- "Reality Tests. This is the method by which persons or organizations validate the 
information they find, the inquires they make, or the cognitive maps they create. This they do 
by finding and articulating a legitimizing connection between their information, inquires, or 
cognitive maps and critical social and cultural experiences. Realities tests can be objective or 
subjective, or they may be rooted in traditions and customary practices. " 
4- "Domain of Inquiry and Articulation. In addition to the three substantive components 
mentioned above, frames of reference also are characterized by two other elements: their 
domain of inquiry and their degree of articulation. The domain of inquiry delineates the 
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boundaries of inquiry and concern, the relevance of particular variables, and the alternate 
frames of reference. For the most part, frames of reference are taken for granted. However, 
the extent to which they are articulated varies. Some may be expressed as assumptions that 
underly organizational inquiries. Large organizations sometimes articulate and codify their 
shared frames of reference in stated policies. " 
Source: Shrivastava, P. - Bhopal - Anatomy of a Crisis, 2nd Edition, London, Paul Chapman 
Publishing LTD., 1992, pp. 73 - 76 
Having said all that, one of the key elements in stakeholders' relationships is 
communication. Booth (1993) identified that this crucial element in crisis 
management (stakeholder communication) is often ignored. Communication 
with stakeholders prior to, during, and after a crisis is essential. If stakeholders 
are left in the dark as to what is happening (crisis development), this may 
cause serious and irreversible problems in a later stage and when crucial 
support from interest groups and other parties is essential for organizational 
recovery. A good example of lack of attention to stakeholder communication 
can be illustrated by the Guinness crisis of 1986-87. This case is even more 
striking because it was an internal communication problem, in addition to the 
consequences of non-communication and miscommunication with key 
external stakeholders. In this case, the majority of the board of directors did 
not know what was happening because the crisis management team never 
found the time to call a board meeting. Eventually, members of the crisis 
management team had to explain what they had done and found that support 
from the directors was lacking (Booth, 1993). 
It is also important to observe once again that a crisis can be seen as an 
opportunity as much as a threat for many involved in a crisis. Crisis often 
opens up new possibilities and liberates innovatory ideas. During a crisis 
what to one set of stakeholders may be defined as a threat to their world may 
be seen by another set of stakeholders as a new opportunity (Booth, 1993). 
4.4 - Identifying Stakeholders 
It has been mentioned before that modern organizations operate in a very 
complex social system. That alone makes it difficult enough for organizations 
to identify precisely those that can be truly identified as stakeholders. 
Moreover, time and circumstances change. So do stakeholder relationships 
and their importance to the survival of the organization (Vincent, 1990). Some 
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stakeholders are more important than others in determining the success of the 
business. Depending on the nature of the issue (or policy to be adopted) the 
stakeholders can be different from time to time, making the process of 
identification more complex and subtle. Therefore, stakeholders are not 
always the same. There may also be conflicting interests between 
stakeholders. Indeed, Mitroff (1989, pp. 46) argues that 
"the number of stakeholders one must deal with in complex systems is so 
large, so varied, and so quickly changing that it would be almost impossible 
to create with any confidence a single, unchanging, timeless theory for 
describing the behavior of all stakeholders and their impacts on one 
another for any extended period of time. " 
Stakeholder identification is indeed a matter of great conflict and contradiction 
in the literature. As mentioned previously (section 4.2.1.2), the application of 
the stakeholder theory has many managerial implications. One of the most 
conflicting areas is undoubtedly stakeholder identification. Some authors 
suggest a broad framework where almost any group is included, but as 
expected, this brings serious managerial difficulties (and adopting this 
approach alone may not contribute positively to organizational performance). 
Others clearly favour a narrower view and approach which leaves out 
important (legitimate) stakeholders which can at some stage of organizational 
development act and disrupt organizational performance. Donaldson and 
Preston (1995, pp. 85 - 86) support the view that stakeholders are identified 
"through the actual or potential harms and benefits that they experience or 
anticipate experiencing as a result of the firm's actions or inactions. In 
practice, and in addition to legal requirements, appraisal of the legitimacy of 
such expectations is an important function of management, often in concert 
with other already recognized stakeholders. " 
However, and as observed already in section 4.2 of this chapter, irrespective 
of the arguments surrounding the issue of stakeholder identification, it is 
important to understand that all stakeholders, directly or indirectly, have the 
potential to be affected by organizational crisis or inflict damage on an 
organization. Moreover, in the context of this research, there is also a need to 
identify those stakeholders who are important in preventing and managing 
crisis. 
Having said that, and since organizational policies are made constantly, 
organizations need to identify those 'stakeholders that are inherent in the 
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situations with which they must deal. Mitroff (1989, pp. 32) offers a practical 
and systematic framework for uncovering stakeholders comprising of seven 
methods: imperative, positional, reputational, social participation, opinion- 
leadership, demographic, and organizational. 
4.4.1 - The Imperative Method 
The "imperative" method identifies stakeholders who feel "strongly enough 
about an organization's proposed policies or actions to act on their feelings". It 
is suggested that in using this method one should make a list of as many 
imperatives, slogans, and catch-words as possible that have been said 
(spoken, uttered) in the context of a policy issue. This approach also identifies 
any acts of defiance (i. e., strikes, etc. ) or other actions- that suggest 
dissatisfaction with the policy system. The source of the imperatives and the 
acts are identified and each is considered as a potential stakeholder. This 
method has however a deficiency: it misses silent stakeholders who 
nevertheless have a strong opinion on a policy issue. 
4.4.2 - The Positional Method 
Stakeholders that hold formal positions in a policy-making structure (whether 
internal or external to the organization) can be identified by the method 
"positional". The deficiency of this method is that it ignores important 
stakeholders that are not formally a part of the organization but have, 
nonetheless, an impact on it. 
4.4.3 - The Reputational Method 
The "reputational" method makes it necessary to ask various knowledgeable 
and important persons to nominate those whom they believe have a stake in 
the system. The deficiency in this approach is that many groups may be 
neglected, such as non-elite, unorganized, and disenfranchised groups. 
4.4.4 - The Socio-Participation Method 
The "social-participation" method identifies individuals and organizations as 
stakeholders to the extent that they participate in activities related to a policy 
issue. Evidence of "having a potential stake in a issue" can be that such as 
attendance at meetings, membership in special organizations or committees, 
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voting, and other observable behaviour. The deficiency of this approach is an 
obvious one: many latent, currently non-participatory stakeholders will be 
overlooked (such as children, the aged, the silent majority, future generations, 
etc. ). 
4.4.5 - The Opinion-Leadership Method 
The "opinion-leadership" method identifies those who tend to shape the 
opinions of the stakeholders. For instance, the editors of important magazines, 
newspapers, and journals. This approach has the advantage of identifying 
important stakeholders who are not part of the formal structure or do not have 
the same status as those selected by previous methods. However, its 
disadvantage is that it is less precise and requires more judgment on the part 
of the analyst than do some of the other methods. 
4.4.6 -The Demographic Method 
The identification of stakeholders by such characteristics as age, sex, level of 
education, occupation, race, religion, place of birth, is done by the method 
"demographic". The disadvantage of this approach is that it assumes 
homogeneity of interest within any particular group. 
4.4.7 - The Focal Organization Method 
The last method selects a "focal organization" in a policy system and seeks to 
identify the individuals and organizations who have important relationships 
with the focal organization. Typical relationships are those of supplier, 
employee, customer or client, ally, competitor or adversary, regulator or 
controller (e. g., government), and regulatee or controlee (e. g., subdivision of a 
parent organization, legally controlled entities). This method has the 
advantage of identifying potential parties or elements that other approaches 
can overlook. It has the disadvantage of not being comprehensive and of 
potentially missing key stakeholders such as opinion leaders. 
Since each method covers stakeholders that the others do not address, Mitroff 
(1989) suggests that organizations should use all of them in thinking about the 
forces in their environment. It is important to emphasize that those forces can 
determine, due to the interconnectedness of the system in which organization 
operate, the future survival of an organization. Therefore, in today's world the 
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systematic consideration of stakeholders might very well be dire necessity and 
not a luxury (Mitroff 1989). As mentioned before, stakeholder identification is 
still a matter of controversy and causes managerial difficulties due to both 
conceptual lack of understanding and managerial limited capacity. 
4.5-Assumptions and Stakeholders 
Assumptions are important variables in effective crisis management. As has 
already been discussed earlier, one way to understand crises is through 
understanding how stakeholders view reality. Shrivastava (1992) suggested 
that perceptual differences among stakeholders in any crisis arise because 
crises are, by definition, ill-structured situations, and therefore, susceptible to 
many different interpretations. It has also been argued that social events are 
subject to multiple conflicting and disparate interests, assumptions, values, 
and interpretations. In the previous chapter it has been stressed that the 
culture of an organization has an important, if not vital, part to play in crisis 
situations. Organizational culture was defined by Mitroff , gam 
(1989, pp. 271) 
as 
"the set of rarely articulated, largely unconscious beliefs, values, norms and 
assumptions that the organization makes about itself, the nature of people 
in general and its environment". 
Thus, assumptions are an essential part in evaluating stakeholders' 
perceptions and actions in crises. 
An important feature of today's organizations is that they are facing more and 
more uncertainty, and as a consequence are required to subscribe to several 
practices that may represent dramatic departures from the way they previously 
planned for their future (Baker, 1991; Ritchie and Marshall, 1993). Faced with 
uncertainty it is necessary to try and predict or forecast the nature and 
direction of future events and articulate these as assumptions around which 
one can construct the strategic plan (Vincent, 1990; Ritchie and Marshall, 
1993). Indeed, Mitroff and Kilmann (1984 pp. 116) argue that there is nothing 
more fundamental that an institution, public or private, can know about itself 
than the assumptions it is making about itself and the outside world. As a 
result, there is nothing more important that it can do than to periodically raise 
to the surface for explicit examination and challenge its key operating 
assumptions. They argue that for them (the authors) 
"this is the essence of strategic thinking, not fancy financial analysis, nor 
fancy BCG (Boston Consulting Group) animals (cows, stars, etc. ). Financial 
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analysis is itself only based on a subset of the entire set of assumptions that 
an organization must consider, thus it can not be the whole of strategic 
planning or thinking. " 
A definition of assumption from a business-oriented point of view was 
developed by McConkey (1988, pp. 67) as 
"best present estimates of the impact of major external factors, over which 
the manager has little if any control but which may exert a significant impact 
on performance or the ability to achieve desired results". 
While this definition encompasses the understanding of environmental 
implications to the organization, it fails to address the fundamental aspect of 
the organization itself. That is, what assumptions the organization makes 
about itself. How does it perceive itself in the environment? These questions 
are fundamental to a better and more complete understanding of external 
forces and possible future events. 
Assumptions make planning possible. Without assumptions it would be all but 
impossible to undertake any planning (Vincent, 1990). Planning does deal 
with the future, and it is not possible to predict with unfailing accuracy when or 
how future events will come to pass. In fact, one of the assumptions of most 
skilled profit planners is the bold assertion that no assumptions used in their 
profit plans will take place exactly as formulated. McConkey (1988, pp. 68) 
gives the example, for that matter, of a statement in the introduction to the 
annual profit plan of a successful company that says: 
"Implicit in the planning process is the fact that events in Year X will 
certainly be different from what is predicted. Inevitably, circumstances will 
require changes in the plans, and these changes must be orderly and 
planned. Plans are less important than planning. " 
Essentially, assumptions serve three useful purposes in good planning. First, 
assumptions permit the planning process to begin and progress. Without 
assumptions, there would be so many uncertainties that one would not know 
where to begin. By isolating those future occurrences that would have the 
most significant impact on the business, and making assumptions about them, 
management has a base upon which begin its planning. For example, an 
employee strike always is a possibility when a contract is due to expire. 
Unless management makes a definite assumption about the chances of a 
strike, the situation would be so nebulous that planning would be impossible. 
If, after evaluating all aspects of its labour-relations picture to the best of its 
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ability, management is able to conclude that there will be no strike, it can 
begin the planning process. If management concludes that there will be a 
strike, the planning process can still begin - because there is a definite 
assumption on which to build plans. (In this particular example, if the 
probability of a strike occurring is approximately the same as the probability of 
one not taking place, management should structure alternative plans to cover 
both possibilities). 
Second, assumptions also serve as checks to the validity of plans. Selecting 
applicable assumptions and undertaking a critical analysis of the probability 
that each assumption is as accurate as possible takes a considerable amount 
of guesswork out of the planning process. 
Finally, once the goal-setting process has been completed and the target year 
has begun, assumptions serve as continuing checkpoints for possible 
required revisions to the plans. By having these assumptions clearly spelled 
out, management always has before it the basis on which the plans were 
constructed. If during the year actual events differ from the assumptions, 
management knows immediately that it must take action to keep its strategies, 
objectives, and resources allocations realistic and current. 
Since the main concern of this study. is with crisis management and 
stakeholders relationships it is also necessary to look at assumptions from a 
different and more individualized perspective. One explanation of the different 
views and actions of stakeholders in a crisis is that they make different set of 
assumptions about the real nature of the problem. In the same way, 
stakeholders also make assumptions about each other and act upon their 
assumptions. Anderson (1981, in Mitroff, 1989, pp. 13) offers a more 
meaningful definition of assumptions: 
"Assumptions are the building blocks of a person's makeup and therefore of 
behavior.... Assumptions guide the individual, determine what he or she will 
and will not do. They determine what the person expects or anticipates from 
self and others in any situation (Anderson, 1981, pp. 779). 
The better one understand one's assumptions, the better able one can be 
to change behavior and thus avoid trouble" (Anderson, 1981, pp. 781, in 
Mitroff 1989, pp. 13). 
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Some organizations have been very successful in making assumptions and 
acting upon them. Some large corporations, such as Texaco, have high-level 
managers whose jobs consist of making assumptions (Fink, 1986). However, 
assumptions have, as do almost everything, their life cycle. Concrete 
examples can show how critical are the assumptions a business makes about 
itself. For instance, one may consider the life cycle of the premises of the 
automobile, industry in the United States. Studies indicate that the life cycle of 
the automobile industry's critical premises in that country lasted no more than 
sixty years (Mitroff and Linstone, 1993). From roughly 1910 to 1970, the 
assumptions directing the industry were not only valid, but they allowed for the 
overwhelming success of one of the most important industries that the world 
has known. But, as the world witnessed, in the span of some five to ten years, 
the American automobile industry virtually collapsed. The industry became so 
out of touch with reality that it almost disappeared for good. Before looking at 
those assumptions, Figure 4.5 below lists a number of cherished assumptions 
which are now thought to be obsolete but which for many years underpinned 
most of the strategic thinking and planning of many of the world's most 
successful organizations. 
Figure 4.5 - Cherished Assumptions Now Thought Obsolete 
" Inflation will never exceed 5 per cent per annum 
" Energy will always be cheap and abundant 
" The price of oil will never exceed $2 a barrel 
" Import penetration of home markets will never exceed 15 per cent 
" The primary aim of business is to make money 
" Strict financial control is the key to good administration 
" Market growth of 10 per cent per annum 
" Workers do not have an important impact on productivity or product 
quality 
" The consumerist movement does not represent the concerns of a 
significant portion of the buying public 
" Success comes from having the resources to quickly adopt innovations 
successfully introduced by others 
" Frequent styling changes are more important to customers than 
product quality 
Source: D. Brownlie, The Marketing Book (London: Heinamann, 1987) 
pp. 100; in Baker, M., Marketing - An Introductory Text, 5 th Edition, 
Macmillan, 1991, pp. 23 
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Figure 4.6 below considers a sample of the assumptions behind the strategies 
of the United States automobile industry. It lists what Mitroff and Einstone 
(1993) call the "Unwritten Rules of the American Automobile Industry". The first 
column is the "straight or plain talk" interpretation of the more scholarly 
wording of the assumptions listed in column two. Source: Mitroff, Ian, I.; 
Linstone, H., A. - (1993), The Unbounded Mind - Breaking The Chains of 
Traditional Business Thinking, New York, Oxford University Press, pp. 71 - 73. 
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Figure 4.6 - The Unwritten Rules of the American Automobile Industry 
Straight Talk 
1. An easy short childhood is the best 
preparation for adulthood and 
maturity. 
Professional Talk 
It was a distinct advantage that by 
about 1930 the modern car industry 
was firmly established, its com- 
petitive practices well understood, its 
major product design features firmly 
locked into place, etc. 
2. We are stable now and forevermore; 
the broader world is stable. 
3. "They love us" (i. e., our products); 
they're loyal, won't switch; we can 
take them for granted; we can 
assume consumer stability. 
4. Nothing new will be invented that 
will radically shake up our product; 
essentially, we know it all: the sta- 
bility of car technology can be taken 
for granted. 
S. Our focus need not be broader than 
the driver; a restricted focus of 
innovation can be assumed. 
6. Don't change until forced to; resist, 
deny change; put your major ener- 
gies into denial and resistence. 
7. Get your priorities wrong; innovation 
can take a backseat to efficiency. 
8. Keep getting your priorities wrong; 
good labor relations can take a 
backseat to efficiency. 
9. Were so big and powerful, smug and 
secure that we can shut out the 
whole world; we can charge and pass 
on anything we want to our cus- 
tomers. So what if we're arrogant? 
The competitive dynamics and basic 
business of automobile production is 
essentially stable and well known. 
The tastes of U. S. car buyers are 
standardized and stable; thus, except 
for yearly styling changes, we do not 
have to make radical or substantial 
changes in our product. U. S. car 
buyers will not demand a new type 
of car that we have never built in 
large volume before. 
The design/production of future 
cars will not require fundamentally 
new manufacturing processes or 
technologies. 
Innovations relating to driver comfort 
are more important than funda- 
mental technical innovations in the 
basic product. 
We can succeed by not spending 
money on fundamental innovations 
until forced to by governmental 
regulatory agencies, foreign com- 
petition, consumers, etc. 
Because of GM's dominant industry 
strategy (under A. P. Sloan), based on 
clever, marketing to different demo- 
graphic segments of the population 
and frequent style changes, technical 
innovation was subordinated to 
efficiency in production, i. e., effi- 
ciency is more important than 
innovation. 
Efficiency in production is more 
important than good labor relations; 
good labor relations are not im- 
portant to efficiency. 
Foreign competition will never be 
significant; therefore. U. S. car 
makers will not be prevented from 
passing the higher costs of pro- 
duction necessary to keep up with 
the competition on to consumers. 
( con tin ued ) 
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Figure 4.6 - The Unwritten Rules of the American Automobile Industry (continued) 
Straight Talk Professional Talk 
10. Since we don't need much inno- The capital and debt capacity re- 
vation, we can finance whatever we quired to finance whatever innova- 
want to. tions are required will be readily 
available. 
11. Managers don't need challenge in As the business of car making 
their work; the restricted became well understood, not only 
focus/nature of managerial work can did managerial work become routine, 
be assumed. but it was desirable that it did so. 
The challenge of managerial work 
was not necessary to the long-term 
sucess of the industry 
12. If you want to have tunnel vision, then An extremely handsome bonus 
you have to reward it. We are system that rewards top management 
masters at creating a system for for short-term thinking is not 
producing managerial myopia. hazardous to the long-term Interests 
of the entire industry. 
13. Workers don't need challenge in Workers are willing to trade money 
their job; the restricted for challenge in their jobs. 
focus/nature of all jobs can be 
assumed. 
14. Keep everyone small-minded and It is not necessary to engage most 
uninvolved. employees in the larger purposes of 
the business. 
15. Don't rock the boat, don't bite the It is not in the interest of top 
hand that feeds you; these rules managers to tamper with the system 
pertain to the unwritten culture of that promoted them. It is not 
the industry. necessary for top management to 
look at the big or whole picture. 
16. We don't need constant informal It is not necessary to foster an 
parties as they do in Silicon Valley. industry-wide culture of innovation, 
intense competition between com- 
panies, informal sharing of infor- 
mation, entrepreneurism, and the 
intense cycling of executives between 
firms. 
17. We've discovered the principles of Not only is the organizational struc- 
organization for all time. ture of U. S. car makers appropriate 
for its time, if not all time, but it is 
well suited to responding to 
changing government policies, 
consumer tastes, and foreign 
competition. 
18. No one, including ourselves, can Despite GM's great success due to its 
teach us anything about good orga- early organizational structure under 
nization; we resist learning anything Alfred P. Sloan, Ford was correct to 
even from ourselves. resist the professionalization of its 
upper management for so long, and 
Chrysler was correct to resist adopting 
GM's structure of high differentiation 
and high integration. In other words, 
U. S. car makers had nothing significant 
to learn from one another regarding 
the design of their respective 
organizational structures. 
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While these assumptions are obsolete and not held by anyone any longer, 
one should not underestimate the need for relevant assumptions as an 
essential element in planning (Baker, 1991, pp. 29). The question is "what are 
appropriate and relevant assumptions? " The problem with the automobile 
industry in the United States was that the culture of the industry (the unwritten 
rules) did not permit them to be aware of the changes in their environment. 
They were virtually victims of their own success. As Mitroff and Linstone (1993, 
pp. 73) observed, 
"the assumptions are so intertwined with technological, human, social and 
organizational factors that it's literally impossible to say where one factor 
clearly leaves off and another begins. The entire list in effect constitutes a 
social contract for the automobile industry. Or put it somewhat differently, 
the entire set of assumptions constitutes an orchestrated belief system.. The 
individual assumption neither exist nor make complete sense by 
themselves. They fit together and mutually reinforce one another as part of 
a larger pattern. " 
It is then interesting to notice again (as in Chapter 3) that the culture of an 
organization can destroy the very organization to which it belongs. In this 
case, and for the purpose of this study, it is also important to observe that 
those unwritten rules denied all kinds of stakeholders, from employees to 
suppliers, from customers to competition and so on. In Chapter 3 it was 
observed that changing the culture of an organization is extremely difficult. In 
many accounts, only after undergoing a crisis, can significant innovations 
take place. The automobile industry failed to see that when their basic 
assumptions began to change, the industry needed to base its practices on 
new ones. The greatest difficulty, however, is that when a set of rules makes 
sense for so long, it is almost impossible to change those rules because they 
take on the character of eternal truths (Mitroff and Linstone, 1993). In this 
case, and like most industries, instead of changing when it needed to - and in 
the best of all possible manners by anticipating the future - the automobile 
industry in the United States did even more of what it did in the past. It 
reinforced and acted on its old assumptions and ways of doing things. 
Another example of wrong assumptions can be illustrated by Coca-Cola's 
attempt to introduce "New Coke". When Coca-Cola executives announced 
New Coke, they assumed that their regular customers would accept the 
change while Coca-Cola penetrated a new, younger market. As it is known 
today, the assumption turned out to be wrong. The old customers rebelled, 
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and that is the reason why today there is "New Coke" and "Classic Coke". 
Needless to say, the costs and implications for Coca-Cola were very 
significant. 
Assumptions are at the center of decision making in most common 
circumstances. As mentioned earlier, stakeholders make assumptions about 
each other and about themselves. Indeed, Mitroff and Emshoff (in Mitroff and 
Linstone, 1993) argue that assumptions are the properties of stakeholders. 
That is, as one does not always have the precise information, or data, to know 
precisely how a certain policy will affect stakeholders and consequently 
predict their reactions, one then use assumptions. In fact, its is argued that the 
bigger, the more complex the problem, the more it is likely to involve a wider 
range of stakeholder forces, and as result of that, the more assumptions will 
have to be made. Assumptions, then, are rooted in the behaviour of someone 
or some party; assumptions, in short, pertain to stakeholders; they do not exist 
in a vacuum (Mitroff and Linstone, 1993). 
It is impossible to avoid making assumptions, and therefore, assumptions 
need to be displayed and examined in such a way that they can be debated. 
Mitroff and Emshoff (in Mitroff and Linstone, 1993, pp. 146) emphasize this 
point by saying that it is "far better to debate a question without settling it than 
to settle a question without debating it". In practice, assumptions are not as 
easily formulated as it may appear. Most people cannot generate assumptions 
directly. They are too vague, too hazy, too hidden from view. However, 
assumptions can be fostered, for example, by asking people to list the 
members of a set of actors, or parties, etc., that are affected by one's actions. 
In this way, it is both a concrete and an easily accomplished task. Thus, once 
stakeholders are identified, it is then a relatively easy step to ask, 
"What do I have to assume is 'true' of a particular stakeholder (i. e., its 
behavior) such that starting from this assumption I can then derive or 
support my policy or my actions? " (Mitroff and Emshoff in Mitroff and 
Linstone, 1993, pp. 146). 
It is important, however, to notice that assumptions about stakeholders need to 
be made in a concerted way. As observed by Vincent (1990), some problems 
may arise when the organization attempts, for instance, to implement cross- 
functional systems. It has been observed that information executives 
experience frustration and stress when attempting to implement cross- 
functional systems because executives of different functions, specializing in 
202 
G. Santana Ch. 4- Stakeholders and Crisis Management 
different stakeholder relationships, use different assumptions to guide their 
actions. 
4.5.1 - Formulating Assumptions 
Having said all that, the question to be asked is: "what then are appropriate 
and relevant assumptions? " (Baker 1991, pp. 29). To develop formal 
assumptions one must devise highly specific statements which are more 
focused than simply broad generalizations. Assumptions must be more 
focused in certain issues. It is important to recognize that it is not necessary to 
make assumptions about anything or everything which may occur in the future 
- only those events or issues which are significant-and of direct relevance to 
the organization. McConkey (1988, pp. 68) argues that the' formulation of 
assumptions should proceed in orderly steps and proposes the following 
sequence: 
1- Isolate those future events that are most likely to have a significant effect on the company's 
business; 
2- Evaluate as accurately as possible the probable effects of these events; 
3- Determine whether an assumption is necessary; if so, formulate the assumption; 
4- Record all assumptions 
5- Continuously track the validity of all assumptions; 
6- Revise the assumptions and plans and take corrective action when assumptions prove to be 
incorrect. 
In addition, it is important to negotiate within the organization a common set of 
key assumptions as a basis for planned action. Agreement on key 
assumptions is necessary to achieve unity of action Vincent (1990). 
Thus, assumptions are clearly our best guess as to the future state of affairs. 
As time passes, these future events become nearer and the information 
available becomes more certain. Therefore, it is important to monitor the 
accuracy of the assumptions and to be prepared to adjust the plans to reflect 
changes in the original assumptions. Baker (1991, pp. 30) suggests that an 
important factor in formulating assumptions is to quantify how likely or 
probable it is that a given assumption will materialize, rather than just qualify it 
as "likely", "very likely", or "unlikely". For the purpose of planning it is vital that 
all the decision makers share the same scale of values albeit that these 
values will be subjective, i. e., particular to each individual decision maker, 
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rather than objective in which case there would be a known or certain 
outcome for a given event. 
Mitroff and Emshoff (in Mitroff and Linstone, 1993 pp. 147 - 148) formulated in 
practical and operational terms a viable method for handling problems 
concerning multiple stakeholders and assumptions. The result of their work 
suggest that, from the point of view of the host organization, the decision 
makers (or in their terms, groups) will differ in opinion in many ways in their 
assumptions when dealing with complex systems and stakeholders. For 
instance, they argue that 
"there is no guarantee that all groups will generate the same set of 
stakeholders ... This is thus one of the first ways in which groups can differ 
from one another. If they do, then they are making different assumptions 
about who is influencing or who ought to influence (at the very least be 
considered) in their situation. Many a group differs over 'the basic right of 
recognition'. " 
The point here is that, as already discussed, the world today is very much 
interconnected and organizations, private or public, have to consider a much 
greater number of stakeholders than it did previously. 
Another way in which groups can differ is with regard to the property they input 
to a particular stakeholder or in the qualitative form of their assumptions (for 
instance, if consumers are considered as a stakeholder, one group of decision 
makers can consider consumers to be price-sensitive, while other groups may 
consider the opposite: price-insensitive). Finally, the authors argue that 
groups can disagree over their importance and certainty rankings (for 
example, two groups of decision makers can conceivably agree that the 
consumers are a relevant stakeholder. They can even agree on the same 
qualitative assumption of price-sensitivity. However, one group may consider 
this to be very important to their policy while another may regard it very 
unimportant. 
The issue of stakeholder "legitimacy" is still a matter of great controversy. As 
discussed in previous sections, some authors suggest a narrow approach to 
identify stakeholders while others present some very broad frameworks that 
are almost functionally unrealistic. Some aspects of this problem could be 
resolved by adopting the view of "primary" or "secondary" stakeholders 
discussed earlier. However, although different contributions to the issue of 
stakeholder identification have been made, it is important to understand that 
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all stakeholders, directly or indirectly, have the potential to be affected by 
organizational crisis or inflict damage on an organization (contributing 
towards organizational crises). Moreover, stakeholders are important in 
effective crisis management as they can help in preventing and managing 
crises. 
4.6 - Archetypes - Symbolic Images 
One of the objectives of this study is to examine the relationship between hotel 
organizations and their main stakeholders during crises. It should be clear by 
now that any organization is part of a system, and its acts or policies will 
invariably affect all other parts of that system. In the same way, the actions of 
any other "player" in that system will invariably affect the whole system as well. 
In another word, we live and operate in an interdependent and interconnected 
world. However, as discussed earlier, whenever one individual or institution 
interacts with another individual or institution they form mental images of one 
another (Mitroff and Kilmann, 1984). They project their hopes, their fears, their 
dreams, wishes, doubts, worries, joys and anxieties on to one another. For 
instance, the recent case of British Airways attempt to steal secrets from Virgin 
Atlantic (Gregory, 1994) shows that whenever two competitors interact, they 
form a distorted picture of one another. Stakeholders inevitably see the other 
as braver, or wiser, or more evil, or stronger, etc. That is, they create 
archetypal images to enable them to cope with the complexity and stress of 
reality. 
To help understanding of archetypes and their relation to organizational 
management, a brief reference to archetypes is made here. As part of the 
applied methodology of this research, archetypal images (a set of archetypal 
stakeholders) are used in an instrumental manner in order to achieve the 
research objective. It is important to emphasize that it is totally outside the 
scope of this study to detail aspects of archetypes and their properties and the 
theories about them. The concern here is purely instrumental. 
4.6.1 - Archetypes - An Introduction 
Although attempts to apply such an approach to organizations have been few, 
Turner (1992, pp. 62) argues that 
"while the romanticism of symbols perpetuates dualism, it may be equally 
dangerous to neglect the sensuous, aesthetic and stylistic character of 
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organizations, and to regard them as rational authority machines, their 
members acting as mere nodes of communication, command and control. " 
There have been few studies relating archetypal studies and institutional 
management theories (such as Mitroff, 1989) which are very interesting and 
provocative. For example, Mitroff (1989) argues that institutions exert influence 
on the inner personalities of people such as to "cause" new archetypes to 
emerge, to form, around the symbols that are in tune with the images of an 
age. Mitroff goes further to suggest that organizational symbols are symbolic 
of the complex mixtures of stakeholders, "real" and archetypal, which 
compose the structure of organizations and the individuals that compose 
them. 
The growth of interest in symbolism in organizations has occurred during the 
period when the advocates of what has been called 'the structural allegory' 
have been attempting to revise the way in which one might think. Turner 
(1992, pp. 51) suggests that 
"writers of the various structuralist schools refuse to accept conscious, 
intentional sources of meaning ... and would transform inquiry about the 
'reality' of 'things' into an exploration of codes. " 
Although "anti-empiricist" tendencies of structural analysis are refused by 
Turner (because they "lie uneasily with some of the issues which seem to me 
to be of importance in organizational theory"), Turner alerts to the fact that, at 
the other extreme, it is not intellectually sufficient to look solely at the manner 
in which symbols contribute to the functioning of an organization. Turner 
(1992, pp. 52) goes further to suggest that 
"... 'corporate culture' writers promote the use of symbols to achieve 
functional change, while taking as given the symbolic constitution of an 
organization. Paradoxically, there is a limit to which such analyses can deal 
with their own ostensible goals of promoting change, for the partial picture 
which they have of why and how organizations function can only be 
completed by looking outside the framework of functionality. " 
Most of the references about archetypes quote Jung C. G. as the "father" of 
archetypal psychology. Wolman (1989) defines an archetype (Jung C. G. ) as 
the 
"structural component of the collective unconscious which is inherited. It is a 
deep unconscious representation of an experience that has been common 
to a human race for countless generations. The archetypes form the core of 
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autonomous partial systems, independent of the consciousness. If one 
becomes stirred up, the archetype takes 'possession' of the individual and 
causes neurosis. The archetypes are called primordial images, dominants, 
imagos, mythological images, and behavior patterns. The anima, animus, 
and the shadow are the main archetypes. " 
Archetype is the most symbolic, universal psychological image of a character 
type known. Jung (in Mitroff, 1989, pp. 84) says that 
"(the archetypes) exist preconsciously and presumably they form the 
structural dominants of the psyche in general. They may be compared to 
the invisible presence of the crystal lattice in a saturated solution". 
And Neumann (1963, also in Mitroff, 1989, pp. 84) says, 
"Not only does (an archetype) act as a magnetic field, directing 
unconscious behavior of the personality through the pattern of behavior set 
up by the instincts; it also operates as a pattern of vision in the 
consciousness, ordering the psychic material into symbolic images". 
In sum, archetypes are the most basic, universal, human symbols through 
which humans experience the world (and themselves) and order the world of 
phenomena so that they are able to have experience. 
Bird (1989, in Turner, 1992, pp. 49) refers to archetypes as "a transpersonal 
pattern of energy, meaning and value related to instincts, a pattern which 
crosses history and culture". Turner (1992, pp. 49) argues that to discern a 
deeper significance in these diagnoses, one has to accept the Jungian view 
that such a pattern, related to instinct, is constituted by important regularities 
which hold constant, not only across history but also across cultures. "This 
then constitutes a claim for a degree of theoretical coherence which jars with 
the doubts about the possibility of universal social theories. " 
In his studies about archetypes Mitroff (1989, pp. 85 ) puts emphasis on the 
point that "the more one examines the great diversity of world cultures, the 
more one finds that at a symbolic level there is an astounding amount of 
agreement between various archetypal images". Mitroff (1989) goes further to 
suggest that 
"people may disagree and. fight one another by day but at night they show 
the most profound similarity in their dreams and myths. The agreement is 
too profound to be produced by chance alone. It is therefore attributed to a 
similarity of the psyche at the deepest layers of the unconscious. These 
similar appearing symbolic images are termed archetypes. " 
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One may be tempted to ask questions such as 
"Why does the mind produce these images? What is their function? What is 
their purpose? At the most elemental level, archetypes exist to help a 
person develop an emotionally satisfying picture of the world. The world is 
so terrifying to the primitive and child that both need some way of coping 
with it, of organizing it. " (Jaynes, 1976, in Mitroff, 1989, pp. 85). 
The primitive and child use archetypes because they cannot use the 
techniques available to the adult. They are unable psychologically to distance 
themselves enough to give a disinterested, rational, or scientific picture of the 
world. Since the child and the primitive project their inner fears out onto the 
world, little wonder that some of the most universal and potent archetypal 
images are of the strangest looking demons - half human - half animal 
creatures. 
McCully (1971, in Mitroff, 1989, pp. 86 - 87) says that: 
"Every aspect of a person's existence is capable of being turned into an archetypal symbol, 
image, or character. An archetype, or image that represents it, ... contains the essence of a 
particular experience that has been repeated enough to make a permanent but not 
necessarily unalterable print on neural structure ... It does not appear that archetypal patterns 
are necessarily fixed. Inherent capacities for flexibility may be a chief difference between 
neural structure in man and other animals. Nevertheless, some of our experiences are so 
fundamental in existence that one cannot expect the human condition without them.... 
Archetypes include such prototypal (basic human) experience as food gathering, 
elimination, fertility, father, mother, authority, self, femininity, goddess, eternity, childhood, 
circle (the circle usually stands for completeness, wholeness - the containment of opposites. 
It is also one of the four basic geometric figures. ), square, devil (evil), god (good), maleness, 
and sleep. If we look at the core or essence of a symbol, according to laws pertaining to 
subjective processes, we will find evidence for archetypal influences. * 
Each archetype is an idealized image, more pure and extreme, and larger 
than life, to help us cope with and understand the complexities of life (Mitroff, 
1989, pp. 88). This can be clearly understood when one considers the hold 
that fairy tales have on the mind of a child. Bettelheim (1977, in Mitroff, 1989, 
pp. 88 - 89) puts it in this way: 
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"Contrary to what takes place in many modern children's stories, in fairy tales evil is as 
omnipresent as virtue. In practically every fairy tale good and evil are given body in the form of 
some figures and their actions, as good and evil, are omnipresent in life and the properties 
for both are present in every man. It is this duality which poses the moral problem, and 
requires the struggle to solve it.... 
The figures in fairy tales are not ambivalent - not good and bad at the same time, as we all are 
in reality. But since polarization dominates the child's mind, it also dominates fairy tales. A 
person is either good or bad, nothing in between.... One parent is all good, the other evil.... 
Presenting the polarities of character permits the child to comprehend easily the differences 
between the two, which he could not do as readily were the figures drawn more true to life, 
with all the complexities that characterize real people. Ambiguities must wait until a relatively 
firm personality has been established on the basis of positive identifications. Then the child 
has a basis for understanding that there are great differences between people, and that 
therefore one has to make choices about who one wants to be. This basic decision, on 
which all later personality developments will build, is facilitated by the polarizations of the fairy 
tale. " 
4.6.1.1 - Archetypes and Organizations 
There is no need to regard archetypes as literally "real" (that is, actual existing 
stakeholders) to take advantage of their usefulness. Maccoby (1976, in Mitroff, 
1989, pp. 89) alerts to the fact that such images naturally and automatically 
crop up in organizational life; as such, they provide a unique, if not novel, way 
of understanding organizations and their impact on individuals and vice- 
versa. Thus, the discussion about archetypes does not hold exclusively for 
individuals. It can also be extended to small groups and institutions. As one 
advances up the level of human phenomena from the single individual to that 
of the organization, there is a difference in degree, but not in kind, in the 
explanation of human behaviour (Mitroff, 1989). Characters, both real and 
imagined, actual and symbolic, develop in small groups. Groups develop 
myths and stories no less than individuals do to give meaning to their 
existence and structure to their relationships. Indeed, Hirsch (1983, in Mitroff, 
1989, pp. 115) gives an example of the use of archetypes by the business 
world. Hirsch demonstrates that when one large business attempt to take over 
another, the language in which it is conducted. is anything but subdued. 
"It reflects all the emotions, fears, and joys that one should expect to find 
when the spoils of winning and losing are so big. When one is in a situation 
that is so rife with potential uncertainties, exhilaration, conflict, and hard 
feelings, one should expect to see archetypal imagery being used to cope 
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with the intensity of the feelings being expressed and to attempt to contain 
them. " 
This is indeed one of the fundamental purposes of the language that is used. It 
helps to insulate both parties, taker and takee, from the intensity of their 
feelings. Hirsch (1983, in Mitroff, 1989 pp. 115), observes that: 
"The takeover event in itself clearly conforms to a predictable set of scenarios or scripts. In 
the most neutral terms, this boils down to offer --> decisions/actions taken --> outcome. In 
the business world, this relatively simple diagram has taken on the far more colorful form 
available from such well known popular genres as the western (ambush and shootout 
replace [the more blant terms] offer and actions taken), the love affair and/or marriage, 
warfare (replete with sieges, barricades, flak, and soldierly honor), ' mystery, and piracy on 
the high seas (with raiders and safe harbors). Generic formulations also entail the frequent 
appearance of mercenaries or hired guns (investment houses to whom most of the 
negotiating is delegated), and black and white knights (culled from tales of chivalry in which 
the distressed damsel is either undone or rescued). In virtually all formulations, the acquiring 
executive is macho and the target company [that is, the company to be acquired] is accorded 
the female gender ("sleeping beauty" or a bride brought to the alter; reference to rape also is 
not uncommon). " 
'"For example, the efforts of American Express to acquire McGraw-Hill were said by many to 
test the limits of the normative boundaries for legitimate acquisition tactics: the appropriate 
genre here, for coding purposes, became all-out warfare". 
Symbolism plays an important part in social life. In the same line, institutions 
are unavoidably symbolic, but they cannot be reduced to the symbolic. While 
symbolism is generally recognized as part of an institution's life, its importance 
is not taken seriously or is usually repressed (Turner, 1992). Symbolism in 
such a case is thus seen either as a neutral instrument which merely serves to 
express the existing content of a situation, or as a phenomenon with its own 
logic which, once understood, can be inserted into an existing rational orderto 
produce deducible consequences. 
Symbolism inescapably presupposes images ("imaginary capacity" as termed 
by Castoriadis, 1984, in Turner, 1992 pp. 52). That is, whenever one talks 
about symbols one is referring to an elementary and irreducible capacity for 
evoking images. However, Turner (1992, pp. 52 = 53), argues that 
"this giving of meaning does not occur at the behest of 'real factors' 
because prior to the attribution of meaning, such factors have no place or 
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importance for the society; the meaning of the society itself determines what 
is real. Thus the 'problems' of a society depend upon how people in that 
society define themselves. " 
The symbols which carry meanings within social institutions are not fixed, 
inevitable or necessary, but neither are they merely haphazard or 
conventional. Turner (1992, pp. 54) quoting Duncan (1969) also suggests that 
"The usefulness of symbols lies partly in their ability to offer a bridge 
between various meanings, allowing us to cross and recross from one 
meaning to another, making it possible to live with ambiguity without the 
need to choose between its elements. " 
The concept of organizational culture (discussed in a previous chapter), 
according to Mitroff (1989, pp. 120) can be explained in terms of the types of 
characters present in an organization and the system of interactions that takes 
place between them. An organization's culture is composed of many things, 
including: the "rules", written and unwritten; its special language and 
dictionaries of terms; its jokes; history; myths; rituals; special awards and 
rewards; ceremonies; and symbols. All these, compose an organization's 
culture. 
"At the same time, it is also true that at the deepest levels, an organization's 
culture is made up by the special set of characters it consciously and 
unconsciously selects to represent 'it"' (Mitroff, 1989, pp. 120). 
Indeed, Turner (1992, pp. 63) argues that organizations cannot exist without 
being generated by and being able to use various forms of symbolic orders. 
Turner (1992, pp. 62) also suggests that 
"Every organization is a jungle of symbols - symbolic fields, symbolic acts 
and symbolic games. All of life, inside or outside organizations, is symbolic, 
even the biological process of transmitting hereditary information from one 
generation to another. Communication between individual human beings is 
a symbolic process, and all culture is predicated upon such symbolic 
interaction. The way in which we understand the operations of the 
individual human mind, in psychology or psychoanalysis, is symbolic, as is 
the way in which we interpret the structure and behaviour of social grouping 
and phenomena. " 
The way in which organizations interact is also explored by Turner (1992, pp. 
62). It is argued that the relation of an organization to the market and to the 
economy is also, in part, a symbolic matter. Although the market is sometimes 
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"talked about as a kind of final substratum of reality, with the implication that 
this is where reality testing will ultimately take place, the market itself is a 
complex symbolic construct. The creation and the sustenance of a market 
requires a realm of discourse which depends upon skilled 
accomplishments by participants who have particular sets of symbolic 
knowledge and beliefs. " 
Aredal (1989, in Turner, 1992 pp. 49) makes an interesting point regarding the 
rationalism of modern organizations: 
"Within organizations, it is not understood just how great an extent 
rationalism has destroyed the ability to reflect on ideas and to interpret 
symbols, and how this rationalism has left the organization exposed to 
unconscious mental powers. " 
4.6.1.2 - Archetypes Property 
In a search for a rational typology of archetypes, Mitroff (1989, quoting 
Nuemann, 1963, pp. 92 - 93) points out that 
"it is nearly impossible. Archetypes are neither exclusive nor exhaustive. 
Archetypal images are themselves neither fixed, constant, nor static. New 
archetypes are continually being made and altered as humanity shapes 
and remakes itself. We can attempt to take a snapshot of some of the basic 
experiences around which archetypes form, but we cannot fix the basic 
number or the form of archetypes. Indeed, one of the archetypes that 
always seems to form just when we think we have captured the 'complete 
set of archetypes' is an archetype having to do with precariousness, 
randomness, danger, and/or incompleteness. This archetype seems to 
function to alert us that the psyche may never fully succeed in fathoming 
itself in fixed, static form. " 
While one can gain considerable insight into the broad outlines of the full 
range of archetypes, complete and definitive knowledge of the full set seems 
unopen to mortals. Indeed, Mitroff (1989, pp. 93) argues that "Complete 
knowledge, like perfection itself, is an attribute of an archetype. It is not a 
property of humanity". 
Finally, Mitroff (1989, pp. 93) calls attention to the fact that stakeholders, at the 
level of social system, do not typically contain contradictory properties. At the 
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very least, stakeholders attempt to avoid contradictions. This property is 
generally not characteristic of archetypes. Mitroff. (1989, pp. 93) goes further to 
state that 
"Although there is a tendency for archetypal images to split into good 
versus bad, strong versus weak, nurturing versus devouring aspects, the 
split is never complete. Thus, archetypes follow a logic that is very different 
from that which typifies the elements of 'rational' social system analysis. " 
In sum, when dealing with a phenomenon as complex as a human being, one 
is not dealing with an entity that is free from contradiction. Contradiction is one 
of the essential characteristic properties of people, groups, organizations, and 
institutions. All of the archetypes contain contradictory properties or aspects. 
As Mitroff (1989, pp. 94) puts its, 
"the Mother is weak and strong, loving and devouring. An organization can 
be both big and small, weak and strong, beautiful and ugly, and so forth at 
the same time. " 
4.7 - Stakeholder Theory and the Hotel Industry 
As the discussion in this chapter revealed, stakeholder management is 
becoming a crucial issue in business operations. It is increasingly important 
for crisis management, since stakeholders can contribute actively in both crisis 
prevention and management. The topic of stakeholder has been, 
unfortunately, largely overlooked by the hotel industry. No evidence of studies 
or research could be found directly relating stakeholders to the hotel industry. 
Knowles (1996) introduces the concept of stakeholders in a very generalized 
form as it relates to strategic planning. It is not substantiated with any empirical 
or theoretical evidence. 
The topic of stakeholder theory has already been discussed in the context of 
the tourism industry. Wheeler (1992) and Simmons (1994) introduced the 
concept but from a practical perspective. That is, their works are mainly 
concerned with the applicability of stakeholder theory in practice, without 
outlining some of the critical issues surrounding its conception and 
implementation issues. The consequences of not including (or taking into 
account) stakeholders in planning and decision making for tourism 
development are many and well publicized. Among other things it can lead to 
resentment, xenophobia and ultimately lead to protests and violence against 
213 
G. Santana Ch. 4- Stakeholders and Crisis Managemert 
tourists and tourism enterprises (Chapter 5 discusses and gives examples of 
such situations). 
Robson and Robson (1996) explored the notion of stakeholder theory applied 
to the tourism industry. Specifically, the authors examined the implications for 
tourism marketing decision makers of the current debate on the stakeholder 
theory. It is argued that for tourism businesses, stakeholders need to be drawn 
into the decision making process. Robson and Robson (1996, pp. 534) argue 
that 
"Stakeholders need to be identified, and relationships nurtured to ensure 
that analysis of concerns, goals, values and responsibilities are understood 
and synthesized into the strategic framework of the business. " 
Even though the topic of stakeholder theory has been discussed in the context 
of the tourism industry it is still in a very incipient form. Robson and Robson 
(1996) argue that works covering the broad area of tourism planning fail to 
consider the role of stakeholder management or that of environmental issues. 
As noticed above, whenever the topic has been discussed it has emphasized 
practical issues and neglected the important issues of conception and 
implementation. There could not be found any evidence on the literature 
regarding stakeholder theory and the hotel industry, specially relating to the 
issues of crisis and crisis management. 
4.8 - Summary 
This chapter described and discussed the topic of stakeholders in 
organizational management. The stakeholder theory has been discussed and 
an account of its recent history and current issues has been presented, 
specifically in relation to the controversies surrounding the theory. Despite the 
efforts and contributions of leading scholars and practitioners to the field of 
business and society, controversy still persists. There are still fundamental 
problems, such as operational definitions and managerial implications for the 
effective implementation of the concept, that need to be addressed and 
resolved. Having said, the stakeholder theory is an evolving field and all the 
controversy and different views and input into the issue of stakeholder theory 
has been positive and contributed towards its development. 
Stakeholder theory is based on the principle of extending recognition to a 
wider range of individuals or groups that have a "morally valid claim" on the 
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organization, as opposed to the previous views about claims and stake 
(stockholder theory). This view is supported by business ethicists. Ethicists 
condemn the stockholder theory as morally indefensible because it fails to 
respect the right of other organizational constituencies to self-determination. 
As observed in the course of this chapter, the stakeholder theory differs 
fundamentally from other theories in that its intention is to explain and guide 
the behaviour of organizations towards respecting and satisfying stakeholders 
expectations without favouring any one group at the expense of others. It goes 
well beyond the acknowledgment that organizations have stakeholders. 
Stakeholder groups have a diverse range of claims and interests upon 
organizations. Regardless of whether they are legitimate or not, failure to 
acknowledge or address/respect the claims of particular stakeholders can be 
very detrimental to organizational general performance, if not in the short term, 
certainly in the long term. It was observed, however, that there are practical 
issues that may constrain organizational intention to satisfy stakeholders 
interests, such as restriction or limit on organizational resources or even 
managerial capabilities. It was also noticed that there is negligible empirical 
evidence concerning the relative attention organizations give to stakeholders 
groups. The whole area of stakeholder theory still need more empirical 
research to support its claims. 
One of the managerial implications in adopting and implementing the 
stakeholder theory is in relation to the difficulties encountered in identifying 
"legitimate" stakeholders. The literature provides conflicting views. While 
some authors suggest a narrow approach to identify stakeholders (leaving 
important ones out), others offer very broad frameworks that are not easily 
implementable or functional. There has been, however, some attempt to 
classify stakeholders, such as a "primary" and "secondary" stakeholders. 
Primary stakeholders are those groups that the organization is directly 
dependent on for its immediate survival (such as investors, customers, 
employees, etc. ). Secondary stakeholders are those groups that are not 
directly engaged with the organization in transactions and that are not 
essential for its survival. This notion is questioned in this research. Technically 
it may be quite correct, however, potentially it underestimates the power, or 
intention, of some stakeholders to disrupt and compromise the survival of the 
organization. The example of the media is a well known one. Although it may 
not have a "stake" in the organization (not a "primary" stakeholder), indirectly, 
it can be argued, the organization does depend on it for its long term survival. 
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The power of the media is unquestionable. It has the ability and capacity to 
shape and mobilize public opinion in relation to an organization's product, 
strategy, leadership, and so forth. It can take sides in an organizational issue 
and be in favor or in opposition to it. The crises cases of Tylenol and the oil 
spill of the Exxon Valdez are only too well publicized cases where the media 
played a great part in "forming" the opinion of the public, and to a great extent, 
influencing the outcome and resolution of the crisis (in the case of Exxon, 
where the media took an unfavourable view of the organization and its 
behaviour, the crisis is still unresolved). Quoting Freeman (1984, pp. 53), 
"Some groups may have as an objective simply to interfere with the smooth 
operations of our business. For instance, some corporations must count 
'terrorist groups' as stakeholders. As unsavory as it is to admit that such 
'illegitimate' groups have a stake in our business, from the standpoint of 
strategic management, it must be done. " 
The issue of identifying stakeholders was also discussed in a later stage in the 
chapter after the subjects of crisis and crisis management were considered in 
association with stakeholder management. This part presented seven 
practical methods for identifying stakeholders developed by Mitroff (1989). 
Given the nature of this study, all stakeholders deserve almost equal attention 
in strategic decision making, if only for the fact that stakeholders can play key 
roles in both preventing and managing crisis. 
The proposed practices of the stakeholder theory are a radical departure from 
the dominant organizational practices and management thinking of a few 
years ago. Today, not only are organizations taking into account and 
addressing stakeholders expectations, values, etc., they are also making use 
of the theory as a measure for corporate performance. As noted earlier, 
executives in some leading organizations are evaluated by their performance 
on stakeholder relationships, and organizations are also being judged by their 
"social performance". There is evidence to suggest that stakeholder 
management improves organizational performance at all levels. Having said 
that, there is still controversy in relation to the issue of measurement of 
corporate social performance. Clarkson (1995) alerts to the fact that there is 
no operational definitions available for the concepts of corporate social 
performance, corporate social responsibility, and corporate social 
responsiveness. The main consequence of this lack of definition and proper 
understanding of the concepts is that a framework or model for systematic 
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collection, organization, and analysis of corporate data relating to the 
concepts above has not yet been developed. 
The main conclusion that can be derived from all the discussion above is that 
an organization represents only one minor interest in a broader inter- 
organizational network or system. Management find it difficult to manage and 
co-ordinate the diverse interest of stakeholder groups. The task faced by 
management to learn the interrelationships among hundreds of companies, 
industry, political and international phenomena is not an easy one. The 
complexity of this system is increasingly intensified by the ever increasing 
instability of relationships among phenomena. Modern international business 
is characterized by complex chains of cause and effect, wide ranges of 
strategic action, and many participating individuals, groups, and political 
entities. As observed in the course of this chapter, and based on research 
evidence, making correct inferences about complex relationships presents a 
task which decision makers find more and more difficult to master. 
Having said all that, and although the stakeholder theory is still a matter of 
evolution and controversy, the fact of the matter is that the most prominent 
alternative to it (i. e., the stockholder theory - management serving the 
shareowners) is morally untenable (Donaldson and Preston (1995, pp. 88). 
In this chapter, stakeholder theory has been linked to crisis management. As 
observed throughout this chapter, anyone (individual or group) has the 
potential to affect or be affected by organizational action or inaction. Hence, 
understanding stakeholder systems and dynamics is an essential element in 
effective crisis management. As also observed, stakeholders are key players 
in both preventing and contributing to crisis resolution. This chapter also 
introduced and discussed another set of stakeholders that are not addressed 
in the traditional literature. The traditional stakeholder. system refers to and 
represents the impact of impersonal/institutional forces external to the 
organizations. This new set of stakeholders represents another set of 
stakeholders that emanate from the sociopathic behaviour that has been 
directed at the modern organizations (such as sabotage, executive 
kidnapping, executive crime, highjacks, poisoning, etc. ). The important point 
here is not that the traditional view is wrong, it is just incomplete. The 
discussion in this chapter supports the view that those two sets of 
stakeholders are inseparable and in constant contact with one another. Given 
this picture, it is even more urgent and essential that organizations understand 
217 
G. Santana Ch. 4- Stakeholders and Crisis Manaaemert 
the implications of the interconnectedness and interdependence of their 
behaviour and actions (or inactions) and the potential effect of those internal 
and external forces. 
In previous chapters and in this chapter the notion that crises are not isolated 
phenomena has been emphasized. Crises are both organizational and inter- 
organizational phenomena. They are caused by human, communication, and 
technological failures within and among organizations. Crises are constituted 
of independent events that take place in geographically dispersed locations 
and at different times. Crises are also characterized by the presence of 
multiple stakeholders. Stakeholders are inevitably involved in causing and 
mitigating the effects of crises, and can assume a multitude of roles in crisis. 
As observed, stakeholders change, they are not static, and as the crisis status 
also change they may assume different positions. The example of the Bophal 
crisis described earlier illustrates the implications related to crisis and 
stakeholder systems, the roles stakeholders play and their potential in 
resolving or contributing to aggravate crises. 
Understanding stakeholders is then paramount for organizational crisis 
management. For that matter, the issue of frame of reference was also 
discussed. Frame of reference is an analytical tool that is defined as a method 
used by people and organizations to select and process information. Frame of 
reference reflects the biases, attitudes, and models for making judgments. 
According to Shrivastava (1992) it is the lens through which an individual or 
organization views the world. Thus, frame of reference is particularly valuable 
for understanding how and why organizations react to crises the way they do. 
It is a critical determinant of whether, and how, an organization will respond to 
crisis. Frame of reference also helps, in analyzing crisis events, to explain why 
organizations often take actions that seem to the outside observer obviously 
wrong, tactless, or ill informed. 
Today, the long term survival and prosperity of any organization depends 
greatly on the effective management of the relationships within the system in 
which organizations operate. When the issue of crisis and crisis management 
is considered, this issue is even more urgent. As Chakravarthy (1986, in 
Greenley and Foxall, 1996, pp. 106) posits, a necessary condition for 
"excellence" is the continued cooperation of all stakeholder groups. As the 
level of uncertainty increases at all levels of organizational activities, 
stakeholder relationship becomes increasingly important. Booth (1993, pp. 
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30) argue that companies should develop an almost symbiotic relationship 
with their stakeholders so that risk and uncertainty can be reduced or to a 
significant level externalized. The chance of crisis, radical change is thereby 
reduced. 
The whole issue of stakeholders and crisis requires an understanding of 
assumptions and how they operate. This chapter also introduced the concept 
of assumptions and demonstrated their relevance to the topic under 
consideration. One of the most prominent characteristics of organizational life 
today is that organizations are facing more and more uncertainties. Faced with 
uncertainty, organizations need to predict or forecast the state and nature of 
future affairs and articulate these as assumptions around which they can 
devise their strategic planning. Therefore, assumptions are at the centre of 
decision making in the most common circumstances. As mentioned earlier, 
stakeholders make assumptions about each other and about themselves. 
Indeed, Mitroff and Emshoff (in Mitroff and Linstone, 1993, pp. 143) argue that 
assumptions are the properties of stakeholders. That is, as one does not 
always have the precise information, or data, to know precisely how a certain 
policy will affect stakeholders and consequently predict their reactions, one 
then uses assumptions. In fact, its is argued that the bigger, the more complex 
the problem, the more it is likely to involve a wider range of stakeholder forces, 
and as result of that, the more assumptions will have to be made. 
Assumptions, then, are important variables in effective crisis management. 
Stakeholders make assumptions about the future, others in the system, and 
about themselves. Understanding how these assumptions are made and 
function is paramount. This is specially true in crisis situations. In the event of 
a crisis, it is crucial to know and understand how stakeholders view the event 
itself and what assumptions they make about it. In fact, one way to understand 
crises is through understanding how stakeholders view reality. As observed in 
this and in previous chapters, one explanation of the different views and 
actions of stakeholders in "a crisis is that they make different set of 
assumptions about the real nature of a the problem. In the same way, 
stakeholders also make assumptions about each other and act upon their 
assumptions. Successful response to crisis depends greatly on the concerted 
effort of stakeholders (since one lives and operates in an interconnected and 
interdependent world). 
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The issue of archetypes has also been introduced and discussed (albeit 
briefly) in this chapter. There have been few studies linking archetypes and 
organizational theories. The use of archetypes in this research is purely 
instrumental, nevertheless, and as observed in the course of this chapter, 
archetypal images emerges whenever individuals or groups/institutions 
interact with one another. As business operates in a system of interdependent 
and interconnected relationships, it can be assumed that archetypal imagery 
(consciously or unconsciously) is a vibrant part of organizational life. In fact, it 
is has been suggested that organizations are archetypes themselves. 
Archetypes are commonly used in the symbols of organizations. It is argued, 
in turn, that organizational symbols are symbolic of the complex mixture of 
stakeholders, real and archetypal, which compose the, structure of 
organizations and the individuals that compose them (Mitroff, 1989). 
Archetypes are used to assist individuals and groups to make sense of the 
complex phenomena which are encountered in daily life. The use of 
archetypes allows one to have experience. Archetypes exist to help a person 
develop an emotionally satisfying picture of the world. 
In organizational management, archetypes have been used (in practice and in 
text books) by organizational culture professionals and writers (promoting the 
use of symbols) to promote functional changes. Archetypes are also useful for 
understanding organizations and the impacts of organizations on individuals 
or groups and vice-versa. Therefore, when considering stakeholder 
relationships in crisis situations, understanding archetypes becomes a even 
more relevant issue. It is also suggested that in crisis situations archetypal 
imagery is more likely to emerge and be projected. As demonstrated by Hirsch 
(1983, in Mitroff, 1989), the use of archetypes helps people to insulate 
themselves from anxiety, intensity of feelings, and other symptoms that a crisis 
may bring. The understanding of archetypes then becomes an important 
element in effective crisis management. Archetypes can be, in conjunction 
with other management tools, a useful element in understanding 
stakeholders' relationships. 
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THE HOTEL INDUSTRY AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
5.1 - Introduction 
When the words tourism and travel are mentioned there is little tendency to 
associate them with crisis. Tourism and travel are usually associated with 
pleasure, enjoyment, relaxation, safety, and so on. All those words and 
meanings are embodied in the concept of tourism. At the other extreme, 
inherent in the word crisis, are the concepts of distress, trauma, panic, anxiety, 
and fear. Having said that, crisis today is a real part of the tourism business. 
From the standpoint of responsible management, tourism and crisis cannot be 
disassociated. 
Crisis is not something new for the tourism industry. According to Lehrman 
(1986), although 1985 was a record-breaking year for international tourism, it 
was also a year during which terrorist activities, civil disturbances, airline 
crashes, and natural disasters repeatedly took centre stage. Although crisis 
always existed in the industry, 1985 was the year in which crisis began to be 
associated with the travel and tourism industry. Lehrman (1986) argues that in 
prior years, crises tended to be isolated occurrences because they were 
separated by large gaps of time and distance. However, 1985 and early 1986 
saw a series of bombings, highjackings, and murders directed at American 
citizens and businesses abroad. Those events put the industry into the fore 
and indicated that travel, specially international travel was not safe. From that 
period on, crises not only became more frequent but also more diversified and 
severe. 
The hotel industry is one of the most susceptible and vulnerable industries to 
crisis. The industry is characterized by its fragmented structure and dynamic 
operating environment. Operationally, high levels of uncertainty surrounding 
service encounters and operations also characterize the industry. Brownell 
(1990, pp. 197) argues that "few other organizations experience the same 
high degree of uncertainty". The issue of crisis in the hotel industry is a real 
one. Research evidence, as will be discussed later, has shown that the 
number of crises are not only on the increase but also that crises are 
becoming increasingly more complex, difficult to anticipate and to manage 
effectively. The range of crises the hotel industry is vulnerable to is very large 
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indeed. It ranges from terrorist attack to white-collar crime, from credit card 
fraud to rape, from suicide to employee violence. The issues of crisis 
management and crisis preparedness in the context of the hotel industry are 
analysed and discussed. 
Although no special attention is given to any particular type of crisis (or ways 
to prevent and manage them), this chapter dedicates a section to the issue of 
crime in the hotel industry. Safety has been always the concern of both 
travelers and management. Some examples of criminal activities associated 
with the hotel industry and hotel industry practices are given. 
This chapter also puts into context the issues of stakeholder management and 
the hotel industry in relation to crisis and crisis management. The fact that the 
industry is part of an entire system of relations (stakeholder system) makes it 
exposed to variations and changes in that system. Hotels operate in a 
dynamic and evolving environment. The industry is also characterized by the 
high level of interdependence and interconnectedness which it depends on to 
conduct its operations. Given the interconnectedness and interdependence of 
the operating system in which hotels function, failure to manage stakeholder 
relationships can have devastating effects on both the organization and 
stakeholders. 
There is a real lack of work and research in the areas of crisis and crisis 
management specially devoted to the hotel industry. Negligible evidence 
exists in relation to the tourism industry. This is also true for the issues of 
stakeholders and stakeholder theory applied to the industry. It is argued that 
what has been done so far has been approached from a practical point of 
view, disregarding the fundamental issues of conception and implementation. 
Before going into details on the issues of crisis and crisis management in the 
hotel industry, this chapter provides an overview of the industry globally, 
assessing and discussing some important issues and trends relevant to the 
industry. Issues of definitions (what constitutes a hotel), the problem of 
classification, and problems surrounding the issues of industry comparisons 
and analysis, as well as management practices and trends in the industry, are 
addressed in the first part of this chapter. Then, the emphasis of the chapter 
moves to the European scene and finally to the UK sphere and the issues 
directly related to this study. The chapter makes a revision of the structure of 
the UK hotel industry and dedicates a section to the recent history of the 
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industry. Namely, the effect of the recession and the Gulf War and the 
consequences and changes suffered by the industry. The period between 
1989 and 1994 has been regarded by analysts as the most difficult one since 
World War II. This section examines the impacts on demand and the 
reshaping of the supply structure. The recession prompted a period of 
rationalization and consolidation in the industry. 
5.2 - The Hotel Industry 
5.2.1 - The Hotel Industry -A World Overview 
The hotel industry is an essential and important component of the world's 
travel and tourism industry. However, estimating the exact size and common 
characteristics of the hotel industry is not a simple task. The hotel industry 
across the world consists of hundreds of thousands of hotels owned and/or 
operated by independent operators, multinational chains, insurance 
companies, pension funds, governments, and other investors (Olsen, 1995). 
Another issue that contributes to the difficulty of identifying and estimating the 
world hotel industry is that destinations range from the dormant, the newly 
emerging, and the mature economies; there is no internationally accepted 
grading system; and countries vary considerably in the way data is recorded 
and processed (if at all, in some cases). Moreover, and for this purpose more 
significantly, there is currently in practical usage no definition of what 
constitutes a hotel - even though the World Tourism Organization has 
provided some guidelines (Todd and Mather,. 1995). 
Data on the hotel industry is available in most countries. The World Tourism 
Organization makes annually a compilation of these data provided by each 
country and produces annual estimates of the total size of the market. These 
estimates are categorized into "hotels and similar establishments", which 
includes the formal hotel sector (hotels, motels, boarding houses, etc. ), and 
what the World Tourism Organization termed "supplementary means of 
accommodation", which consists of private rented accommodation, hostels 
and chalets, camping sites and others. Given the diversity of the industry, the 
difficulties in gathering accurate data (methods of collection and interpretation 
of data vary considerably from country to country, and in some countries no 
systems are in place which could fulfill the provision of data - Todd and 
Mather, 1995, pp. 7), and the other points mentioned above, the figures 
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provided by the World Tourism Organization should be interpreted as only 
indicative, although they are the "best" source of data. 
Given these limitations, any statistical analysis of the hotel industry needs to 
be viewed with caution "as the reliability of data, the variety of sources and the 
definitions used, vary on a national and international basis" (Pizam and 
Knowles, 1994, pp. 283). Todd and Mather (1995, pp. 7) argue that attempts to 
make comparisons of the hotel profile of different destinations, as well as 
growth patterns within individual destinations, should be done with extreme 
caution. It is emphasized that these problems are even more acute in Europe, 
due to the fact that Europe 
"has the longest heritage of hotel development and thus a large variety of 
types of property - hotels, motels, posadas, guest houses, ' inns, boarding 
houses, albergos, paradores, etc. - which in different countries may or may 
not fall under the broad 'hotel' categorization. " 
The UK exemplifies some of these limitations. There is no statutory 
requirement for hotel registration in the UK and therefore industry size can 
only be approximated. The estimated size of the industry ("approximation") 
can be taken from national grading schemes, the Huddersfield University 
Hotel and Catering Research Centre (Huddersfield University), and official 
government statistics (Pizam and Knowles, 1994). Pizam and Knowles (1994) 
argue further that these complications are aggravated by the fact that 
definitions and methods of data collection vary significantly between the UK's 
national tourism boards. 
Measuring industry performance is also a complicated and often very difficult 
task. Industry performance data have different sources, usually a variety of 
consultancy reports which are generally limited by the size of their sample. 
Data also comes from stockbroker reports, which concentrate on publicly 
quoted companies. Given that in many countries the bulk of the hotel industry 
consists of small, independent owners (and therefore not usually public 
limited companies) the data are not representative and caution also has to be 
exercised in interpreting and using such data. Having said that, a new 
methodology to measure hotel portfolios was developed by Kleinwort Benson 
Securities Limited in the UK (Slattery, 1996). The methodology measures 
systematically the performance of hotel portfolios and is based on a series of 
weighted indexes of supply side variables. Such methodology was not 
available until now. It is argued that the index approach has the benefit of 
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permitting comparisons to be made between the performance of groups within 
the same class and type of hotels ("division"). The numerical values assigned 
to any one hotel company (or portfolio) are thus of less direct relevance than 
the relative position of each portfolio within its own division. This kind of 
analysis tool is most welcome. Although in this precise study it only covers the 
quoted hotel companies in the UK, Slattery (1996) argues that it can be 
applied to any other market. The analysis shows a consistent picture when a 
hotel company (or portfolio) is measured with respect to four key measures: 
room yield; other turnover per room; trading margin; and trading profit per 
room. 
5.2.1.1 - The Problem of Definition 
The problem of definition is a real one in the hotel sector, considering the 
issues discussed so far. Definition of the concept has evolved from time to 
time and this fact has also contributed to the difficulties encountered in the 
interpretation of the trends in hotel capacity. As an example, Todd and Mather 
(1995) give the example of the radical decline in hotel capacity in the UK and 
the changes in eastern Europe's hotel stock (between 1989 and 1993) which 
are attributed to changes in the definition of the concept. In the former case, 
the market fall in hotel rooms between 1991 and 1993 looks very suspicious 
for analysts who follow this market closely. In the case of eastern Europe, the 
extreme fluctuations during this period call for further investigation. 
The World Tourism Organization defines "hotels and similar establishments" 
as 
"... are typified as being arranged in rooms, in number exceeding a 
specified minimum; as coming under a common management; as providing 
certain services, including room service, daily bed-making and cleaning of 
sanitary facilities; as grouped in classes and categories according to the 
facilities and services provided; and as not falling in the category of 
specialised establishment. " (in Todd and Mather, 1995, pp. 7). 
Defining a hotel company is also a complex issue. Lewis and Chambers 
(1989) argue that there are in reality three "industries" within what is known as 
the hotel industry: 
" Companies involved in constructing, developing and owning buildings 
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" Companies involved in managing hotels (with or without holding equity in 
the hotels under management); and 
" Franchising companies which develop hotel chains without being involved in 
either owning hotels or managing hotels. 
The definitions above are, however, not representative of all hotel companies. 
There are hotel management companies that own no properties and have no 
hotels at all. Richfield Hospitality Services and Interstate Hotels Corporation in 
the United States of America are two examples of such companies. They 
provide hotel management services (i. e., employ personnel who run hotels) 
but do not have their own company's name attached to the hotels at all. 
Therefore, to the general public and consumers of services, of their hotels, 
such companies are more or less invisible. As will become clear later in this 
chapter when the issues of grading and classification are discussed (issues 
which are also surrounded by confusion and controversy), the consumer is not 
really worried as to whether they are staying in a hotel that belongs to 
Company A, is managed by Company B, is marketed by Company C, and is 
known as Company D. In the case of hotel classification, consumers are now 
demanding that classification should be done in relation to the quality of the 
establishment and not in relation to the facilities on offer. 
Hotel affiliation refers basically to the relationship that exists between a hotel 
and the company under whose auspices it operates (Slattery, 1996). There 
are basically five categories: 
" Owned hotels - Owned hotels are those that are freehold properties on which 
the company has no rent obligations. It is by far the largest category in the UK. 
" Leased hotels - are those which includes properties which are rented as well 
as sale and leaseback hotels. The leased hotel category increased 
considerably in the 1990s when interest rates and limited capital access 
prompted companies such as Forte, Stakis, Greenalls, Friendly and Ladbroke 
to enter the sale and leaseback market. 
" Management contract with an equity stake - This category is an increasing 
trend as companies compete more vigorously to win management contracts. It 
is relatively rare in the UK and includes Friendly Hotels' joint venture with 
British Land. 
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" Equity-free management contract - Equity-free management contract is by far 
the most common form of contract in hotels, particularly among the major 
international hotel brands. The time scale for contract varies but is typically 20 
years or more and is typically based on a structure of 3 per cent of turnover 
and 10 per cent of gross operating profit (GOP). Knowles (1996) points out 
that as the competition to win this kind of contract increases among the hotel 
chains, the terms have tended to weaken. Slattery (1996) suggests that it is 
not uncommon to see today terms of 2 per cent of turnover and 8 per cent of 
GOP. This trend is also expected to continue. 
" Franchised hotels - Franchised hotels are owned and operated by 
independent hoteliers and short chains who pay a franchise fee to a major 
hotel chain to operate their hotel under the auspices of the hotel brand. The 
attraction for owner/operators is that they have access to brand infrastructure 
such as central reservations, marketing, training and purchasing. Holiday Inn 
Worldwide, Hospitality Franchise Systems and Choice Hotels are among the 
major hotel franchisers. 
Franchising in the UK is still relatively new and not much practiced. However, 
with the expansion of Holiday Inn, and other major recent agreements in the 
industry (such as between Whitbread and Marriott and the agreement 
between Friendly Hotels and Choice Hotels), franchising in the UK is 
expected to increase significantly in the next few years. 
There are also hotel marketing consortia and affiliations. The biggest and 
best-known is Best Western - which is in fact a non-profit-making self-help 
company serving its 3,395 member hotels around the world with marketing, 
training, standards and procurements services (Todd and Mather, 1995). 
A given hotel company can be, in many cases, more than one of the 
descriptions above (owner-manager, managers, and franchisers) at the same 
time. An owner may manage some of his own hotels, manage others which do 
not. belong to him, have varying amounts of minority or majority shareholdings 
in properties which he manages, can also franchise his name and might even 
have individual properties which are also members of marketing affiliations 
such as, say, The Leading Hotels of the World. 
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Apart from owner-managers, owners and franchisers, there are also consortia 
(e. g., The Leading Hotels of the World), affiliations (e. g., Best Western), 
reservation companies (e. g., Carlson Marketing Group), travel agents, tour 
operators and wholesalers all of which have claims of varying intensity to be 
regarded as part of the hotel industry. The latter three categories are generally 
fairly peripheral to the hotel industry, but the others are not (Todd and Mather, 
1995). 
There are of course some other variations in the structure of hotel companies. 
The intention here is, however, just to give a general idea of the shape of the 
industry and not of exploring the many existing and operating permutations 
under the broad umbrella of "hotel companies". 
5.2.1.2 - Hotel Market Structure 
In 1993, according to figures provided by the World Tourism Organization, the 
world room supply of hotels and similar establishments were 11.8 million, up 
from 10.9 million in 1989 and 7.9 million in 1981 (Todd and Mather, 1995). An 
examination of product growth in the five years to 1993 shows an annual 
average increase of 2% (shown in Table 5.1 below). This growth, however, 
has not been uniformly shared. Certain regions had more growth than others. 
For example, it has been recorded an average growth of 6.8% (from 1989 to 
1993) for the East Asia-Pacific region (the highest in that period). In contrast, 
eastern Europe and the Middle East region registered a decline on the 
number of rooms in the same period. The western Europe and North America 
regions showed an slow increase, consistent with a more mature region and 
the impact of recession suffered in those regions over the period. Steady 
growth has been identified in the Caribbean and Africa regions. 
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Table 5.1 - Rooms in Hotels and Similar Establishment by Region. 1989-93 
Rooms in Hotels and Similar Establishments by Region, 1989 - 93 
Annual Average 
% change 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1989-93 
No ('000) 
Africa 311.2 332.2 344.1 364.3 374.3 4.7 
Caribbean 127.0 133.8 143.8 150.9 158.9 5.8 
Central & South 504.5 524.0 517.9 535.1 539.2 1.7 
America 
North America 3,545.2 3,652.0 3,710.6 3,720.6 3,731.8 1.3 
East Asia- Pacific 1,126.0 1,214.9 1,302.7 1,378.7 1,463.3 6.8 
South Asia 107.8 111.4 113.9 120.5 124.9 3.7 
Eastern Europe 427.4 310.1 296.9 324.4 340.0 -5.6 
Western Europe 4,563.1 4,628.1 4,694.8 4,883.7 4,868.7 1.6 
Middle East 167.9 168.2 157.3 168.9 166.4 -0.2 
Total 10,880.1 11,074.8 11,281.9 11,646.7 11,767.6 2.0 
Source: Word Tourism Organization -Year Book of Tourism Statistics, 1995 
5.2.1.2.1 - The Problem of Hotel Classification 
As already mentioned above, there are many difficulties in establishing the 
exact size of the international hotel industry. Considering the discussion so 
far, it is not then a surprise that there exists no comprehensive breakdown of 
hotel capacity by grade on an international basis. As emphasized above, most 
countries have their own systems of hotel grading. In some countries grading 
classification is nationally imposed, in others classification is done by the hotel 
associations, while in others a voluntary scheme may prevail. However, it is 
not uncommon to find that no scheme exists at all in some countries. A more 
detailed discussion on this topic, regarding the UK, is provided later in this 
chapter 
ft is worth emphasizing that even where classification schemes do exist, they 
are surrounding by the complexity and inconsistency of individual countries' 
interpretations of what constitutes a 5-star or 4-star hotel. Of the countries that 
submit data to the World Tourism Organization, only 55 provide data on hotel 
capacity by grade (Todd and Mather, 1995). 
The bulk of the accommodation is to be found in the middle range 2- and 3- 
star categories (reflecting a worldwide basis as discussed above). This 
section of the hotel accommodation supply accounted in 1993 for over half of 
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the total hotel capacity (56%). According to figures provided by the World 
Tourism Organization, there has been a consistent increase in the share of 
higher grade hotels and a sharp decline in the share of bottom range 1-star 
hotels. 
5.2.1.2.2 - Industry Structure 
Independent private hotels account for most of the hotel capacity on a 
worldwide basis. Even though the major international hotel chains enjoy the 
prestige and high profile factor, they in fact represent a small share of the 
global hotel accommodation supply. For example, in 1993, of the 11.8 million 
hotel rooms in all regions of the world, the top 12 international chains 
accounted for only one-sixth of the rooms (Todd and Mather, 1995). Even, as 
a matter of illustration, if the next 31 largest international hotel companies (i. e., 
companies with over 5,000 rooms and with representation in more than five 
countries) are considered, they would account for only about one quarter of 
the global hotel room supply. 
Analysis of the hotel market structure by Pizam and Knowles (1994) revealed 
that the upper- and mid-level hotels in North America are dominated by chain 
hotels, both foreign (8%) and domestic (77%). Europe showed a different 
picture, where the structure is more fragmented. In Europe independent hotels 
dominate the market (70%), while foreign chains have 11 per cent of the 
market and domestic chains secure 19 per cent of the share. These figures 
represents a mirror image between the Americas and Europe. This contrast is 
even greater when countries such as Italy (where approximately 90% of hotels 
are independently owned) are considered. 
Todd and Mather (1995) argue that the shape of the current structure of the 
hotel industry (in different regions of the world) has to a greater extent strong 
correlation with historical development and traditions. In North America, for 
example, the hotel industry has evolved in concert with, in the first place, the 
spread of the use of the motor car, and then with the use of the airplane. Hotel 
development took place along the interstate highways (the emergence of 
hotel chains) and at airports within the United States (specially where airlines 
such as PanAm and TWA had their international routes). The United States 
leads the world in the concentration of hotel chains in its own market and in 
the spread of its hotel chains to other parts of the world. Even though more 
recent developments mean that in terms of ownership many chains are not 
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American (for example, Holiday Inn - Bass, UK; and Inter-Continental - 
Japanese), many hotel chains have their roots based in North America and it 
can be argued that their cultures are still very American. 
In Europe, the hotel industry is characterized by an enormous amount of 
small, family-run businesses catering to the family holiday market and the 
middle manager business traveler. If one considers that a high proportion of 
the world hotel capacity is found in Europe, these characteristics inevitably 
influence the overall balance. There are of course significant international 
hotel chains in Europe, such as Accor, and some other increasingly powerful 
European groups, however, the individually-owned and privately-run 
properties still predominate in the European scene (Todd and Mather, 1995). 
The European hotel industry has some other distinctive characteristics. It is 
highly fragmented and dominated by independents (as mentioned above); it 
has a relatively high number of employees (4 million in 1992); the UK is the 
most chain-oriented; the penetration of USA-based hotel chains is not 
significant; and there are differences in the business culture of the hotel 
industry throughout Europe. (it is possible to contrast the traditional 
"innkeeping" approach of Switzerland with the "management and business" 
orientation of the UK) (Pizam and Knowles, 1994). 
In Asia and the Pacific, independent hotels account for 66 per cent, and 
foreign chains for 20 per cent. Africa and the Middle East have 53 per cent 
independent and only a small fragment of domestic chains (11 %) (Pizam and 
Knowles, 1994). 
The bottom range of the hotel market supply is dominated by independent 
ownership. For many years budget hotels have been successful in North 
America, however, in terms of occupancy they have shown a steady decline 
since 1980 (Pizam and Knowles, 1994). The worldwide picture also reflects 
this trend in decline (Todd and Mather, 1995). 
Singapore, Bermuda, South Korea, the Philippines and Portugal are the only 
countries that have over 50% of the hotel capacity in the 4- and 5-star 
categories. At the other extreme of the scale, France has over 50% of the hotel 
capacity concentrated in the 2-star range alone. Italy and Hungary have a 
high share of 3-star hotels (around 42% each); and countries such as South 
Africa, Indonesia, Argentina, Peru and Venezuela have a high proportion of 
lower graded hotels and unclassified properties (Todd and Mather, 1995). 
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Figure 5.1 below represents a general picture of some financial and operating 
trends of the worldwide hotel industry in 1994. The trends mentioned here are 
the result of a study done by Smith Travel Research, Horwath International 
and the International Hotel Association with more than 3,000 hotels 
worldwide, which resulted in the 25th edition of the Worldwide Hotel Industry. 
Figure 5.1 - Worldwide Hotel Industry Financial and Operating Trends - 1994 
General Picture of the Financial and Operating Trends 
of the Worldwide Hotel Industry - 1994 
" World occupancies reached 66.5 per cent in 1994, led by hotels in North 
America which reported occupancy rates of 70.5 per cent. 
" By price category, luxury hotels not only reported the highest average daily 
rates, but also the highest average occupancy of the price segments at 
68.8 per cent. 
" Hotels in Africa and the Middle East reported the highest pre-tax income, 
at 13.1 per cent of total sales, largely due to the significantly lower level 
of fixed charges they reported. 
" First-class properties reported the highest profitability among the price 
categories, at 4.8 percent of total sales. Economy properties were the least 
operationally efficient and, despite the fact that they had reported the 
lowest level of fixed charges, were the only price category to report a loss 
in 1994. 
" Business travelers represent the highest demand component across all 
segments reported. 
" Hotels in every region and price category reported that print advertising is 
the most commonly used type of advertising. 
" All reporting hotels indicated that they offered weekend discounts, with 
the average discount being just under 30 per cent. 
" Worldwide, more than 55 per cent of all rooms were sold at a discount in 
1994, with properties in Asia and Australia reporting the highest level of 
discounted rooms, at 66.2 per cent. 
" By day of the week, occupancies were lowest on Sunday and highest during 
the midweek. The biggest daily variation was reported by European hotels, 
where midweek occupancy was more than twice the level it typically was on 
Sundays. 
" Credit cards were the preferred method of payment worldwide. Guests 
staying in the higher-priced properties were more likely to pay for their 
stay with a credit card than their counterparts staying at lower-priced 
hotels. 
Source: Lomanno, M. - (1995), Examining Worldwide Trends, Hotel & Motel Management, V. 
210 (21), December, 11, pp. 15 
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5.2.1.3 - The Changing Face of the Industry - An Overview of Management 
Practices and Trends in the International Hotel Industry 
The environment in which the industry operates has changed dramatically in 
the last few years. Management has been forced to rethink their business 
practices and the way they operate their businesses. This section gives a 
general overview of major trends in management practices in international 
hotel operations. 
Until quite recently investors were receiving high returns due to property value 
increase and hotel companies were satisfied to concentrate on the operations 
side of hotel management. As will become clear in later sections, the effects of 
recession, the Gulf War, changes in market demand, 'oversupply of 
accommodation, etc., and greater pressure from investors, changed the 
scenario and focus of hotel management operations. The net conclusion is 
that to survive and prosper hotel management has to be more externally 
oriented. The inward model on which hotel management used to focus is no 
longer applicable in the rapid-pace environment of the industry. A recent study 
by Olsen and Zhao (1997) revealed that while some major hotel companies 
have already adopted some aspects of this new paradigm, most have not, 
demonstrating the industry characteristic of being slow to adapt to changes 
and being predominantly a re-active industry. 
A comparison between the environment and the reality in which the hotel 
industry operates today and that of ten years ago might suggest that hoteliers 
would have to work hard to be unsuccessful. The main drive behind the boom 
in the industry was basically demographic shifts. The demographic changes 
(population growth) in the West after the Second World War yielded millions of 
potential travelers. It is estimated that in North America and Europe alone the 
baby boom phenomenon has produced a population of 700 million. This 
particular demographic group, since it became wage earning, represented a 
growth in disposable income, which produced demand fortravel. Other issues 
contributing to the prosperity of the industry include the end of communism in 
some parts of the world and the growth in population and the economic 
development of the Asia-Pacific region. Olsen (1995) argues that there is a 
correlation between the total output of the global hotel industry and the 
variables that constitute economic development, as supported by the figures 
relating to mature economies and the growth in the industry (this issue is 
discussed further in the following section). The hotel industry has, then, a 
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considerable growth potential in nations and regions that are just now starting 
to fully develop their economies and improve performance in macro-economic 
variables. 
However, the factors that led management thinking and practices in the 
industry in the past (factors that contributed to the perception änd adoption of 
a mode of thinking in hotel management) are no longer sufficient to justify 
industry management practices today. Success in the hotel industry was, in a 
crude way, simply a matter of finding the right location and providing the 
appropriate level of service. Success would follow automatically. The 
discussion so far in this research has argued that the environment in which 
business operates today is not at all benign. Finding the right location and 
providing the best service are no longer enough. A new approach is needed 
to sustain growth and development in the industry. Previously, management 
was concerned only with internal operations, focusing on cost control and 
achieving maximum efficiency. 
This management approach (or philosophy) was encouraged by the 
inflationary real estate market. That is, hotel industry investors built hotels and 
expected the majority of their capital returns to come from real estate 
transactions. Investment in the industry was also favoured by investors 
because of the inflation-adjusted room rate increases (unlike other 
alternatives, such as commercial and residential real estate which were 
bound to rental contracts that limited the passing on of the effects of recession, 
the hotel industry could change hotel room rates daily, passing on the effects 
of recession to the customer immediately). Management did not need to be 
preoccupied with adding value, as long as inflation continued to take care of 
business returns to investors. Management had the main focus of keeping 
their clientele satisfied. Adding value to assets was the job of inflation. This 
management model has perpetuated in the industry making the industry 
particularly vulnerable since the environment has changed dramatically. The 
recession has passed and closed the door on the strategies based on 
inflation. The overcapacity created by investors and developers in the past 
and a flat demand curve during the recession have forced management to 
rethink the way they do business. New ways of generating return and wealth 
had to be found. 
Hotel schools' curricula and company training programmes have also 
contributed to this management philosophy in the industry. Olsen and Zhao 
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(1997) argue that traditionally, educational systems emphasize upon 
operations management and control. While there can still be found many 
courses on cost control and managerial accounting, very few examples of 
courses on revenue maximization exist and little attention has been paid to 
the issue of teaching how to maximize the value-adding capability of the hotel 
asset. This business approach has now become obsolete. Inflation is no 
longer a "partner" for generating returns on investment and hotels are just 
another asset that needs to compete for scarce capital in the demanding 
capital market which is increasingly finding it difficult to find the right financial 
opportunity. The reality today requires that hotel management concentrates on 
asset productivity which is translated into adding value with an emphasis 
upon cash flow per share as a measure of this performance. Hotel 
management must now invest in sustainable competitive ' methods that 
generate value. That is, attention has to be shifted from the profit and loss 
account to the balance sheet. However, this is just an emphasis to achieve a 
balance between the old paradigm and the new one. Profit and loss 
accounting is still very important since it creates the revenues that generate 
wealth. In addition, the old paradigm suggests an emphasis on customer 
satisfaction. This also has to remain the focus of management, specially now 
that hotel customers are an increasingly diverse and demanding group and 
the market for serving the customers is more dynamic and competitive. What is 
required now from management is that it all should be done better, so that 
investors can be convinced that the returns from this competitive industry offer 
an alternative to other attractive investments. Management has to create 
competitive advantage in an industry where it is difficult to do so. 
In response to the difficulties encountered (recession, increased competition, 
low demand, pressure from owners and investors, etc. ), the industry 
developed over the last few years a number of competitive methods and 
strategies to bring back returns. In a study conducted on behalf of the 
International Hotel & Restaurant Association in 1995, analyzing the 
competitive methods of the largest international hotel companies in the last 
ten years (in Olsen and Zhao, 1997), trends on hotel management and 
competitive methods utilized by the industry in that period were identified. 
They included: 
" Frequent guest programmes 
" Strategic alliances 
" Computer reservation systems 
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" Amenities 
" Branding 
" Technological innovation 
" Niche marketing and advertising 
" Pricing tactics 
" Cost containment 
" Service quality management 
" International expansion 
" Travel agent valuation 
" Franchising and the management fee 
" Employees as important assets 
" In-room sales and entertainment 
" Special services for frequent guests 
" Conservation/ecology programmes 
" Business services 
" Database management 
" Core business management 
" Direct to consumer marketing 
Olsen and Zhao (1997) argue that all these methods are focused upon 
techniques or tactics designed to attract customers and to reduce the risk of 
investment through franchising and management contracts, and the increased 
utilization of some form of technology. It is also argued that these methods are 
very intangible and also have a short life span. More importantly, they are 
easily copied. It has been noticed that although the leading companies always 
developed first the new or better competitive method, the methods were 
copied in a very short period of time. Olsen and Zhao (1997, pp. 57) 
concluded that none of the methods described above 
"represented a sustainable competitive advantage from any hotel group for 
any length of time. Nor were they necessarily value-producing methods. 
Perhaps in more favourable economic climates they could have been, but 
they were developed during the darkest days of the industry recession. 
Thus, they served mostly to keep decline or losses to a minimum. " 
This conclusion again emphasizes the fact that the industry is traditionally a 
re-active one. The methods used, although they represent a good attempt to 
combat the threatening environment, indicate that the old management 
paradigm was still present in the management strategic decisions. 
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Today, the management of hotel operations requires a pro-active approach. 
This approach demands a look into the future and into the forces in the 
environment that shape the industry, as discussed in previous chapters and 
as discussed further later in this chapter. The main conclusion is that this new 
paradigm requires an external view. The industry is renowned for its insularity. 
A high level of interaction with those in the same operating environment is 
now a condition for success. Other relevant issues such as the environment, 
stakeholder management, etc., need to be taken more seriously and acted 
upon. Instead of being reactive, the industry needs to act proactively, 
assessing the impacts of their strategic choices given the changes presented 
by the environment. It is important to notice that although the industry is 
characterized by a high level of uncertainty, this new approach can drastically 
reduce the level of uncertainty, giving the industry the chance to take 
advantage of the opportunities while minimizing the threats (Zhao and Mema, 
1992; Mullins, 1992; Lockwood, 1989). For an industry attached to tradition, 
the new changes required in management thinking are not a simple matter. 
Yet, companies that do not act on this direction will be left behind in today's 
business climate and environment. 
5.2.1.4 - The Hotel Industry and Its Relevance to National Economies and 
Society 
The hotel industry plays an important economic and social role where it 
operates. Hotels, wherever they are located, are a source of employment for 
many people, consume and purchase a wide range of services and goods 
from the local community, contribute to the tax base of the area, and are, in 
general, a sizable capital investment. These are only some of the most 
tangible aspects of hotels in relation to the economy and society. 
In 1994 the hotel industry worldwide generated more than US$247 billion 
(Olsen, 1995). A recently released comprehensive study by the International 
Hotel Association on the scope of the global hotel industry (Into the New 
Millennium: The International Hotel Association White Paper on the Global 
Hospitality industry) revealed that for every one hotel room in the world, there 
is one person employed in the hotel industry (Hasek, 1996). The industry 
employs globally, more than 11.1 million people and represents about 5% of 
the world's total work force. The study also 'revealed that the European 
Economic Area has the largest concentration of hotels globally, with an 
approximate total of 152,000 (Hasek, 1996). In 1995, according to the 
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International Hotel Association, the hotel industry generated an estimated 
US$253 billion in revenues worldwide. Europe accounted for the biggest 
share, of 43 per cent or US$110 billion, followed by the Americas with US$81 
billion (or 32 percent) (Paci, 1997). 
The figures mentioned above illustrate the importance of the industry to 
society. In nations where tourism is the main source of income, these levels of 
revenues are essential for maintaining a strong tax and employment balance. 
In more developed nations, the revenues are also important contributors to 
local and national economies. The nations that constitute the European Free 
Trade Association generate more than US$87 billion (35 per cent of the world 
output). North America generates US$62 billion (24 per cent). This high gross 
output is facilitated by the levels of mature economic development and 
supportive infrastructure that. these regions present (Olsen, 1995). A closer 
examination of these numbers suggests that there is a correlation between the 
total output of the global hotel industry and the variables that constitute 
economic development (variables that support macro-economic development 
include gross domestic output, level of employment, level of education of the 
workforce, basic infrastructure, etc. ). Olsen (1995) argues that this relationship 
is important since it indicates that the hotel industry has considerable growth 
potential in nations and regions that are just now starting to fully develop their 
economies and improve their performance in each individual macro-economic 
variable. 
The benefits of hotels for the local, regional, and national economy have been 
well documented in both the specific and the broad body of literature that 
covers the topic. The hotel industry can, however, have some negative 
impacts on both the economy and society. These aspects have also been the 
focus of attention in the last few years. A detailed analysis of both the direct 
benefits or the negative impacts themselves is beyond the interest of this 
research. Since this study is concerned with crisis, crisis management, and 
management attitudes (behaviour) towards those issues in the hotel industry 
in the UK, the following sections will narrow down the discussion to the 
European scene and finally the UK, after which the focus of this chapter will be 
on the issues related specifically to the topic of crisis, crisis management and 
stakeholder relationships. 
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5.2.2 - The European Hotel Industry 
As Europe emerges from the worst recession since the Second World War, a 
hotel industry steeped in tradition faces many changes. As hotels are driven 
by economic factors, the downturn has triggered a period of consolidation, 
rationalization and restructuring, notably in cases such as Thailand-based 
Dusit Sindhom's takeover of the Kempinski Group, Forte's acquisition of Air 
France's Meridien Hotels, ITT Sheraton's purchase of CIGA Hotels and now 
Granada's acquisition of Forte. These trends and activities are expected to 
continue, with larger independent hotels gradually submitting to the 
international chains, as hoteliers perceive that bigger public companies can 
offer investors better liquidity and consequently find it easier to raise finance 
(McGuffie, 1996; Eardley, 1994). 
At the same time, the implications of the rapidly increasing availability and 
supply of new sophisticated technology are causing deep concern. The 
dilemma facing management involves investment priorities in relation to 
available funds. The challenges is to balance desirability/benefits with the 
costs. 
Europe is responsible for a great concentration of the world's hotel capacity, 
as mentioned above. However, Europe has reached maturity and is gradually 
losing strength in relation to emerging regions such as the Asia-Pacific. The 
number of visitors to the European Union (EU) countries, for example, has 
actually fallen by 11 % in the last 15 years and the income from such visitors 
has fallen by 14%. A Visa International Survey in autumn 1994 confirmed that 
business travel was still languishing in northern Europe, particularly in the 
Benelux countries, France and Germany (McGuffie, 1996). 
According to data gathered by Todd and Mather (1995), in 1993 western 
Europe had a total of 4.9 million hotel rooms, or 41.4 % of world capacity. 
Eastern Europe had 340,000 hotel rooms (2.9% of the total hotel room supply 
in the world). An analysis of developments and trends in the hotel rooms 
supply in Europe between 1989 and 1993 shows an average annual growth 
for western Europe of 1.6% (with a peak of 4% in 1992 followed by a decline 
in capacity in the following year). Although western Europe has had growth in 
that period, the overall balance for Europe was smaller in that period because 
eastern Europe showed an average annual decline of 5.6% since 1989. 
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Therefore, the overall increase for Europe as a whole was just 1.1% from 
1989 to 1993. 
The collapse of the former eastern bloc created expectation of growth in the 
hotel capacity in that region. However, for many different reasons it has not 
materialized. Although, and as mentioned previously, data from certain 
regions need to be looked at with caution, according to the World Tourism 
Organization data, there has been a decrease in hotel capacity in the region 
from 584,000 rooms in 1988 to less than half that number (297,000 rooms) in 
1991. There has been, nevertheless, a noticable increase in the number of 
hotel rooms from 1991. In 1992 there was an increase of 9.3% and in 1993 
the overall capacity increased by 4.8%. This overall increase in 1992 and 
1993 were not enough to reach the numbers found in 1989. The main 
expansion in hotel capacity in the eastern countries during that period took 
place in the Czech Republic - specially in Prague, and in small and medium- 
sized properties in Hungary (Todd and Mather, 1995). 
The picture of western Europe shows that the eastern Mediterranean and the 
west of the region registered a strong growth in the period between 1989 and 
1993. Northern Europe, however, has shown a decline in room capacity since 
1989 - specially in the UK - and only a small increase in the south of the 
European continent. The countries with the largest hotel capacity in Europe 
are Italy (942,000 rooms), Germany (744,000 rooms), Spain (641,000 rooms), 
and France (589,000 rooms). Although, as discussed before, there are some 
difficulties in interpreting and comparing international data, it appears that 
together, Italy, Germany, Spain, and France (all prime tourist destinations) 
account for over half of Europe's hotel room capacity. 
The UK, Switzerland and Israel have registered an absolute decline in the 
number of hotel rooms since 1989. In several other western countries, 
specially in Sweden, Italy, and Austria, growth has been stagnant. This has 
been mainly the reflection of economic recession and the less buoyant 
tourism industry of these countries. Other countries, however, have shown 
above average growth. In the south, Greece, Portugal and Spain; in the 
northern countries, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, and Norway; and in the west, 
Germany, France, the Netherlands and Belgium (Todd and Mather, 1995). 
Table 5.2 below shows the room capacity in some selected European 
countries from 1989 to 1993. 
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Table 5.2 - Room Capacity in Some Selected Countries Between 1989 - 93 
Rooms in Hotels and Similar Establishments in Selected Countries 
in Europe, 1989 - 93 Annual Average 
change 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1989-93 
No ('000) 
UK 485.5 496.7 507.5 438.1 363.6 -7.0 
Sweden 80.1 82.0 83.9 83.6 82.6 0.8 
Denmark 34.1 35.6 37.1 37.9 38.4 3.0 
Ireland 22.7 22.8 24.1 24.4 26.2 3.6 
Italy 926.1 938.1 939.2 943.7 942.4 0.4 
Spain 597.5 603.0 627.1 639.0 640.7 1.8 
Greece 224.5 232.8 244.0 252.6 257.4 3.5 
Portugal 75.1 79.4 82.6 84.6 88.6 4.2 
Germany 614.1 609.4 611.2 730.0 744.3 4.9 
France 543.9 547.0 547.3 599.1 589.2 2.0 
Netherlands 58.7 58.7 59.4 61.1 70.2 4.6 
Source: Word Tourism Organization - Year Book of Tourism Statistics, 1995 
A Horwath International Worldwide Hotel Study (in Walker, 1995) revealed 
that although the international hotel industry is recovering well from the worst 
of the recession, European hotels were still having a difficult time in 1995. The 
study showed that while hotels in the Middle East and Africa performed well, 
occupancy in the European properties registered a four percentage points 
below world average, and pre-tax profits were well below most other regions. 
High unemployment, effects of recession, and lack of consumer confidence 
were the main factors affecting the European industry. The study also found 
that European hotels had the highest room rates across the board, costing an 
average of US$89,84. 
5.2.3 - The United Kingdom Hotel Industry - Recent Macroeconomic Trends 
The hotel industry is known to be sensitive to economic growth and recession. 
After a long period of difficulties, the underlying strength of the world economy 
is already contributing a positive impact to the hotel sector. 
Looking at a broader picture, the World Bank forecasts that the global GDP 
(Gross Domestic Product) will rise from US$24,500bn in 1994 to 
US$33,200bn in 2004. Thus, 3.3% average annual growth. The World Bank 
expects that the developed world will account for 75.5% by 2004 (losing its 
1994 share of 79.6%). The World Bank also expects that the biggest winner 
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will be Asia (excluding Japan, Australia and New Zealand), which is forecast 
to have 11.1% of global GDP by 2004. This figure is a substantial increase on 
its position of 7.5% in 1994. The rest of the world, however, will experience 
little change in that period (Todd and Mather, 1995). 
The European Intelligence Unit (E. I. U) publishes detailed macroeconomic 
forecasts in its Country Forecast service. It is forecasted that within regions, 
the GDP growth up to 1999 of the major tourism origin countries, which are 
important in terms of generating business for the hotel industry, will be 
variable. The United States of America will grow on average at 2.7% a year 
until 1999; Japan by 2.9%, Germany by 2.6%, the UK by 2.8% and France by 
2.6%. 
As a matter of illustration, this contrast with countries such as China, expected 
to have a GDP growth of 52% in that period, an average of 8.7% a year. Other 
Asian countries with exceptional expected growth are Thailand (8.3% average 
growth), Indonesia (7.2%), and South Korea (7%) (Todd and Mather, 1995). 
The current economic growth in the UK is expected to continue until the end of 
1997, but to slow down by the end of the decade. 
5.2.3.1 - The UK Hotel Industry 
5.2.3.1.1 - Structure of the Industry in 1993 - 1995 
This section is intended to depict the state of the hotel industry up to 1995, 
when the data collection took place for this research. More recent data may be 
available, however, for the purpose of this research, data from that period are 
more relevant as all the discussion and findings of this study reflect the reality 
as at that time. 
As mentioned previously, there is no universally agreed definition of hotel (or, 
what constitutes a hotel) and methodologies applied to gather data are not 
100% reliable and usually difficult to compare. Nevertheless, the data below is 
a good indication of the state of the hotel market in the UK in the period under 
consideration. This section concentrates on the supply structure of the hotel 
industry in the UK. The demand side of the industry is discussed in the context 
of the major events and developments that dominated and shaped the 
industry in that period (in sections 5.2.3.1.2 and 5.2.3.1.3). 
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5.2.3.1.1.1 - UK Hotel Market Profile 
5.2.3.1.1.1.1 - Supply Structure 
Almost one decade ago, Holloway (1989) suggested that accommodation 
(overall accommodation, not only hotels) in the UK ranges, from simple self- 
catering caravans, costing less than £10 a night for a family, up to five star 
hotels in London where a room for a night can cost £1000 or more. The 
situation is not different today. The structure of the industry is very fragmented 
as it is in most places around the globe. Several small hotels, guest houses, 
holiday camps and self catering installations (flats, youth hostels, etc. ) are also 
a relevant part of the industry. It has been estimated that, considering all 
relevant parts of the accommodation sector, a total of 2 million bed spaces 
were available in 1986. Of those, 1.4 million were serviced and 600,000 were 
self-catering. 
Narrowing down to the hotel sector, the industry has been badly affected by 
recession and other domestic and international events (those issues are 
discussed in details in later sections). From 1988 to 1993, the number of 
hotels in the UK has fallen by 9%, from 28,673 in 1988 to 26,150 in 1993 
(Leisure Intelligence, 1994, pp. 4). The universe covered by the Leisure 
Intelligence report (1994) includes what is referred to as "establishments 
which provide more than just bed and breakfast accommodation, and offer a 
minimum of reception service, meals for residents and have more than five 
bedrooms. " 
In 1991, the supply of hotel rooms in the UK was approximately 507,000. Of 
those rooms, 23.5 per cent (119,000) were owned/operated by public 
operated companies (PLC). Pizam and Knowles (1994) suggest that there has 
been, from 1986 to 1991, a concentration of growth in the UK PLC hotels. The 
ten largest companies at the time in the UK (Forte; BIL - Mount Charlotte & 
Thistle brands; Queens Moat Houses; Bass -* Holiday Inns & Toby Hotel 
brands; Rank Organization - Rank Hotels, Shearing Holidays, Butlins, Rank 
Motorway Lodges; Ladbroke - Hilton International, Hilton National, Associate 
Hotels; Swallow; Accor; Stakis; and Jarvis), had increased their room supply 
from 64,081 in 1986 to 89,382 in 1991. The figure in 1991 (89,382) 
represented approximately 76 per cent of the total PLC hotel rooms and 18 
per cent of total UK hotel rooms (Pizam and Knowles, 1994). 
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In 1993, the ten largest hotel groups in the UK by number of hotels and 
number of rooms (Forte; Mount Charlotte/Thistle; Queens Moat Houses; Hilton 
UK; Whitbread; Swallow Hotels; Accor UK; Holiday Inns; Stakis; and Jarvis) 
had a combined 848 hotels which accounted for 87,373 rooms of the total 
hotel capacity (Leisure Intelligence, 1994). Table 5.3 below shows the 
situation of the hotel industry in the UK in 1994. 
Table 5.3 - Ten Largest Hotel Groups in the UK by Number of Hotels and 
Rooms in 1994 
Top 10 UK Hotel Groups by Number of Hotels and Number of Rooms, 1994 
Hotels in UK Rooms in UK 
Forte 344 30,362 
Mount Charlotte 112 14,288 
Thistle Hotels 
Queen's Moat Houses 100 10,332 
Hilton UK 40 8,440 
Swallow Hotels 35 4,379 
Accor UK 29 4,338 
Holiday Inn Worldwide 24 4,210 
Stakis Hotels 33 4,056 
Country Club Hotel 78 4,000 
Group 
Jarvis Hotels 46 3,680 
TOTAL 841 88,085 
Source: - HCIMA - Hotel Catering & Institutional Management Association, The Hospitality Year 
Book - 1995 Edition, London, Sterling Publications Limited, 1995, pp. 106 
Table 5.4 below shows the top ten quoted hotel companies in the UK in terms 
of rooms. The data below is from a study by Kleinwort Benson Securities 
Limited in the UK on the quoted hotel companies in the UK at the end on 
1995. The study assumes that the acquisition of Forte by Granada took place 
at the end of 1995 rather than 23 January 1996 (Slattery, 1996). 
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Table 5.4 - Ten Largest Quoted Hotel Companies in the UK by Number of 
Hotels and Rooms in 1995 
Top 10 Quoted UK Hotel Companies by Number of Hotels and Rooms, end-1995 
Holding Number of Number of 
Company Hotels Rooms 
Granada 384 32,422 
Brierley 106 -13,841 
Whitbread 146 9,722 
Queens Moat 86 9,667 
Ladbroak 42 8,547 
Stakis 44 5,162 
Bass 65 5,074 
Greenalls 59 4,521 
Accor 29 4,415 
Rank 39 4,401 
TOTAL 1000 97,772 
Source: Slattery, P. - (1996), Measuring Hotel Portfolios' Performance, Travel & Tourism 
Analysis, V. 3, pp. 78 - 99 
5.2.3.1.1.1.2 - Classification 
As also mentioned before, grading and classification are a complex and 
confusing issue in the hotel industry. Analyzing the structure of the hotel 
industry can also be done through the various classification schemes in 
operation. However, those schemes encompass only a small sample of the 
UK hotel industry (Pizam and Knowles, 1994). 
The 1969 Development of Tourism Act that created the tourist boards for 
England, Scotland and Wales, also made provision for the statutory 
registration and classification of hotels and other tourist accommodation. 
However, and as discussed previously, this provision has never been 
implemented. One reason for this is that voluntary schemes have been 
favoured ever since by successive governments (Peisley, 1996). 
None of the existing schemes have ever been considered to be fully effective 
by both the industry and consumers. A comprehensive review of the systems 
in operation started in mid-1996 and is expected to lead to radical change. 
The review has been carried out by the ETB - English Tourist Board with the 
DNH - Department of National Heritage, BTA - British Tourist Authority, and 
other national and regional tourist boards. 
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The English Tourist Board launched in 1987 the Crown scheme which 
classified serviced accommodation (i. e., not self-catering) according to the 
facilities offered. Depending on the number of facilities offered the 
establishment would be awarded Crowns (from one to five). The 
establishment that offered the least number of facilities (one Crown) meant 
that the accommodation was *simply "listed". Table 5.5 below shows the ETB 
Crown scheme in England in 1993 and 1994. 
Table 5.5 - ETB Crown Scheme in England in 1993 and 1994 
ETB Crown Scheme in England - 1993 and 1994 (No. of Establishments) 
Grading 1993 1994 
Classified only 5,509 5,322 
Grade not achieved 17 10 
Approved 913 802 
Commended 3,368 3,620 
Highly Commended 1,229 1,464 
De luxe 75 78 
Total 11,111 11,386a 
a Includes 90 lodgers. 
Source: Peisley, T., in International Tourism Reports, 1996, pp. 38 
The ETB from 1989 also started to grade hotel establishments by their quality. 
This was done by a quality inspection by ETB personnel. From 1996 this 
became a compulsory part of the Crown scheme in England, as research has 
shown that consumers want, above all, any classification or grading system to 
be quality-based. Having said that, the required extra grading made the 
system even more confused, and in effect resulted in a two-tier system which 
is difficult for consumers to understand and therefore more costly for hoteliers 
to market effectively (Peisley, 1996). Table 5.6 below shows the ETB Crown 
scheme classification/grading breakdown in England in 1995. 
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Table 5.6 - Classification/Grading Breakdown in the ETB Crown Scheme in 
England. 1995 
ETB Crown Scheme in England - Breakdown, 1995 
No of Crowns 
Listed One Two Three Four Five Total 
Classified only 1,564 523 1,234 858 286 25 4,490 
Approved 218 112 201 239 46 1 817 
Commended 590 298 1,206 1,434 716 45 4,289 
Highly Commended 159 67 603 374 408 104 1,715 
De luxe 4 1 23 9 19 27 83 
Total 2,535 1,001 3,267 2,914 1,475 202 11,394 
Source: Peisley, T., in International Tourism Reports, 1996, pp. 38 
According to data provided by Peisley (1996), there are currently in England 
33,100 establishments which are classified as "serviced" and 16,400 which 
are classified as "non-serviced". In the ETB Crown Scheme alone there are 34 
per cent of the serviced establishments (that is, *11,394). Although other well 
established schemes by motoring organizations such as the Automobile 
Association and the Royal Automobile Club have also accommodation under 
their own distinct systems (the AA has 7,231 accommodation establishments 
within its grading system; the RAC has some 5,188 accommodations under its 
scheme), its is argued that more accommodations should be brought into a 
scheme in other to maximize benefits for members and the customers. 
Some attention has been given to the issue of incidence of usage of hotel 
grading schemes in the UK. A recent survey in the UK (Callan, 1995), on the 
incidence of employment of grading schemes and the perceived importance 
of quality grading by users in choosing their hotels, revealed interesting 
results. The survey showed that the use of stars and crowns is not considered 
to be of primary importance by customers when selecting a hotel. It was also 
identified that the most used schemes are those of motoring organizations, 
with the AA (Automobile Association) having a 62.3% usage and the RAC 
(Royal Automobile Club) 38.4%. Only about 25% of these users employ 
quality grades to assist with their selection. National Tourist Boards have 
30.5% of users and of these, almost 45% make use of quality grades for 
selection. The Good Hotel Guide and Egon Ronay rated ahead of Michelin for 
hotel selection. The survey also revealed that around two-thirds of three-to- 
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five-star hotel users employ a scheme or guide to select their hotel, but less 
than 15% use three or more. 
5.2.3.1.2 - The UK Hotel Industry in Crisis - Major Developments 
The hotel industry in the UK is emerging from what most analysts refer to as 
the worst period experienced by the hotel industry since World War II. A 
combination of events in late 1980's and early 1990's conspired to put the 
hotel industry to its hardest test. As a matter of illustration, this section refers to 
and accounts for some developments in the industry focusing on the events of 
the second half of 1990 and early 1991. 
The hotel sector was particularly badly affected by a combination of factors in 
the UK such as recession, unemployment, reduction in disposable income 
because of the Poll Tax, mortgage interest rates, rising fuel prices, snow, 
increase in VAT and others. Moreover, recession in the United States of 
America and the outbreak of the war in the Gulf played an important role in the 
already decreasing business at the time. Many companies banned all but 
essential travel, and potential holiday makers postponed their bookings. 
Business travelers whose trips were deemed essential often found that their 
expenses had been drastically cut, prompting a search for good-value- 
accommodation. 
Mount Charlotte Thistle Hotels marketing director at the time, Bill Bailey (in 
Legate, 1991) identified a general fall in business in 1990 and 1991. This 
company had 26 three to five-star hotels in London and this fact made it 
possible for Mr. Bailey to monitor the fall across the market. It was pointed out 
that the top end was badly hit as there were no independent business 
travelers after the invasion of Kuwait. Middle market hotels 'fared a little 
better, while the bottom end suffered badly due to the fact that coach business 
from Europe did not arrive as tourism stopped altogether. 
Along the same lines, Pannell Kerr Forster published a report, 'London Trends 
1991', where it was observed that London's luxury hotels were the first to 
suffer, back in the summer 1990, with occupancy declining by four percentage 
points and the average rate in real terms falling 5.1 per cent. Mid-market 
business and tourist hotels did not start to suffer until Autumn (1990), but the 
industry in general was not prepared for the dramatic downturn in January 
and February (1991), when luxury hotel occupancy fell by 20 per cent on the 
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previous January and deluxe hotels fared even worse. Britain's top two 
hoteliers at the time - Forte (formerly Trust House Forte) and Mount Charlotte 
Hotels - made clear the impact of the recession and war on their business 
when they announced their figures in May (1991). Forte's pre-tax profits fell 27 
per cent to £190 million for the year to end-January, while those of Mount 
Charlotte stayed virtually static at £47.5 million in spite of a 55 per cent 
increase in turnover after acquiring Thistle Hotels in 1990. Only Queens Moat 
Houses, the third largest UK hotel operator; appears to have done better than 
its rivals - its pre-tax profit figures were some 51 per cent higher at £94.09 
million (May, 1991). However, this reflects the fact that some 40 per cent of its 
hotel stock was based on the continent where the impact of recession had 
been felt less (Churchill, 1991). 
The war had a major impact on hotel occupancy. Just after it started, the 
Savoy group (which includes Claridges, Connaught, the Berkerley, Savoy, 
and Lygon Arms) reported a decline of 18 per cent in trade at its London 
hotels. In the same period, the Inn on the Park, London, also reported that 
occupancy level was only 60 per cent, down 20 per cent on the previous year. 
Most hotels identified cancellations of bookings as the United Nations 
deadline for Iraq to leave Kuwait approached. The Dorchester reported that 
only half of the hotel's 252 bedrooms in operation were occupied in the first 
week of the war, while Edwardian Hotels reported an 8- 13 per cent decline in 
occupancy, mainly due to cancellations from American and Scandinavian 
visitors (Sall, 1991). According to the British Incoming Tour Operators 
Association (BITOA, in Sall, 1991), the incoming American market had been 
the hardest hit, with 90 per cent of bookings canceled. The director of 
management consultants Pannell Kerr Forster Associates at the time, Stan 
Dixon (in Sall, 1991), attributed 66 per cent of this decline to the Gulf War. 
Moreover, the threat of terrorist activities and the perception that commercial 
aircraft are particularly vulnerable had led to an influx of reservation 
cancellations. 
Horwath Consulting carried out a survey between March 21-27 with 84 
general managers of four and five star hotels throughout the hotel industry 
(Horwath Business Review; 1991). The majority of those questioned - 54 per 
cent - thought that the UK recession was the most important factor in the hotel 
industry's situation while 32 per cent believed that the high level of UK interest 
rates was the cause of the crisis. In the same survey, it was also identified that 
while 58 per cent of hotels had postponed plans for capital expenditure, 36 
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per cent had brought them forward and only 6 per cent had abandoned them 
altogether. The survey also showed that between November 1990 and March 
1991, hotels were hit in almost every area of the market. It was observed that 
over 40 per cent of those questioned claimed that business, conference, food 
and beverage and banqueting areas were all performing worse than before 
November 1990. The worst hit, in the same period, was business demand 
which declined in 49 per cent of hotels. 
Ironically, investment in the hotel industry in that period had not been affected 
by the recession. The main reason for that might be attributed to the long-term 
view of hoteliers. The English Tourist Board statistics shows that in the last six 
months of 1990, work started on 351 project in England - new hotels, 
extensions or refurbishments - only marginally down on the, first half, and 
eighty five hotels were under construction in the same period (in Horwath 
Business Review, 1991). 
The recession at that time was also marked by many redundancies, along with 
short working weeks and other emergency moves (Churchill, May 8/1991). 
This trend had also been identified by the Horwath consultants. Statistics 
revealed by the survey showed a decrease in staffing levels over the months 
of October 1990 to March 1991. Over three quarters of those questioned in 
their survey had laid off and only 2 per cent had increased staffing levels. Nine 
per cent forecasted that they would decrease staff numbers by the summer of 
1991, but an almost equal number - 45 - 46 per cent - would be increasing 
staffing levels (Horwath Business Review, No. 1, Spring, 1991). 
However, the recession so far in that period had also provided gains in some 
segments. The budget hotel sector was not as affected as the top hotels, in 
fact, some groups had benefited from recession-hit companies trading down. 
The Accor group took advantage of low construction costs and invested 
heavily in the UK. Of 25 Ibis projects in the UK, 15 were committed (Sonsino, 
1991). Forte's division Travelodge reported 90 per cent occupancy during the 
Gulf War. Others such as Choice International's Sleep Inn reported winter 
occupancy of 90 to 100 per cent, with business traveler booking-in during the 
week and leisure guests at weekend (Legate, 1991, pp. 10). Within the same 
lines, some hotels claimed that the crisis helped to bring them and guests 
closer. For example, Terry Holmes (in Legate, 1991), Cunard's vice-president 
at the time, produced badges showing the US and British flags with the words 
'A Very Special Relationship'. This was distributed in America at a time when 
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US media talked constantly about Britain and British troops. Mr. Holmes 
argued that the crisis contributed to establish a loyalty factor with its prime 
market, which will encourage Americans to return to Britain. 
5.2.3.1.3 - The Changing Face of the Industry - Effects of Recession and Other 
Major Impacts 
The previous section focused on the immediate period preceding and afterthe 
Gulf War. At the time, analysts predicted a long period of hardship for the 
industry. Some of their worst fears, unfortunately, were materialized. 
A Leisure Intelligence Report (1994) concluded that the period of 1991 and 
1992 were the worst years for the UK hotel industry since World War II. The 
main problem for the industry was the excesses of the 1980's, such as 
overborrowing to finance expansion in the boom years. As mentioned briefly 
above, the onset of the recession and the Gulf War (responsible for keeping 
visitors and travelers away), left the hotel industry with decreasing asset 
values, extremely poor revenues and a high level of debts. Not surprising, 
some hotel companies (and many independent hotels) had fallen into 
receivership. The fall in property values has left many hotel companies with a 
deficit in their balance (larger debts than their assets). Rising interest rates 
during 1991 and 1992 also meant that revenues would fall, given that 
consumer expenditure was reduced significantly. 
The recession, the Gulf War and the fear of terrorism reduced the demand 
from both domestic and international guests in both the business and leisure 
markets. The slump in demand forced hotel companies to slash room rates 
and use heavy promotional techniques to stimulate the UK leisure market in 
an attempt to fill capacity. Even though occupancy increased, the increased 
revenues were not enough to meet the high yields that the industry demanded 
to fulfill its commitments (the main beneficiaries were the consumers). In 1993, 
the UK market was estimated at over 26,000 hotels, with a combined turnover 
of £5.9 billion. Average room occupancy was down to 50% (Leisure 
Intelligence Report, 1994). 
In 1993 and early 1994 the picture for the UK hotel industry was still very 
difficult. While the recession was fading away and interest rates had fallen, 
constraints on consumer spending and the fear of unemployment remained. 
The Leisure Intelligence Report (1994) revealed that the leisure sector did not 
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experience a significant upturn in consumer spending, and more importantly, 
because business activities in other sectors were reduced, companies cut 
back on business travel accommodation. As mentioned before, and because 
the business market is the most profitable for the hotel industry, the decrease 
in business activities led many hotels to cut prices and offer discount-led 
promotions in an attempt to fill capacity from the leisure market. 
The effect of recession in the UK meant an increase in home holidays in the 
domestic market. Even though the hotel industry was at the time exercising a 
high level of discounting and promotion, the high cost of hotel accommodation 
practiced in the UK led customers to choose other means of accommodation 
such as holiday centres, holiday cottages, caravanning, camping, etc. Prior to 
the recession, the hotel industry usually used promotions for the weekend 
breaks, reserving the midweek availability to the business market. However, 
second to the Leisure Intelligence Report (1994, pp. 3), 
"since the economic slump and the decline in the numbers and spending 
power of business travelers, this pattern no longer applies. Hotels are now 
thankful for any type of customer at any time. " 
The year of 1995 showed improvements in the UK hotel industry. According to 
McGuffie (1996, pp. 37) the UK, and London in particular, "rallied strong in 
1995", in relation to most hotels in northern Europe which continued to trade 
in markets showing minimal growth. While countries such as Austria, 
Germany, France, and Switzerland suffered (rising strength of their currencies 
which discouraged foreign visitors), the UK, Portugal and Spain benefited 
from the weakness in their currencies. Average room occupancy in Germany 
in 1994 was 58.7% while in the UK it was 64%. Average pre-tax income per 
room in the same year in Germany was US$1,438, while in the UK it reached 
US$2,104 (Horwath International - Worldwide Hotel Study, 1995, in McGuffie, 
1996). 
After the long period of difficult times, the hotel industry in the UK showed 
some signs of growth in 1995. The business sector, the most lucrative one, 
increased consistently in that period. A survey of business hotels by Pannell 
Kerr Forster Associates showed 9 per cent more overseas visitors in 1995, at 
12.5 million, with business room rates up by 13 per cent on 1994, to average 
of £83,92, and with occupancy rates averaging 83 per cent (Peisley, 1996). 
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Estimates by Pannell Kerr Forster Associates for the London business hotels 
suggested an increase in profit of 30 per cent for 1997 (Pannell Kerr Forster 
Associates, however, made a provision for this estimate in case terrorist 
activities increases and changes their predictions). If their prediction holds, in 
effect, London will experience a capacity shortfall with an estimated 5,000 to 
10,000 more rooms needed to deal with the increased business (Peisley, 
1996). 
One in four overseas visitors to the UK is for business purposes. One in eight, 
on domestic trips, is a business traveler. Table 5.7 below shows (in 
percentages) the purpose of visits of the domestic market for England and the 
UK in 1994. 
Table 5.7 - Purpose of Visit to England and the UK. 1994 (%) 
Purpose of 
Visit (Domestic) Inbound 
England UK UK 
Holiday 55 57 44 
VFR 29 27 21 
Business 12 11 24 
Other 55 11 
Source: Peisley, T., in International Tourism Reports, 1996, pp. 39 
BDO Hospitality Consulting also carried out a survey around the country 
which showed similar results as the ones achieved in London in 1995. Their 
results showed that of the one hundred, 3 to 5-star hotels surveyed, 90 per 
cent had increased occupancy and 80 per cent had higher yields (Peisley, 
1996). 
5.2.4 - The Hotel Industry and Crisis Management 
The previous sections are intended to put into perspective the hotel industry 
and some of its major characteristics during the period in which this research 
took place (and also the immediate period that preceded the research - the 
impacts of the recession and the Gulf War). -It is not the intention of this 
research to explore in detail all of the statistics available. Given that the 
objective of this research is to examine the crisis preparedness of hotel 
organizations and stakeholder relationships in crisis situations, the analysis of 
the quantitative aspects of the state of the industry does not go beyond what 
253 
G. Santana Ch. 5 -The Hotel Industry and Crisis Management 
has already been presented. Moreover, previous study, as mentioned in 
previous chapters and is discussed further in Chapter 6 and 7, revealed that 
structure, size, and other quantitative variables of organizations are not a 
reliable measure to crisis preparedness. In fact, Booth (1993) argues that the 
larger organizations become, the more they have to develop crisis 
management systems in order to survive. Size is no indication whatsoever of 
survivability. 
There is no doubt that the travel and tourism industry is especially susceptible 
and vulnerable to crisis. The industry is very sensitive to political, social, 
economic or environmental change (if external factors only are examined). It 
has been argued that when a disaster strikes in the industry in most cases it 
causes irreparable harm. Given that entire companies and livelihoods depend 
directly or indirectly on the industry, a crisis (no matter how temporary) has the 
potential to disrupt and/or destroy many organizations (or sectors within the 
industry). Tourism is often unable to rebound as quickly as other business, 
since much of a destination's attraction is derived from its image (Sonmez, 
1992; Kelly, 1993; Cassedy, 1992). This has been experienced in some tourist 
destinations, such as Rio de Janeiro (negative publicity regarding violence, 
crime, etc. ). In this case, as Rio was the "gateway" to Brazil, all the country 
paid the price for over a decade. Only now is tourism returning (but not to Rio 
itself). The hotel industry in Rio de Janeiro sustained substantial losses over 
that period. 
Previous chapters demonstrated that the world is becoming (at a fast pace) 
more crisis/disaster prone. Discussion in Chapter 2 demonstrated that crises 
are built into the very fabric of our time. Although this research is concerned 
only with man-made crises, natural disasters are nevertheless an important 
issue for the industry. As a matter of illustration, in the past three decades the 
frequency of great natural disasters has increased fivefold and the total of 
economic losses have tripled, according to the Office of the United Nations 
Disaster Coordinator (Cassedy, 1992). This trend is expected to continue due 
to, among other things, human interference with nature, effects of pollution, 
etc. The effect of natural disasters on tourism destinations or on tourism- 
related organizations is well documented (Durocher, 1994; Sonmez and 
Backman, 1992; Murphy and Bayley, 1989; Bean, 1992; Snepenger and 
Karahan, 1988; Janiskee, 1990; Liming, 1990; Gilbert, Ilvento, and Scavone, 
1993; Milo and Yoder, 1991; Kruse, 1993; Quinn, 1993). Estimates from the 
insurance industry in the " USA in 1992 suggested that 43 per cent of 
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businesses struck by a serious catastrophe never resume operations, and 28 
per cent of companies that do manage to reopen are so weakened by the cost 
of business interruption that they close within three years of the incident 
(Bean, 1992). 
Figure 5.2 below highlights some of the most recent and well publicized crises 
(caused by nature or man-made crises) experienced by the tourism and 
hospitality industry around the world. The list of crises are divided into main 
areas. 
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Figure 5.2 -A Sample of Recent and Well Publicized Tourism and Hospitality 
Related Crises 
Recent Tourism and Hospitality Related Crisis 
" Health Related 
1996 Meningitis Scare - Spain 
Cancellation of thousands of holiday trips (June) 
1996 BSE (mad cow disease) Scare - Europe (March) 
Severe implications across the industry 
1996 McDonald's sued over the "burger bug" death. 
A bacteria found in a burger killed a6 years old girl and 
made many more severely ill (September) 
. Environment Related 
1996 Oil Spill in Penbroke - Wales (February/March) 
1996 Torrential rain caused sudden flooding in camp site in Biescas, Spanish 
Pyrenees. Over 70 people died (8/8/96) 
1993 Holbeck Hall Hotel -A cliff side hotel fell into the sea (June) 
" Terrorism Related 
1996 IRA bombing of Hotel in Northern Ireland in the town of Enniskillen 
17 injuried (July) 
1996 Egypt - Terrorist attack on tourist bus 
1996 Spain - ETA Bombing of airports and hotels In the Costa Dourada (July) 
Basque Separatist Group planted 6 bombs in 2 days in hotels in the 
resort town of Salou, causing panic and terror among tourists and 
local residents. The bombing of Reus Airport in the same area 
injuried more than 60 people, including 25 British tourists 
1996 Israel - Terrorist attack on tourist bus 
1996 Tourist kidnappings in Peru, Sri Lanka, India, Indonesia 
" Social/Civil Related 
1996 Boycott on all Disney's products by the Protestant Church in the USA 
The Protestant Church considered Disney Corporation's policy 
towards homosexuals "too liberal" (June) 
1996 Sex-tourism in Asia and Latin America 
Pressure by Interest Groups and Civil Liberty Groups. Legislation 
change in some Western countries to prosecute offenders. 
1992 Los Angeles rioting (April) 
Ind=t: y Related 
1996 Hostile Takeover of Forte by Granada 
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5.2.4.1 - Crisis Management in the Hotel Industry 
5.2.4.1.1 - Hotel Environment / Stakeholders 
Hotels operate in a dynamic and competitive environment. The discussion 
above suggests that there is a high level of interdependence between the 
hotel industry and its stakeholders. Almost one decade ago, Jones and 
Lockwood (1989) had already argued that effective management would not 
only respond proactively to the environmental forces that shape and influence 
the industry, but would also respond proactively to the potentially conflicting 
needs of their respective stakeholders. 
Hotels today compete in a global economy for their survival, growth, and 
profitability. The internationalization of the hotel industry at the same time that 
provides more opportunities for growth also encounters new challenges due 
to the interactions necessary for its operations. The globalization of the 
industry has, in many ways, been accelerated under the pressures of 
advances in technology, communication and transportation, deregulation, 
elimination of political barriers, sociocultural changes, and global economic 
development, as well as growing competition in a global economy (Zhao and 
Merna, 1992). 
Zhao and Merna (1992), provide a comprehensive review of the literature, 
research, definitions, etc., in the areas of environment, environmental 
scanning, and impact analysis. Most works on environmental scanning 
consider only "external" elements and how they impact and influence the 
organization. As hotel organizations today expand both domestically and 
internationally, the environmental forces becomes more complex, dynamic, 
uncertain and turbulent. A requisite for survival in the hotel industry, therefore, 
is to understand the worldwide sociocultural changes, political, economic, and 
technological developments, and ecological considerations which make up 
the general environment. This research, however, is also focusing on other 
"environments" apart from the "normal" forces that compose the operating 
environment of hotel, as it should be clear by now. The discussions on 
stakeholders in Chapter 4 elucidate the broad sense of environment applied 
in this study. 
Chapter 4 provides an extensive discussion on the issue of stakeholders and 
stakeholder management. Following the conclusion of that discussion, in 
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striving to achieve its strategic and other goals, a hotel cannot operate in 
isolation from the environment in which it operates. The hotel industry, 
arguably, even more than other industry (given its nature and operating 
structure), does not operate in a vacuum. The economic survival and 
performance of a hotel is directly dependent on the many activities that 
interplay between the hotel and its environment. The interactions between the 
hotel and its environment give rise to a series of broader obligations to 
society. As discussed in Chapter 4, those obligations are both internal and 
external and can be referred to as "social" or "moral" obligations or 
responsibilities. The range of claims that a hotel may be expected to satisfy 
might be very broad indeed. The most common ones are those groups that 
have a direct relation to a hotel (or, as termed in the previous chapter, the 
"primary" stakeholders). That is, those on whom the survival of the 
organization depends directly. Among those, the most obvious are the 
employees, shareholders, customers, the community, the government, the 
suppliers, business associates, the competitors, financial institutions, etc. 
Mullins (1992, pp. 11) argues that the 
"increasing rate of change in major environmental factors (technical, 
economic, social and governmental) has highlighted the need to study the 
hotel as a total organisation and to adopt a systems approach. In addition to 
these major areas of change, the hotel faces a multiplicity of constantly 
changing environmental factors which affect its operations and 
performance. " 
Figure 5.3 below considers those major external forces. 
258 
G. Santana Ch. 5- The Hotel Industry and Crisis Management 
Figure 5.3 - External Environmental Influences 
Economic Social 
Technological activity attitudes Government 
innovations policies 
Suppliers Trade unions 
Shareholders or Guests and 
providers of customers 
finance 
Chamber of Local authority 
commerce 
- THE HOTEL inspectors 
Climate Culture 
Competitors Other organisations 
International HCIMA 
relations HCTCC Pressure 
groups 
Source: Mullins, L., J. - (1992), Hospitality Management -A Human Resource Approach, Pitman 
Publishings, London, pp. 11 
As is obvious, a hotel organization has little or no control over those external 
forces. The effectiveness of hotel operations will be determined largely not 
only by internal considerations and choices, but also by the way management 
manages the challenges and opportunities provided by the external 
environment. It is then paramount that hotel organizations have a high degree 
of adaptability to operate successfully in the modern environment. 
Tools such as environmental scanning and impact analysis can assist hotel 
organizations in gathering information and assessing the impact of these 
environmental forces on the organization. The application of these tools helps 
facilitate strategic planning and decision making for the organization. Swift 
dissemination and analysis of environmental information within the 
organization enhances the organization's competitive position, allows a 
quicker response, either defensive or offensive, and strengthens the 
organization's ability to change and/or control the environmental forces that 
are a part of the international hotel environment (Zhao and Merna, 1992). 
259 
G. Santana Ch 5 -The Hotel Industry and Crisis Management 
5.2.4.1.2 - The Hotel Industry and Crises - Vulnerability and Management 
The discussion above focused on the external forces (or stakeholders) that 
shape and affect the industry. As mentioned in the previous sections and other 
chapters, this research is also concerned with other stakeholders not usually 
discussed. Those stakeholders can be said to be an extension of the more 
conventional stakeholder system. They are characters derived from the 
sociopathic behaviour that has been directed towards organizations, such as 
airplane highjacks, executive kidnapping, hotel bombing, product tampering 
(in hotel and catering establishments), etc. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, the traditional view of stakeholder does not encompass the total 
range of stakeholders that in reality have the potential to affect the modern 
organization. Irrespective of the fact as to whether one agrees or not with this 
proposed "total" stakeholder system, these stakeholders are in effect 
legitimate stakeholders and cannot be neglected. Indeed, Freeman (1984, pp. 
53) argues that 
"Some groups may have as an objective simply to interfere with the smooth 
operations of our business. For instance, some corporations must count 
'terrorist groups' as stakeholders. As unsavory as it is to admit that such 
'illegitimate' groups have a stake in our business, from the standpoint of 
strategic management, it must be done. " 
It can be concluded then, that the world in which business operates today has 
the distinct characteristics of a high level of interdependency and 
interconnectedness which increases significantly the vulnerability of people 
and institutions to affect or being affected by the behaviour and actions or 
inactions of themselves and/or others. The range of stakeholders that 
potentially affect or are affected by an organization is also wider and in 
principle they are in constant contact with one another. 
5.2.4.1.2.1 - The Hotel Industry and Crises - Vulnerability 
Tourism-related activities are not usually associated with disasters/crises. 
Enjoyment, pleasure, relaxation, and safety are embodied in the concept of 
tourism, whereas crises/disasters bring distress, fear, anxiety, trauma, and 
panic. Unfortunately, it is difficult to disassociate (from the management point 
of view, at least) crisis from the management of tourism-related organizations 
today. The issue of crisis is a real one in the industry and researches have 
shown that not only is the number of crises on the increase but also crises are 
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becoming increasingly more complex, more difficult to anticipate and to 
manage effectively. As mentioned in previous chapters, as technology 
develops, as organizations become more sophisticated and complex, more 
complex are the problems they produce. Regardless of the unpleasantness of 
the topic, hotel management has to acknowledge that crises (brought about by 
nature or man-made) have been and continue to be a part of the daily 
operation of their business and have the potential to affect direct or indirectly 
all of those concerned with their operation. 
The hotel industry is no exception to what has been discussed so far. On the 
contrary, due to its operating nature and environment, the industry is one of 
the most vulnerable and susceptible industries to crisis (Brewton, 1987; 
Webster, 1990; Barton, 1994; Bell, 1990). The hotel industry is characterized 
by its fragmented structure and dynamic operating environment. High levels of 
uncertainty in its operations and service encounters also characterize the 
industry. In fact, Brownell (1990) suggests that in the hospitality industry 
uncertainty is the norm. Brownell (1990, pp. 197) goes further to state that "few 
other organizations experience the same high degree of continuous 
uncertainty. " 
Given the operating nature and environment of the hotel industry and that, as 
argued by some authors such as Brownell (1990), the industry is 
characterized by a high degree of uncertainty, it would be expected that the 
industry would be designed to absorb uncertainties, that is, be highly adaptive 
to changes, and would plan continuously for the unexpected. However, 
previous discussion in this chapter has also emphasized that the industry is 
traditionally re-active and slow to adapt to changes. Moreover, the industry is 
also characterized by long traditions and some other features that makes 
adaptability to change a difficult and complex task. 
The environment in which the industry operates today is, however, totally 
different to the one of just few years ago and a new management paradigm is 
(as discussed earlier) needed. For an industry long attached to tradition, the 
changes required in management practices to survive in the current business 
environment, that is, the changes required in management thinking, are not 
easily attainable. Management has to learn how to learn, as discussed in a 
previous chapter. After that, management must acquire the ability to anticipate 
changes and make the right decisions. It must become competent at handling 
the speed of change and develop strategies that will guide the company into 
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the near and distant future. Management has to be able to succeed in an 
environment where the only tradition that is valued is the one that provides the 
organization with sustainable competitive growth. While this does not happen, 
the industry at large will still be vulnerable to the external and internal rapid- 
pace changes that characterize the world today. 
Chapter 3 dedicates a whole section to the hospitality industry's ability to 
adapt to changes in the environment and the many implications of the main 
characteristics of the industry to this process. To achieve this new 
management paradigm, it calls for strategic change what requires a 
fundamental rethinking of the beliefs by which organizations define and carry 
out their businesses. As discussed in Chapter 3, any proposed change in 
organization will have to be "approved" by the system of assumptions 
currently held at a given time. Basic underlying assumptions, are an 
evolutionary learning process over the shared experiences of a group of 
people. They are, as observed, extremely difficult to change. Discussion in 
Chapter 3 also suggested that organizational culture significantly influences 
an organization's ability to move through transition processes. In fact, the 
culture of an organization not only determines and influences the design of 
strategies, but also determines the success of its implementation. The culture 
of an organization must also be supportive of change. If not, the failure of 
strategic change attempts is certain, generating anxiety and confusion in the 
organization. 
Given that the industry is characterized by well-established history and 
traditions, it is not surprising that many difficulties in implementing change are 
encountered. First, planned strategic change is bound to find a certain degree 
of resistence from organizational members. The most commonly found types 
of resistance to change are ignorance about the implications of the change, 
ignorance in relation to the urgency of the proposed change, ignorance about 
the role one will play after the change; fear of losing privileges, status; general 
misunderstanding of the change or not understanding the necessity for the 
change. The reasons may vary but they have the same effect of hindering or 
making difficult the transition process. Considering that the hotel industry has 
a high level of turnover and part-time employment (the workforce in general 
envisage few, if any, long-term career opportunities) resistance to change is 
even stronger, since members cannot see themselves "benefiting" from 
changes. 
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The industry also has some additional features that contribute to the difficulties 
in implementing changes. Brownell (1990) suggests that other factors that 
function as a barrier to change in the hospitality industry should also be 
considered, as for example the customer as partial employee, the increasing 
diversity of the workforce, and the rapid pace of innovation and subsequent 
uncertainty. Those issues have already been addressed in Chapter 3. Having 
said that, it can be concluded that the nature of hotel operations, the 
uncertainties that surround their operations, the ever changing environment, 
the many distinct characteristics of the industry, the long established 
management thinking and practices in the industry, all hinder management's 
ability to anticipate and adapt to new realities and contribute significantly to 
the vulnerability of the industry to crises. 
Although this research has no intention of identifying and specifying individual 
crises that the hotel industry is vulnerable to, it can be said that the range of 
crisis the industry is susceptible/vulnerable to is very large indeed. In fact, 
most of the crisis types presented in Chapter 2 can be applied to the industry. 
Crisis in the hospitality industry can take many shapes and forms - from a 
jumbo jet crashing on a hotel to a stock market crisis to rape or sexual 
harassment. In a study conducted by Barton (1993), of some 802 business 
disasters from 1980 to 1991, nearly 8 percent occurred in the hospitality 
industry. Some of those crises received world media coverage, highlighting 
the vulnerability of the industry. Among the crises events which captured world 
media attention were the fire of the MGM's Grand Hotel - 85 people were 
killed (Las Vegas, 1980); the Bombing of the Grand Hotel (Brighton, UK, 
1984); the collapse of two skywalk bridges in the Hyatt Regency Hotel in 
Kansas City (1981) - 114 deaths and more than 200 injured; the lethal 
outbreak of "Legionnaires' Disease" at the Philadelphia's Bellevue Stratford 
Hotel (1976); the murder of 23 people at Luby's Restaurant in Killeen, Texas 
(1991); a US$ 1 million ransom paid to the kidnappers of a daughter of a Las 
Vegas hotel-casino owner (1993); the terrorist bombing of the New York's 
World Trade Center which made significant structural damage to the New 
York Vista Hotel (1993); and the list goes on and on. In Europe, more recently, 
the BSE food scare ("mad cow disease") affected all involved in the industry. 
The issue of violence in the kitchen of hotels and restaurants in the UK, 
specially in five stars establishments, has been under scrutiny after a 
television documentary which showed the level of violence top chefs subject 
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their apprentices and inferiors (The Big Story, A Carlton Programme for ITV, 
10, October, 1995). 
Guest and employee injury in hotels is costing the industry US$ millions every 
year in compensations paid to guests and employees and expensive lawsuits. 
No figures or calculations in the literature could be found regarding the costs 
to image, reputation, etc., for the hotel industry, although this is a cost that 
should also be considered from the standpoint of crisis management. Guest 
injury is a very serious matter and can lead to a serious crisis. In the United 
States of America, in 1988 alone, more than 12,000 people died as a result of 
falls, according to the National Safety Council (Bean, 1992). Most of those 
slips and falls occurred in public places such as hotels and motels. 
In the UK the topic of racism in the hospitality industry has been brought to the 
fore after some high profile cases. Although it is difficult to establish whether 
there is any more or less racism in the hotel and restaurant industry, the 
problem in the industry is said to be widespread (Tinworth, 1995). The 
industry's record has not been good regarding racism. According to Tinworth 
(1995) there were four cases brought to the attention of the Commission for 
Racial Equality from April to October 1995 alone. Of those, three went to 
tribunals, of which two of the cases were won by the applicants. From 1990 to 
1995 there were, on average, six or seven cases a year brought to tribunals. 
The hotel industry's practices in recruiting and promoting minorities were 
criticized by the Commission for Racial Equality (in Tinworth, 1995) on a report 
into racism in the hotel industry published in 1991. The Commission found 
that racism was the main cause of lack of success of minorities in the industry. 
It also identified that there is indeed a "glass ceiling" in the industry, 
preventing people not only from succeeding in their career but also in not 
attracting talented people from minorities. Among the reasons for lack of 
success, was the image of "establishment" of the industry. This was reinforced 
by the promotional literature of hotels which invariably stereotyped people 
from minorities in menial jobs. Recruiting practices were also criticized by the 
report in that it utilizes mainly the trade press. The Commission reasoned that 
by placing job advertising in the trade press the industry was in effect 
preventing the idea of working in the industry coming to the attention of those 
from ethnic background. 
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Few of the recommendations made the Commission were acted upon. 
Tinworth (1995, pp. 12) argues that 
"The biggest three hotel chains, Forte, Thistle & Mount Charlotte Hotels and 
Whitbread Hotels were unable to provide any statistics on ethnic minority 
recruitment or the number of people from ethnic minorities in high level 
jobs. " 
Sexual harassment and gender discrimination are, unfortunately, "common 
practice" in the hospitality industry and the level of claims against employers 
have risen considerably in the last few years. Although it primary affects 
women, men are also subject to sexual harassment (Woods and Kavanaugh, 
1994; Anders, 1993). In a study with hospitality-industry managers, conducted 
by Woods and Kavanaugh (1994), more than 80 per cent of the men and 
women surveyed perceived gender discrimination and sex harassment in the 
workplace as an ongoing problem. Although males and females disagree on 
how sexual discrimination and sex harassment are manifested, they agree 
that both are common practice. Woods and Kavanaugh (1994) research also 
revealed that both male and female managers believe that sexual 
discrimination is pervasive in hospitality. 
A crises impact survey in 1990 in the hotel industry (carried out in the USA) 
revealed the following about crises: 72% escalated in intensity; 72% were 
subject to close media scrutiny; 55% interfered with normal business relations; 
52% damaged the company's profitability; 35% damaged the company's 
public image; 32% were subject to close government scrutiny; and 14% 
damaged personal reputation (Webster, 1990). Although no specific data of 
that sort for the hotel industry in the UK (crisis impact survey for specific 
regions or country) could be found in the literature, it is believed that the 
pattern of crisis (in terms of nature and numbers) in the industry in the UK is 
not different from other places. Moreover, it is believed that crime in the 
industry not only increased but became more sophisticated. Looking at the 
broader picture of the tourism industry (not only hotels), it is argued that tourist 
activities provide a front for criminal activities (Ryan, 1993). This issue is 
further developed in the next section. 
In the UK, apart from other types of crisis, the hospitality industry also 
experienced a crisis of confidence in the early 1990s after numerous hostile 
corporate takeovers, near collapses, and malpractices. Companies that 
promised much at their launch and gained the confidence of the financial 
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markets and independent investors failed to fulfill expectations which had 
serious consequences for both investors and consumers. Among the troubled 
companies were Brent Walker, Kennedy Brookes, Pavilion Leisure, Baron 
Hotels, Penguin Hotels, and Leading Leisure. Other heavily publicized cases 
were the suspension of shares of the Queens Moat Houses and Resort Hotels, 
the takeover of Mecca Leisure by Rank, and more recently, the hostile 
takeover of Forte by Granada. 
People travel (and stay in hotels) for many different reasons. Regardless of 
their purpose of travel, their decisions to travel are based on several 
psychological traits, such as desire for adventure, peace/tranquillity, comfort, 
education/experience, etc. However, none of those desires have the capacity 
to overrule one of the most basic human desires (or needs) - safety. It is 
important to emphasize that safety in this case. is not only the real, factual 
safety, but most importantly, the perceived one. A study of three national 
tourism offices in dealing with major crises affecting their destinations (Hong 
Kong, after the Tiananmen Square student massacre in China; Fiji, after a 
bloodless military coup in 1987; San Francisco, after the Loma Prieta 
earthquake in 1989) revealed that a crisis can very quickly cripple the travel 
and tourism industry (Cassedy, 1992). In those cases the crises were crises of 
perception and it was observed that they can be just as devastating, if not 
more so, than crises that actually cause physical damage. In each of the 
cases, the crises were the perception of stability and danger by the traveling 
public. The industry suffered because people lost confidence in the 
destinations as an attractive and safe place to visit and stay. Similar findings 
were identified by Brayshaw (1995) in a study on crime, public safety and 
public perception for Florida, USA. The study revealed that the real risks were 
substantially smaller than public perception would suggest. It is argued that 
this "misperception" about Florida was the result of extensive and distorted 
media coverage. A study showed that the media grossly distorted the 
incidence of crimes against tourists (in Florida) and overestimated the real risk 
of victimization (Crystal, 1993). Despite the arguments, Florida experienced a 
real crisis in which the hotel industry was strongly affected. 
Given that tourism activities are interrelated and there is a great deal of 
dependence on transportation, exchange rates, political and social structure 
of both destination and origin, weather, and so forth, the tourism industry (and 
most important for this discussion, the hotel industry), is highly vulnerable to 
variations in any, or, in a combination of those factors. 
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5.2.4.1.2.1.1 - The Hotel Industry and Crime 
Previous chapters, specially Chapters 2 and 3, highlighted both types and 
consequences of crises. The range of crisis that a business is vulnerable to 
today is greater than ever, and unfortunately is on the increase. This study has 
no intention of delineating specific or all the crises that the hotel industry is 
vulnerable to or discussing how to prevent or manage them. As mentioned in 
Chapter 2, crises are by nature unstructured situations and never happen as 
expected. Nevertheless, the hotel industry, by its operating nature, provides 
the set for some crises that other business do not experience, at least in the 
same frequency. For example, it is not uncommon for suicides to take place in 
hotels (people do not normally go to theaters or banks to commit suicide), acts 
of violence (murder, etc. ), rape, robberies, and so on. Those are only a few 
examples of the types of episodes that have the potential to disrupt or threaten 
a business. Inevitably, they call for media attention, police and other 
governmental services scrutiny, and at the very least affect employee morale 
and have an impact on the image of the business, if not on revenues. 
Although this study has no intention of focusing on specific crises, societies all 
around the world are experiencing a rise in crime. This section, then, puts the 
hotel industry into this context. It is important to emphasize, however, that 
tourist crime victimization data are, if produced at all, closely guarded by many 
tourism-reliant destinations (Ambinder, 1992). 
The security and safety of travelers have been brought into focus in recent 
years in many destinations. The escalation of crime in tourism destinations is 
a serious threat to all of those involved in the industry. Many destinations, after 
acquiring an undesirable reputation of crime or related activities, have 
suffered irreparable damage. Rio de Janeiro, Miami, New York, Rome, 
Chicago, and others, have been victims of such images. Those places 
suffered from adverse international publicity after, among other things, a 
series of attacks, often fatal, by criminals on tourists and travelers. The tourism 
industry is the first one to pay the price, specially the hotel industry. Invariably, 
demand declines. 
Highly publicized crimes against tourists have long been known to cause 
major shifts in travelers' destinations choices (Edgell, 1990). In Florida, an 
outbreak of crimes against tourists in 1993 (at-least 12 tourists were killed 
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during the calendar year), caused a decline of 11% in the number of overseas 
tourists and a 16% decline in the number of Canadian tourists, in the first 
seven months of 1994. The number of European visitors declined nearly 20% 
- from 1.3 million to 10.5 million. Tourism from Great Britain and Germany, the 
top European markets for Florida and the two countries that had a number of 
their citizens who visited Florida attacked or murdered, declined by 22% 
(Pizam, 1995). 
Internationally, terrorism, and particularly the kind that is specifically aimed at 
tourists, has caused the world tourism industry billions of dollars in lost 
revenues. For example, following the 1992-93 terrorist attacks against 
international tourists in Egypt, the country's tourism industry lost more than 
US$1 billion in tourism revenue (Associated Press, 1993). Tourists and 
tourism facilities are preferred targets for terrorists because of several 
reasons. Among them: 
" They afford good opportunities, 
" Are relatively safe, 
" Have significant economic ramifications in destinations dependent on 
tourism, 
" Can be used as a form of punishment for foreign policy decisions or military 
actions, and 
" Enable terrorists to publicize their causes, because of its high international 
visibility. 
Armed political conflicts, such as in Northern Ireland, have disastrous impact 
on the industry and convey the image that hotels or tourist facilities are not 
safe. Only recently (July, 1996) a hotel in Enniskillen, Northern Ireland, was 
blown up by the Irish Republican Army, injuring 17 people. In Spain in 1986 
ETA-Militar (a Basque Separatist Group) placed bombs at a number of hotels 
including the Las Garzas, Benidorn (June), Atalaya Park, Estepona (June) 
and the Don Carlos, Marbella (July), as well as on beaches. Security and 
safety in the past ten years seem not to have improved dramatically. In July 
1996 ETA bombed airports and hotels in the Costa Dourada. The bomb attack 
on Reus Airport injured more than 60 people, including 25 British tourists. The 
town of Salou had more than six bombs planted in hotels in that resort area, 
causing panic and terror among tourists and residents. 
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Tourists fall foul of criminal activities by chance in some countries while in 
others they are deliberately targeted for a variety of reasons (Brayshaw, 
1995). Ryan (1993) classified the relationship between crime and tourism. It is 
argued that this relationship ranges from the committing of a crime where the 
tourist setting is incidental, to a situation where tourists and tourism facilities 
are deliberately targeted as objects of terrorism action. Figure 5.4 below 
shows Ryan's (1993) five types of relationships: 
Figure 5.4 - Classification of Types of Relationship Between Crime and 
Tourism 
" Type one: Tourist are incidental victims of criminal activity which is 
independent of the nature of the tourist destination. In this case most 
crime is directed against the indigenous population, and is of a nature 
consistent with that found in non-tourist locations. 
" Type two: A venue which is used by criminals because of the nature of 
the tourist location, but the victims are not specifically tourists. 
" Type three: A location which attracts criminal activity because 
tourists are easy victims .A subset of this stage is the case where 
tourists are not only victims but also aggressors. In both cases, 
however, crime is comparatively unorganized; that is, most crime is 
committed by individuals or small groups, is opportunistic and 
primarily motivated by acquisition of property. 
" Type four. Criminal activity becomes organized to meet certain types 
of tourist demand 
" Type five: Organized criminal and terrorist groups commit specific 
violent actions against tourists and tourist facilities. 
Source: Ryan, C. - (1993), Crime, Violence, Terrorism and Tourism - An Accidental or Intrinsic 
Relationship?, Tourism Management, V. 14 (3), pp. 173 - 174 
The question as to whether there is a relationship between crime and tourism 
has been addressed for many years by researchers (Pizam, 1982; Chesney- 
Lind and Lind, 1986; McPheters and Strong, 1974, among others). Pizam 
(1982) used data from 50 USA states and examined various crime categories 
such as violent crime, property crime, manslaughter, homicide, rape, robbery, 
aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and motor theft. It was found that 
nationally, tourism as measured by expenditures, does not constitute a 
meaningful determinant of crime. The variable that most contributed to crime 
was the proportion of minorities. Temperature, income, and median size family 
contributed to violent crime. Chesney-Lind and Lind (1986) analyzed police 
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records for the city and county of Honolulu and found that the average annual 
crime rates for robbery, burglary, larceny and crimes against property were all 
significantly higher in the tourist areas for either the rest of Honolulu, Hawaii or 
the remainder of the USA. Destinations' seasonality is another factor that 
influences crime. McPheters and Strong (1,974) in a study of Miami, Florida, 
observed that property crimes increased with the influx of visitors, but not 
violent crimes. 
Ryan (1993) concludes that the question of this relationship may be a false 
one. It is further argued that both tourism and crime are reflections of more 
fundamental social forces to be found in an increasingly urban lifestyle. The 
social and psychological motivations for crime and tourism contain within 
them responses to the complex network of work, family, and peer groups. 
Finally, Ryan (1993, pp. 181 - 182) argues that 
"The concept of a relationship between crime and tourism must recognize 
that both are derived patterns of action formulated by the social mores, 
cultures and economic systems that generate demands for escape from 
current reality. From one perspective, both tourism and crime are 
mechanisms of escape from a status quo. The difference may be within the 
social acceptability of the behaviour patterns evinced by each, yet both 
have their continua of varying degrees of tolerance by the wider society. " 
Regardless of crime typologies and as to the extent that this relationship 
exists, the fact is that crime, factual or perceived, is a major factor in visitors' 
considerations in choosing a destination. As mentioned before, safety and 
security are paramount for tourism development and security. It is important to 
emphasize that "cosmetic" measures are not effective and do not lure the 
tourists back to a destination. Some researchers conclude that the 
introduction of additional security personnel in an area without the 
simultaneous reduction in the number of motivated offenders will not reduce 
the level of crimes (Pizam, 1995). In 1994, the Brazilian government in an 
attempt to restore "normal life" and the image of Rio de Janeiro, put the army 
on the streets. Although crime reduced substantially, and local residents 
applauded the measures, tourists were skeptical of visiting a city guarded by 
the army. Moreover, when the army returned to their barricades crime 
restarted. The government's measures were not only flawed but also 
extremely expensive to the tax payers. After the terrorism attacks on tourists in 
Egypt the same kind of attitude was taken by the authorities in that country 
(excursion buses were escorted by the army). The fact is that the real problem 
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remains latent and the real threat to tourists is never eliminated. In fact, this 
kind of measure serves only to reinforce the perceived image that the place is 
not safe. 
Invariably, the hotel industry is one of the first to suffer. Jones (1993) identified 
that one year after the Los Angeles riots tourism was still far from the levels 
achieved prior to the riots. It was also observed that hotel occupancy rates 
were 12% lower than the previous year's rates. Moreover, compared to 
natural disasters, and as discussed in this and previous chapters, man-made 
crises deter tourists for longer periods. 
The tourism industry (not only hotels) provides a front for criminal activities 
(Ryan, 1993). Ryan (1993) cites the example that the Mafia boss, Francisco Di 
Carlo, ran a series of businesses including hotels, bureau de change, travel 
agencies and a wine bar in the south of England as a front for drug trafficking. 
Hotel rooms provide privacy for both legal and illegal activities. Hotel 
conference facilities are sometimes openly used for terrorist organizations 
meetings, etc. 
The hotel industry has recently been associated with organized crime with 
respect to credit card frauds. Hobson and Ko (1995) argue that although credit 
card fraud is a serious and increasingly worldwide problem, hotel industry 
procedures in many cases facilitate that crime. In 1992, credit card losses from 
criminal activity amounted to around US$1300 million worldwide. Over 60% of 
that loss was through the use of counterfeit credit cards and about 70% of the 
information used in credit card fraud was illegally obtained by criminals from 
hotel employees. While the tourism industry is dependent on having a secure 
and guaranteed form of payment for its services and goods, hotel operators 
need to recognize and prevent the opportunities for fraud that seemingly 
harmless procedures present to criminals and dishonest employees. 
Although no precise figure is available, it is estimated that the annual cost of 
fraud to hoteliers in the UK is in the millions. Fraud in the hospitality industry 
ranges from the straight "walk-out", where a guest simply leaves without 
paying the bill, credit card fraud, theft by guests, theft by staff, etc., to more 
sophisticated corporate white-collar crime (Harris, 1994). 
Hotel crimes are also costing hotels millions in security lawsuits. Troy (1994) 
argues that after the industry's "wake-up-call" in terms of legal liability (the 
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1974 rape of singer/actress Connie Francis in a Westbury, New York, hotel, 
which resulted in a much-publicized trial culminating in a multimillion-dollar 
verdict against the hotel) hoteliers should be aware of the extent that crime 
can take their organizations. Nearly two decades after the Francis case, a 
US$10 million lawsuit levied against Dallas-based Motel 6 reached the front 
page of the Wall Street Journal in July 1992. Although there is no data on out 
of court settlements on security lawsuits, it is estimated that the numbers and 
the values of settlements are on the increase. Hotels are paying a high price 
to keep their names out of the news media. 
Hotel crime in the USA reached such a rate (and publicity) that the industry 
had to take drastic measures to protect itself and its customers. The American 
Hotel & Motel Association with the American Automobile Association and the 
American Society of Travel Agents (endorsed by other organizations) 
developed a programme, called "National Traveler Safety Campaign", which 
among other things provides a list of 10 safety tips which are given out to 
guests at check-in, and a 90-second video on in-room television (Bobbitt, 
1994). Although those almost "educational" efforts are not enough to prevent 
all crimes, it is a step in the right direction. It is known that people behave 
differently when away from home. For example, while one would not open 
one's door to a stranger at home, this behaviour does not apply in a hotel. 
However, although measures such as this one are welcome, the problem of 
crime is far more complex to solve. Hotels must look at the long term and strive 
to achieve long-term sustainable solutions. As mentioned in previous 
sections, crime is not an isolated issue and cannot be prevented or resolved 
by isolated action. Only a concerted effort by business, community, interest 
groups, victims, and so forth, can result in a long term sustainable answer. 
Hotels are by nature "open spaces". Safety and good hospitality are attributes 
highly rated by travelers. If hotels are turned into fortresses they will surely 
lose their appeal and characteristics. The challenge then is for management 
to find solutions (provide safe environments for guests and employees) that do 
not compromise the "spirit" of -hotels. 
5.2.4.1.2.2 - The Hotel Industry and Crises - Management 
Discussions in previous chapters have emphasized the fact that good crisis 
management is first and foremost a concerted attempt to, in the first place, 
prevent crises. Since not all crises can be averted (crises are inevitable), crisis 
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management also comprises a series of coordinated management tools and 
efforts to manage crisis in all its phases (for detailed analysis on the 
management of crisis and their phases, refer to Chapter 2). 
Considering that the hotel industry is of increasing importance not only to the 
economy and the community where it is located but also to the 'network and 
interrelationships (stakeholders) that the total travel and tourism industry 
represents, the importance of having a crisis management plan is paramount 
for the responsible business practices of today. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, only with proper advance planning can there be a positive side to a 
crisis. Moreover, from the stakeholder theory standpoint, survival is not 
enough. Management must also increase and deliver value to those that have 
a claim in their business. 
Second to Lewis (1994), the hotel and catering industry accounted for a large 
proportion of business failures in Britain in the period 1983 - 1991. In 1991, 
there were 2229 business failures in the hotel and catering industry, an 
increase of 372 per cent on 1983 levels. Lewis's (1994) survey of business 
failure in the hotel and catering industry also revealed that the level of 
business failures in the hotel and catering industry during the "boom" years 
did not fall below 1983 levels (contrary to what happened across other 
industries and sectors). It was also observed that the rate of acceleration of 
business failures in the hotel and catering industry was much higher than 
elsewhere. 
Having said that, the number of tourism-related organizations that include the 
possibility of disasters in their strategic planning is negligible. A study on the 
preparedness of the travel and tourism industry to crisis conducted by 
Cassedy (1992) concluded that, overall, the industry's awareness of the 
importance of crisis management planning is minimal. The study also 
revealed that, in contrast with what other sectors of the economy and 
corporations have done, instead of incorporating strategic crisis management 
planning into their businesses, many travel segment organizations continue to 
operate as "mom and pop" businesses, even on an NTO (National Tourism 
Office) level. 
A survey on the effect of the recession on corporate hotels in London 
(Santana, 1991) revealed similar (and distressing) results. Even though the 
economy is cyclical (and recessions are a natural part of the economic course 
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of events), it was observed that most hotels had no plans (of any kind) for this 
inevitable economic cycle. The survey also revealed that not one of the hotels 
surveyed had any set of strategies for crisis periods. Hotel executives had no 
idea of what crisis management meant or was about. 
Webster (1990) suggested that the term crisis management was an unfamiliar 
one to hoteliers in the UK. This fact, unfortunately, has not changed in 
practice, as the next chapters will reveal. 
As already mentioned, only with advance planning can there be a positive 
side to a crisis. The element of luck plays a minimal role in what crisis 
management is concerned with. It is virtually impossible to invent solutions in 
the heat of a crisis. The stress unleashed by a major 'crisis impairs 
management's ability to function and respond in a rational way to the 
demands of a crisis situation. It has been argued that in principle most crisis 
can be avoided. Cassedy's survey (Cassedy, 1992) showed that most of the 
downturn caused by the Gulf War in the Pacific Asia area could have been 
avoided. Because hoteliers and other organizations in the travel sector were 
not prepared for crisis, they resorted to inefficient and ineffective short-term 
solutions. 
Lack of crisis preparedness has been identified in all levels of the tourism 
sector. Cassedy's (1992) study on the three national tourism offices facing a 
destination crisis mentioned earlier (Hong Kong, after the Tiananmen Square 
student massacre in China; Fiji, after a bloodless militar coup in 1987; San 
Francisco, after the Loma Prieta earthquake in 1989) revealed that not one of 
the destinations had a crisis management plan to serve as a basis for taking 
proactive actions. Therefore, they had no alternative but to act in a reactive 
manner. It can be argued that the NTO in each case could not have averted 
the crises. However, they could at least have identified the potential threats in 
the "warning-sign" phase of the crises and plan for the potential effect of the 
crises in each phase of the crisis cycle. 
As mentioned above, crises are on the increase and not, unfortunately, on the 
decrease. Despite this evidence, the hotel industry is far behind, with regard to 
crisis management, in comparison to other industries. Having said that, hotel 
organizations need to be prepared for crisis. By planning and training for crisis 
in advance, the negative effects of crisis on the organization, on the people 
inside the organization, and on the stakeholders, can be greatly reduced. How 
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well hotel organizations respond to a crisis and how quickly they recover from 
setbacks will have long-term effects on visitors' perceptions of the 
organization. 
Crisis management is still a recent field. This is specially true for the travel and 
tourism industry. According to Lehrman (1986), although 1985 was a record- 
breaking year for international tourism, it was also a year during which terrorist 
activities, civil disturbances, airline crashes, and natural disasters repeatedly 
took centre stage. Although crisis always existed-in the industry, 1985 was the 
year in which crisis began to be associated with the travel and tourism 
industry. Lehrman (1986) argues that in prior years crises tended to be 
isolated occurences because they were separated by large gaps of time and 
distance. However, 1985 and early 1996 saw a series - of bombings, 
highjackings, and murders directed at American citizens and businesses 
abroad. Those events put the industry into the fore and indicated that travel, 
specially international travel was, not safe. From that period on, crisis has 
been increasing dramatically. Most of the development in crisis management 
to date has been in the area of communication (Public Relations). It is 
important to emphasize that no bad news can be converted into good news. 
Unfortunately, in the travel and tourism sector crisis management is often 
associated with crisis communication. 
5.2.4.1.2.2.1 - The Hotel Industry and Crises - Management -A Stakeholder 
Approach 
Having said all that, the world of business today is highly interconnected and 
interdependent. The action or inaction of any one player in the total system 
has the inherent potential to affect any and/or all other players in the system. 
The hotel industry, as has any other part of the stakeholder system, also has 
the potential to affect other stakeholders. This is specially true in situations of 
crisis. As discussed in previous sections, the hotel industry represents many 
benefits to local, regional, and national economies and societies. The nature 
of hotel operations imply a direct interaction with local community, 
governments, interest groups, suppliers, customers, etc. Whenever a crisis 
occurs, potentially all those stakeholders can be affected. to a varying degree. 
Where a local economy depends heavily on the tourism industry, as is the 
case in many parts of the world, this issue is even more relevant and takes on 
another dimension. Therefore, hotel organizations cannot consider in isolation 
their own crisis interests. In fact, Mitroff and Pearson (1 993a) argue that 
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"Organizations that are well prepared recognize that a crisis has the 
potential to affect not only themselves, but also the broadest array of 
stakeholders: consumers, competitors, suppliers, and the members of the 
general environment. " 
Given the interconnectedness and interdependence of the operating system 
in which hotels operate, failure to manage stakeholders relationships can 
have a devastating effect on both the organization and stakeholders. Mullins 
(1992, pp. 11) already called attention to the fact that hotels should be studied 
as a "total organisation" and that a system approach should be adopted. 
The hotel industry is considered to be "the business of people", for obvious 
reasons. Given that the great majority of industrial and commercial crises in 
the past two decades were "caused" by humans (as previous chapters 
illustrated), the hotel industry cannot afford to be indifferent to the issue of 
crisis and crisis management. Traditionally, when the issue of crisis and 
stakeholders are put together, stakeholders are *often seen in the, position of 
"victims" (or potential victims) of actions or inactions of organizations (that is, 
affected by). However, the previous chapter also revealed that stakeholders 
can be both the element that contributes actively towards crisis escalation 
and/or the element that contributes towards crisis prevention. Stakeholder 
management is a key element in crisis prevention and crisis management. 
A hotel's operation has a number of potentially damaging "side-effects" on its 
stakeholders and on the environment. The effect of industrial or commercial 
crises on its stakeholders is of a very different nature than the effects of natural 
disaster. While natural disasters are usually localized to a specific 
geographical region, the impacts and effects of an industrial or commercial 
crisis can easily transcend geographical boundaries and can even have 
transgenerational effects (as in the effect of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power 
Accident discussed in previous chapters). A natural disaster is a single event 
that no human being has control over. However, man-made crisis is a 
complex system of interdependent events and involves multiple, conflicting 
stakeholders (Shrivastava, . 1992). Crises inevitably extend beyond the 
organization of origin to encompass a broad range of economic, social and 
political agents and forces. It is important to remember that while no control 
can be exercised over natural disaster, man-made crises are in principle 
preventable. Therefore, management often receives severe condemnations. 
The issue of crisis and stakeholders, as well as the role stakeholders play in 
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either contributing to the escalation or the prevention and management of 
crises, is discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
The impacts/effects of tourism and hotel development are well documented. 
Tourism activities and hotel developments, are often held responsible for 
pollution (visual, noise, increased traffic, increased number of visitors, etc. ), 
environmental impact and other impacts, increases in the price of houses, 
cultural imperialism, of causing pressure on services such as water, electricity, 
and other municipal services, etc. However, the hotel literature has negligible 
evidence on crisis management and/or stakeholder relationships in crisis 
situations. 
Stakeholder management is becoming a critical issue in the successful 
operation of business, as discussed previously. Tourism development (and for 
that matter, hotel development and management) that excludes local citizens 
from planning and decision making and deprives them of land and precious 
resources can result, among other things, in resentment, xenophobia and 
ultimately lead to protests and violent acts against tourists and tourism 
enterprises. Such was the case in the Solomon Islands and Fiji, where 
citizens protested by blocking roads, burning tires and closing resort hotels 
(Pizam, 1995). This kind of attitude also "legitimizes" attacks on tourists or 
tourist enterprises. Some nationalistic groups, for example, justified attacks on 
tourists and/or tourism facilities, on the ground that tourism threats a valued 
pattern of life; or because they do not approve of the source of the fundings (it 
being an institution, or country, etc., that such groups disapprove of) (Ryan, 
1993). 
Stakeholders has been the topic of some work in the tourism industry, 
particularly tourism planning. However, Robson and Robson (1996) argue that 
work covering the broad area of tourism planning fails to consider the role of 
stakeholder management or that of environmental issues. It is also argued that 
where environmental issues are mentioned they are set within the context of 
growth objectives and aggressive marketing. Although tourism activities are 
largely or entirely an environmental-based (physically) activity, Baum (in 
Robson and Robson, 1996) found, in an international tourism policy research,. 
that just over half of respondents were concerned with the potential effects of 
tourism on the environment. 
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Even though the topic of stakeholder management has been discussed in the 
context of the tourism industry, Robson and Robson (1996) argue that the 
concept has been introduced from a practical perspective, without outlining 
some of the critical issues surrounding its conception and implementation. It is 
further argued that the concept as abstract or philosophical contributions to 
the subject are valuable in themselves, "but academics and practitioners need 
to address the practical aspects of implementation" (Robson and Robson, 
1996, pp. 537). 
5.3 -Summary 
The hotel industry is characterized by the high level of uncertainty in which it 
operates. This uncertainty is mainly derived from the dynamism of the hotel 
operating environment and the intrinsic characteristics of hotel operations and 
management practices. The hotel industry is also characterized by a long 
established history and tradition. Having said that, hotel operations depend 
directly on a web of relationships that can range from the whole structure of 
international markets to the more mundane local supply of labour and goods. 
The nature of hotel operations, the environment in which it operates, and the 
long established traditions that reflect on management practices discussed in 
previous sections, combine to make the industry one of the most vulnerable to 
crisis. The range of crisis that the hotel industry is vulnerable to is very 
comprehensive. Given the fast pace of organizational and technological 
development, crises are becoming not only more frequent and severe but also 
more complex to solve. It is important to emphasize that this research is mainly 
concerned with man-made crisis. By that, the importance of natural 
crisis/disasters is not diminished. Hotels are (for the majority) resource-based 
enterprises and depend a great deal on the environment, weather, etc., for 
their successful operation. 
The industry as a whole, (globally) has undergone dramatic changes during 
the past ten years. Global recession, wars, environmental disasters, changes 
in demographics, exchange rate fluctuations, mergers, takeovers, shifts in 
business demand, resource scarcity, terrorist attack, technological 
innovations, etc., have all impacted the industry in a major way. In Europe, the 
industry has been suffering from a prolonged recession. 
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Some practical and fundamental issues, such as what constitutes a hotel 
(definition) impair a comprehensive and accurate analysis of the industry. 
Comparisons are flawed and methodologies are confused. Most data needs 
to be handled and interpreted with caution. The problem of analyzing the hotel 
industry (profile of destinations, growth patterns, performance, etc. ) is more 
evident in Europe, where the industry is composed of a large variety of types 
of properties and where different governments and other bodies assign 
different categories, grades, etc., to different properties. A methodology that 
measures in a systematic manner the performance of hotel portfolios was 
developed recently by Kleinwort Benson Securities Limited UK. However, it 
has only been applied to quoted hotels. To validate the success and 
applicability of such tools more research is needed, encompassing the whole 
hotel industry and having then a wider representation of the industry. 
In the UK, the problem of industry analysis is marked by difficulties. For 
example, definitions and methods of data collection vary significantly between 
the UK's national tourism boards. The problem of grading and classification is 
a matter of confusion for analysts, consumers, and practitioners in the UK. 
Although the UK government had made provision for the statutory registration 
and classification of hotels and other establishments, this provision has never 
been implemented. There are many voluntary schemes but none has been 
fully accepted and effective. The incidence of use of grading schemes in the 
UK has been studied recently (Callan, 1995). The survey revealed that the 
perceived importance and applicability of grading schemes (stars and crowns) 
by customers in choosing a hotel is not significant. That is, hotel customers do 
not consider stars and crowns to be of primary importance in making their 
choices. 
As mentioned throughout this chapter, the effects of recession and the Gulf 
War were quite severe on the hotel industry in Europe, and specially in the 
UK. Only now is the industry beginning to emerge from what analysts regard 
as the most difficult period for the industry since World War II. As the industry is 
driven mainly by economic factors, the last few years provided an environment 
of consolidation, restructuring, and rationalization in the industry. This trend is 
expected to continue. This chapter dedicated a section accounting some 
major relevant issues and developments in the UK hotel industry during the 
worst period of the recession and the Gulf War. 
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There is no doubt that the hotel industry has a predominant position of 
importance in local, regional, and national development. Hotels are providers 
of employment, contribute to tax, local economy (they are a major buyer of 
goods and services), and represent (in most cases) a considerable capital 
investment, among others. A recent study by the International Hotel 
Association revealed that for each hotel room available in the world there is a 
person employed in the hotel industry. Globally, more than 11.1 million people 
are employed by the industry, which represents about 5% of the total global 
work force. In 1995 the hotel industry generated an estimated US$253 billion 
in revenues worldwide. As mentioned previously, Europe has the biggest 
concentration of hotels. Europe, in term of revenue, accounted for the biggest 
share in 1995 (43 per cent). 
The numbers relating to the industry illustrate the relevance of the industry to 
societies and economies around the world. This is specially true for regions 
where the tourism industry is the main source of income and contributor to the 
national balance of payments. Having said that, the hotel industry has a great 
social responsibility in that many companies, suppliers, livelihoods, etc., 
(stakeholders) depend directly or indirectly on its success and operations. 
However, the environment in which the industry operates is a very dynamic 
one. The discussion in this chapter suggests that there is a great deal of 
interdependency and interconnectedness between the hotel industry and its 
stakeholders. The hotel industry is, as discussed before, very sensitive to 
changes in the external environment. This level of "sensitivity", and the 
uncertainty that surrounds the external environment, makes the industry 
vulnerable to crisis. Changes in the external and internal environment may 
trigger a crisis in the industry, as many examples in this chapter illustrate. 
This chapter elucidated how vulnerable the travel and tourism industry is to 
crisis. It has been argued that when a crisis strikes the industry, in most cases, 
it causes irreparable harm. Although this study is concerned with man-made 
crisis, natural disasters are nevertheless an important issue in hotel 
management, for obvious reasons. Previous researches have also pointed out 
that the tourism industry is often unable to rebound, if at all, as quickly as other 
business because much of a destination's attraction is derived from its image. 
The discussion in this' and previous chapters suggests that the world is 
becoming increasingly more crisis prone. The range of crisis that can strike an 
organization is greater then ever. The range of stakeholders that can affect 
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and be affected by organizational behaviour (crisis policies) are wider than 
ever. Due to the operational nature of the hotel industry, and its operating 
environment, the hotel industry is one of the most vulnerable to crisis. It has 
been argued that in the hospitality industry uncertainty is the norm, and that 
few other organizations experience such a high level of uncertainty (Brownell, 
1990). The range of crises that the hotel industry is susceptible/vulnerable to 
is very large indeed. Although there has been no attempt in this chapter to 
enumerate or specify all crises that the hotel industry is vulnerable to (or to 
account for specific ways of preventing and managing them), the discussion in 
previous sections provides many examples of the types of crisis that can affect 
the industry. Crisis can range from sex harassment to executive fraud and 
from guest/employee injury to major stock market crashes. 
A special section on crime was developed given the prominent issue of safety 
in the industry. Safety and hospitality are perceived fundamental attributes of 
the hotel industry. The hotel . industry, given its nature, is very vulnerable to 
crime (both from external and internal intervention). In fact, it has been 
suggested that the travel and tourism industry provides the "right" environment 
for criminal activities to take place. Terrorism has taken a heavy toll on the 
industry worldwide. The hotel industry is an easy target for terrorists given that 
it provides the "platform" for their objectives. 
A review of the literature on the relationship between crime and the tourism 
industry suggests that there is indeed a correlation between tourism 
development and activities and criminal activities. Regardless of the 
discussion as to the extent that this relationship exists, there is, as mentioned 
above, a real problem facing the industry since its success depends mainly on 
its image. it is important to emphasize that crime, perceived or factual, is a 
major element in travelers' decision making process. Where destinations have 
acquired an undesirable image, the hotel industry was invariably one of the 
first to suffer. 
As mentioned previously (not only in this chapter), crises are on the increase 
and not, unfortunately, on the decrease. Lewis (1994) found that the hotel and 
catering industry accounted for a large proportion of business failure in Britain 
between 1983 - 1991. Lewis's study also revealed that the rate of acceleration 
of business failures in the hotel and catering industry was higher than in other 
sectors. Despite this and other evidence discussed so far in this study, the 
hospitality industry is far behind, with regard to crisis management, in 
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comparison with other industries such as airlines. Cassedy's (1992) study on 
the crisis preparedness of tourism-related organizations revealed that the 
number of tourism-related organizations that include the possibility of 
disasters in their strategic planning is negligible. Awareness of the importance 
of crime management planning was found to be minimal. 
Due to lack of preparation (researchers have found that in general, managers 
do not possess the emotional strength necessary to deal with the pressure of 
crisis situations, as discussed in previous chapters) whenever a crisis strikes 
in the industry, hotel management resorts to short-term quick-fix solutions that 
are invariably ineffective (and in most cases serve to aggravate rather than 
mitigate the problem). Given that the environmental system in which hotels 
operate is very interconnected and interdependent, failure to 'prevent and/or 
manage crisis effectively can have a devastating effect not only on the host 
organization but also on the entire stakeholder system. As mentioned on 
previous occasions, while natural disasters have the distinct characteristics of 
being timely and localized, commercial and industrial disasters/crisis have no 
boundaries. It can easily (and most often does) transcend geographical 
boundaries and affect distant stakeholders. That is, crises never happen in 
isolation. They not only have the potential to set off a chain of other crises 
within the organization but also to affect and involve and encompass a range 
of economic, social and political agents and forces. As research by 
Shrivastava (1992) revealed, a man-made crisis is a complex system of 
interdependent events and involves multiple, conflicting stakeholders. 
Crisis management is a very recent field. There is negligible evidence of work 
(literature) in the fields of crisis management and stakeholder in the tourism 
industry. This is even more scarce when the hotel industry is concerned. For 
tourism-related organizations, apart from the works of Barton (1994), Brewton 
(1987), Cassedy (1992) and a few others, very little has been done. The 
researcher agrees with Robson and Robson (1996), regarding works on 
stakeholder theory in the tourism industry, and extends it to the field of crisis 
management in the industry, that although there is some evidence of work in 
those fields, they have been done from the practical point of view and failed to 
consider the fundamental issues of conception and implementation. 
Having said all that, the hotel industry needs to be more proactive and 
prepare for crisis. Only with proper advance planning there can be a positive 
side to a crisis. By planning and training for crisis in advance, the negative 
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effects of crisis on the organization, on the people inside the organization, and 
on the stakeholders can be reduced dramatically. How well an organization 
responds to crisis depends on the level of preparation. The hotel industry 
needs to develop a systematic and concerted approach to deal with crisis. 
Without understanding crisis (its origin, nature, phases, dynamics, impacts, 
etc. ) the management of such inevitable business realities is virtually 
impossible. Quick-fix solutions to complex problems serve only to exacerbate 
the problem. 
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METHODOLOGY 
6.1 - introduction 
It is not a simple task to advance new fields of research. As has already been 
mentioned, crisis management is in its infancy. Not much has been 
researched in this area, and consequently not much written material and 
research approaches to the many questions have been developed. Crisis 
management research is further complicated due to the fact that it embraces a 
diverse number of distinct disciplines. Most of the effort put into research in 
crisis management has been towards a single method of study: 'the case study 
(Turner, 1976; Reilly, 1993; Nystrom and Starbuck, 1984). Although case 
studies provide substantial depth of analysis, they can be difficult to compare 
(Booth, 1993; Reilly, 1993). A reduced number of researchers have compared 
the impact of a single crisis across multiple organizations (Shrivastava, 1992; 
Marcus and Goodman, 1989; Billings, Milburn and Schaalman, 1980). More 
recently, research has begun to explore crisis issues across large samples of 
individuals and organizations (Mitroff eta-1,1989; Smith, 1990). As discussed 
in Chapter 2, there is also the problem of construct ambiguity. The literature 
provides no generally accepted definition of crisis, and attempts to categorize 
types or forms of crises have been sparse. 
Crises and crisis management are directly related to organizational culture. In 
fact, some authors argue that the culture of an organization can be its own 
worst enemy in creating crises. Given this evidence, and building upon 
previous research in the area of organizational culture, the present research 
investigates the relationship between organizational culture and crisis 
preparedness in hotel organizations in the UK. Organizational culture has 
been the topic of many studies. The difficulty of studying and understanding 
organizational culture is obvious since one is trying to unveil the mainly 
unconscious non-obvious/hidden factors of an organization. In many cases 
even the people who form and compose the organization are unaware of 
those forces. 
As has been emphasized throughout this study, a crisis never happens to one 
organization alone. It does not happen in isolation. A crisis invariably has 
dramatic consequences for stakeholders and can change forever the way 
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business stakeholders operate. Since the world is a system of interdependent 
relationships, the issue of stakeholders is a fundamental one for any business 
topic under investigation. However, as with crisis management, this field has 
still not been explored very much and research in this area is very fragmented. 
The present research is further complicated since it tries to establish the 
outcome of the interaction and relationship between organizational culture 
and crisis management in the hotel industry and stakeholders in crisis 
situations. That is, the research explores and attempts to establish a 
relationship between crisis preparedness and stakeholders' relationships in 
crisis situations. 
Not many organizations are aware of crisis management as a business 
function. In fact, it represents a "counter-culture". It seems that the world is 
obsessed with the positive side of management, emphasizing the sole 
importance of production, technological progress, breakthrough, etc. To all 
that, there is, as there is 'in nature, the other side of those forces: the 
destruction potential of the very success they claim. Research on crisis 
management has been largely overlooked in comparison to other issues that 
promote "success". Managers are educated and trained to think success. That 
has been the focus of Business Schools. The net result of such emphasis is 
that managers are not prepared technically, psychologically, and emotionally 
to deal with crisis (even though crisis is a common feature in business today). 
Managers are often seen as unconfident, pessimistic, etc., when 
contemplating a downturn in their business. They are not "allowed" to 
consider a downside in their business. Indeed, Pauchant and Douville (1993, 
pp. 60) argue that, given the current culture of obsession with "progress", one 
"would without question find it necessary for a business school to support 
departments or interest groups focusing on 'managerial problem-solving' or 
'production management; however, a business school or an organization 
would look rather suspect (to put it mildly), if they had departments or 
interest groups addressing the issues of 'managerial problem-spreading' or 
of 'destruction management'. " 
That is, the field of crisis management goes against the normal cultural norms 
of our society. 
Recent history reveals that crises are an integral part of business today. 
Indeed, some authors argue that crises are built into the very fabric of our 
times. No single sector in the economic system is immune to crisis. While 
crisis management has been developed and implemented in some sectors 
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(such as in the chemical and oil industries), crisis management is still non- 
existent in others. The hotel industry is among those that are not benefiting 
from this business function, even though it is a sector that is highly susceptible 
and vulnerable to crisis. 
This chapter will discuss the methodological issues applied in this study. 
However, in addition to the problems associated with the points mentioned 
above, the shortcomings of the literature and secondary data in the topics 
under investigation (or rather, the lack of it; specifically in the hospitality 
industry) are very significant indeed. As also mentioned in previous chapters, 
most of the development in the area of crisis management has been done in 
the "hard" (manufacturing) industry, and research in the issue of stakeholders 
is also scarce and fragmented. Nevertheless, this very lack of resources and 
lack of integration in all fields has led to the research question. Below are the 
steps and methodology applied to satisfy the objectives of this study. 
6.2 - Procedure Flow of the Research - Figure 6.1 
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Topic: Crisis Management and 
Stakeholder Relationship in the 
Hotel Industry in the UK 
Literature Review 
Research Question 
Given hotels' organizational culture, is there any 
consistency in their views (archetypal) of 
stakeholders in crisis situations? 
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6.3 - Research Design 
Although there are various opinions about how to design and conduct 
research, Oppenheim (1992) outlines fourteen steps a researcher should 
follow. Oppenheim's logical fourteen steps research outline is very clear and 
straightforward. It is essential for any researcher to have those outlines in 
mind while designing a plan of work. They are as follows: 
(1) Setting a research aim 
(2) Literature review 
(3) Conceptualization with exploratory interviews 
(4) Deciding on a design of study 
(5) Setting a hypothesis (research questions) 
(6) Designing research instruments 
(7) Pilot work 
(8) Designing sample 
(9) Drawing samples 
(10) Field work 
(11) Processing data 
(12) Statistical analysis 
(13) Testing hypotheses (questions) 
(14) Research report 
It is possible to group the fourteen steps Oppenheim describes into four major 
stages of research: the preparation stage (steps 1 to 5), the design stage 
(steps 6 to 9), the data collection stage (step 10) and the processing stage 
(steps 11 to 14). In this chapter, up to step 12 will be discussed, although not 
strictly in the same order/sequence as above, but very consistent to the stages 
to follow (for details refer to Figure 6.1) 
6.3.1 -Theory andHY Hypothesis 
When the design of the study has been decided, analytic rational or other, the 
area of interest or domain facet of the research and background facet will then 
be decided accordingly (Donald, 1995). 
In social research there are two approaches to interaction between research 
and theory: Theory-building and theory-testing - Figure 6.2. 
288 
G. Santana Ch 6- Methodology 
Figure 6.2 -Theory-construction and Theory-testing Approachea 
The Theory Construction Approach 
Empirical level I Obs. 1 
start here 
Conceptual-abstract level 




Obs. 21 Obs. 31 1 Obs. 4 
THEORY 
THEORY 
Obs. 1 Obs. 2 Obs. 3 I Obs. 
obs. = observation 
(Source: de Vaus, 1986) 
Theories are basically sets of what might be called "relational rules". The 
relational rule specifies how variation in one theoretical construct is related to 
variation in one or more others. 
Mechanistic or process explanation accounts for phenomena which are its 
precursors. It is usually in the form: if A and B occur, then C will follow. 
Functional explanation accounts for a phenomenon in terms of the 
consequences it has. It is usually in the form: A occurs in order that B will 
follow. The functional explanation assumes that the phenomenon to be 
explained is purposive or intentional (occurs to achieve some goal). 
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Just as mechanistic and functional explanations are not simple enough to 
keep apart, the distinction between theories built from induction and theories 
developed through deduction is not easy to maintain in practice. Induction 
entails inferring a general law from particular instances. Deduction entails 
drawing from the general an inference to the particular. In practice, theory- 
building is a messy, interactive process. Relational rules that seem to be valid 
are usually crafted by successive approximation. This process of 
approximation will involve both deductive and inductive reasoning. 
Essentially, the process of induction allows one to produce theoretical 
generalizations; the process of deduction allows one to derive specific 
propositions from those generalizations. Deduction is as important as 
induction in theory-building because a theory can only be tested by 
examining whether the specific propositions that have been 'derived from it 
can be supported empirically. 
Research designed to test a theory will be organized so as to show whether a 
proposition deduced from that theory is wrong. If one fails to disprove the 
proposition, the theory survives to face another test. Research can never 
prove a theory, it can merely accumulate examples of where the theory has 
not been disproved (Breakwell, 1995). In practice, many studies suggest that 
there is no pure theory testing or theory construction but an interplay of both 
(de Vaus, 1986; Breakwell, 1995). Thus, both processes affect the course of 
research. 
Hypothesis, on the other hand, is a formal statement of predictions derived 
from theory, previous researches or even hunch (Davies, 1995). A series of 
research questions may be identified instead of hypotheses depending on the 
research methods. The formulation of a hypothesis or research questions at 
the onset of research design is essential in order to identify operational 
definitions and variables, feasibility, and testability of the research as well as 
to ensure that the collected data will address the research aims (Barrett, 
1995). 
In this research, the research question and research proposition were derived 
from previous pieces of research as well as from theory. It is not the aim of the 
research to test a hypothesis or to form new theory but it will address the 
topics in a new way and from a new perspective given that research in this 
area, as mentioned in the "introduction" to this chapter and in previous 
chapters, is not only in its infancy, but is also fragmented. As will become 
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clear, specifically in the hotel industry, the topics raised here have been 
largely overlooked. The first part of this research (establishment of 
organizational crisis preparedness) is partially inspired by the work of Mitroff, 
Pauchant, Finney, and Pearson (1989). Mitroff and his colleagues were some 
of the first scholars to link and systematically observe the relationship between 
organizational culture and crisis preparedness. Their work provided the basis 
for the researcher to start exploring the possibilities of unveiling the cultural 
profile of hotel organizations in relation to crisis and crisis management. 
6.3.2 - The Process of Research Problem Development 
The hotel industry is well known for being very slow to adapt to changes (Bell, 
1990; Webster, 1990; Brewton, 1987; Gilbert, and Kapur, 1990'). It is primarily 
a "reactive" and not a "proactive" industry in comparison with others in the 
service sector. However, and as mentioned in many occasions before, crises 
are inevitable; they happen to all kinds of industries and to all kinds of 
management styles and philosophy. The research problem was developed 
from the following evidence and observations: 
- The hotel industry is one of the most susceptible/vulnerable industries 
to crises due to its operating and market environment nature. However, very 
little has been done to counteract the negative effects of a crisis (and for that 
matter, to understand the dynamics of crises), and worse, to capitalize on the 
opportunities provided by a crisis. 
- Most of the developments in crisis management have been in the 
"manufacturing sector". The service sector is extremely dynamic and constant 
changes in the internal and external operating and working environments 
have brought uncertainties which require special attention (i. e., alternative 
ways to deal with uncertainties and the consequences of those uncertainties - 
planning). 
- Previous studies revealed that organizational culture is the decisive 
element as to whether an organization is able (or not) to face the challenges 
posed by an impending crisis. 
- The relationship between organizations and its stakeholders has been 
largely overlooked in the hotel industry, specially in a crisis period/situation. 
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- In a crisis situation, hotel "customers" cease to be the direct buyers of 
hotel products/services and become the whole society, if not the world, 
depending on the nature of the crisis (i. e., Hyatt Regency disaster, Kansas 
City, when 114 people died, 1981). Customers are more and more 
knowledgeable and increasingly demand responsible actions and attitudes 
from corporate executives and their companies - specially in a crisis situation. 
For example, a study conducted in America revealed that 77% of Americans 
consider a company's environmental reputation when buying things (Small, 
William J.; Exxon Valdez: How to Spend Billions and Still Get a Black Eye, 
Public Relations Review, V. 17(1), pp. 9- 25, Spring 1991. Also, Smith, D.; 
Beyond Contingency Planning: Towards a model of Crisis Management, 
Industrial Crisis Quarterly, V. 4, pp. 263 - 275,1990). This trend is not 
exclusive to the manufacturing sector. The hotel industry has been under 
pressure for a long time to act in relation to the environment and other 
pressing social issues. Indeed, pressure from clients, special interest groups, 
and from sectors within the industry have resulted in the development of many 
measures. Apart from that, regulatory bodies have sprung up both in the 
public and in the private sector, such as the Green Globe (WTTC - World 
Travel and Tourism Council), to give guidance, assistance, and technical 
support to hotels, and to penalize those that neglect the environment. 
6.3.2.1 - The Problem: Given that business operations and management are 
characterized by high levels of interdependence and interconnectedness, it is 
no longer enough for any organization to consider merely its own crisis 
interest in isolation from the environment. Organizations need to acknowledge 
that a crisis has the inherent potential to affect not only themselves, but also 
the broad array of stakeholders that comprise their operating system. 
Given the above, there is a clear need to understand and establish the 
position of the hotel industry in the UK in relation to the issues of crisis, crisis 
management, and stakeholders' relationships in crisis situations. The 
evidence and observations provided above have led to the topic being 
investigated and to the research question and research proposition. 
6.3.3 - Research Question 
This research aims to elicit the organizational culture differences, if any, in 
attitudes towards crisis and crisis management, as well as organizations' 
attitudes towards their stakeholders during crisis periods. As extensively 
292 
G. Santana Ch. 6- Methodology 
discussed in Chapters 2,3, and 4, the culture of an organization is the most 
decisive element in determining and shaping the actions and attitudes of an 
organization towards all aspects of organizational matters. The behaviour of 
an organization (attitudes and actions) is unlikely to have no repercussion for 
their stakeholders. That is, any action or policy adopted by an organization is 
very likely to affect and influence the actions and attitudes of other 
organizations and players in their operating environment. This evidence led to 
the research question: Given hotels' organizational cultures, is there any 
consistency in their views (archetypal images) of stakeholders in crisis 
situations? 
The research question, in turn, led to the research proposition. 
6.3.4 - Research Proposition 
The higher the readiness/preparedness of organizations for crisis, the higher 
the consistency of those organizations in viewing the behaviour and role of its 
functional stakeholders in crisis situations. 
6.3.5 - Operational Definitions 
Before going into detail of the research survey method applied, the 
operational definiton of the key elements of the research is presented below: 
A- "READINESS/PREPAREDNESS FOR CRISIS" - Readiness/ preparedness 
for crisis is measured by the extent to which the culture of an organization is 
favourable to crisis management. 
B- "CONSISTENCY OF ORGANIZATIONS IN VIEWING THE BEHAVIOUR OF 
FUNCTIONAL STAKEHOLDERS" - When organizations conform to a regular 
pattern of opinion with regard to a functional stakeholder. 
C- "FUNCTIONAL STAKEHOLDERS" - Are all those vested interest groups, 
parties, associations, institutions, and individuals who exert a hold and a claim 
on organizations. Functional stakeholders are all those who either affect or 
who are affected by an organization and its policies (i. e. its behaviour). 
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6.3.6 - Research Objectives 
The general purpose of this research is to examine and analyze crisis 
preparedness in the hotel industry and to explore stakeholders' relationships 
in crisis situations. This general purpose led to the formulation of more specific 
objectives: 
1- To examine and describe the organizational cultures of hotel organizations 
in relation to crisis and crisis management - Crisis preparedness of hotel 
organizations. 
The objective of this first part of the research is to establish the cultural profiles 
of hotel organization in relation to crisis and crisis management. That is, to 
observe whether the organizational culture of an organization makes it "crisis 
prepared" or "crisis not prepared". 
The results of this investigation resulted in a framework of "Prepared" Vs "Not 
Prepared" organizations that in turn provided the basis for the second stage of 
the research. 
2- To measure the perceived differences (views/opinions) that hotel 
organizations ("Prepared" Vs "Not Prepared") have of their "functional 
stakeholders" in distinct crisis- situations. 
The objective of the second stage of the research is to measure whether the 
image (archetypal image) perceived by "prepared" organizations of its 
"functional stakeholders" - and their role - in crisis situations is more consistent 
than that of those that are "not prepared". 
3- To develop a crisis management model that would embrace and reflect all 
major relevant concepts to the topic of crisis management. 
Having said that, the following is the step-by-step approach required to 
conduct this research. 
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6.4 - measuring Culture 
For over 5,000 years, managers have relied largely on intuition to assess the 
readiness of their employees to perform assigned responsibilities and to link 
an organization's culture to its outputs. However, even in the absence of any 
systematic means to actually measure organizational culture, it is known that 
the Egyptian managers were able to classify pyramid workers with labels such 
as "happy team" and the "vigorous team", reflecting the unique spirit displayed 
by different groups of workers (Wilkerson and Kellogg, 1992/93, pp. 413). 
The objective of this research concerning organizational culture is to establish 
whether the culture of a particular subject (hotel organization - corporate level) 
is "crisis-prone" or "crisis-prepared". Previous methods of measuring and 
classifying organizational culture were developed by many scholars and 
practitioners. A few examples of some of those methods are summarized here: 
" The Deal and Kennedy Model 
Their model focuses on two main variables: amount of risk and speed of 
feedback. It basically considers, for example, how big a risk a company must 
take and how fast the feedback comes to determine whether that risk has paid 
off (Deal, T.; Kennedy, A., 1982). 
" The Harrison and Handy Model 
Their model addresses more complex cultural issues but are similar enough 
to be considered together. They look at levels of formalization and 
centralization in organizations (Source: Desmond Graves, Corporate Culture: 
Diagnosis and Change, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1986). 
" The Hampden-Turner Model 
Hampden-Turner model assumes that organizations are driven by dilemmas. 
Indeed, he argues that the everyday issues arising within a corporation take 
the form of dilemmas, and therefore, the whole area of corporate culture is 
constructed entirely of such dilemmas. He also suggests that "ideally, the 
culture should reconcile the dilemma" (Hampden-Turner, 1990, pp. 17). 
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" The Wilkerson and Kellogg Model 
Their model looks at how management can quantify and control cultural 
change in organizations. They focus on measurement techniques and argue 
that measuring organizational culture also depends largely on the ability to 
capture and record the opinions of the workforce (Wilkerson, D., and Kellogg, 
J., 1992/1993). 
" The Cooke and Rousseau Model 
Cooke and his colleagues (Cooke and Lafferty, 1986; Cooke and Rousseau, 
1988; Cooke and Szumal, 1993), approach organizational culture by looking 
at shared norms and beliefs and behaviour. They conceptualized a framework 
for measuring organizational culture through normative beliefs and shared 
behavioural expectations. The model holds that culture reflects two 
fundamental dimensions: tasks versus people, and lower order (security) 
versus higher-order (satisfaction) needs. The model resulted in the 
Organizational Culture Inventory which measures 12 sets of normative beliefs 
and behavioural expectations (cultural "styles") reflecting, to varying degrees, 
these two fundamental distinctions (Klein, gam, 1995; Sparrowe, 1995). The 
12 sets of normative beliefs and shared expectations are related/associated to 
three general types of cultures, "Constructive", "Passive-Defensive", and 
"Aggressive-Defensive" (Cooke and Szumal, 1993). 
" The Life Style Inventory (Lafferty, 1973; Cooke and Rousseu, 1983) 
The Life Style Inventory was developed prior to the Organizational Culture 
Inventory (which is complimentary to the Life Style Inventory). While the 
Organizational Culture Inventory measures culture by assessing the ways in 
which organizational members are expected to think and behave in relation to 
both their tasks and to other people (Cooke and Rousseu, 1988), the The Life 
Style Inventory measures the self-perceptions of individuals with respect to 12 
thinking styles that are causally related to such outcomes as managerial 
effectiveness, quality of interpersonal relations, and individual well-being 
(Cooke and Rousseu, 1983). 
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- The Bennett III, R.; Fadil, P.; and Greenwood, R. Model 
This model addresses the issue of strategic fit. The model recognizes the 
impact organizational culture has on strategic implementation and assumes 
that alignment of culture to strategy is essential for overall organizational 
effectiveness. Their resulting model is specific enough to provide a directional 
framework for initiating cultural change, yet, the model is general enough to 
incorporate the idiosyncrasies that each organizational setting presents 
(Bennett III etat, 1994). 
Although the models above are important for classifying organization culture, 
they try to relate organizational culture to productivity/performance, level of 
risks, resolution of organizational dilemmas, cultural change, etc. For the 
purpose of the present research a new approach is needed: one that 
measures some other aspects that reveal how the culture of an organization is 
related to and/or influences crisis management. 
As noted in Chapter 3, there are still controversies surrounding the issues of 
organizational culture concept, definition, and operationalization. As also 
emphasized on previous occasions, organizational culture is a relatively new 
field, and much of the confusion about organizational culture is the result of 
the use of different concepts and definitions of organizational culture. 
Organizational culture as a concept is an area of long-standing dispute 
between well established fields of research such as anthropology, 
archeology, and cultural anthropology (Ott, 1989; Schein, 1990a; Cooke and 
Rousseau, 1988). Ott (1989) provides a compendium of organizational culture 
definitions from fifty-eight books and articles on organizational culture or 
related topics. This serves as an illustration of the complexity of the topic. 
The emergence of culture as a concept relevant to organizations and their 
effectiveness has generated many as yet unresolved issues concerning the 
design, development, and study of organizations (Cooke and Rousseau, 
1988). The issue of organizational culture is particularly divided in relation to 
the use of survey instruments and cross-sectional designs in the study of 
organizational culture. For example, the use of survey instruments was 
questioned by Schein (1 990b) as to whether this method would be capable of 
capturing the complexities of organizational culture. However, quantitative 
research has begun to investigate the outcomes of culture so richly described 
in case studies (Klein el-al, 1995; Cooke and Rousseau, 1988; O'Reilly, 
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Chatman, and Caldwell, 1991; Rousseau, 1990). This stream of research has 
been furthered by the development of instruments measuring cultural or 
culture-related phenomena, such as normative beliefs and shared 
behavioural expectations (Cooke and Lafferty, 1986, Cooke and Rousseu, 
1988, Klein etpl, 1995), values (O'Reilly, Chatman, and Caldwell, 1991), and 
value congruity (Enz, 1986). The advantages of, quantitative methods include 
the ease of cross-sectional assessments and comparisons (across 
individuals, organizations, or subunits), the replicability of assessment in 
different units and by other researchers or organizational development 
professionals, and a common articulated frame of reference for interpreting 
the data (Cooke and Rousseu, 1988). 
The present research follows the quantitative stream of research on culture. 
Organizational culture is operationalized in terms of "rationalizations" (Chanlat 
and Bedart, 1990; Moscovici, 1984 - in Pauchant and Mitroff, 1992, pp. 84). A 
thorough discussion of the issues surrounding the measurement of 
organizational culture may be found in Cooke and Szumal (1993); Schein 
(1990a, 1990b); and Ott (1989). For the purpose of this part of the study 
(establishment of organizational culture), it is sufficient to offer two 
observations. First, by operationalizing culture in terms of rationalizations, 
culture is not being reduced to this phenomenon. Rather, rationalization 
represents one dimension through which organizational culture is manifested, 
and thus influences individuals and groups and behaviour. Second, with 
respect to the issue of using survey instruments and quantitative techniques to 
understand culture, it must be noted that the questions posed in this study 
demand a quantitative approach to the measurement of culture. As noted by 
Sparrowe (1995), quantitative measures and analytic methods are able to 
assess the effects of culture while controlling other factors statistically, 
whereas qualitative approaches are hard pressed to do so. The above issues 
are furthered and individually developed later in this chapter. 
6.4.1 - Level of Formalization 
The level of formalization of organizations will not be fully evaluated since 
previous research has shown that formalization is not necessarily. the most 
important factor an organization should consider in the area of crisis 
management (Mitroff el-W, 1989). The research revealed that the formal plans 
and procedures an organization undertook as well as the formal reasons it 
gave for its actions were not sufficient to explain what it did. It was also 
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revealed that many organizations surveyed wanted to routinize crisis 
management. That is, they wanted to reduce crisis management to a set of 
preset formulas and procedures. However, Mitroff _Qt_gl 
(1989, pp. 271) argue 
that 
"organizations often believe, erroneously, that they are sufficiently prepared 
if they have a formal set of crisis plans and procedures that they could 'pull 
off the shelf' during the heat of a crisis. " 
As already seen in Chapter 2, a crisis does never happens as it was planned 
for (Fink, 1986; Mitroff and Kilmann, 1984; Mitroff and Pauchant, 1990). 
Although structure and formalization are important factors in organizational 
behaviour, they do not necessarily provide answers as to whether an 
organization acts or unacts in the area of crisis management. By that, the 
importance of formalization and structure are not diminished, but as 
organizations have learned in the area of strategic planning, the importance 
lies in the process, not in the results (plans) themselves. That is, the process of 
thinking, the act of learning, is the true important end. It is here that 
organizational culture is decisive (Mitroff etp(, 1989). Some previous studies 
on crisis readiness/preparedness have revealed that issues such as 
organizational size and past crisis experience are not reliable or a good 
measure of crisis preparedness. For instance, some research suggests that 
increasing size may be associated with decreasing crisis readiness. Large 
organizations may suffer from cumulative control loss (Williamson, 1975), 
which restricts their communication and information dissemination ability, 
while resource access may become highly centralized and restricted in large 
firms (Kanter, 1983). Hannan and Freeman (1977) argue that large 
organizations are more likely than smaller ones to exhibit structural inertia; 
hence, compared to small firms, big companies could be less able to respond 
quickly to crisis situations. Big companies in the life cycle stage of 
bureaucratic decline may respond to potential crises with formally rather than 
substantively rational behaviour programmes (Reilly, 1987). In Starbuck's 
(1983) terms, they may act as bureaucratic action generators, responding with 
an unreflective, inappropriate approach to a potential crisis. In the same way, 
some research suggests that past experience with crisis may yield some 
organizational behaviour which makes the company less ready/prepared to 
cope with future crises. For example, a prior crisis may have strengthened 
defensive routines (Argyris and Schön, 1978) or conflict (Milburn et at, 1983) 
within the organization, or engendered the threat-rigidity effects noted by 
Staw, Sanderlands, and Dutton (1981), all of which could lower the firm's 
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quick response ability as well as restrict information dissemination and 
resource access. In contrast, several researchers have argued that 
organizational actions are characterized by rigid underlying assumptions 
which are difficult to change, that is, organizational culture (Schein, 1990a; 
Ott, 1989; Kekäle and Kekäle, 1995; Bass and Avolio, 1994; Klein aLaj, 1995; 
Allcorn, 1995; Cooke and Rousseu, 1988; Weick, 1987,1988; Mitroff, 1988a; 
Shrivastava, 1992; Smith, 1990; Pauchant and Mitroff, 1988; Smith and 
Sipika, 1993; Booth, 1993; Mitroff and Pearson, 1993a; Starbuck, 1983; Mitroff 
g gj, 1989; Miller, 1988; Fink, 1986; Pheysey, 1993; Mitroff and Kilmann, 
1984). Such assumptions, for example, "any effort in relation to crisis before it 
happens - such as prevention - is a waste of time and money", may persist 
despite strong historical evidence to the contrary (e. g., poor performance in 
prior crises), keeping the organization's crisis preparedness low. Therefore, 
culture is the fundamental issue that determines what an organization really 
does (if anything) in relation to crisis management. (Chapter 3 presents a 
review of the literature in and a discussion of the issue of organizational 
culture in relation to crisis management. ) This set of less observable, largely 
unconscious factors exerts a strong, if not decisive, effect on the behaviour of 
all organizations. The aim of the first phase of the research is to deliberately 
explore the effects of organizational culture on crisis management. 
The first part of this research (establishment of crisis-prone organizations and 
crisis-prepared organizations) is partially inspired on the research by Mitroff, 
Pauchant, Finney and Pearson (1989). In this sense, the researcher will be 
looking for displayed behaviour (or rationalization) executives make in 
relation to crisis management. The displayed behaviour determines how 
prone or prepared an organization is for crisis. The first part also looks at 
cultural systems in relation to crisis management. In cultural systems, issues 
such as internal flow of communication, decision-making and reward systems 
are addressed. 
6.5 - Research Instruments 
Having identified the specific research question and research proposition, 
having established adequate operational definitions of the concepts, and 
having decided on the research method (survey, as discussed previously), the 
researcher is now in a position to select possible research designs and 
methods of data collection which can be used to obtain the data for 
addressing the research question and research proposition. 
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The research objectives imply that the present research has two separate 
stages. The first is the identification of organizational culture in relation to 
crisis management. This phase provides a framework of organizations that are 
crisis-prone and organizations that are crisis-prepared. The second stage of 
the research investigates the expected relationship between host 
organizations and its stakeholders given distinct crisis situations (one in which 
the host organization is "guilty" of a crisis, and the other in which the host 
organization is the "victim" of a crisis). 
6.5.1 - First Stage - Establishing Organizational Culture in Relation to Crisis 
Management: "Crisis Prepared" vs "Crisis Not Prepared" Organizations 
Organizational culture is mainly manifested, and therefore can be best 
identified, through symbolic language and rituals as well as through the 
unwritten rules, assumptions, values and beliefs of an organization (Mitroff at 
1,1989; Smith, 1992; Wilkerson and Kellogg, 1992/93, Hampden-Turner, 
1990). For that, semi-standardised interview and questionnaires are used in 
this research. The former is applied to identify elements concerned with the 
"formalization" of the organization in relation to crisis management, such as 
whether the organization has an established organizational structure for crisis 
management, as well as for identifying some aspects of organizational culture. 
The latter (questionnaires) are applied to identify the culture of the 
organizations in relation to crisis management through rationalizations (or 
displayed behaviour) that executives make in relation to crisis management 
and other important issues in crisis management such as decision-making, 
internal flow of communication, and reward systems. 
It was anticipated that not all (if any) organization in the sample of this 
research would have established crisis management programmes or plans as 
a business function. Moreover, and as argued by Mitroff et al (1988b), crisis 
management possesses no single clear line of authority or responsibility 
within organizations. In one organization, crisis management may fall under 
the environmental health and safety; in another, security; while in others, 
public relations, public affairs, corporate communications, legal, engineering, 
or any one of a number of specialities. Therefore, the researcher expected to 
encounter a diverse understanding of the topic, both within a particular 
organization as well as among different organizations. 
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The decision to use a semi-standardised interview gave the interviewer 
freedom to adapt the research instrument to the level of comprehension and 
articulateness of the respondents. Indeed, Fielding (1993) suggests that in 
using semi-standardised instruments, the interviewer, while asking certain 
major questions the same way each time, is free to alter their sequence and to 
probe for more information. Thus, the interviewer was able to adapt the 
research instrument in accordance to the respondent's comprehension and 
articulateness, and to handle the fact that in responding to a certain question, 
respondents also provided answers to questions that would be asked later. 
For the interview refer to Appendix 2. 
Although the use of a non-standardised interview could be also considered for 
the purpose of uncovering some aspects of organizational culture, it would 
have required an extensive and comprehensive relationship between the 
researcher and the subjects (organizations) in the form of observation (at least 
observation). However this is not the case in the present research. The non- 
standardized instrument allows interaction and free conversation between 
interviewer and respondent which permits the former to guide the 
conversation and to probe (Fielding, 1993; Burgess, 1982). As mentioned 
previously, most of what constitutes an organization's culture is unconscious. 
Probing is one way of improving the interviewers chance of best achieving its 
objectives (follow-up questioning to get fuller- response; verbally or non- 
verbally). However, probing can also be used in semi-standardised interviews 
and indeed produced the results needed for the proposed research. 
Given the nature of the instruments, the interviews were tape-recorded. For 
accuracy of analysis and validity of data, it was imperative that all interviews 
were tape-recorded. Moreover, recording conveys the impression that 
responses are taken seriously, which made respondents more interested and 
involved in the interview. However, the researcher was well aware of the 
sensibility of asking respondents' permission to tape-record interviews. For 
that, requests to tape-record interviews were made explicit and in advance, 
confidentiality was offered, and respondents had the choice of having the 
original tapes after the research was concluded, or to have a copy of the tape, 
or still, a transcript in order to check its accuracy. Not one organization asked 
for the tapes or transcripts, however, all organizations asked for a copy or a 
summary of the results of the research, which will be provided after 
completion. 
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The culture of an organization is often held as being of critical importance to 
corporate strategic decision making, particularly in terms of its ability to 
respond to a crisis event. As discussed in Chapter 3, there are many 
observable factors that guide the behaviour of management and employees in 
organizations, such as the environment in which a company competes, the 
structure of its industry, its financial status, its capital and plant requirements. 
However, it is known that other less observable factors exert a strong efluence 
on the way people behave in organizations. These factors are collectively 
referred to as the culture of an organization. These less visible factors are the 
basic assumptions held by the members of an organization about themselves 
and their organization, their environment, or the nature of people or life in 
general. As also mentioned in Chapter 3, these beliefs are largely 
unconscious and rarely articulated. In effect, culture is the set of unwritten 
rules that govern acceptable behaviour within an organization. 
A basic notion of organizational culture is that it has an existential function in 
organizations. One of the fundamental functions of organizations is to produce 
goods and services; indeed, an organization is often defined as a grouping of 
individuals who cooperate with each other with the common purpose or the 
politically defined goal of accomplishing something that they could not do 
individually. However, allowing individuals to produce some goods and 
services is not the only function of organizations. Another is providing people 
with an escape from their anxiety. This existential function explains why some 
people will embrace and protect the norms developed in an organization, 
even if they lead to crises. In crisis-prone organizations managers and 
employees are very skilled at developing rationalizations that will validate 
their day-to-day actions, disregarding the fact that these actions can lead, after 
a while, to crises (Pauchant and Mitroff, 1992, pp. 82). Thus, what holds these 
organizations together, what forms the culture of such organizations, what is at 
the basis of decisions and actions, is the set of sometimes faulty assumptions 
or rationalizations that the members of the organization have developed. 
It is evident that the culture of an organization is more than a set of 
rationalizations. In order to obtain a complete picture, a great number of 
variables should be carefully studied, such as myths and stories developed in 
the company, the kinds of ceremonies or ritualized events individuals 
subscribe to, the anecdotes and jokes passed around in the organization, the 
political games played, the motivations behind reward and punishment, and 
so forth. Still, studying the rationalizations expressed by managers, and their 
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mindset, captures a significant part of corporate culture (Chanlat and Bedart, 
1990; Moscovici, 1984 - in Pauchant and Mitroff, 1992). By operationalizing 
culture in terms of rationalizations, culture is not being reduced to this 
phenomenon. Rather, rationalization represents one dimension through which 
organizational culture is manifested, and thus influences individuals and 
groups and behaviour. This part of organizational culture (expressed 
rationalizations) is under investigation in the present research. By 
investigating it, the level of an organization's readiness for crises can be 
identified and a set of prepared and not prepared organizations can be 
determined. 
The primary aim of this first stage is to explore the effects of organizational 
culture on crisis management, that is, to establish the crisis preparedness (or 
the favourability of organizational culture to crisis management) of different 
organizations. The cultural element of "favourability" to crisis management 
measured here are the "rationalizations" managers make in relation to crisis 
and crisis management. For that, an index of rationalizations - with 30 
variables - executives make in relation to crisis and crisis management were 
used in the form of a questionnaire for each executive to subscribe to. The 
rationalizations are measured in an ordinal scale of 1 to 7. The seven-digit 
scale was adopted so that subjects could have more scope to express their 
choices. Specifically in the case of the present research, a scale of less than 
seven-digits (say, 1 to 5) would not be satisfactory because it would limit 
respondents' ability to place their right choices. Moreover, what is being 
investigated here is the proneness and preparedness of organizations in 
relation to crisis. The researcher believes that there is no such thing as a one 
hundred percent prone organization nor a one hundred percent prepared 
organization. Thus, the use of a broader scale (1 to 7) gives respondents a 
more realistic option for positioning themselves. 
The sum of the scores of this index comprises the favourability of the culture of 
a particular organization to crisis management, that is, whether the culture of 
an organization makes it "prepared" or "not prepared" for crisis. 
6.5.1.1 - Pilot Study - First Stage 
A pilot study was carried out with the objective of validating the data collection 
techniques and to see whether the data to be collected would give the 
researcher the information needed to achieve the objectives of the research. 
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With respect to the first stage of data collection (the objective of that stage was 
to establish which organizations are prone to and which organizations are 
prepared for crisis) the researcher developed a questionnaire with thirty two 
(32) rationalizations (or statements) management makes about crisis and 
crisis management. This questionnaire is mainly concerned with 
organizational culture. Another questionnaire relating to cultural systems was 
also developed and tested. The latter refers to the more practical affairs in the 
daily life of a business organization, such as internal flow of communication, 
decision-making, reward system, etc. This questionnaire has 13 (thirteen) 
questions. Although the researcher included some questions related to 
reward system and decision-making, these questions to some extent reflect 
the issue of communication. As discussed in Chapter 2, communication (both 
internal and external) is one of the most important tools in crisis preparedness 
and crisis management (Reilly, 1993). Restriction (of any kind) in 
communication and information dissemination processes, as well as content, 
can endanger an organization's crisis readiness (Mirvis and Marks, 1986; 
Staw etal_, 1981). Moreover, and as noted by Turner (1976), if management 
and other key employees have limited knowledge of the resources and tools 
allocated for crisis response, they cannot be ready to deal with the occurrence 
of unanticipated threats. The effort of managers and employees to respond to 
a crisis situation can be short-circuited by the unavailability of necessary 
information, which can be as basic as the home telephone numbers of key 
managers or legal counsel. The researcher in this part (questionnaire 2) 
observes the attitudes of managers, concerning the internal communication 
issue, in general and in relation to crisis and crisis management. It is important 
to note that although the issues in questionnaire 2 are of a more practical 
nature, the present research is looking beyond the formal levels of crisis 
management structure in organizations; in another words, the main interest is 
in the cultural aspects of organizations in relation to crisis and crisis 
management. 
One of the objectives of the pilot regarding this first stage (the two 
questionnaires mentioned above) was to validate the statements and more 
importantly to validate the scale "translation" from "Very True" to "Prone", and 
from "Not True at All" to "Prepared" in the first questionnaire. The second 
questionnaire follows the same logic but in this case the "translation" was from 
"Never" to "Prone", and from "Always" to "Prepared". 
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The pilot was undertaken with ten subjects: nine academic staff and one 
researcher. 
The approach adopted was to ask the pilot subjects to analyze each individual 
statement. The first questionnaire carried the following instruction: "If an 
individual said each of the following statements were "Very True"; would 
he/she be working foran organization that is crisis prone or crisis prepared? " 
The scale ranged from "Prone" to "Prepared". As mentioned previously, a 
seven-digit scale was adopted so that subjects could have more scope for 
making their choices. The researcher piloted a five-digit scale and a seven- 
digit scale for the questionnaires and asked respondents to indicate which 
one of the scales represented more realistically their choices. The unanimous 
choice was the seven digit one. Respondents felt more comfortable with a 
scale that provided them with a broader scope in which they could position 
themselves more realistically. 
The second questionnaire -carried the following instruction to the pilot 
subjects: "If an individual answered "NEVER" to each of the following 
questions, would he/she be working for an organization that is crisis prone or 
crisis prepared? " 
This first part of the research relates to organizational culture and cultural 
systems in relation to crisis management. Below are the pilot questionnaires. It 
is important to emphasize here that the revised questionnaire for the main 
study would carry different instructions and measurement (data analysis 
technique). The revised questionnaire can be seen in Appendix 3. The 
objective here (pilot) was to validate the statements and scale "translation". 
306 
G. Sxtana Ch 6- Methodobrny 
Questionnaire 1 
If an individual said each. of the following statements were "Very True", 
would he/she be working for an organization that is crisis prone or crisis 
prepared? 
Prone Neither Prone Prepared 
nor Prepared 
1 -The bigger the organization, the less 123 4 5 67 
vulnerable it is to crises. 
2- Any accident is regarded as part of the nature 123 4 5 67 
of our operations. 
3- We just consider something to be a crisis if it 123 4 5 67 
happens to or hurts us. 
4- We do not have to be preocupied with crisis 123 4 5 67 
management. It is somebody else's responsibility. 
5- Only organizations that are badly managed have 123 4 5 67 
crises. 
6- The locations of our hotels make them immune 123 4 5 67 
to crises. 
7- Crises do not happen in our organization. 123 4 5 67 
8- If a crisis should occur, we have laid out 123 4 5 67 
emergency procedures. We need only to refer to it. 
9- Past experiences has shown us that with time 123 4 5 67 
most crises resolve themselves. 
10 - If a crisis occurs, our management and technical 123 4 5 67 
people can fix it. Nothing special is required. 
11 - In the end, most crises turn out not to be very 123 4 5 67 
important. 
12 - Any effort in relation to crisis before it happens 123 4 5 67 
(such as prevention) is a waste of time and money. 
13 - Whenever a major crisis occur, there will be 123 4 5 67 
always people that will rescue us. 
14 - We fully trust our employees. 123 4 5 67 
15 - The range of crisis is so vast that it makes it 123 4 5 67 
impossible to make preparations. 
16 - There is nothing to do in relation to crises 123 4 5 67 
before it happens. 
17 - Most of the crises have a technical solution. 123 4 5 67 
18 - Whenever a crisis strikes, the application of 123 4 5 67 
technical and financial quick-fixes would resolve it. 
19 - We do not regard the media as an important issue. 123 4 5 67 
It is easy to manipulate it. 
20 - In our organization we all work in a rational and 123 4 5 67 
objective way, therefore, we can handle any crises. 
21 - Crises are isolated. 123 4 5 67 
22 - There is no need to involve employees and the 123 4 5 67 
community in the crisis planning of our organization. 
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Prone Neither Prone Prepared 
nor Prepared 
23 - Only top management should be involved in 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
decision-making. 
24 - There is no need to worry about morale around 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
here. In our organization it is always high. 
25 - Communication is not an important issue here. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
We understand each other. 
26 - Safety is the responsibility of top management, not 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
of individual employees. 
27 - The establishment of relationship with interest-groups 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
is a futile effort. They do not understand our business. 
28 - What happens in other industries does not teach 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
us anything. 
29 - Environmental issue is a matter for politicians. 1 2 3 4. 5 6 7 
We do not have to worry about it. 
30 - There is no need to change if nothing makes us 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
do so. 
31 - Security is an issue that concerns security 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
personnel alone. 
32 - Our clients are always very understanding. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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" Questionnaire 2 
If an individual answered "NEVER" to each of the following questions, would 
he/she be working for an organization that is crisis prone or crisis prepared? 
1- Do people at the top get important 
information from lower levels? 
2- Do people on the lower levels understand 
communication that comes from the top? 
3- Do people that have different responsibilities 
talk to each other? 
4- Is the subject "crises" a welcome subject for 
discussion? 
5- Do people feel free to talk about "bad things" in 
your organization? 
6- Do you reward people who bring bad news to 
you? 
7- Do you encourage people to look for danger? 
8- Do you encourage people to evaluate the risks 
involved in any aspect of the business? 
9- Are people rewarded when something potentially 
dangerous to the organization is spotted? 
10 - Do you encourage new ideas in your 
organization? 
11 - Do you encourage employees to innovate in 
your organization? 
12 - Do you compensate employees to innovate, even 
if the innovation is not successful? 
13 - Do you encourage debate and discussion in 
decision-making? 
6.5.1.1.1 - Pilot Results - First Stage 
Prone Neither Prone 
nor Prepared 
Prepared 
1 2 345 6 7 
1 2 345 6 7 
1 2 345 6 7 
1 2 345 6 7 
1 2 345 6 7 
1 2 345 6 7 
1 2 345 6 7 
1 2 345 6 7 
1 2 345 6 7 
1 2 345 6 7 
1 2 345 6 7 
1 2 345 6 7 
1 2 345 6 7 
The objectives of the pilot were to validate both the statements (in the first 
questionnaire), the questions (in the second questionnaire), and more 
specifically the scale "translation" from "Very True" to "Prone" in the first 
questionnaire, and from "Never' to "Prone" in the second questionnaire. The 
question posed to the researcher was: Can one say that if an individual 
answers "Very True" (in the first questionnaire) or "Never" (in the second 
questionnaire), he/she is working for an organization that is crisis prone? The 
pilot was then designed to test these assumptions and to validate the 
statements. 
309 
G. Santana Ch 6- Methodology 
Prone Prepared 
1234567 
Very Neither True Not True 
True nor False at All 
The approach adopted to accept or reject a statement was as follows: For a 
statement to be considered valid, it had to have at least 50% of respondents 
answering positively. Number four (4) in the scale was assigned the value 
zero. To its left the values were positive: 1,2, and 3. To its right, the values 
were negative: -1, -2, and -3. Thus, if at least 50% of respondents placed their 
answers to the left of zero (four in the scale), the statement was considered 
valid. In other words, if someone answered "Very True" to a statements he/she 
would be working for an organization that is crisis prone. It is important to 
emphasize that the pilot subjects were asked to analyze each individual 
statement. 
The result of the analysis of the pilot study revealed that apart from two 
statements (statements number 8 and 14 in the first questionnaire) which were 
rejected, all the others in the first questionnaire were considered valid, as well 
as all the questions in the cultural system questionnaire (second 
questionnaire). Both revised questionnaires can be seen in Appendix 3. 
6.5.2 - Second Stage 
As the objective of this stage was to explore the expected relationship 
between the host organization and its stakeholders during a crisis situation, 
two approaches were required: one that would give the subjects two distinct 
crisis situations, and another that would present the subjects with a set of 
"functional stakeholders" and a set of "archetypal stakeholders" so that 
respondents could relate them given different crisis status. 
The main objective of this stage, and for that matter the objective of the 
present research, was to measure whether there is any consistency in hotel 
organizations' view of stakeholders (archetypal image) during crisis (that is, 
against their organizational culture - "prepared" vs "not prepared"). In other 
words, to see whether the image perceived by "crisis-prepared" organizations 
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of its stakeholders (archetypal image) - and their role - in crisis situations is 
more consistent than those organizations that are "not prepared". For that, two 
distinct crisis situations were created: one in which the host organization was 
the "victim" of a crisis; and the other where the host organization was "guilty" of 
a crisis. 
After each individual single crisis situation was presented to a subject, a set of 
"Functional Organizational Stakeholders" as well as a set of "Archetypal 
Organizational Stakeholders" were presented to subjects. The sets of 
"Functional" and "Archetypal Stakeholders" were presented in the form of a 
questionnaire matrix so that respondent could relate/rate functional 
stakeholders to archetypal stakeholders (given distinct crisis situations). 
The researcher adopted two stakeholder sets (functional and archetypal) 
developed by Mitroff and Pearson (1993a) as parameters of this study. 
However, since the stakeholders that comprise both sets may not necessarily 
be the ones that the subjects consider to be relevant, a pilot study was carried 
out so that a more relevant set of stakeholders could be developed. The pilot 
study and results for this second stage of the research are discussed below in 
this section. Figures 6.3 and 6.4 represent the "Functional" and "Archetypal" 
Stakeholders sets developed by Mitroff and Pearson (1993a). 
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It is important to re-emphasize here (as it has already been mentioned in 
Chapter 3) that the use of archetypal images in this research is purely 
instrumental. It is beyond the scope of this research to investigate the symbolic 
nature of organizations, or the effects of it. The meaning of archetypal 
stakeholders (heroes, victims, villains, etc. ) used here are assumed to be 
common sense in the context of the industry and, to some extent, to the culture 
of the nation at large. The researcher believes that this study, as it is proposed 
here, could not be carried out between industries and also between countries, 
even if the industry concerned is the same industry to be analyzed between 
countries. One major reason for that, is that in different cultures (nations) the 
meaning of such stakeholders (archetypal) may be viewed with some degree 
of difference. Moreover, and as mentioned in Chapter 2, defining crisis alone 
can be an example of the difficulties that would be encountered. That is, what 
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may be considered a crisis in the United Kingdom,. may not be considered a 
crisis in, say, Spain, where management is more tolerant. Cross-industry 
analyses may also prove to pose the same problem. Structure of industry, 
market conditions, technological aspects, etc., all may contribute to complicate 
and compromise the results if caution is not taken. 
6.5.2.1 - Pilot Study - Second Stage 
The main concern of this research is to investigate organizational views (from 
top executives in hotel organizations) of their main stakeholders in distinct 
crisis situations. To do this, two distinct crisis situations were developed: one 
in which the organization is "Guilty" of a crisis, and the other where the 
organization is the "Victim" of a crisis. 
A number of crisis types were piloted with the same pilot subjects. Crisis types 
such as health related crisis, security and safety crisis, executive crimes, plant 
defects, information related crisis, terrorism, and fire, were presented to the 
pilot subjects. The objective was to identify what type of crisis would be more 
easily understood by the main subjects, given the context of each distinct 
crisis situation of "Guilty" and "Victim". In other words, which type of crisis 
could the main subjects grasp more easily (given situations) and see it in the 
context of the present research. All pilot subjects agreed that the type of crisis 
more appropriate for the situation "Guilty" would be the type "FIRE". They all 
also agreed that the most appropriate crisis type to illustrate the situation 
"Victim" would be the type "TERRORISM". With the results in hand two distinct 
crisis situations were developed and also tested. Below are the two situations. 
"Guilty" Situation - The first crisis situation is one in which the host 
organization is in the "Guilty" category. 
314 
G. Santana Ch 6- Methodology 
Crisis Situation 1- "GUILTY" 
SITUATION: Fire in a Prestigious Property of the Group 
There has been a major fire in one of your most prestigious hotels. The fire 
resulted in five deaths, many injuries and considerable damage to the 
property. Among the dead were four guests and one employee. The injuries 
were among guests, employees, members of the fire brigade, a member of the 
public who tried to help guests to escape the "inferno", and some members of 
a conference group that were having a dinner party in one of the hotels' 
function rooms. 
The findings of the investigation into the hotel fire have established that most 
of the fire exits were blocked. The main fire exit was blocked by trolleys on the 
fourth floor, where the fire started, and where all the casualties occurred. The 
ground floor fire exit was blocked by tables and chairs from the restaurant, 
which was undergoing a one-day minor refurbishment on the day of the fire. 
Other objects (including an employee's motorcycle) also blocked the exit. 
Most of the injuries happened in this fire exit, where people were trapped and 
panicked. Other fire exits were found not to be in accordance with specific 
requirements. 
With this scenario in mind, please state how you would see your main 
stakeholders. In each row, please indicate your prime preference by ticking 
one of the boxes. 
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Crisis Situation 1- "GUILTY" 
Instruction: Please tick one box of your preference in each row. 
Stakeholders Victims Heroes Rescuers Enemies Allies Protectors Villains 




Media II II II II I1 Q 
Suppliers 
Competitors 
Special Interest Groups 
Regulators (official bodies) F7 F7 
Consumers 
Financial Institutions II II II II II ii ii 
Insurance Companies 
Local Community II II II II ii ii ii 
Nation (wider community) I II II II II II iI 
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"Victim" Situation - The second crisis situation is one in which the host 
organization is in the "Victim" category. 
Crisis Situation 2- "VICTIM" 
SITUATION: Terrorist Bomb Attack in one of the most Prestigious 
Property of the Group 
A massive explosion has occurred in the flagship hotel of the group. The 
explosion, caused by a well planned terrorist attack, was one of the most 
vicious in recent history. The hotel group had nothing to do with the motives of 
the terrorist group. The hotel was the target, apparently, to expose the 
objective of the terrorists, which was to destroy the most important symbols of 
the country. 
The bomb caused the deaths of many innocent people among employees, 
guests, and some members of the three small conferences that were going on 
at the time of the explosion. Injuries were wide-spread. No one present in the 
hotel at the time of the explosion could escape without injuries. 
With this scenario in mind, please state how you would see your main 
stakeholders. In each row, please indicate your prime preference by ticking 
, Qoe of the boxes. 
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Crisis Situation 2-"VICTIM" 
Instruction: Please tick one box of your preference in each row. 
Stakeholders Victims Heroes Rescuers Enemies Allies Protectors Villains 
Management 
Stockholders 
Workers II II II II II Q 
Union 
Media II II II II I1 11 1I 
Suppliers Q 
Competitors 
Special Interest Groups 
Regulators (official bodies) F -1 F-1 
Consumers 
Financial Institutions r F-1 
Insurance Companies Q 
Local Community 1 
Nation (wider community) 
6.5.2.1.1 - Pilot Results - Second Stage 
The set of "Functional Organizational Stakeholders" was also piloted. The 
researcher presented the pilot subjects with a set of stakeholders (taken from 
Mitroff and Pearson, 1993a, plus five new ones which the researcher 
considered to be important to the hotel industry) and asked whether those 
stakeholders were relevant to the operations of hotel organizations in the 
context of the intended sample. One stakeholder was rejected (International 
Community); however, four new functional stakeholders were added to the 
Mitroff and Pearson (1993a) list (Financial Institutions, Insurance Companies, 
Local Community, National - wider community) as a result of the pilot study. 
The set of "Archetypal Organizational Stakeholders" was also piloted. The 
objective here was to see whether there was any kind of disagreement or 
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discrepancy among responses in relation to the images or meanings 
conveyed by the archetypes. All respondents agreed on the intended 
meaning of the archetypal images. That is, in the context of this culture (UK), 
and for that matter in the context of the intended sample, the respondents 
agreed on the message conveyed by the archetypal stakeholders. 
6.6 - The Sample 
Previous research on the subject of crisis management revealed that during 
crises it is more common to identify the main decisions (strategic) to be taken 
by the top executives (i. e., managing directors, marketing directors, financial 
directors, etc. ) or by other top designated executives (individual directly 
concerned with overseeing crisis management or similar function), than by 
unit managers (Janis, 1989; Mitroff and Pauchant, 1990; Barton, 1993; 
Shrivastava, 1992; Nystrom and Starbuck, 1984; Fink, 1986). Indeed, in many 
instances crisis management decisions and control is a matter for head office. 
Of course, a great effort (human and material resources) is directed to the 
units and their management and employees, as well as, in some cases, 
towards the community (in terms of education - relating to the business 
activities and potential effects, etc. ), or/and towards other interested parties. In 
addition to the reasons for interviewing only top executives above, other 
researchers have provided evidence to support this choice (top executives 
rather than unit managers and employees). Studies by Hambrick (1981) and 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) of the effects of top management characteristics 
on organizational outcome have shown that job level can affect an executive's 
perceptions about his organization as a whole. Moreover, and as observed by 
Tushman and Romanelli (1985), higher level executives are an important 
component of an organization's preparedness to crisis because they are 
critical actors in any organizational change situation. Compared to lower level 
managers, upper level executives tend to have longer tenure with their firms, 
and longer tenure has been related to greater commitment (Salancik, 1977). 
Finally, the higher an executive is in the organization, the more likely she/he is 
to know about and have access to any crisis preparedness resources the 
company has in place (Kiesler and Sproull, 1982). 
Given this evidence, the researcher approached top executives of the fifty (50) 
top hotel organizations operating in the United Kingdom. The source of these 
organizations was "The Hospitality Yearbook", 1995 edition (HCIMA - Hotel 
Catering & Institutional Management Association, "The Hospitality Yearbook", 
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1995 edition). The 50 top hotel groups are quite representative of the range of 
products in the market. They range from 5 star luxury city centre hotels to 
budget hotels in motorways and in the country. Many of the groups have a 
large international operation, while others are mainly British and operate 
exclusively in the UK. Some others have few large hotels concentrated in big 
urban centres, while others have a large number of medium and small hotels 
spread out in the country and/or the world. 
Given that the top executives of those groups are used to dealing with all the 
issues related to their different mix of business (from the small to the top of the 
range hotel), and in many cases international operations, which bring cultural 
differences and exposition to a whole range of different issues, much more 
information (also in terms of the quality of the information) could be gained 
from their opinion. Most of the hotel groups have their shares in stock markets 
in many places of the globe, which again gives them another dimension and 
concept of their business. If the researcher had -approached the managers of 
the traditional small privately owned hotels much of the information required 
for the research would not be available. The top hotel groups are also leaders 
in management innovation. 
An attempt to interview at least two executives in each individual organization 
was made, but in many cases with no success. Given that in a serious crisis 
(as mentioned above) decision-making would be done at the highest level, 
those executives holding key positions were approached. That is, the top 
executives (Managing Director, Chief Executive Officer, President, and Vice- 
President), as well as the Marketing Director, since marketing (specially 
communication and Public Relations) is an integral part of any crisis 
management exercise. However, in some cases the researcher was advised 
that the person responsible for crisis management, or similar function, had a 
different profile, like for example the Security Officer, or the Financial Director. 
This fact reinforces the findings of Mitroff et al (1988b), where they found that 
crisis management falls under a diverse set of responsibilities. This fact might 
also explain the difficulty in finding a clear or coherent definition of "crisis" by 
hotel executives. They all regard and define "crisis" from their own perspective 
and past experience. More details about the profile of interviewees and their 
organizations can be seen later in this section. This matter is also further 
discussed in Chapter 7. 
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In this present research, job level was operationalized as a continuous 
variable with three levels. First, the top executive of the organization (CEO, 
Managing Director, President, Vice-President, etc. ), secondly, the top 
marketing executive of the organization (Marketing Director, Marketing 
President, Director of Marketing and Sales, etc. ), and finally, what the 
researcher has generalized as "operations" (this includes the positions that 
are more related to the operation of the business and less with the strategic 
side of the organization (e. g., Human Resource Director, Finance Director, 
and so forth). 
6.6.1 - Approaching Hotel Group Executives 
Although at least two executives were approached in each organization, some 
organizations, due to their internal policies, did not participate in this research. 
However, there were cases where more than two executives in an 
organization were interviewed. 
A letter was sent to all 50 hotel groups explaining the research objectives and 
emphasizing that a telephone contact to the executive concerned would be 
made a week later to find a suitable date for the interview. Attached to this 
letter were a presentation letter from the co-supervisor, Dr. David Gilbert, and 
a brief description of what crisis management is. The decision to include the 
latter, was taken after the pilot results and individual contact with the industry 
revealed that crisis management is still a not well known subject, let alone 
practiced in the hotel industry. 
A telephone contact with each targeted executive was made and an interview 
time and date was arranged with those that agreed to collaborate with the 
research. It has to be emphasized here that even though all the executives 
made a great effort to meet the researcher in person, in many cases, due to 
the nature of their responsibility, schedule, and so forth, a face-to-face meeting 
proved impossible. In those cases, the research material (questionnaires and 
the crisis situations, with appropriate instructions on how to proceed, specially 
the sequencing for answering the questions) was mailed and upon receiving 
that material some of those subjects were interviewed by telephone. However, 
not all of the executives were available for a telephone interview. 
The researcher estimated, after the first contact, that the data collection time 
would take place between February and April 1995. For many different 
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reasons some executives had to postpone the meeting and therefore the data 
gathering period was extended until August 1995. 
Although some organizations did not participate at all in the research, others, 
in contrast, not only were very helpful (suggesting other executives within their 
organizations to be interviewed, for instance), but also in one case, an 
organization in fact offered their business (all their hotels worldwide) to be 
studied and was even willing to finance some aspects of the study. Overall, 
the response was very positive and the executives were very collaborative. 
This fact was reflected in the quality of the data gathered. Only in two 
instances, with posted questionnaires, the respondents failed to answer the 
"Crisis Situations" questionnaires. Having said that, the quality of the data was 
constrained by the "normal" limitations of the methods used. That is, in the 
case of the questionnaires, without open-ended questions the questionnaires 
lost flexibility and consequently lost the wealth of information. Similarly, with 
the semi-structured interviews, while it provided the researcher and 
interviewees the guidelines for the conversation and minimum diversion, and 
also kept the duration of the interview as short as possible, it also in some 
instances affected the amount of obtained information. Having said that, 
overall, the quality of the data obtained was very good and satisfied the 
research objectives. 
6.6.2 - Response Rate 
The response rate was surprisingly high for this kind of research: 
- Of the 50 hotel groups approached, 33 hotel groups participated in the 
research: 66%. 
- 30 interviews were conducted. In the cases where interviews were 
conducted, questionnaires were also answered. 
- 24 questionnaires were received 
by post (in the cases where interviews 
proved impossible). 
-A total of 54 questionnaires completed. 
- Of the post response, only two (2) crisis situation questionnaires were not 
answered. 
- An average of 1.63 executives 
(for each of the 33 hotel groups) participated 
in the research. 
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6.6.3 - Sample Profile - Executives by Field 
The figures below represent the number and percentage of respondents by 
their title and position within their organization. Of the 54 respondents, 18 
were classified under "Managing Directors and Chief Executive Officers", 21 
held a "Marketing" position in their organizations, and 15 were classified 
under the "Operations" category. 
Figure 6.5 - Respondents by Field 
1-m. d. + ceo = Managing Directors and Chief Executive Officers 
2- mktg = Marketing Executives 
3- operations = Operations 
Figure 6.6 - Respondents by Field - Percentage 
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6.6.4 - Sample Profile - Hotel Groups 
One explanation for the high response rate obtained in this study can be 
attributed to the confidentiality offered by the researcher to respondents. It was 
evident that crisis management is a matter of "secrecy" and most 
organizations were concerned as to the use of the information and asked for 
assurance. As mentioned before in this chapter, the researcher offered 
respondents to return the tapes or transcripts as soon as the research is 
completed. Any direct information that could lead to the identification of any 
particular organization is avoided here. Therefore, for these reasons, the 
researcher rounded some figures, and averaged others to present it here. 
Nevertheless, it gives a clear and good account of the hotel groups under 
investigation. The intention here is not to give a full and descriptive account of 
the organizations under investigation, but to illustrate the contrasting nature of 
their structures. Moreover, and as mentioned previously, their structure plays a 
relatively minor part as to whether they are "crisis prepared" or not. What is 
decisive and does determine their "preparedness" is their culture. For that, a 
more complete and thorough account of both the respondents and their 
organizations' profiles is given in Chapter 7. 
Having said that, below are some examples of the contrasting structures of 
hotel groups under investigation in terms of size (number of hotels in the UK 
and abroad), number of employees, annual revenue, and the age of the 
company. 
6.6.4.1 - Size of Companies 
Number of hotels in the UK - Maximum: over 340 
Number of hotels in the UK - Minimum: 4 
Number of hotels outside the UK - Maximum: over 600 
Number of hotels outside the UK - Minimum: 0 
6.6.4.2 - Human Resources (both in the UK and abroad) 
Number of Employees - Maximum: over 40,000 
Number of Employees - Minimum: over 300 
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6.6.4.3 - Revenue (Group Revenue, includes revenue from hotels outside the 
UK) 
Annual Sales - Maximum: over £2 billion 
Annual Sales - Minimum: over £5 million 
6.6.4.4 - Age of Companies: 
Oldest: over 250 years ("in the business") 
Youngest: over 5 years old 
6.6.5 -The Interview and Questionnaire Application 
Not all interviews took place in the working place of the executives. In most 
cases the researcher visited the executives in their normal working hours and 
in their usual working place. However, given the schedule and time 
availability of these top executives, in some instances the researcher met the 
interviewees in a totally different setting. On two occasions the interviews took 
place during an arranged breakfast, and in three other occasions in the lobby 
of a hotel away from their head offices. These different occasions provided the 
researcher with interesting findings. The researcher expected that those 
interviewed outside their working environment would behave differently, in 
relation to their approachability and involvement in the interview, to those 
interviewed in their normal working environment. Some reasons for this 
assumption were that they might be free of constant telephone calls, the 
secretary coming through the doors, and the usual line of people waiting to 
see the executives outside their door, among other duties of top executives. 
There seemed to be no correlation (at least in this study) between executives' 
involvement and interest in the interview and the setting where the interviews 
took place. Most executives took great interest in the subject, asked questions, 
and discussed in detail the open-ended questions. One reason for that might 
be that crisis management was a new subject for most of the executives and 
there was a visible interest in the subject in general and in the possible 
applicability of crisis management to their own operations. 
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6.6.6 - The Sequencing of the Data Gathering Instruments 
The researcher was aware of the importance of not creating biases in any step 
of the research. As the research required more than one instrument, and since 
some instruments reflected and provided some information about crisis 
management, the sequencing of the application of those instruments became 
an important issue. It is important to note that right from the first approach to 
hotel organizations it was clear that not all executives (and for that matter hotel 
organizations) were aware of the subject in question. The idea of providing 
the executives with a formal definition of crisis management before the 
interviews was raised and tested in the pilot study. This idea was rejected for 
two main reasons: first, it was identified that if a definition was presented it 
would inevitably lead to a past experience of the executive of some type of 
crisis and therefore create biases. The researcher was not interested directly 
in crisis typology. The idea was not to talk about any kind of crisis (specified or 
experienced), instead it was to concentrate on the cultural aspects of the 
organizations in relation to crisis and crisis management. Second, if a 
definition was provided it would not only limit the respondents' ability to 
express their views, but it would also allow no room for the respondents to 
define "crisis". The definition of "crisis" is an important part of this research. 
One of the most important findings of the whole study is the perception of what 
a "crisis" is, . and 
how "crisis" is defined by top hotel executives. This issue also 
goes back to the level of understanding of respondents discussed in Chapter 
2 and earlier in this chapter. As crisis management falls under different 
responsibilities, depending on the nature of the operation or business 
objectives, and since different executives (holding different positions and 
responsibilities) would be interviewed, the issue of providing a definition was 
rejected. 
Having said that, the sequencing of the research instruments became very 
important. Since the objective of the first stage was to identify the 
"favourability" of organizational culture to crisis management, it was important 
to have executives without preconceived ideas of crisis and crisis 
management to answer the first and second questionnaires. This would allow 
the respondents to answer the statements (rationalizations) without relating 
them to the issue of crisis (or a specific definition of crisis, or crisis typology). 
After the questionnaires were answered, the researcher presented the 
respondents with the crisis situations and only then the interview took place. 
The researcher believes that this order was the most logical one. If the crisis 
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situations and/or interview took place prior to the questionnaires, the 
executives' responses to the questionnaires would be greatly influenced by 
the crisis situations (types of crisis and stakeholder relationship) and/or by the 
knowledge and thinking behind the questions and answers of the interview. 
The crisis situations were presented in a different sequence to see whether 
there would be any implications in the results. Half of the respondents were 
given crisis situation 1 ("Guilty") first and then crisis situation 2 ("Victim"). The 
reverse was done with the other half of the respondents. There was no 
perceived difference or evidence to suggest that this has influenced their 
answering pattern. 
6.7 - Data Analysis 
6.7.1 - Factor Analysis 
Having collected the data, the data was carefully inputted into the SPSS 
programme and an accuracy check was carried out both at the time of the 
input as well as after all data was inputted. Some corrections eventually had 
to be made as double checks proved it was necessary. After the amendments, 
the data was again checked to make sure that it had been inputted into the 
programme according to respondents' answers. 
Prior to the factor analysis, the researcher put the data in a spreadsheet (Excel 
Version 3.0) with the intention of exploring it without a preconceived idea of 
the likely outcome. Different approaches to data was applied in the 
spreadsheet. The results provided no satisfactory answer (as expected with a 
spreadsheet) to the need of the study. However, it gave the researcher some 
insights as to the next logical step in addressing the data. It was clear, then, 
that a more powerful, comprehensive and sophisticated method would be 
necessary. The data was inputted into SPSS (Version 6.0) to be explored. As 
a first step, a frequency analysis was done on the data of the first and second 
questionnaires. The objective of using frequency analysis was purely to see 
whether there were any significant patterns in the data so that the researcher 
could identify, from the information obtained, other relevant statistical methods 
to apply. The frequency of the data revealed an interesting pattern of 
response, however, it was still not enough to explain whether an organization 
had a culture favourable or not to crisis management, and a more 
sophisticated method was needed. Cross tabulation was also applied but 
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resulted only in the relationship between respondents and their choices. No 
real explanation for what was needed at this stage was found. It became clear 
that data summarization would be the ideal application because it would 
provide a more clear and understandable pattern of the issues being 
investigated. Factor analysis was chosen to accomplish this part and was a 
very successful approach to the data. Factor analysis, its relevance, 
implications, and applicability to the research objectives is developed further 
in this section. 
Factor analysis is a branch of multivariate analysis that is concerned with the 
internal relationships of a set of variables. It was initially developed by 
psychologists and was primarily concerned with hypotheses about the 
organization of mental ability suggested by the examination of correlation or 
covariance matrices for sets of cognitive test variates (Lawley and Maxwell, 
1971). 
The central aim of factor analysis is the "orderly simplification" of a number of 
interrelated measures. Factor analysis seeks to do precisely what humans 
have been engaged in throughout history, that is to make order out of the 
apparent chaos of the environment (Child, 1990). If one was unable to 
organize experiences in such a complex environment, the assimilation and 
communication of knowledge would be a most arduous, if not impossible, 
task. The work of developmental psychologists in the formation of concepts 
has adequately described this process. At an early stage of development, 
children gradually learn the characteristics which differentiate one object from 
another by observing and manipulating them in a variety of situations. This 
cataloguing of similarities and differences has much in common with factor 
analysis. 
Traditionally, factor analysis has been used to explore the possible underlying 
structure in a set of interrelated variables without imposing any preconceived 
structure on the outcome. At its crudest, no thought might be given to the 
selection of variables; rather, the data, because they happen to be reasonably 
numerous as with questionnaires or attitude scale items, are submitted for 
analysis in a "let's see what happens" spirit. However, it is not common to 
encounter social scientists research that started in such a manner. In most 
cases, the analysis is preceded by a "hunch" as to the factors which might 
emerge. In having an idea and selecting test materials in the first place it must 
have occurred to the researcher that the tests have something in common or 
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that some are attempting to detect markedly different things. This systematic 
use of the technique in exploring and classifying data is much more prevalent. 
6.7.1.1 - Defining Factor Analysis 
Factor analysis is a generic name given to a class of multivariate statistical 
methods whose primary purpose is data reduction and summarization. In a 
more general sense, it addresses the problem of analyzing the 
interrelationships among a large number of variables (e. g., test scores, test 
items, questionnaire responses) and then explaining these variables in terms 
of their common underlying dimensions (factors). 
Factor analysis (unlike multiple regression, discriminant analysis, or canonical 
correlation, in which one or more variables is explicitly considered the 
criterion, or dependent variable, and all others the predictor, or independent 
variables) is an interdependence technique in which all variables are 
simultaneously considered. In a sense, each of the observed (original) 
variables is considered as a dependent variable that is a function of some 
underlying, latent, and hypothetical set of factors (dimensions). Conversely, 
one can look at each factor as a dependent variable that is a function of the 
originally observed variables (Hair et at, 1987). 
Factor analysis assumes that the observed variables are linear combinations 
of some underlying (unobservable) factors. Some of these factors are 
assumed to be unique to each variable. Therefore, factor analysis starts with a 
set of observations obtained from a given sample by means of such a priori 
measures. Factor analysis then analyzes this set of observations from their 
intercorrelations to determine whether the variations represented can be 
accounted for adequately by a number of basic categories smaller than that 
with which the investigation was started (Kim, 1978b). Thus, data obtained 
with a large number of a priori measures may be explained in terms of a 
smaller number of reference variables (Fruchter, 1954). 
The general purpose of factor analytic technique, then, is to find a way of 
condensing (summarizing) the information contained in a number of original 
variables into a smaller set of new composite dimensions (factors) with a 
minimum loss of information; that is, to search for and define the fundamental 
constructs or dimensions assumed to underlie the original variables (Hair, 
1987). In other words, when a group of variables has, for some reason, a great 
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deal in common a factor may be said to exist. These related variables are 
discovered using the technique of correlation. Child (1990) gives an example 
of how this correlation works: if one took a group of people and correlated the 
lengths of their arms, legs and bodies one would probably find a marked 
relationship between all three measures. Thus, tall men would tend to have 
long arms and long legs and vice versa for short men. This interconnection 
constitutes a factor -a factor of linear size. If, however, eye colour or left- 
handedness had been correlated along with the other variables, they would 
have been unlikely to have shown any relationship with the other three 
variables and consequently would not appear in the same factor of linear size. 
Therefore, and as defined by Norusis (1993, pp. 47), factor analysis is "a 
statistical technique used to identify a relatively small number' of factors that 
can be used to represent relationships among sets of many interrelated 
variables. " Factor analysis helps to identify these underlying, not-directly- 
observable constructs. It can then be said that the basic assumption of factor 
analysis is that underlying dimensions, or factors, can be used to explain 
complex phenomena. Observed correlations between variables result from 
their sharing these factors. The goal of factor analysis is to identify the not- 
directly-observable factors based on a set of observable variables. 
6.7.1.2 - Characteristics of a Successful Factor Analysis 
One of the objectives of factor analysis is to represent relationships among 
sets of variables parsimoniously. That is, one would like to explain the 
observed correlations using as few factors as possible. If many factors are 
needed, little simplification or summarization occurs. Factors should also be 
meaningful. A good factor solution is both simple and interpretable. When 
factors can be interpreted, new insights are possible. 
Broadly, according to Hair Xt (1987), factor analysis technique can perform 
four functions: 
1- Identify a set of dimensions that are latent (not easily observed) in a large 
set of variables; this is also referred to as R factor analysis. 
2- Devise a method of combining or condensing large number of people into 
distinctly different groups within a larger population; this is also referred to as 
0 factor analysis. 
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3- Identify appropriate variables for subsequent regression, correlation or 
discriminant analysis from a much larger set of variables. 
4- Create an entirely new set of a smaller number of variables to partially or 
completely replace the original set of variables for inclusion in subsequent 
regression, correlation or discriminant analysis. 
Approaches 1 and 2 above take the identification of the underlying 
dimensions or factors as ends in themselves; the estimates of factor loadings 
are all that is required for the analysis. Method 3 also relies on the factor 
loadings but uses them as a basis for identifying variables for subsequent 
analysis with other techniques. Method 4 requires that estimates of the factors 
themselves (factor scores) be obtained; then the factor scores are used as 
independent variables in a regression, discriminant or correlation analysis. 
For the purpose of this research, approach 1 above was adopted to identify 
the dimensions within a large number of variables related to crisis and crisis 
management. 
6.7.1.3 - Why Factor Analysis 
As mentioned previously in this chapter, more than one research technique 
was required to achieve the objectives of this research. The first part of the 
research is concerned with organizational culture in relation to crisis 
management. Organizational culture, as defined in Chapter 3, is a set of less 
observable, largely unconscious factors that exert a decisive effect on the 
behaviour of all organizations. The primary aim of this first stage is to explore 
the effects of organizational culture on crisis management, that is, to establish 
the crisis preparedness (or the favourability of organizational culture to crisis 
management) of different organizations. The cultural element of "favourability" 
to crisis management measured here are the "rationalizations" managers 
make in relation to crisis and crisis management. Rationalizations are the 
basic assumptions developed and held by members of an organization about 
themselves, their organizations, and their environment. By investigating the 
expressed rationalizations managers and executives make about crisis and 
crisis management, the level of organization readiness to crises can be 
identified and a framework of "crisis-prepared" and "crisis not prepared" 
organizations can be developed. It is evident that the culture of an 
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organization is more than a set of rationalizations. In order to obtain a 
complete picture, a great number of variables should be carefully studied, 
such as myths and stories developed in the company, the kinds of ceremonies 
or ritualized events individuals subscribe to, the anecdotes and jokes passed 
around in the organization, the political games played, the motivations behind 
reward and punishment, and so forth. Still, and as argued by Chanlat and 
Bedart (1990) and Moscovici (1984) (in Pauchant and Mitroff, 1992), studying 
the rationalizations expressed by managers, and their mindset, captures a 
significant part of corporate culture. 
For that, an index of rationalizations - with 30 variables - that executives make 
in relation to crisis and crisis management were used in the form of a 
questionnaire for each executive to subscribe to. The rationalizations are 
measured in an ordinal scale of 1 to 7, as described earlier in this chapter. 
Given that the number of rationalizations (variables) were considerable and 
also that an underlying dimension of those variables was desirable (so that 
individual organizations could be assessed through a new perspective) factor 
analysis was chosen. 
The sum of the scores of the index of rationalizations (using the extracted 
factors) comprises the favourability of the culture of a particular organization to 
crisis management, that is, whether the culture of an organization makes it 
"prepared" or "not prepared" for crisis. 
6.7.1.4 - Applicability 
This section intends to explore the suitability of the questionnaire data for 
factor analysis and the appropriateness of the method to the research 
purpose. 
6.7.1.4.1 - Interdependence Technique 
As factor analysis is an interdependence technique it allows all variables to be 
considered simultaneously. Thus, each of the observed (original) variables is 
considered as a dependent variable that is a function of some underlying, 
latent, and hypothetical set of factors (dimensions). The fact that factor 
analysis is an interdependence technique is very relevant to this study since 
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all variables (rationalizations) are equally important and reflect the "mindset" 
of the organization under investigation. 
6.7.1.4.2 - Design Measurement 
The designed questionnaire is of metric measurement - ordinal scales. 
6.7.1.4.3 - Sample Size 
Sample size is of key importance in the application of factor analysis since it is 
directly related to the reliability of the results (factors). From the literature on 
factor analysis, specially Child (1990) and Hair et al (1987), it is not 
uncommon to fact analyze a sample smaller than 100, provided certain 
precautions are taken. The factor loading is an important and directly related 
issue regarding the number of cases one wants to analyze. Most analysts use 
a rule of thumb: factor loading of ± 0.30. The literature indicates that any 
loading above ± 0.30 is significant or salient. This criteria is said to be quite a 
rigorous one. However, with a sample smaller than 100, factor loading has to 
be at least ± 0.30. For this research, a loading of 0.50 was adopted. The 
larger the absolute size of the factor loading, the more significant the loading 
is in interpreting the factor matrix. Thus, a loading of 0.50 ensures a more 
significant level. 
6.7.1.4.4 - Calculation of the Correlation Matrix 
Factor analysis offers the analyst two alternatives in calculating the correlation 
matrix: the analyst can either examine the correlations between the variables 
or the correlations between the respondents. Given the objective of the 
present research, the best alternative is to examine the correlations between 
variables. Hair Xl (1987) argue that this is the most common type of factor 
analysis. Factor analysis may also be applied for a correlation matrix of the 
individual respondents. However, this approach is not utilized very frequently 
because of computational difficulties. Instead, most analysts utilize some type 
of cluster analysis or hierarchical grouping technique to group individual 
respondents. 
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6.7.1.4.5 - Extraction/Factor Model 
Numerous variations of the general factor model are available. The most 
frequently employed factor analytic approaches are component analysis (or 
principal component analysis) and common factor analysis (or principal-axis 
factoring). In general, the component model is used when the objective is to 
summarize most of the original information (variance) in a minimum number of 
factors for prediction purposes. In contrast, common factor analysis is used 
primarily to identify underlying factors or dimensions not easily recognized. 
The selection of the appropriate model requires an understanding of the types 
of variance. Child (1990) argues that many of the fundamental ideas in factor 
analysis derive from the concept of variance. Variance is a 'statistical term 
which provides an index of the dispersion of scores and is defined as the 
square of the standard deviation (Child, 1990; Kim, 1978a). For the purpose of 
factor analysis, total variance consists of three kinds: (1) common, (2) specific 
(or unique), and (3) error. Common variance is defined as that variance in a 
variable that is shared with all other variables in the analysis. Specific 
variance is that variance associated with only a specific variable. Error 
variance is that due to unreliability in the data-gathering process or a random 
component in the measured phenomenon. When using component analysis, 
the total variance is considered and hybrid factors are derived that contain 
small proportions of unique and in some instances error variance, but not 
enough in the first few factors to distort the overall factor structure. Specifically, 
with component analysis, unities are inserted in the diagonal of the correlation 
matrix. Conversely, with common factor analysis, communalities are inserted 
in the diagonal, and the factors are derived based only on the common 
variance. From a variance point of view, there is a big difference between 
inserting unity in the diagonal and using communality estimates. With unity in 
the diagonal, the full variance is brought into the factor matrix. Common factor 
analysis substitutes communality estimates in the diagonal, and the resulting 
factor solution is based only on common variance (Hair gam, 1987; Norusis, 
1993; Harman, 1967). 
That is, principal-axis factoring (or common factor analysis) proceeds. much 
the same as principal component analysis, except that the diagonals of the 
correlation matrix are replaced by estimates of the communalities. At the first 
step, squared multiple correlation coefficients can be used as initial estimates 
of the communalities. Based on these, the requisite number of factors is 
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extracted. The communalities are reestimated from the factor loadings, and 
factors are again extracted with new communality estimates replacing the old. 
This continues until negligible change occurs in the communality estimates 
(Norusis, 1993; HaireLpl, 1987; Kim, 1978b). 
Given that the primary objective of this part of the research is to identify the 
latent dimensions or constructs represented in the original variables, and that 
the researcher has little knowledge about the amount of unique or error 
variance and therefore wishes to eliminate this variance, the appropriate 
model for the present research is the common factor model. 
Other variations of the general factor model available are the Maximum 
Likelihood and Alpha Factoring. Maximum likelihood method produces 
parameter estimates that are-the most likely to have produced the observed 
correlation matrix if the sample is from a multivariate normal distribution 
(Norusis, 1993; Kim, 1978b). The alpha factoring method considers the 
variables in a particular analysis to be a sample from the universe of potential 
variables (in contrast with maximum likelihood which assumes that the 
variables one considers constitute the universe, and that the only sampling 
involved is the sampling of individuals - Kim, 1978b). The alpha factoring 
method maximizes the alpha reliability of the factors. This differs from the 
previous described methods, which consider the cases to be a sample from 
some population and the variables to be fixed. With alpha factor extraction, the 
eigenvalues can no longer be obtained as the sum of the squared factor 
loadings, and the communalities for each variable are not the sum of the 
squared loadings on the individual factors. The alpha factoring method and 
the maximum likelihood method do not fulfill the requirements of the present 
research. The subject of factor models is further discussed in the "Findings" 
chapter (Chapter 7). 
6.7.1.4.6 - The Rotation of Factors 
An important concept in factor analysis is the rotation of factors. Although the 
factor matrix obtained in the extraction phase indicates the relationship 
between the factors and the individual variables, it is usually difficult to identify 
meaningful factors based on this matrix. Often the variables and factors do not 
appear correlated in any interpretable pattern. Most factors are correlated with 
many variables. The initial unrotated factor matrix is computed to assist in 
obtaining a preliminary indication of the number of factors to extract (Hair, 
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1987). Hair X1(1987) argue further that in computing the unrotated factor 
matrix, the analyst is simply interested in the best linear combination of 
variables - best in the sense that the particular combination of original 
variables would account for more of the variance in the data as a whole than 
any other linear combination of variables. Therefore, the first factor may be 
viewed as the single best summary of linear relationships exhibited in the 
data. The second factor is defined as the second best linear combination of 
the variables subject to the constraint that it is orthogonal to the first factor. To 
be orthogonal to the first factor, the second factor must be derived from the 
proportion of the variance remaining after the first factor has been extracted. 
Thus, the second factor may be defined as the linear combination of variables 
that accounts for the most residual variance after the effect of the first factor is 
removed from the data. Subsequent factors are defined similarly until all the 
variance in the data is exhausted (Hair et al, 1987; Kim, 1978a; Norusis, 
1993). Indeed, Child (1990, pp. 27) argues that 
"the techniques for extracting the factors generally endeavour to take as 
much common variance as possible in the first factor. Subsequent factors 
are, in turn, intended to account for the maximum amount of the remaining 
variance until, hopefully, 'no common variance remains. " 
Although the unrotated factor solutions may achieve the objective of data 
reduction (it may also fulfill desirable mathematical requirements), unrotated 
factor solutions may not provide information that offers the most adequate 
interpretation of the variables under investigation. Since one of the goals of 
factor analysis is to identify factors that are substantively meaningful (in the 
sense that they summarize sets of closely related variables), the rotation 
phase of factor analysis attempts to transform the initial matrix into one that is 
easier to interpret (Norusis, 1993; Kim, 1978b). Rotation of factors also 
improves the interpretation by reducing some of the ambiguities that often 
accompany initial unrotated factor solutions. While in the unrotated factor 
solutions each factor after the first factor (which tends to be a general factor 
with almost every variable loading significantly and accounts for the largest 
amount of variance) accounts for smaller portions of variance, when the factor 
matrix is rotated this trend is modified. The ultimate effect of rotating the factor 
matrix is to redistribute the variance from earlier factors to later ones to 
achieve a simpler, theoretically more meaningful, factor pattern. 
The term "rotation" in factor analysis means exactly what it implies. Two main 
options are available: orthogonal factors and oblique factors. In an orthogonal 
336 
G. Santana Ch. 6- Meüiodology 
solution, which is the simplest case, the factors are extracted in such a way 
that the factor axes are maintained at 90 degrees, meaning that each factor is 
independent of all other factors. Therefore, the correlation between factors is 
arbitrarily determined to be zero (Hair etal, 1987). An oblique factor solution is 
more complex than an orthogonal one. While in the orthogonal rotation the 
axes are maintained at 90 degrees, in the oblique rotation the axes are 
rotated and the 90 degree angle between the reference axes is not retained. 
However, an entirely satisfactory analytic procedure has not been devised for 
oblique solutions. They are still the subject of considerable experimentation 
and controversy. As the term oblique implies, the factor solution is computed 
so that the extracted factors are correlated. Oblique solutions assume that the 
original variables or characteristics are correlated to some extent; therefore, 
the underlying factors must be similarly correlated (Hairgt al, 1987). 
Given that the objective of the researcher is to reduce the number of original 
variables to a smaller and more significant set of dimensions (factors), and 
that the oblique solution is still a subject of controversy and experimentation, 
the orthogonal solution has been chosen. Furthermore, Hair et al (1987) 
argue that although there are several approaches available for performing 
either orthogonal or oblique rotation, only a limited number of oblique 
rotational procedures are available and often the analyst is forced to accept 
the one that is accessible. In addition, to date, none of the oblique solutions 
have been demonstrated to be analytically superior. It is, however, worth 
mentioning that both factor rotation models have been tested and analyzed. 
Always using a factor loading of 0.50, the results between the different models 
revealed some significant differences in the first rotated factor but the 
subsequent factors were similar, although in different order, in both rotational 
models. More details on oblique rotation can be found in Appendix 4. 
Orthogonal rotations are discussed in the following section. 
The purpose of rotation is to achieve a simple structure. Norusis (1993), 
explains "simple structure" as the desirability to have each factor having non- 
zero loadings for only some of the variables. This will greatly facilitate the 
interpretation of factors. In addition, it is also desirable that each variable have 
non-zero loadings for only a few factors, preferably one. This permits the 
factors to be differentiated from each other. If several factors have high 
loadings on the same variables, it is difficult to ascertain how the factors differ. 
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The objective of all methods of rotation, in practice, is to simplify the rows 
and/or columns of the factor matrix to facilitate interpretation. "Simplifying the 
rows" means making as many values in each row as close to zero as possible. 
"Simplifying the columns" means making as many values in each column as 
close to zero as possible. 
6.7.1.4.7 - Orthogonal Rotation Methods 
A variety of algorithms is used for orthogonal rotation to a simple structure. 
Three major orthogonal rotation approaches have been developed. They are 
Quartimax, Varimax, and Equimax. 
The most commonly used method is the varimax method, which attempts to 
minimize the number of variables that have high loadings on a factor. This 
should enhance the interpretability of the factors (Norusis, 1993, pp. 65). 
The ultimate goal of quartimax rotation is to simplify the rows of a factor matrix. 
That is, it focuses on rotating the initial factor so that a variable loads high on 
one factor and as low as possible on all other factors. In contrast to quartimax, 
the varimax criterion centres on simplifying the columns of the factor matrix. It 
is important to notice that in quartimax approaches many variables can load 
high or near high on the same factor because the technique centres on 
simplifying the rows. In other words, the quartimax method emphasizes simple 
interpretation of variables, since the solution minimizes the number of factors 
needed to explain a variable. A quartimax rotation often results in a general 
factor with high-to-moderate loadings on most variables. This is one of the 
main shortcomings of the quartimax method. With the varimax rotational 
approach, the maximum possible simplification is reached if there are only 1's 
and 0's in a single column (Norusis, 1993; HairgLW, 1987; Kim, 1978b). 
The equimax approach is a compromise between the quartimax method 
(which simplifies variables) and varimax method (which simplifies the factors). 
Rather than concentrating either on simplification of rows (variables) or on 
simplification of the columns (factors), it tries to accomplish some of each. 
The quartimax method has not proved very successful in producing simpler 
structure. Its difficulty is that it tends to produce a general factor in the 
rotations. Haire -al 
(1987) argue further that 
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"regardless of one's concept of 'simpler structure, inevitably it involves 
dealing with clusters of variables; a method that tends to create a large 
general factor (i. e., quartimax) is not in line with the goals of rotation. " 
Varimax criterion, in contrast to quartimax, centres on simplifying the columns 
of the factor matrix. In other words, the varimax method maximizes the sum of 
variances of required loadings of the factor matrix. With the varimax rotation 
approach, there tend to be some high loadings (i. e., close to -1 or +1) and 
some loadings near 0 (zero) in each column of the matrix. The logic is that 
interpretation is easiest when the variable-factor correlations are either close 
to +1 or- 1, thus indicating a clear association between the variable and the 
factor, or close to 0, indicating a clear lack of association. This indicates the 
fundamental aspect of a simple structure (Hairl, 1987). 
The varimax method has proved very successful as an analytic approach to 
obtaining an orthogonal rotation of factors. Even in those cases where the 
results do not meet the analyst's concept of a simple structure, the solution is 
close enough to reduce greatly the labour of finding a satisfactory rotation 
(Child, 1990; Norusis, 1993; Hair et al, 1987). 
Considering the above, for the present research orthogonal solution and 
varimax rotation have been chosen since they offer the best fit for the 
accomplishment of the research objectives. Chapter 7 provides a discussion 
on all tried rotations for this research. Rotation results on the specific rotations 
mentioned above can be found in Appendix 7 (Varimax), Appendix 12 
(Quartimax), and in Appendix 13 (Equimax). 
As the objective to use factor analysis is to identify logical combinations of 
variables, the use of factor analysis stops at this stage, leaving the researcher 
to interpret the factors. If however, the objective was to identify appropriate 
variables for subsequent application to other statistical techniques, the 
researcher would carry on examining the factor matrix and selecting the 
variables with highest loading as a surrogate representative for a particular 
factor dimension. 
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6.7.1.4.8 - Criteria for the Number of Factors to be Extracted 
When a large number of variables is factored, the analysis will extract the 
largest and best combinations of variables first, and then proceed to smaller, 
less understandable combinations. The decision as to when to stop factoring 
(that is, how many factors to extract) generally begins with some 
predetermined criterion, such as the a priori or the latent root criterion (also 
referred to as the eigenvalue), to arrive at a specific number of factors to 
extract. An exact quantitative basis for deciding the number of factors to extract 
has not been developed (Hair stall, 1987). 
After the initial solution has been derived, the analyst usually makes several 
additional trial rotations, and on the basis of information contained in the 
results of these several trial -analyses, the factor matrices will be examined 
and the best representation of the data will be used to assist in determining 
the number of factors to extract. 
The eigenvalue criterion is the most commonly used technique. However, 
although the rule is very simple to apply, it does differ depending on whether 
component analysis or common factor analysis has been chosen as the basic 
model. It is important to recall that in component analysis 1's are inserted in 
the diagonal of the correlation matrix and the entire variance is considered in 
the analysis. In component analysis only the factors having eigenvalues 
(latent roots) greater than 1 are considered significant; all factors with 
eigenvalues less than 1 are considered insignificant and disregarded (Hair gt 
al, 1987; Kim, 1978b). 
Eigenvalue is defined by Kim (1 978a, pp. 76) as 
"a mathematical property of a matrix; used in relation to the decomposition 
of a covariance matrix, both as a criterion of determining the number of 
factors to be extracted and a measure of variance accounted for by a given 
dimension. " 
That is, eigenvalue represents the amount of variance accounted for by a 
factor. 
When the common factor model is selected, the eigenvalue 1 criterion should 
be adjusted slightly downwards. With the common factor model, the 
eigenvalue cutoff level should be lower and approximate either the estimate 
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for a common variance of the set of variables or the average of the 
communality estimates for all variables. 
The rationale for the eigenvalue criterion is that any individual factor should 
account for at least the variance of a single variable if it is to be retained for 
interpretation. The eigenvalue approach is probably most reliable when the 
number of variables is between 20 and 50 (in the case of the present 
research, 30 variables). In instances where the number of variables is less 
than 20, there is somewhat of a tendency for this method to extract a 
conservative number of factors. When more than 50 variables are involved, 
however, it is not uncommon for too many factors to be extracted. 
The other method is the a priori criterion. The a priori is a simple yet 
reasonable criterion under certain circumstances. It is most applied when the 
analyst already knows the number of factors to extract before undertaking the 
factor analysis. The analyst simply instructs the computer to stop the analysis 
when the desired number of factors has been extracted. This approach is 
useful when the analyst is testing a theory or hypothesis about the number of 
factors to be extracted. It also can be justified in instances where the analyst is 
attempting to replicate another researcher's work and extract exactly the same 
number of factors that was previously found. 
As observed before in this chapter, component analysis factor model has the 
drawback of containing 'hybrid' factors (factors containing both common and 
unique variance), specially the later factors. That is, while all factors contain at 
least some unique variance, the proportion of unique variance in later factors 
is substantially higher than in earlier factors. Indeed, Child (1990, pp. 38) 
argues that "some unique variance creeps into all factors and that the 
proportion in later factors to be extracted is so great as to swamp the common 
variance". Therefore, it is necessary to identify the optimum number of factors 
which can be taken out before the intrusion of non-common variance (unique 
variance) becomes serious (i. e., before the amount of unique variance begins 
to dominate the common variance structure). The scree test is a method 
designed to perform this function. The scree test is derived by plotting the 
latent roots (eigenvalues) against the number of factors in their order of 
extraction, and the shape of the resulting curve is used to evaluate the cutoff 
point. Starting at the highest eigenvalue (latent root) the plot is curved 
(usually) at first and then develops into a linear relationship (becomes an 
approximately horizontal line). The point at which the curve straightens out is 
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taken as the maximum number to be extracted (Child, 1990; Kim, 1978b). After 
that point, too great a proportion of unique variance would be included; thus 
these factors would not be acceptable. As a general rule, when using the 
scree test, it will result in at least one and sometimes two or more factors being 
considered as significant than will the latent root. criterion (Hair et p1,1987). 
Some studies indicated that this method is often superior to others where 
there are minor factors and the interest is in locating only major common 
factors (Kim, 1978b, pp. 45). However, Kaiser (1970, in Kim, 1978b) argues 
that this criterion is often very subjective because it is not uncommon to find 
more than one major break in the root-graph and there is no unambiguous 
rule to use. 
Having said all that, however, in practice, a single criterion is seldom used to 
determine how many factors to extract. Instead, usually a criterion such as the 
eigenvalue criterion is applied as a guideline for the first rotation. Then 
several additional trial rotations are undertaken, and by considering the initial 
criterion and comparing the factor interpretations for several different trial 
rotations, the number of factors to be extracted can be selected based upon 
the initial criterion and the factor structure that best represents the underlying 
relationship of the variables. In short, the ability to assign some meaning to the 
factors, or to interpret the nature of the variables, becomes an extremely 
important consideration in determining the number of factors to extract (Hair el 
_aj, 
1987). Considering that the a priori criterion does not apply to the present 
research, that the factor model chosen for the research is the common factor 
analysis (i. e., the latent root criterion is particularly suitable for component 
analysis), and that the scree test criterion is not without controversy and 
ambiguity, for the present research the cutoff point was determined by the 
level of interpretability of the factors (since the researcher was looking for 
meaningful dimensions). It is important to note that all methods mentioned 
here have been explored and are discussed in Chapter 7. 
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6.7.1.4.9 - Criteria for the Significance of Factor Loadings 
The process of factor interpretation requires decisions regarding which factor 
loadings are worth considering and which are not. Factor loadings is defined 
as 
"the correlation between the original variables and the factors, and the key 
to understanding the nature of a particular factor. Squared factor loadings 
indicate what percentage of the variance in an original variable is 
explained by a factor. " (Hair etpl, 1987, pp. 234). 
Below are 3 common criteria used to assist in that decision: 
1- The first criteria is not based on any mathematical proposition. It is in fact a 
rule of thumb that has been used frequently by factor analysts in which 
loadings having values of ± . 30 or greater are taken as significant. Loadings ± 
. 40 are considered more 
important, and if the loadings are ± . 50 or greater, 
they are considered very significant. Thus, the larger the absolute size of the 
factor loading, the more significant the loading is in interpreting the factor 
matrix. These guidelines are considered useful when the sample size is 50 or 
larger. This approach may appear too simplistic, yet compared with other 
criteria it is quite rigorous and acceptable. 
2-A factor loading represents the correlation between an original variable 
and its factor, as mentioned previously. In determining a significance level for 
interpretation of loadings, an approach could be used that is similar to that of 
interpreting correlation coefficients. Specifically, loadings of at least ± . 19 and 
± . 26 are recommended 
for the 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively, when the 
sample size is 100. When the sample size is over 200, ±. 14 and ± . 18 are 
recommended for the 5 and 1 percent levels of significance. Finally, when the 
sample size is at least 300, loadings of ± . 11 and ± . 15 are recommended for 
the 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. Since it is difficult to assess the 
amount of error involved in factor analytic studies, it is probably safer to adopt 
the 1 percent level as the criterion for significance. 
3-A disadvantage of methods 1 and 2 is that the number of variables being 
analyzed and the specific factor being examined are not considered. It has 
been explained previously that as the analyst moves from the first factor to 
later factors, the acceptable level for a loading to be judged significant should 
increase. The fact that unique variance and error variance begin to enter in 
later factors means that some upward adjustment in the level of significance 
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should be included. The number of variables being analyzed is also important 
in deciding which loadings are significant. As the number of variables being 
analyzed increases, the acceptable level for considering a loading significant 
decreases. Adjustment for the number of variables is particularly true as one 
moves from the first factor extracted to later factors (Hair gam, 1987; Child, 
1990). 
Considering the objectives of the research, that the sample size is 54, and that 
± . 50 
is a very rigorous and acceptable factor loading (. 50 is considered very 
significant), the first criteria above was adopted. For the results and 
comparison with other factor loadings also applied, refer to Chapter 7. 
6.7.1.4.10 - Reliability 
Reliability means the indispensable attribute of consistency (Oppenheim, 
1992; de Vaus, 1986). It refers to the consistency or stability of any 
experimental effect (Fife-Schaw, 1995). The internal reliability of the extracted 
factors, using Cronbach's alpha, was relatively high. For details refer to 
Chapter 7. 
6.7.1.4.11 - Interpreting the Factors 
Afterthe rotated factor loadings have been obtained, the next step is to try to 
identify the content and nature of the factors. That is, to try to interpret the 
factors in a way that gives a meaningful summary of the original data. In order 
to identify the factors, it is necessary to group the variables that have high 
loadings together for the same factor. Plots of the loadings are one way of 
determining the clusters of variables. Another convenient strategy is to sort the 
factor pattern matrix so that the variables with high loadings on the same 
factor appear together. Small factor loadings can be omitted from such a table. 
That is, if the analyst has as absolute value . 50, no factor loadings less than 
. 50 
in absolute value would be displayed (Child, 1990; Norusis, 1993). 
When a factor solution has been obtained in which all significant variables are 
loading on a factor, the analyst attempts to assign some meaning to the 
pattern of factor loadings. Variables with higher loadings are considered more 
important in this stage of factor interpretation. They greatly influence the name 
or label selected to represent a factor. Thus, the analyst will examine all the 
variables for a particular factor and, placing greater emphasis on those 
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variables with higher loadings, will attempt to assign a name or label to a 
factor that accurately reflects to the greatest extent possible what the several 
variables loadings on the factor represent. It is important to note that this label 
is not derived or assigned by the factor analysis computer programme, but 
rather is intuitively developed by the factor analyst based upon its 
appropriateness for representing the underlying dimensions of a particular 
factor. The final result will be a name or label that represents each of the 
derived factors as accurately as possible. 
In some instances, it is not possible to assign a name to each of the factors. 
When such a situation is encountered, the analyst may wish to use the label 
"undefined" to represent a particular factor or factors derived by that solution. 
In such cases, the analyst interprets only those factors that are meaningful and 
disregards undefined or less meaningful ones. It is important to note, however, 
that in describing the factor solution, the factor analyst indicates that these 
factors were derived but were undefinable, and only those factors 
representing meaningful relationships were interpreted (Hair, 1987). 
For the application of factor analysis the researcher used SPSS version 6.0. 
6.7.1.5 - Limitations of Factor Analysis 
The multivariate statistical technique of factor analysis has been presented 
here in broad conceptual terms. The literature is very homogeneous (as 
expected with statistical methods) concerning the application and use of factor 
analysis. Factor analysis helps the investigator make sense of large bodies of 
interrelated data. When it works well (as is the case in this research), it points 
to interesting relationships that might not have been obvious from examination 
of raw data alone or even a correlation matrix. Potential application of factor 
analytic techniques to problem solving and decision making in business and 
research is numerous and growing. 
Factor analysis is a much more complex and lengthy subject than might be 
indicated by this brief and crude exposition. However, the researcher has 
never attempted or pretended to explore the mathematics and other issues of 
factor analysis. That is well beyond the scope of the present research. Having 
said that, it is important to point out some limitations that the method presents. 
Four of the most common limitations are as follows: 
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1- There are many techniques for performing factor analysis. Controversy 
exists over which technique is best. 
2- The subjective aspects of factor analysis (deciding how many factors to 
extract, which technique should be used to rotate the factor axes, which factor 
loadings are significant) are all subject to many differences in opinion. 
3- The computational labour involved in conducting factor analysis and any 
other multivariate techniques with large databases necessitates the use of 
computers. With the rapid spread of computers, this particular limitation has 
diminished. 
4- The problem of reliability is real. Like any other statistical procedure, a 
factor analysis starts with a set of imperfect data. When the data changes 
because of changes in the sample, the data-gathering process, or the 
numerous kinds of measurement errors, the results of the analysis also 
change. The results of any single analysis are therefore less than perfectly 
dependable. This problem is especially critical because the results of a single- 
factor analytic solution frequently look plausible. It is important to emphasize 
that plausibility is no guarantee of validity or even stability (Kim, 1978a; Child, 
1990; Hair, 1987; Fruchter, 1954). 
6.7.2 - Stakeholders Analysis - Crisis Situations 
One of the objectives of this study is to investigate the consistency of views of 
hotel executives in relation to its "functional stakeholders" in crises situations. 
Indeed, the main proposition is that organizations that are crisis "prepared" 
have a more consistent view of the expected role and behaviour of their 
"functional stakeholders" in crises periods. As mentioned previously in this 
chapter, "functional stakeholders" are all those vested interest groups, parties, 
associations, institutions, and individuals who exert a hold and a claim on 
organizations. Functional stakeholders are all those who either affect or who 
are affected by an organization and its policies (i. e., its behaviour). For the 
purpose of this research, "consistency" occurs when organizations conform to 
a regular pattern of opinion with regard to a functional stakeholder. 
The study has so far provided a continuum of crisis preparedness. A sample of 
five organizations from each side of the continuum has been extracted and the 
analysis of their cultural, and to some extent structural, characteristics 
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revealed that there are striking differences between "prepared" and "not 
prepared" organizations. To identify whether any consistency of opinion can 
be found among respondents in relation to their "functional stakeholders" in 
crisis situations, the same sample (five organizations from each extreme) is 
used. The measure of consistency is obtained by observing where "prepared" 
or "not prepared" executives subscribe to an "archetypal stakeholder" at a 
level of at least 60%. That is, consistency will only be considered where at 
least 3 (three) or more organizations subscribe to the same "archetypal 
stakeholder" in any individual "functional stakeholders". For example, given a 
crisis situation, say "Victim", if 4 (four) organizations of any extreme 
("prepared" or "not prepared") respond that the "media" (a "functional 
stakeholder") is a "Villain" (an. "archetypal stakeholder"), then a consistency of 
opinion is said to have occured. However, if only 2 (two)' organizations 
subscribe to the same stakeholders, there is no consistency of opinion, since 
this represents less than 60% of the respondents. 
Before going into detail of the analysis, there is a point that needs clarification. 
The pilot study on this section of the research suggested that apart from one 
functional stakeholder ("International Community") all others should be 
retained, and a few more should be added to reflect more realistically the 
social partners of a hotel groups' operations. "Union" was among those 
"functional stakeholders". Although the pilot study supported it, a great number 
of respondents did not consider it relevant to their operations (as a 
stakeholder). In many cases the respondents simply commented "N/A" (not 
applicable). Given that only some groups considered "Union" a relevant 
stakeholder, an analysis of this "functional stakeholder" proved impossible 
and is not considered here. 
6.7.2.1 - Consistency Data Analysis 
Given the objective of this part of the research (to measure whether the image 
perceived, "Archetypal Image", by "crisis-prepared" organizations of its 
stakeholders - and their role -*in crisis situations is more consistent than that of 
those organizations that are "not prepared"), two approaches were required: 
one that would give the subjects two distinct crisis situations (one in which the 
host organization was the "victim" of a crisis; and the other where the host 
organization was "guilty" of a crisis), and another that would present the 
subjects with a set of "functional stakeholders" and a set of "archetypal 
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stakeholders" so that respondents could relate them given different crisis 
status. 
6.7.2.1.1 - Consistency Analysis in the Crisis Situations ("Guilty" and "Victim") 
Having obtained the continuum of "prepared" and "not prepared" 
organizations, the researcher used five organizations from each extreme to 
find whether there was any consistency in the views of executives in relation 
to the role and behaviour of their "functional stakeholders" in each given 
situation. Respondents were first presented with an individual crisis situation 
(say, "Guilty"). With this scenario in mind ("Guilty"), the researcher presented 
the respondents with a matrix containing a set of "Functional Organizational 
Stakeholders" as well as a set of "Archetypal Organizational' Stakeholders". 
The respondents were then asked to rate/relate the expected "Functional" 
stakeholders' role and behaviour ("Archetypal Image") in a "Guilty" situation. 
The same procedure was followed for the "Victim" crisis situation. 
The approach used to analyze the level of consistency in each crisis situation 
was a simple and straightforward one. Given that the number of cases to be 
investigated was small, no statistical application was required. The researcher 
went back to the main data and one by one examined how each individual 
respondent subscribed in each individual "functional stakeholder". A 
reference matrix was created so that the relevant score (over 60% at least) in 
each "functional stakeholders" could be recorded, as well as to register the 
"archetypal stakeholder' subscribed. 
Below is an example of the score matrix used for both situations. This 
particular example was used for the "Victim" crisis situation. 
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Figure 6.7 - Score Matrix 
SITUATIO N TWO - "VICTIM" 
Stakeholders "Prepared" 
'Archetypal Stakeholder" 
"Not Prepared" "Prepared" "Not Prepared" 
1- Management II II II 
2- Stockholders 
3- Workers 
4- Media II LI II 
5- Suppliers II II II Q 
6- Competitors II II I 
7- Special Interest Groups I II (ý 
8- Regulators (official bodies) 
9- Consumers II II II II 
10 - Insurance Companies 
II II II I 
11 -Local Community 
II II II I 
12 - Nation (wider community; 
II II II 
To illustrate further the consistency score of "prepared" and "not prepared" 
executives in each crisis situation, a graphical visual representation was also 
used. This showed more clearly where consistency occurred and where it did 
not. For the results and detailed analysis refer to Chapter 7. 
6.8 - Summary 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, this research started with the 
firm proposition of unveiling new ground in the field of crisis management, 
stakeholders, and organizational culture in the hotel industry. One of the 
shortcomings of doing something innovative is that not much 
material/research has been done, or is available, specifically in the area of 
crisis management and stakeholder relationships. Coupled with the fact that 
crisis management is an emerging field (lack of comprehensive theory), 
research in those areas in the hospitality industry is virtually non-existent. 
This research followed the general outline of survey research design, with 
special attention and focus on crisis management and stakeholder 
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relationships in the hotel industry in the UK. The pilot study of the 
methodology applied was of extreme value and importance. As is always the 
case, the pilot study could not represent the perfect parameters of the 
population. In the case of this particular research, this fact is very significant. 
The access to the population (top executives of hotel groups) under 
investigation, by the nature of their position, was not an easy one, and the pilot 
was carried out in a different, but representative population. Nevertheless, the 
results of the pilot study were extremely valuable. It highlighted the 
weaknesses in the questionnaires and interview design which were revised 
more than one time before actually conducting fieldwork. When the final data 
(fieldwork) was collect the "unexpected" problems were anticipated, and 
action had been taken to correct and to complement the data with the 
interviews. The pilot study was also very instrumental in the identification of 
possible analysis techniques. 
Having said that, although the questionnaires were designed as carefully as 
possible, the result was not a perfect one. Not all information required to 
explain the phenomenon under investigation could be gained from the 
questionnaires themselves. But as mentioned above, this fact was anticipated 
and the data obtained from the interviews complemented the data. 
The application of factor analysis proved very successful for the present 
research. The data was suitable for the method and the internal reliability 
(Cronbach's alpha) of the factors were high. The rotated factors are 
meaningful and provided new light to the topic under investigation and the 
methodology as a whole applied in this research. The main objective of 
applying factor analysis was to establish the crisis preparedness of hotel 
organization. For this purpose, the results were highly satisfactory and are 
used in further analysis in this study. In this sense, factor analysis provided the 
basis for the next stage by providing a continuum of crisis preparedness, that 
is, a continuum in which there can be found extremes of crisis "prepared" and 
crisis "not prepared" organizations. 
Naturally, there were some areas where restrictions and difficulties were 
encountered, given the nature of the research itself and the limitations of factor 
analysis. For example, in interpreting the factors, without complementary 
source of information from the interview data the researcher would have 
encountered greater difficulties in explaining the factors. This fact, however, 
was anticipated and the interview and questionnaires were designed to 
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complement each other. Having said that, there are some points where the 
researcher would make improvements. The interview, for example, would not 
be restricted to the subjects and topics used here only, but would cover a 
much broader spectrum of organizational life, operations, and business. 
However, the sample (executives) and the time restriction of their availability 
played an important role in this issue. 
The following chapter (Chapter 7) is concerned with the data analysis and 
discussions. 
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DATA ANALYSIS, FINDINGS and DISCUSSION 
"An organization, per se, cannot be either crisis prone or crisis-prepared, but only the 
individuals within it, those who influence the organization's perspective on crises and foster - or 
resist - crisis management efforts. 11 
Pauchant, T.; Mitroff, I., 1992 
7.1 -Introduction 
This chapter discusses the data results obtained from the analysis techniques 
applied to satisfy the research objectives. Given that more than one instrument 
was employed in the survey study, a step by step discussion, exploring each 
individual method and its analysis, is presented. The chapter starts with an 
overview of the sample and its main features, characteristics (in terms of 
structure), and its relevance and implications to the research. Then an 
analysis of the methods explored in the data analysis process of the first part 
of the research (identification of crisis preparedness of hotel organizations) is 
unfolded, starting with the application of frequency analysis, and 
crosstabulation analysis. A descriptive account of the approach and 
application of factor analysis to questionnaire 1 data is provided as well as the 
results obtained. The factor analysis of the data resulted in four dimensions. 
That is, the factor analysis of the data revealed that preparedness to crisis in 
the hotel industry can be explained in terms of four major dimensions: "Pro- 
activeness", "Denial", "Fatalism/Hopelessness", and "Technical Dimension". 
From these dimensions, a continuum of crisis "prepared" and crisis "not 
prepared" organizations was derived. The two sets of organizations provided 
the basis for further investigation to satisfy both the research question and the 
research proposition. The interview data, as well as the data from 
questionnaire 2, were used in association with the results of the factor 
analysis. It provided useful insights into the factor interpretation process. A 
contrasting view of both sets of organizations emerged and an illustration of 
their mindset in relation to crisis and crisis management is developed. 
Having completed the first stage of the research, the data and results obtained 
were used to satisfy the second stage, that is, the consistency measurement of 
hotel executives' view of stakeholders' roles and behaviour in distinct crisis 
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situations. The research proposition states that "The higher the 
readiness/preparedness of organizations to crisis, the higher the consistency 
of those organizations in viewing the behaviour and role of their functional 
stakeholders in crisis situations". The objective was to observe whether there 
were any patterns in the data regarding the responses of executives in each 
individual crisis situation. For that, as mentioned above, the two sets of 
organizations obtained in the first stage ("prepared" and "not prepared") 
provided the basis for this investigation. The researcher used frequency 
analysis and crosstabulation analysis as an initial approach to the data and its 
results and implications are also presented. 
The main conclusion of the data analysis is that it is indeed possible to 
identify, applying the methodology used in this research, crisis preparedness 
of hotel organizations. The analysis also confirmed the research proposition in 
that organizations that are crisis "prepared" are more consistent in their view 
of stakeholders' roles and behaviour in a given crisis situation than 
organizations that are "not prepared" to crises. The following is the procedure 
flow of the data analysis, and the step by step approach to the data analysis. 
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- Mental exploration 
- Frequencies 
- Crosstabulations 
- Factor Analysis 
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7.2 - Sample Overview and Implications for the Research and 
Methodology 
7.2.1 - Barsole Profile - Implications and Relevance to Chosen Methods 
7.2.1.1 - Sample Size 
Given the nature of this research and its scope (investigation of the 50 top 
hotel organizations operating in the UK), the sample was necessarily 
restricted. The sample was taken from the HCIMA (Hotel Catering & 
Institutional Management Association) "The Hospitality Yearbook", 1995 
edition, page 106. 
An attempt to interview at least two executives in each individual organization 
was made, but in many cases with no success. Given that in a serious crisis 
decision-making would be done at the highest level (Stubbart, 1987; Smart 
and Vertinsky, 1977; Dutton et al, 1983; Staw etw, 1981; Janis and Mann, 
1977; Dutton and Duncan, 1987; Janis, 1989; Mulder et p1,1971; Nunamaker 
et al, 1989; Booth, 1993; Williams and Olaniran, 1994), those executives 
holding key positions were approached. That is, the top executive (Managing 
Director, Chief Executive Officer, President, and Vice-President), as well as 
the Marketing Director, since marketing (specially communication and Public 
Relations) is an integral part of any crisis management exercise. However, in 
some cases the researcher was advised that the person responsible for crisis 
management or similar function had a different profile, like for example 
Security Officer, or the Financial Director. This fact reinforces the findings of 
Mitroff et al (1988b), where they found that crisis management falls under a 
diverse set of responsibilities. This fact also explains the difficulty in finding a 
clear definition of "crises" by hotel executives. They all regard and define crisis 
from their own perspective and past experience. This will be discussed later in 
this chapter. 
7.2.1.2 - The Response 
Although at least two executives were approached in each organization, some 
organizations, due to their internal policies, did not participate in this research. 
However, there were cases where more than two executives in an 
organization were interviewed. 
355 
( 
G. Santana Ch. 7- Data Analysis, Findings and Discussion 
The response rate was surprisingly high for this kind of research: 
" Of the 50 hotel groups approached, 33 hotel groups participated in the 
research: 66% 
" 30 interviews were conducted. In the cases where interviews were 
conducted, questionnaires where also answered. 
" 24 questionnaires were received by post (in the cases where interviews 
proved impossible). 
"A total of 54 questionnaires responded. 
" Of the post response, only two crisis situations questionnaires were not 
answered. 
" An average of 1.63 executives (for the 33 hotel groups) participated in the 
research. 
7.2.1.3 - Respondents Profile 
As mentioned above and in previous chapters, responsibility for crisis 
management falls under many different professions and people's background. 
However, top executives of hotel groups were targeted for the reasons given 
above and in Chapter 6. Of the 54 responses obtained, the researcher divided 
the respondents by generalizing their profile. For example, the titles of 
"President", "Vice-president", "Director of Board", "Chief Executive Officer", 
"Managing Director", "Executive Vice-President", "Executive Director of 
Hotels", and so on, were all classified under the heading of "Managing 
Director + Chief Executive Officer" (i. e., top executives). Similarly, the other 
targeted group of executives (marketing directors) were given the same 
treatment. Their titles ranged from "Marketing Director", to "Marketing 
Executive"; "Director of Sales & Marketing" to "Marketing Administrator", etc. 
They are under the classification "Marketing". The third group of respondents 
that participated in this research hold a diversified number of positions, not at 
the top level of their organizations, but were referred to the researcher as the 
persons "to talk to". Their positions ranged from "Group Security/Safety 
Officer" to "Finance Accountant"; from "Operations Director" to "Human 
Resources Director"; and they are under category "Operations". Figure 7.2 and 
Figure 7.3 below illustrate the dispersion of the category groups. 
This clustering of respondents into a more general profile of their 
responsibilities and positions within their organizations had no negative 
implications for this study. On the contrary, it proved to be very important in 
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interpreting the data in all stages of the analysis. Comparisons between the 
groups were easier to make and significant results were obtained. 
Figure 7.2 - Respondents Profile - Positions Within Organizations 
1-m. d. + ceo = Managing Directors and Chief Executive Officers 
2- mktg = Marketing Executives 
3- operations = Operations 
Figure 7.3 - Respondents Profile - Positions within Organizations 
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7.2.1.4 - Hotel Companies Profile 
One explanation of the high response rate obtained in this study can be 
attributed to the confidentiality offered by the researcher to respondents. It was 
evident that crisis management is a matter of "secrecy" and most 
organizations were concerned as to the use of the information and asked for 
assurance. As mentioned in Chapter 6, the researcher offered respondents to 
return the tapes or transcripts as soon as the research is completed. Any direct 
information that could lead to the identification of any particular organization is 
avoided here. Apart from that, it is worth mentioning that a full and descriptive 
account of hotel companies structure is unrelated to the relevance as well as 
beyond the purpose of this research. The intention here is only to illustrate the 
contrasting nature of their structure. Hotel groups' structure, as discussed in 
previous chapters, plays a relatively minor part as to whether an organization 
is "crisis prepared" or not. What is decisive and does determine their 
"preparedness" is their culture. The cultural profile of the hotel organizations 
under investigation as well as the profile of their executives are given later in 
this chapter. 
Having said that, and for the reasons given above, the researcher "rounded" 
some figures, and "averaged" others to present them here. It gives, 
nevertheless, a clear and good account of the hotel groups under 
investigation. Figure 7.4 below contains some examples of the contrasting 
structure of hotel groups in terms of size. All figures are 1994. 
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Figure 7.4 - Contrasting Structure of Hotel Group 
Hotel Companies Profile 
1- Size of Companies 
Number of Hotels in the UK 340 4 
Number of Hotels outside the UK 600 0 
2- Human Resource (both in the UK and 
abroad) 
Number of employees 40.000 300 
3- Revenue (Group Revenue - Includes 
revenues from operations outside the UK £2 billion £5 million 
4- Age of Companies - 250 years 5 years old 
("in the 
business")" 
Comment by respondent 
The figures above illustrate how diversified, in terms of structure, the sample of 
the research was. In this sense, it can be said that the sample was quite 
representative. Apart from that, and also as a matter of illustration, it was 
observed that contrasting differences could also be found in relation to 
business practices, market structure, marketing strategies, financial position, 
market share, and so forth. This wealth of variations between the 
organizations proved to be very interesting when the analysis of their 
"preparedness" to crises took place and, as will become clearer later, highlight 
the point that structure indeed plays a relatively small, if any, part in crisis 
"preparedness" in the hotel industry. 
The following section is concerned with data treatment and the process of 
data analysis. 
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7.3 - Statistical Application 
7.3.1 - Approaching the Data - Frequency Analysis. Crosstabulation. Results 
and I lications 
Given the nature of the data, that the research had more than one instrument 
applied, and that the amount of data was considerable, statistical application 
was the most obvious way to approach the data. The data was approached in 
a sequential and exploratory way, starting with a frequency analysis of the 
data which was followed by a crosstabulation analysis. The results of these 
exercises revealed that a more sophisticated and powerful statistical 
technique was required. Factor analysis was the most' suitable and 
satisfactory statistical application to satisfy the research requirements. The 
following is a brief description of the frequency and crosstabulation exercise of 
the data of questionnaire 1 (one), and a comprehensive overview of the factor 
analysis application and results. 
7.3.1.1 - Frequency Analysis 
The data was inputted into SPSS (Version 6.0) to be explored. As a first step, 
a frequency analysis was done on the data of the first and second 
questionnaires. Frequency analysis produces a table of frequency counts and 
percentages for the values of individual variables (SPSS-X User's Guide, 
1988). The objective of using frequency analysis was purely to see whether 
there were any significant patterns in the data and so that the researcher 
could identify, from the information obtained, other relevant statistical methods 
to apply. The frequency of the data revealed an interesting and overall well- 
balanced pattern of response. 
An initial observation of the frequency analysis indicated a pattern of response 
towards the far end of the scale. That is, a greater number of response had 
been between number 3 and 7 in the scale. 
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Prone Prepared 
1234567 
Very Neither True Not True 
True nor False at All 
For example, it became clear, in questionnaire 1, that the scores in some 
variables were higher than in others, indicating a pattern of response in those 
variables. In variables A5 ("Only organizations that are badly managed have 
crises") and A7 ("Crises do not happen in our organization"), 50% of 
respondents answered that the statements (rationalizations) were "Not True at 
All". In variables A19 (" We do not regard the media as an important issue. It is 
easy to manipulate it") and A26 ("Safety is the responsibility of top 
management, not of individual employees"), 48.1% and 46.3% of 
respondents, respectively, also agreed that the rationalizations were "Not True 
at All". Below in Table 7.1 are the frequencies on the variables mentioned 
above. - 
The "Value" in the frequency tables refer to the values in the scale above (the 
values between "Very True" to "Not True At All") 
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Table 7.1 - Frequency on variables A5. A7. A 19. and A26. of Questionnaire _1 







3 4 7.4 
4 10 18.5 
5 5 9.3 
6 5 9.3 
7 27 50.0 
Total 54 100.0 







3 4 7.4 
4 7 13.0 
5 7 13.0 
6 8 14.8 
7 27 50.0 
Total 54 100.0 
A19 - "We do not regard the media as an important issue. It 
is easy to manipulate it. " 
2 1 1.9 
3 3 5.6 
4 5 9.3 
5 9 16.7 
6 10 18.5 
7 26 48.1 
Total 54 100.0 
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After a more detailed observation, it became also clear that the general 
pattern of response between 3 and 7 in the scale was very well-balanced and 
equally distributed. The maximum number of responses to any given variable 
in the whole was 50% (as indicated above, in variables A5 and A7) indicating 
an overall balance. 
Towards the other end of the scale ("Very True") it was observed that the 
maximum number of response in any variable was in variable A15 ("The 
range of crisis is so vast that it makes it impossible to make preparations") and 
A20 ("In our organization we all work in a rational and objective way, 
therefore, we can handle any crises"), where 13% of respondents subscribed 
to number 2 in the scale. However, in almost any variable, at least one 
respondent subscribed to either number 1 or 2 in the scale. Table 7.2 below 
shows the frequency on variable A15 and A20. 
Table 7.2 - Frequency on variables A15 and A20. of Questionnaire 1 
A15 - "The range of crisis is so vast that it makes it 
impossible to make preparations. " 
Value Frequency Precentage 
27 13.0 
3 11 20.4 
459.3 
5 10 18.5 
66 11.1 
7 15 27.8 
Total 54 100.0 
A20 - "In our organization we all work in a rational and 
objective way, therefore, we can handle any crises. " 
Value Frequency Precentage 
111.9 
27 13.0 




7 10 18.5 
Total 54 100.0 
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Having said that, the findings and patterns in the frequency analysis prompted 
and led to the question as to "who" were subscribing to those levels, and 
"why" those patterns were occurring. That is, "who", in terms of respondents 
(Managing Directors, Marketing Executives, or Operations Personnel) and 
their organizations, and was there any evident reason or reasons behind it. 
Was there any pattern in the reasons as well? For that, and as frequency 
analysis could not provide the answers to those questions, other methods 
were sought in an attempt to find the answers to those questions. To satisfy 
the first of the questions ("who") crosstabulation analysis was employed and 
the next section deals with the application and results of crosstabulation 
analysis. The frequency analysis on the whole data on questionnaire 1 can be 
found in Appendix 5. 
7.3.1.2 - Crosstabulation 
Second to the SPSS-X User's Guide (1988), crosstabulation produces tables 
that are the "joint distribution of two or more variables that have a limited 
number of distinct values. The frequency distribution of one variable is 
subdivided according to the values of one or more variables. " The application 
of crosstabulation analysis provided answers to the question of "who" and 
"which" organizations, but unfortunately, not to the important question of the 
motifs (or reasons) behind the pattern. That is, while the results of this method 
provided a general pattern of whom and their positions in their organizations 
subscribed to what variables, crosstabulation could not explain "why" of that 
pattern of response. 
Nevertheless, in Table 7.3 below there are some examples of crosstabulation 
application and their results. In the examples below it is possible to identify the 
positions of the respondents in variables A5 and A7, discussed in the 
frequency section above. For the whole crosstabulation results, please refer to 
Appendix 6. 
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Table 7.3 - Crosstabulationon variables _A5 and 
A7 of Questionnaire 1 
AS - "Only organizations that are badly managed have crises. " 
Value 2 34 5 6 7 
Row Total 
Managing Directors/CEO 1 24 1 2 8 18 
Marketing 1 4 2 1 13 21 
Operations 1 22 2 2 6 15 
Column Total -110- 
3 4 10 5 5 27 
Managing Directors/CEO 1 2 4 1 2 8 
Marketing 1 4 2 1 13 
Operations 1 2 2 2 2 6 
A7 - "Crises do not happen in our organization. " 
Value 23 456 7 
Row Total 
Managing Directors/CEO 11 42 10 18 
Marketing 1 322 13 21 
Operations 2 36 4 15 
Column Total ... ý 
14 778 27 5 
Managing Directors/CEO 1 1 4 2 10 
Marketing 1 3 2 2 13 
Operations 2 
L 
3 6 4 
As was identified in the frequency analysis, 50% of respondents in variables 
A5 and A7 subscribed to "Not True at All" in questionnaire 1. Crosstabulation 
analysis provided the relationship between the position of respondents in their 
organization and the pattern of their response in each individual variable. The 
researcher here was trying to establish whether there were any distinct 
patterns of response between "Managing Directors and CEO", "Marketing 
Executives", and "Operations". Analysis of the crosstabulated data revealed 
no clear pattern or relationship between respondents and their positions and 
their answers. That is, there could be found no significant differences between 
the answers of "Managing Directors and CEO", "Marketing Executives", and 
"Operations". This fact is further reinforced later in the analysis of crisis 
"preparedness" of organizations when it was revealed that there was a clear 
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balance between executives' positions in crisis "prepared" and crisis "not 
prepared" organizations (please refer to section 7.4.1.1). 
Having said that, even though some indications of patterns could be identified 
in frequency and crosstabulation analysis, they did not provide any answer to 
the question of crisis "preparedness". It was still not enough to explain 
whether an organization had a culture favourable or not to crisis management. 
It became evident that a more powerful and sophisticated method was 
needed. One that could find the underlying motifs and reasons behind those 
patterns and explain them. 
7.3.1.3 - Implications of Frequency and Crosstabulation Analyses to the 
Research 
The application of frequency and crosstabulation analysis was an important 
step towards understanding the data. They provided the researcher with many 
insights as to how the data should be treated and indicated the direction to the 
most likely statistical tools that could be used to satisfy the research question 
and research proposition. Data summarization would be the ideal application 
because it would provide a more clear and understandable pattern of the 
issues being investigated. It became clear, then, that a more powerful, 
comprehensive and sophisticated method would be necessary. Factor 
analysis was chosen to accomplish this part and was a very successful 
approach to the data. Factor analysis, its relevance, implications, and 
applicability to the research objectives, as well as the results of the analysis 
are developed in the following sections. 
7.3.2 - Factor Analysis 
The objective of the first instrument (questionnaires) is to identify hotel 
organizations' preparedness to crisis. That is, to identify (in terms of 
organizational culture) the extent to which each individual organization is 
prepared for crises. This analysis led to a set of organizations that are "more 
prepared" to crises and to another set of organizations that are "less prepared" 
to crises. 
As mentioned in Chapter 6, a set of rationalizations hotel executives make in 
relation to crisis and crisis management was used to achieve this goal. Those 
rationalizations are common cultural elements in all organizations. They play, 
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and are regarded by both academics and practitioners to play, an important 
part on the organizational relation/approach to the issues of crisis and crisis 
management. 
For the analysis of the first questionnaire (identification of hotel organizations' 
crisis preparedness) factor analysis has been employed. 
7.3.2.1 - Approach to Factor Extraction and Factor Interpretation 
The following is a description of the approach adopted to obtain the factors 
and factor interpretation: 
7.3.2.1.1 - Sample Size 
Sample size is of key importance in the application of factor analysis since it is 
directly related to the reliability of the results (factors). From the literature, 
specially Child (1990) and Hair et al (1987), it is not uncommon to factor 
analyze samples smaller than 100, provided certain precautions are taken. 
The factor loading is an important and directly related issue regarding the 
number of cases one wants to analyze. Most analysts use a rule of thumb: 
factor loading of ± 0.30. The literature indicates that any loading above ± 0.30 
is significant or salient. This criteria is said to be quite a rigorous one. 
However, with sample smaller than 100, factor loading has to be at least ± 
0.30. Loadings ± 0.40 are considered more important, and if the loadings are 
± 0.50 or greater, they are considered very significant. Thus, the larger the 
absolute size of the factor loading, the more significant the loading is in 
interpreting the factor matrix. These guidelines are considered useful when 
the sample size is 50 or larger. This approach may appear too simplistic, yet 
compared with other criteria it is quite rigorous and acceptable. The loading of 
0.30 has been experimented with and in comparison with the adopted 0.50 
loading it showed very little difference. For details please refer to Appendix 7 
(0.50 loading) and Appendix 8 (0.30 loading). It is also worth mentioning that 
the number of factors extracted are the same and just a few more variables 
would be included. Given the uncertainty surrounding the assessment of error 
in factorial work for small samples, it is safer to adopt a method (loading) that 
will ensure a more significant level. Thus, the adoption of 0.50 in this research. 
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7.3.2.1.2 - Extraction/Factor Model 
Given that the primary objective of this part of the research is to identify the 
latent dimensions or constructs represented in the original variables, and that 
the researcher has little knowledge about the amount of unique or error 
variance and therefore wishes to eliminate this variance, the appropriate 
factor extraction model for the present research is the common factor model. 
As mentioned in Chapter 6, principal component analysis is generally used 
when the objective is to summarize most of the original information (variance) 
in a minimum number of factors for prediction purposes (what is not the case 
in this research). In contrast, common factor analysis is used primarily to 
identify factors or dimensions not easily recognized (what is indeed the case 
of this research). Nevertheless, both models (common factor and principal 
component analysis) have been explored. The rotated factors are almost 
identical. Factors 1 (one) and 2 (two) are identical (loading slightly different in 
some variables, but not significant enough to be a concern, in the component 
analysis model). Factors 3 (three) and 4 (four) are also identical but in the 
component analysis they change order, that is, factor 3 (three) becomes factor 
4 (four), and factor 4 (four) becomes factor 3 (three). Below are the factor 
analysis solutions using Common Factor Analysis (Principal Axis Factoring) 
and Principal Component Analysis. Table 7.4 shows the rotated Principal Axis 
Factoring solution and Table 7.5 shows the rotated Principal Component 
Analysis solution. For full detailed factor analysis refer to Appendix 7 
(Principal Axis Factoring) and Appendix 9 (Principal Component Analysis). 
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Table 7.4 - Principal Axis Factoring 
PRINCI 
Rotat 
PAL AXIS FA 
ed Factor M 
CTORING 
atri x 
VARIMAX converged in 11 iterations. 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
A12 . 88140 
A22 . 66882 
A16 . 58660 
A15 . 57429 
A27 . 53032 
A3 . 50557 
A29 . 73286 
A9 . 67352 
A10 . 56346 
All . 53084 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor S 
A7 . 72731 
A6 . 70845 
A19 . 62349 
A17 . 57026 
A26 . 55116 A18 . 53373 
A25 . 51127 
A5 . 67908 A4 . 51667 
Factor 6 Factor 7 Factor 8 
A21 . 79825 
A20 . 66735 
A24 . 71044 
A14 . 57317 
A2 . 68644 
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Table 7.5 - Principal Component Analysis 
PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS 
Rotated Factor Matrix 
VARIMAX converged in 10 iterations. 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
A12 , 84060 
A22 , 71005 
A15 , 66237 
A16 , 61389 
A27 , 58135 
A3 , 53243 
A9 , 78202 
A29 72078 
A10 , 61001 
All , 57624 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
A17 , 66193 
A26 , 61943 
A25 , 57566 
A18 , 57412 
A19 , 74512 
A7 . 72444 
A6 , 71962 
A8 , 51130 
AS , 71486 
A4 , 62574 
A28 , 53809 
A13 , 51669 
A30 , 50920 
Factor 6 Factor 7 Factor 8 
A20 , 81145 
A21 , 80216 
A14 . 79523 
A24 , 
69208 
A2 , 83506 
.I 
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7.3.2.1.2.1 - Other Variations of Factor Model 
Other variations of the general factor model available were also explored. 
Maximum Likelihood and Alpha Factoring were tested and both showed no 
significant difference to common factor analysis (0.50 factor loading). In the 
maximum likelihood model (where maximum likelihood method produces 
parameter estimates that are the most likely to have produced the observed 
correlation matrix if the sample is from a multivariate normal distribution - 
Norusis, 1993), rotated factor 1 (one) is exactly the same as in common factor 
analysis. While factor 2 (two) and factor 3 (three) show also no difference 
(same variables and similar loading), their order is reversed in the common 
factor analysis, as illustrated in the maximum likelihood rotated factor matrix in 
Table 7.6. For full detailed maximum likelihood solution refer to Appendix 10. 
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Table 7.6 - Maximum Likelihood 
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD 
Rotated Factor Matrix 
VARIMAX converged in 18 iterations. 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
A12 , 91078 
A22 , 70450 
A16 , 62485 
A27 , 55981 
A15 , 53617 
A7 , 90248 
A6 , 71611 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
A29 , 73822 
A9 , 68115 
A10 56503 
A5 , 58086 
A4 , 55911 
A21 92852 
A20 58326 
Factor 6 Factor 7 Factor 8 
A18 , 69782 
A25 , 56230 
A24 , 58979 
A14 , 54560 
All , 51705 
Al 
A2 , 68226 
The Alpha Factoring method considers the variables in a particular analysis to 
be a sample from the universe of potential variables. It maximizes the alpha 
reliability of the factors. This differs from the previous described methods, 
which consider the cases to be a sample from some population and the 
variables to be fixed. With alpha factor extraction, the eigenvalues can no 
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longer be obtained as the sum of the squared factor loadings, and the 
communalities for each variable are not the sum of the squared loadings on 
the individual factors. Alpha factoring has also been tested and the results of 
the alpha factoring (0.50 loading) are almost exactly the same as with the 
common factor analysis as can be verified in the rotated solution in Table 7.7 
below. For full detailed analysis of the Alpha Factoring solution, please refer to 
Appendix 11. 
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Table 7.7 - Alpha Factoring 
ALPHA FACTORING 
Rotated Factor Matrix 
VARIMAX converged in 9 iterations. 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
A12 , 88659 
A22 , 65004 
A16 , 60322 
A15 , 59121 
A27 , 55080 
A30 , 51862 
A3 , 51531 
A29 , 74616 
A9 , 66770 
A10 , 55151 - 
All , 53574 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
A6 , 68543 
A19 , 67454 
A7 , 67348 
A17 , 59302 
A26 , 55089 
A21 , 80304 
A20 , 65476 
Factor 6 Factor 7 Factor 8 
AS , 70153 
A24 , 75773 
A14 , 54886 
A2 , 70397 
Having said that, the main conclusion in relation to the factor extraction 
models explored is that no significant difference was found between the 
rotated factors. The fact that the results of the application of different methods 
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of factor extraction revealed no significant difference between them indicates 
that there exists indeed a very strong underlying structure and that the data is 
reliable. 
7.3.2.1.3 - The Rotation of Factors - Orthogonal 
One of the problems of not rotating the factors is that interpretability becomes 
a very difficult and complex task. Even though the factor matrix obtained in the 
extraction phase indicates the relationship between the factors and the 
individual variables, it is usually difficult to identify meaningful factors based 
on this matrix. Based on the unrotated factor matrix, the variables and factors 
do not appear correlated in any interpretable pattern (see Table 7.8 below). 
The rotation of factors is an important concept in factor analysis since one of 
the goals of factor analysis is to identify factors that are substantively 
meaningful (in the sense that they summarize sets of closely related 
variables). According to Norusis (1993) and Kim (1978b) the rotation phase of 
factor analysis attempts to transform the initial matrix into one that is easier to 
interpret. Rotation of factors also improves the interpretation by reducing some 
of the ambiguities that often accompany initial unrotated factor solutions. 
While in the unrotated factor solutions each factor after the first factor (which 
tends to be a general factor with almost every variable loading significantly 
and accounts for the largest amount of variance) accounts for smaller portions 
of variance, when the factor matrix is rotated this trend is modified. The 
ultimate effect of rotating the factor matrix is to redistribute the variance from 
earlier factors to later ones to achieve a simpler, theoretically more 
meaningful, factor pattern. Table 7.8 below exemplifies the fact that in the 
unrotated factor matrix the first factor is a general one and it also shows that, in 
the case of this research, in the unrotated factor matrix all variables loaded 
positively in the first factor. Table 7.9 shows the initial statistics of factor 
analysis and it is clear that the first factor accounted for the most of the 
variance (33.2%). Full details of unrotated factor matrix can be found in 
Appendix 7. 
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Table 7.8 - Principal Axis Factoring - Unrotated Factor Matrix 
PRINCIPAL AXIS FACTORING 
Unrotated Factor Matrix 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
A28 . 77139 
A30 . 72333 
AS . 68475 
A8 . 67532 
A22 . 66954 
A12 . 66770 -. 58922 
A27 . 66405 
A18 . 65968 
A4 . 65250 
A16 . 63298 
A3 . 62411 
A13 . 60958 
A26 . 60125 - 
A17 . 58973 
A23 . 57580 
A10 . 57544 
A29 . 56561 
A6 . 56239 
A15 . 54969 
A25 . 53895 





A24 . 60477 
All 
A21 -. 52976 
A2 . 51430 
A14 
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Factor Eigenvalue Pct of Var Cum Pct 
* 
Al . 65568 * 1 9.95671 33.2 33.2 
A2 . 62012 * 2 2.10563 7.0 40.2 
A3 . 83818 * 3 1.97496 6.6 46.8 
A4 . 72068 * 4 1.76933 5.9 52.7 
AS . 80792 * 5 1.71931 5.7 58.4 
A6 . 82925 * 6 1.44031 4.8 63.2. 
A7 . 83124 * 7 1.19184 4.0 67.2 
A8 . 72227 * 8 1.10378 3.7 70.9 
A9 . 68516 * 9 . 92818 3.1 74.0 
A10 . 64681 * 10 . 91110 3.0 77.0 
All . 59620 * 11 . 87205 2.9 79.9 
A12 . 85941 * 12 - . 72961 2.4 82.3 
A13 . 71442 * 13 . 70145 2.3 84.7 
A14 . 51556 * 14 . 57378 1.9 86.6 
A15 . 57069 * 15 . 56045 1.9 88.5 
A16 . 71526 * 16 . 54401 1.8 90.3 
A17 . 80891 * 17 . 47936 1.6 91.9 
A18 . 81264 * 18 . 37755 1.3 93.1 
A19 . 74567 * 19 . 31692 1.1 94.2 
A20 . 66623 * 20 . 28134 .9 95.1 
A21 . 71200 * 21 . 26848 .9 96.0 
A22 . 79276 * 22 . 22942 .8 96.8 
A23 . 68845 * 23 . 21485 .7 97.5 
A24 . 83663 * 24 . 16842 .6 98.1 
A25 . 76287 * 25 . 14728 .5 98.6 
A26 . 74730 * 26 . 14023 .5 99.0 
A27 . 63793 * 27 . 10297 .3 99.4 
A28 . 81495 * 28 . 08644 .3 99.7 
A29 . 77669 * 29 . 06865 .2 99.9 
A30 . 81092 * 30 . 03561 .1 100.0 
Given the results above it became evident that a more meaningful and simpler 
solution was desirable so that the researcher could obtain the necessary 
information that would offer the most adequate interpretation of the variables 
under investigation. For that, rotation of the initial factor solution was 
necessary. As discussed in Chapter 6, there are basically two main options for 
rotation in factor analysis: orthogonal and oblique. In an orthogonal solution, 
which is the simplest case, the factors are extracted in such a way that the 
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factor axes are maintained at 90 degrees, meaning that each factor is 
independent of all other factors. Therefore, the correlation between factors is 
arbitrarily determined to be zero (Hair et p1,1987). An oblique factor solution is 
more complex than an orthogonal one. While in the orthogonal rotation the 
axes are maintained at 90 degrees, in the oblique rotation the axes are 
rotated and the 90 degree angle between the reference axes is not retained. 
However, and as also discussed in Chapter 6, an entirely satisfactory analytic 
procedure has not been devised for oblique solutions. They are still the 
subject of considerable experimentation and controversy. As the term oblique 
implies, the factor solution is computed so that the extracted factors are 
correlated. Oblique solutions assume that the original variables or 
characteristics are correlated to some extent; therefore, the underlying factors 
must be similarly correlated (Hair gLa. (, 1987). Hair gLal (1987) argue that 
although there are several approaches available for performing either 
orthogonal or oblique rotation, only a limited number of oblique rotational 
procedures are available and often the analyst is forced to accept the one that 
is accessible. In addition, to date, none of the oblique solutions have been 
demonstrated to be analytically superior. Having said that, and given that the 
objective of the researcher is to reduce the number of original variables to a 
smaller and more significant set of dimensions (factors), and that the oblique 
solution is still a subject of controversy and experimentation, the orthogonal 
solution has been chosen. Thus, different methods of orthogonal rotations 
were performed in search of the best possible solution for the present 
research. 
Three major orthogonal rotation approaches have been developed. They are 
Quartimax, Varimax, and Equimax. 
Quartimax rotation has as its ultimate goal the simplification of the rows of a 
factor matrix. That is, it focuses on rotating the initial factor so that a variable 
loads high on one factor and as low as possible on all other factors. In another 
words, in quartimax approaches many variables can load high or near high on 
the same factor because the technique centres on simplifying the rows. This 
fact is clearly observed in the Quartimax rotation in Table 7.10 below. For full 
factor analysis solution of Quartimax rotation, please refer to Appendix 12. 
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Table 7.10 - Principal Axis Factoring - Quartlmax Rotation 
PRINCIPAL AXIS FACTORING - OUARTIM X ROTATION 
Rotated Factor Matrix 
QUARTIMAX converged in 7 iterations. 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
A12 , 79190 A28 , 75832 
A30 , 73233 
A16 , 70738 
A22 , 69910 A27 , 69595 AS , 67382 A18 , 66400 
A3 , 63987 
A4 , 62556 A8 , 61778 - 
A26 , 61721 A15 , 61352 
A13 , 58367 
A23 , 55743 A17 , 53131 
A25 , 52972 
A7 , 69879 A6 , 69336 A19 , 53594 
A29 , 61359 A9 , 60786 All , 53081 
A24 , 72282 A14 , 56589 
A21 , 75259 A20 , 62407 
Factor 6 Factor 7 Factor 8 
A2 , 66973 
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As can be observed, most of the variables loaded high in the first factor. A 
quartimax rotation more than often results in a general factor with high-to- 
moderate loadings on most variables, and this is not different here. This is one 
of the main shortcomings of the quartimax method. In line with the discussion 
on rotation in Chapter 6, the findings above emphasize the point that the 
quartimax method has not proved very successful in producing simpler 
structure. It tends to produce a general factor in the rotations (as it is evident 
from the findings above). Quoting, as in Chapter 6, Hair et al, (1987, pp. 245), 
"regardless of one's concept of 'simpler' structure, inevitably it involves 
dealing with clusters of variables; a method that tends to create a large 
general factor (i. e., quartimax) is not in line with the goals of rotation. " 
Given the results obtained using quartimax rotations (difficult 'interpretability) 
and for the reasons above, the quartimax method is not appropriate for this 
research. 
In contrast to quartimax, the varimax criterion centres on simplifying the 
columns of the factor matrix. The varimax method is the most commonly used 
method. It attempts to minimize the number of variables that have high 
loadings on a factor, what enhances the interpretability of the factors (Norusis, 
1993). The varimax rotation below illustrate this point. In comparison with 
quartimax, in the varimax rotation approach there tends to be some high 
loadings (i. e., close to -1 or +1) and some loadings near 0 (zero) in each 
column of the matrix. Thus, with the varimax rotational approach the maximum 
possible simplification is reached if there are only 1's or 0's in a single column 
(Norusis, 1993; Hairgl, 1987; Kim, 1978b). There can be said then, that the 
rotation in Table 7.11 below achieved just that, and in this sense, a more 
meaningful and interpretable solution was found. For detailed Principal Axis 
Factoring solution using Varlmax rotation please refer to Appendix 7. 
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Table 7.11 - Principal Axis Factoring - Varimax Rotation 
PRINCIPAL AXIS FACTORING - VARJ 
Rotated Factor Matrix 
VARIMAX converged in 11 iterations. 
MAX ROTA TION 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
A12 . 88140 
A22 . 66882 
A16 . 58660 
A15 . 57429 
A27 . 53032 
A3 . 50557 
A29 . 73286 
A9 . 67352 
A10 . 56346 
All . 53084 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
A7 . 72731 
A6 . 70845 
A19 . 62349 
A17 . 57026 A26 . 55116 A18 . 53373 A25 . 51127 
AS . 67908 A4 . 51667 
Factor 6 Factor 7 Factor 8 
A21 . 79825 
A20 . 66735 
A24 . 71044 
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For the reasons given above and the results of the rotations, the varimax 
method has proved very successful as an analytic approach to obtaining an 
orthogonal rotation of factors and is adopted on this research. The 
interpretation of factors is discussed in details in a later section (Section 
7.3.2.1.6) in this chapter. 
The researcher also tried the equimax rotation. As discussed in Chapter 6, the 
equimax approach is a compromise between the quartimax method (which 
simplifies variables) and varimax method (which simplifies the factors). Rather 
than concentrating either on simplification of rows (variables) or on 
simplification of the columns (factors), it tries to accomplish some of each. This 
method clearly was not satisfactory for the rotation of factors in this research. 
For example, only 2 variables were loaded in factor 1. As mentioned before, 
more than two variables are usually required. Moreover, interpretability 
becomes an almost impossible task. Table 7.12 below shows the equimax 
rotation. For full detailed Principal Axis Factoring equimax rotation please 
refer to Appendix 13. 
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Table 7.12 - Principal Axis Factoring - Eguimax Rotation 
PRINCIPAL AXIS FACTORING - EOU/ 
Rotated Factor Matrix 
EQUAMAX converged in 29 iterations. 
MAX ROTA TION 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
A12 , 80703 
A22 , 62712 
A5 , 71414 
A4 , 57216 
A28 , 55565 
A30 , 53010 
A29 , 73266 
A9 , 66560 
A10 , 54018 
A7 , 70538 A6 , 68918 A19 , 63039 
A26 , 58024 A17 , 53871 
A18 , 52444 
Factor 6 Factor 7 Factor 8 
A21 81523 
A20 67640 
A2 , 70139 
A24 , 73380 
A14 , 57259 
7.3.2.1.4 - Cutoff Point 
Second to Hair et at (1987) the initial unrotated factor matrix is computed to 
assist in obtaining a preliminary indication of the number of factors to extract. 
In the case of this research, the analysis (Principal Axis Factoring) extracted 8 
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factors. However, for interpretation purposes, this criterion is not sufficient and 
appropriate. 
As mentioned in Chapter 6, an exact quantitative basis for deciding the 
number of factors to extract has not been developed (Hair et p1,1987) and 
regardless of the numerous criteria one has available to assist in the decision 
as to how many factors to consider (for example, a priori, latent root criterion, 
scree test), it all comes down to the discretion of the analyst. That is, the ability 
to assign some meaning to the factors, or to interpret the nature of the 
variables, becomes an extremely important consideration in determining the 
number of factors to extract. Although the analysis has extracted eight factors, 
only the four first factors are considered. One reason for that is that factors 5,6, 
and 7 (Principal Axis Factoring) have only 2 variables loading significantly, 
and as seen in the literature review on factor analysis, it is not sufficient. 
Second to Child (1990), when a factor contains two or more variables with 
significant loadings (in the case of this research +0.50) it is referred to as 
"a common factor and the variance of the variables in that factor is known 
as common variance. Since common factors accounts for the 
intercorrelations between variables there are bound to be at least two 
variables involved. " 
Moreover, the variables in each of the factors are not clearly understandable 
(difficult to get a meaningful interpretation from). Factor 8 has only one 
variable loading significantly, and again, it is difficult to explain complex 
phenomena based on just one variable. As discussed in the previous section, 
other different rotations were also applied (quartimax, varimax, and equimax) 
in an attempt to find the best factor solution and to determine the number of 
factor to be extracted. A factor interpretation for each of the rotations was 
carried out and the factor structure that best represented the underlying 
relationship of the variables was the varimax rotation. 
7.3.2.1.5 - The Eigenvalue 
Although the researcher has already determined the number of factors to be 
used in this research, it is nevertheless interesting to look at the eigenvalue for 
each individual factor. The Eigenvalue (amount of variance accounted for by a 
factor) in this research varies dramatically between factor 1 and the other 
factors as can be seen in Table 7.13 below (Final Statistics - Principal Axis 
Factoring). 
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Factor Eigenvalue Pct of Var Cum Pct 
Al . 38810 * 1 9.58562 32.0 32.0 
A2 . 50386 * 2 1.77930 5.9 37.9 
A3 . 57286 * 3 1.59169 5.3 43.2 
A4 . 60540 * 4 1.38100 4.6 47.8 
AS . 79171 * 5 1.34317 4.5 52.3 
A6 . 71429 * 6 1.05409 3.5 55.8 
A7 . 74932 * 7 . 73940 2.5 58.2 
A8 . 59380 * 8 . 72900 2.4 60.7 
A9 . 53832 
A10 . 54022 
As it is clear form the table above, there is a considerable difference between 
factor 1 and factor 2; 9.58 in factor 1 to 1.77 (factor 2). 
Another interesting observation is concerned with the percentage of variance. 
From the initial statistics (refer to Appendix 7) they are respectively, 33.2 
(factor 1), 7.0 (factor 2), 6.5 (factor 3), and 5.9 (factor 4). Thus, the cumulative 
percentage of variance in factor 4 is 52.7%. 
7.3.2.1.6 - Interpretation of Factors 
A factor is a group of variables that have some characteristics in common. In 
order to find out if a group of variables have something in common it is 
necessary to know the correlation between each pair of variables. This is 
done by employing the technique of correlation. As discussed in previous 
sections, when a factor contains two or more variables with significant 
loadings (in the case of this research at least 0.50) it is referred to as a 
common factor and the variance of the variables in that factor is known as 
common variance (Child, 1990). The primary aim of factor analysis is the 
discovery of these common factors. It has been also observed before that 
common factors account for the intercorrelations between variables, and 
therefore, there are bound to be at least two variables involved. The technique 
385 
G. Santana Ch. 7- Data Analysis, Findings and Discussion 
of extracting the factors generally endeavours to take out as much common 
variance as possible in the first factor. Subsequent factors are, in turn, 
intended to account for the maximum amount of the remaining common 
variance until, hopefully, no common variance remains (Child, 1990). 
The factors in this research are observations of crisis preparedness of hotel 
organizations. In order to identify organizations that are "more prepared" and 
organizations that are "less prepared" for crisis, the researcher needed to go 
back to each individual case and see how each organization scored 
(subscribed) in each of the factors, and from that, establish which 
organizations are "prepared" and which one are "not prepared" for crises. But 
first, the interpretation and labeling of factors. 
Interpretation and labeling of factors is not a simple matter. It depends entirely 
on the discretion and understanding of the researcher. The process of giving 
meaning to the extracted factors involves substantive interpretation of the 
pattern of factor loadings for the variables in an effort to name each of the 
factors. As mentioned before, a significant level of factor loading has been 
selected (+0.50) and all significant factor loadings are used in the 
interpretation process. Variables with higher loadings influence to a greater 
extent the name or the label selected to represent a factor. 
The factor solution was derived from a common factor varimax rotation of the 
30 original variables (questionnaire 1). Below are all the extracted rotated 
factors, their variables and factor loadings, and factor names. Before that, the 
results of the Cronbach's Alpha Reliability Test on the internal consistency of 
the extracted factors were relatively high, as can be seen in Table 7.14 below. 
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Table 7.14 - Cronbach's Alpha Reliability Test of the Extracted Factors 
CRONBACH'S ALPHA RELIABILITY TEST - FACTOR 1 
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS - SCALE (ALPHA) 
Reliability Coefficients 
N of Cases = 54.0 N of Items =6 
Alpha = . 8536 
ell, 
r ONBACH'S ALPHA RELIABILITY TEST - FACTOR 2 
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS - SCALE (ALPHA) 
Reliability Coefficients 
N of Cases = 54.0 N of Items =4 
Alpha = . 7559 
CRONBACH'S ALPHA RELIABILITY TEST - FACTOR 3 
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS - SCALE (ALPHA) 
Reliability Coefficients 
N of Cases = 54.0 N of Items =3 
Alpha = . 7552 
CRONBACH'S ALPHA RELIABILITY TEST - FACTOR 4 
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS - SCALE (ALPHA) 
Reliability Coefficients 
N of Cases = 54.0 N of Items =4 
Alpha = . 7680 
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As discussed in section 7.3.2.1.4 above, the process of factor interpretation 
allowed interpretation to be done only up to factor 4. One reason for that is that 
factors 5,6, and 7 have only two variables and factor 8 only one variable. 
Moreover, given that the variables are unrelated to each other, a meaningful 
interpretation of those factors proved impossible. That is, factors 5,6,7, and 8 
do not "make sense" by themselves. Having said that, the following is the 
interpretation of factors 1 to 4. The interpretation in this section was done to 
find how meaningful the factors were in themselves (observing each 
individual variable) and to label the factors. A far more detailed and 
meaningful interpretation in the context of this study is done in later sections 
Factor 1 
FACTOR NAME: PRO-ACTIVENESS 
Factor 1 is the most important factor. It accounts for the greatest amount of 
variance (33.2%). Variable A12 is the most important variable, it has the 
highest loading in any factor (. 88140) and therefore influences dramatically 
the name and how the factor is interpreted. 
A 12 - Factor Loading =. 88 
- Any effort in relation to crisis before it happens (such as prevention) is a 
waste of time and money. 
A 22 - Factor loading =. 66 
- There is no need to involve employees and' the community in the crisis 
planning of our organization. 
A 16 - Factor loading =. 58 
- There is nothing to do in relation to crisis before it happens. 
A 15 - Factor loading =. 57 
- The range of crisis is so vast that 
it makes it impossible to make preparations. 
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A 27 - Factor loading = . 53 
- The establishment of relationship with interest-groups is a futile effort. They 
do not understand our business. 
A3- Factor loading =. 50 
- We just consider something to be a crisis if it happens to or hurts us. 
* Variables A12, A16, A15, and A3 all have the same underlying dimension: 
prevention and preparation. It can also be argued that variable A3, although 
not apparent, to a certain degree, has to do with prevention and preparation. 
The process of learning is directly related to prevention and preparation. By 
learning from other peoples' disasters, the organization is also improving the 
way it operates, deals with stakeholders, and how it goes about crisis 
management (prevention, preparations, etc. ). 
* Variables A22 and A27 can also be said to have a lot in common: The need 
to involve stakeholders in crisis planning (planning takes place before a crisis 
occurs - again, in the prevention and preparation stage). Stakeholders are key 
elements in any crisis management effort. As seen in previous chapters, a 
crisis is something that does not affect organizations alone, but other players 
as well. 
From the literature review these variables above (factor 1) constitute the most 
important ingredients for "good" crisis management. 
The PRO-ACTIVENESS factor has to do with companies being aware of the 
potential implications of a crisis and getting ready/prepared for the inevitable, 
taking into account their outer environment (e. g., their stakeholders). This 
factor reflects the importance of being pro-active in relation to a potential 
situation. Prevention and preparation are key elements as well as stakeholder 
involvement and learning. 
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FACTOR NAME: DENIAL 
Although the PRO-ACTIVENESS factor accounts for the largest amount of 
variance it does not mean that the other factors are unimportant. As mentioned 
before, the process of rotation redistributes the variance from earlier factors to 
later ones to achieve a more meaningful solution. The denial factor accounts 
for 7% of the variance and has the second highest loading in a variable 
(. 73286 in variable A29). Below are the variables and loadings of factor 2. 
A 29 - Factor loading =. 73 
- Environmental issue is a matter for politicians. We do not have to worry about 
it. 
A9- Factor loading = . 67 
- Past experiences has shown us that with time most crises resolve 
themselves. 
A 10 - Factor loading = . 56 
- If a crisis occurs, our management and technical people can fix it. Nothing 
special is required. 
A 11 - Factor loading = . 53 
- In the end, most crises turn out to be not very important. 
The DENIAL factor has to do, in contrast with factor 1, which is directly related 
to action (prevention, preparation, etc. ) in relation to crisis and crisis 
management, with executives getting away from everything: rejection of their 
responsibilities in relation to their own business and their outer environment 
(stakeholders), and playing down the importance/seriousness of a potential 
situation. It is as if those executives are saying: "It is not something we have to 
be worried with". This is about people denying everything. External 
factors/issues (such the environment) also should prompt management to be 
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well prepared and structured for potential crisis that might directly or indirectly 
be connected with those issues (for example, as a cause of, or as a 
consequence of a crisis). 
* Variables A9, Al 0, and Al 1 are grouped together since they reflect the same 
structure, i. e., crises need a timely and decisive response, and special 
requirements (such as crisis management planning, team, structure, etc. ) are 
necessary, because all crises are important and any crisis has the potential to 
ruin a business. 
* Variable A29. Preoccupation with larger (outside) crisis related issues (i. e., 
the environment). Again, this variable reflects management approach to the 
reality of responsibility and commitment to their business and their 
stakeholders. 
Factor 
FACTOR NAME: FATALISM /HOPELESSNESS 
As the name suggests, this factor has to do with the inevitability of crisis. 
History reveals and repeats itself in corporate affairs as far as crisis is 
concerned. The literature review in previous chapters stressed the fact that a 
crisis can happen at any time and in any kind of organization. As also 
witnessed time and time again, the media has very strong leverage in 
corporate affairs. The image/reputation of an organization is (to a very large 
degree) in the "hands" of the media. 
Having said that, this factor is related to the inevitability of crisis and the power 
of the media, and with the inability of management to act (at all levels) in 
relation to those issues. In this sense, management is totally powerless. 
A7- Factor loading =. 72 
- Crises do not happen in our organization. 
A6- Factor loading =. 70 
- The locations of our 
hotels make them immune to crises. 
391 
G. Santana Ch. 7= Data Analysis, Findings and Discussion 
A 19 - Factor loading =. 62 
- We do not regard the media as an important issue. It is easy to manipulate it. 
* Variables A7 and A6 are grouped together. They reflect the inevitability of 
crises. 
* Variable A19 reflects the importance of public opinion and image building 
and reputation. 
Thus, this factor has to do with those organizations that have a stale culture 
(and therefore believe in immunity) and those that have "given up" hope 
totally. As will became clear later in the following sections, even a certain level 
of arrogance was identified in the former. Ironically, those are the most 
vulnerable organizations and the ones that a crisis will have a devastating 
effect on because the people in those organizations instead of preparing 
themselves to the unexpected and inevitable prefer to believe in an "act of 
God". Variable Al 9 can also be said to be related to inevitability. The media is 
not easily manipulated and in the great majority of situations organizations are 
in a vulnerable position with regard to the media. Again, the issue of 
management's powerlessness can be applied and consequently the 
mechanism of fatalism/hopelessness. 
Factor 4 
FACTOR NAME: TECHNICAL DIMENSIONS 
Factor 4 is the last factor to be considered in this research. It accounts for 5.9% 
of the variance. The central issue in this factor reflects a very important fact in 
crisis management. For many different reasons, as will become clear in the 
next section, many executives relate crisis and crisis management to the 
material, "physical" aspect of their business. Therefore, there is a 
misconception that crises are events that affect only those aspects of 
operation. Having said that, crisis management for those executives involves 
actions or procedures that would be related to response to a technical failure 
or shortcoming. Crises, as extensively discussed in previous chapters, are not 
only of a technical nature. For example, if only the aspects of cause and 
consequence are considered, it becomes evident that crises have least effect 
in the physical/asset side of organizations. As revealed by many research 
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results discussed in Chapters 2,3,4, and 5, the great majority of crises are 
caused by human error, and the lasting consequences of a crisis (for example, 
trauma or other psychological effects) are felt in the human side of 
organizations. Having said that, where crisis management is concerned, one 
has to be prepared at other levels, not only technically, but also 
psychologically and emotionally. In this sense, the issue of safety (variable 
A26) is also directly related to the above discussion. The safety of both 
employees and guests is of prime importance in any business, specially in the 
hotel industry, and therefore everyone in the organization should be 
responsible for safety and needs to be involved in this process. The issue of 
communication, both internally and externally, is an extremely important one 
in crisis management. It requires special training and is vital if management is 
to succeed in the management of crisis. 
A 17 - Factor loading =. 57 
- Most of the crises have a technical solution. 
A 26 - Factor loading =. 55 
- Safety is the responsibility of top management, not of individual employees. 
A 18 - Factor loading =. 53 
- Whenever a crisis strikes, the application of technical and financial quick- 
fixes would resolve it. 
A 25 - Factor loading = . 51 
- Communication is not an important issue here. We understand each other. 
* Variables A17 and A18 are grouped: Crises are not a technical matter. 
Thus, this factor has to do with management reducing and narrowing all crises 
and crisis management issues and procedures to a technical perspective 
only. That is, crisis management can "almost" be an engineer's job, and in this 
sense the issue of safety becomes also related to the physical/plant hazards 
issues (excluding the emotional and psychological aspects), and 
communication can also be rotinized in a "mechanistic" way. 
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As mentioned earlier in this section, a more detailed analysis and 
interpretation of the factors in the context of this research is done in the 
following sections. 
7.4 - Identifying the Crisis Preparedness of Hotel Organizations - 
An Analysis of Both Factor Analysis Findings and Qualitative Analysis of 
j-nterview Data 
The cultural element of "favourability" to crisis 'management measured here 
are the rationalizations managers make in relation to crisis and crisis 
management. For that, an index of rationalizations with 30 variables 
(questionnaire 1), which are measured in an ordinal scale of 1 to 7, was 
developed. The sum of this index comprises the favourability of the culture of a 
particular organization to crisis management, that is whether the culture of an 
organization makes it "more prepared" or "less prepared for crisis". Factor 
analysis of this data has resulted in 4 (four) new dimensions (factors) which in 
turn provided the researcher with a new index of "favourabilities" (or 
rationalizations). In this new light, the researcher went back to main data 
(original) and examined how individual organizations performed (or 
subscribed) to those new (more relevant) dimensions. In other words, given 
these new dimensions, which organizations have a culture favourable to crisis 
management ("prepared") and which organizations do not have a culture 
favourable to crisis management ("not prepared"). The result of this analysis 
provided a continuum of "not prepared" organizations to "prepared" 
organizations. A sample of 5 (five) organizations from each extreme of the 
continuum was selected to satisfy both the first stage of the research 
(identification of crisis preparedness of hotel organizations) and the second 
stage of the research (stakeholder relationship). The objective of the second 
stage was to see whether the "prepared" organizations were more consistent 
in their view of stakeholder role and behaviour in distinct crisis situations than 
those organizations that have a culture that makes them less prepared to 
crisis. But first, the process of identifying which organizations are "more 
prepared" to crisis and which organizations are the "least prepared" to crisis. 
As mentioned above, the researcher, with the new set of more relevant 
dimensions (factors), went back to the original data and analyzed how each 
individual respondent subscribed to each individual factor. An aggregate 
measure of crisis preparedness consisting of the scores of individual 
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respondents in each extracted factor (using the index of rationalizations) was 
then obtained. In another words, the sum of the scores of the index of 
rationalizations (in each factor) comprises the favourability of the culture of a 
particular organization to crisis management (i. e., whether the culture of an 
organization makes it "more prepared" or "less prepared" to crisis). However, 
given that each factor has its own individual percentage of variance (the 
amount of total variance accounted for by each factor), the researcher could 
not simply add the sum of the indexes of each factor to obtain the total score. A 
"weight" system was necessary so to have a proper balance between each 
value obtained in each factor. That is, the sum of the index of factor 1 (that 
accounts for 33.2 percent of variance) could not be added to the sum of the 
index of factor 2 (that accounts for only 7.0 percent of variance). Therefore, for 
each individual respondent score in each factor, the researcher multiplied that 
score by the amount of variance that each factor accounted for. For example, 
for the scores in factor 4 (that accounts for only 5.9% of the variance) not to be 
considered as having the same weight as factor 1 (33.2% of variance) the 
amount of variance in factor 4 (5.9) was divided by the amount of variance in 
factor 1 (33.2) to obtain the "weighted" value. This value was then applied 
(multiplied) in all scores in factor 4. 
This procedure was done with all other factors' amount of variance: 
Factor 1: 33.2/33.2 =1 
Factor 2: 7.0/33.2 = 0.21 
Factor 3: 6.6/33.2 = 0.198 
Factor 4: 5.9/33.2 = 0.177 
To obtain the index in each factor the procedure was to add all the scores in 
each individual variable. The result was then divided by the number of 
variables in each factor and multiplied by the weighted value (relative amount 
of variance accounted for by each factor) of each factor. Figure 7.5 illustrate 
this procedure applied for respondent number 1 in factor 3: 
395 
G. Santana Ch. 7" Data Analysis, Findings and Discussion 
Figure 7.5 - Example of Procedure Applied to Obtain the Index in Each Factor 
Variables A7 A6 A19 Score Weighted Score 
577 19 1.27 
Where: 19/3'20/100 = 1.27 
20 = 6.6/33.2 = 0.198 = 0.20 
6.6 = amount of variance factor 3 
33.2 = amount of variance factor 1 
(0.20 = weighted amount of variance) 
Having done that to each factor, the sums of those indexes were obtained. 
The results of this analysis consisted of a measure of crisis "preparedness", 
and provided a continuum -of crisis "not prepared" to crisis "prepared" 
organizations. For details of this analysis, refer to Appendix 14. Figure 7.6 
below is the "preparedness" continuum. 
A7 A6 A19 Score Weighted Score 
5 7 7 19 1.27 
396 
G. Santana Ch. 7- Data Analysis Endings and Discussion 
Figure 7.6 - Crisis Preparedness Continuum 
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7.4.1 - Cultural Profile of "Prepared" and "Not Prepared" Organizations 
A basic notion of organizational culture is that it has an existential function in 
organizations (Pauchant and Mitroff, 1992). One of the fundamental functions 
of organizations is to produce goods and services; indeed, an organization is 
often defined as a grouping of individuals who cooperate with each other with 
the common purpose or the politically defined goal of accomplishing 
something that they could not do individually. However, allowing individuals to 
produce some goods and services is not the only function of organizations. 
Another is providing people with an escape from their anxiety. This existential 
function explains why some people will embrace and protect the norms 
developed in an organization, even if they lead to crises. In crisis prone 
organizations, managers and employees are very skilled at developing 
rationalizations that will validate their day-to-day actions, disregarding the fact 
that these actions can lead, after a while, to crises (Pauchant and Mitroff, 
1992). Thus, what holds these organizations together, that forms the culture of 
such organizations, that is at the basis of decisions and actions, is the set of 
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sometimes faulty assumptions or rationalizations that the members of the 
organization have developed' (Smith, 1990; Booth 1993; Mitroff and Pearson 
1993a; Allcorn, 1995; Fink, 1986). Several researchers have argued that 
organizational actions are characterized by those very rigid underlying 
assumptions which are difficult to change (Schein, 1990a; Ott, 1989; Kekäle 
and Kekäle, 1995; Bass and Avolio, 1994; Klein aLgj, 1995; Allcorn, 1995; 
Cooke and Rousseu, 1988; Weick, 1987,1988; Mitroff, 1988a; Shrivastava, 
1992; Smith, 1990; Pauchant and Mitroff, 1988; Smith and Sipika, 1993; 
Booth, 1993; Mitroff and Pearson, 1993a; Mitroff -el, 1989; Miller, 1988; Fink, 
1986; Pheysey, 1993; Mitroff and Kilmann, 1984; Starbuck, 1983; Weick, 
1984). Such assumptions, for example, "any effort in relation to crisis before it 
happens - such as prevention - is a waste of time and money", may persist 
despite strong historical evidence to the contrary (e. g., poor performance in 
prior crises), keeping the organization's crisis preparedness low. Therefore, 
culture is the fundamental issue that determines what 'an organization really 
does (if anything) in relation to crisis management. This set of less observable, 
largely unconscious factors exert a strong, if not decisive, effect on the 
behaviour of all organizations. The displayed behaviour (rationalizations) that 
executives make in relation to crisis and crisis management determines how 
prone or prepared an organization is to crisis. 
The factor solution obtained from the original set of rationalizations revealed 
that crisis preparedness in the 33 hotel groups under investigation can be 
explained by 4 dimensions: "Pro-activeness", "Denial", "Fatalism/ 
Hopelessness", and "Technical". In order to investigate and develop the 
cultural profile of hotel organizations, the researcher selected a sample of five 
organizations from each extreme of the continuum. The interview data and the 
data from questionnaire 2 are also used here to support and better illustrate 
and complement the findings in the research. It is important to note that 
although the data and issues from the interview and questionnaire 2 are of a 
more practical nature, the present research is looking beyond the formal 
levels of crisis management structure in organizations; in another words, the 
main interest is in the cultural aspects of organizations in relation to crisis and 
crisis management. However, some elements of crisis management structure 
were explored in an attempt to observe whether there was any correlation 
between the cultural and the formal aspect of the organizations. 
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7.4.1.1 - Crisis Management Structure 
As mentioned previously in this chapter and in Chapter 6, a full descriptive 
account of the hotel groups structure under investigation is not directly related 
to the relevance of this study. The formal structure of an organization plays, as 
mentioned in previous chapters and in this one, a relatively minor part as to 
whether an organization is "crisis prepared" or not. What is decisive and 
determines their preparedness to crisis is their culture. Having said that, this 
section looks briefly at the crisis management structure of the groups under 
investigation. 
Of the 33 hotel groups investigated, only eight groups had 'a formal crisis 
management structure. However, crisis management capacity, as it is 
observed in the light of this research, could only be found in one organization. 
Although the other seven hotel groups claimed to have a crisis management 
capacity, in six of the hotel groups they only had in place a mere contract with 
a public relations firm. As mentioned in Chapter 2, to use public relations in 
this way is nothing more than damage limitation. The crisis has already 
happened. By that, the researcher is not diminishing the importance of public 
relations in crisis management efforts, but if used in this way, public relations 
is reduced to a reactive role änd not as a pro-active one. From the point of 
view of a "crisis prepared" organization, public relations should be used first 
and foremost prior to a crisis event to enhance stakeholders relationships and 
to (at some extent) prevent a crisis from occurring in the first place. 
It was interesting to notice that of those organizations that have a "crisis 
management structure" only two of those organizations are in the "prepared" 
extreme of the continuum. The other extreme ("not prepared") has one 
organization which has a crisis management structure. The other five 
organizations fall in the middle zone of the continuum. This finding somehow 
supports the views of some researchers (such as Mitroff and Pearson, Reilly, 
Weick, and others) in that having a crisis management capacity does not in 
itself makes an organization prepared to crisis. In fact, if anything, it reinforces 
the view that organizational culture is the fundamental issue as to the crises 
preparedness of organizations. As mentioned previously in other chapters, by 
having a crisis management "manual" or similar without a strong culture that 
supports it, gives management the false impression that they are prepared to 
deal with the challenges of a crisis. 
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Another interesting observation regarding the formalization side of 
organizations, was the position (level of responsibility in the organization) of 
the respondent in relation to its preparedness to crisis. It was interesting to find 
that in the "prepared" extreme of the continuum there were two top executives 
(one managing director and one chief executive officer), two top marketing 
executives (one director of sales and marketing and one marketing director), 
and one executive from the "operations" category (vice-president of human 
resources). Similarly, from the "not prepared" extreme of the continuum, there 
were also two top executives (one managing director and one chief executive 
officer), two top marketing executives (marketing director and marketing 
manager), and one executive from "operations" (personnel assistant). 
7.4.2 - Cultural Profile of "Prepared" and "Not Prepared" Organizations by 
E= 
For the purpose of this research, a sample of five organizations from each 
extreme of the "preparedness" continuum has been selected to satisfy both 
the research question and research proposition. Below are detailed analyses 
of those organizations in relation to crisis and crisis management in a factor by 
factor account. 
7.4.2.1 - "Pro-activeness" 
Pro-activieness is the most important ingredient of effective crisis 
management. As seen in Chapter 2, a crisis can only be avoided if one is 
proactive - preparing, preventing, and creating the mechanisms needed to 
deal with all phases and aspects of a crisis. Johnson&Johnson is a good 
example of a company that behaved proactively in a crisis of great proportion. 
In fact, Johnson&Johnson has been quoted and portrayed, rightly so, as a 
corporate role model for how to deal with a major crisis. Johnson&Johnson's 
overall approach to the crisis was a rational one. They treated the media/press 
with respect and their reaction to the problem was a rational one (not with 
anger). The company even kept a faithful amount of press inquires so that the 
company could get back with information as soon as events unfolded and they 
could gather the information required. Their response was effectively and 
swiftly to the general American public and thus restored confidence both in it 
as a company and in Tylenol as a product. Against the advice of the FBI 
(Federal Bureau of Intelligence), Johnson&Johnson withdrew Tylenol from the 
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market, thus earning the trust and confidence of the American public in that 
they were prepared to "do the right thing". This response allowed 
Johnson&Johnson to bring Tylenol back to the market successfully, until the 
second crisis when they no longer felt that they could protect the drug 
(Tylenol) adequately in its present form. Other organizations, such as Exxon, 
have now earned the contempt and general distrust of the public. 
Factor 1 has to do with being prepared, being pro-active in relation to crisis 
and crisis management. This factor basically deals with two myths that arise 
perpetually in human affairs and that constantly need to be addressed. One is 
that there can be perfect or complete control of complex human situations. The 
other is that no control is possible at all. Moreover, given the nature of some 
rationalizations in factor 1 (A12 - "Any effort in relation to crisis before it 
happens (such as prevention) is a waste of time and money. "; A16 - "There is 
nothing to do in relation to crisis before it happens. "; A15 - "The range of crisis 
is so vast that it makes it impossible to make preparations. "; and to some 
extent A3 - "We just consider something to be a crisis if it happens to or hurts 
us. "), one can also assume that the element of crisis uniqueness plays a very 
strong part in this factor. As discussed in Chapter 2, it is true that every crisis 
involves an element of uniqueness. However, this does not mean that there 
are no general or generic features of crises or effective procedures for 
handling them whatsoever. All human situations involve an element of 
uniqueness. The main purpose of training, exercises, simulations, etc., is not 
to avoid crisis or potential threatening situations all together, rather, it is to 
prepared individuals to deal with and respond to generic situations when they 
arise. Military strategy, training and exercises are based on this principle. As 
no two battles are ever alike, generals realized long ago that soldiers needed 
basic training before being sent into battle. Even though the training is not 
perfect, basic training lowers substantially the physical and emotional 
casualties due to war. In the same line as mentioned above, one of the 
purposes of military basic training is not to avoid all casualties whatsoever, but 
precisely to free soldiers to think about the unique features of battle that 
cannot be planned for. The assumption is that soldiers will be freer to deal 
with the unique features that arise if the generic features have been planned 
for (Mitroff and Pauchant, 1990). Therefore, planning, simulation exercise, and 
scenario analysis are extremely important. 
Culturally and socially, the modern business world and the systems that 
support it (such as the educational system) have been focusing their efforts on 
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issues that only promote success, such as higher productivity, improved 
quality, improved performance, etc. Although there is nothing wrong with 
those principles in themselves, in order to achieve them the current 
knowledge in designing innovative and performing organizations tends to 
increase their degree of complexity and fragility (Pauchant and Douville, 
1993). As mentioned in previous chapters, the negative (or destructive) 
potential of those organizations in many instance far outweighs their 
productive potential and the social benefits they claim. Authors like Weick 
(1987), Mitroff and Pauchant (1990), Fink (1986), Staw et at (1981), Smart and 
Vertinsky (1984,1977), Turner (1976), Mitroff and Kilmann (1984), Perrow 
(1984), among others, have long ago called attention to the fact that the 
negative effect of technology (technology in a broader sense) exceeds the 
ability of our organizations and management structures to control them. The 
main issue here is that people are not as complex as the problems they create 
and therefore are unable to resolve them. Management abilities are not 
complex enough to sense and anticipate the problems generated by those 
systems. Moreover, given the anxiety and other psychological and emotional 
effects of a crisis on those that are responsible to manage them, this invariably 
reduces their ability to act. Crisis intervention, then, has the potential to 
exacerbate rather than reduce the problem. Having said that, it appears that 
the main result of economic, administrative and educational efforts and drives 
to issues that promote success meant that mangement is not prepared 
psychologically, emotionally, and technically to deal with the inevitable: crises. 
In this context, one should also appreciate and acknowledge that any and all 
organizations are now subject to every known and conceivable type of crisis. 
In addition, in our modern times a crisis never occurs singly or in isolation. 
Crises increasingly occur in clusters, setting a chain reaction of other crises as 
part of the initial one. Being pro-active, planning for, preparing for, and training 
for crises is the only possible way management can avert crises and, when 
they do occur, manage them effectively. 
Having said that, "prepared" and "not prepared" hotel organizations differ 
considerably in their believes and practices regarding all the issues discussed 
above. 
From the sample of the "prepared" organizations in this study, one hotel group 
has been investing in crisis management for the last ten years. The amount of 
resources devoted to crisis management has been constantly increased over 
the years and clearly reflects management's awareness of the growing 
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prospects of more complex vulnerabilities. It was interesting to learn that this 
organization suffered a very severe crisis in the past. Their interest in crisis 
management, therefore, is not without precedent. Having said that, their effort 
is very comprehensive (comprehensiveness is seen here in terms of the 
extent of crisis management efforts, activities, training, perception of crises 
themselves and their impact both on the business and on stakeholders). This 
organization, in particular, will be referred to as organization "A" from now on. 
Crisis management is a high priority function for this organization and they 
look far beyond that which is expected by the researcher in this industry. 
Simulation exercises are carried out (they place great emphasis not only in 
the media - as does others in the "prepared" category - but also on crime, 
death, physical disaster, even an airplane crashing into one of their hotels), 
they work closely with stakeholders (in particular the police, community 
leaders, the City, competitors, suppliers, the media, and interest groups), they 
acknowledge that a crisis will affect not only themselves and their direct 
interests, but can also impact far beyond their routine and address this issue 
with great responsibility. 
Other organizations in the "prepared" side, although not as comprehensive as 
the one mentioned above, had no simulation exercise whatsoever, but 
showed nevertheless some similar characteristics. For instance, one 
organization had expanded the only real crisis management effort it had in 
place (media training) to other crisis management training such as procedures 
to deal with outbreaks of food poisoning (this was in the form of preventive 
exercises at hotel group level, and how to deal with this event once it 
happened), evaluation of other crises' impact, such as employee crime, on 
their business (crisis management efforts such as this one meant that the 
personnel department had to work closely with not only other departments 
within the organization but also a great deal of involvement with other 
stakeholders was necessary for crisis prevention and management planning), 
and crisis training was being conducted with lower level employees, not just 
top management. Another organization was planning (at the time of the 
interview) to develop closer relationships with stakeholders, specially in the 
area of crime prevention, in their international operation. 
Apart from organization "A", in general, the difference between the other 
"prepared" organizations in relation to their crisis "preparedness" is one of 
approach and also of substance. It has to be said again that organization "A" 
stands alone in many issues like investment, stakeholder involvement in crisis 
403 
G. Santana Ch. 7- Data Analysis, Findings and Discussion 
planning, and other efforts in crisis management. The differences then for the 
other organizations on the "prepared" side of the continuum are more subtle. 
As mentioned in the previous section, only two organizations in this extreme of 
the continuum have a "crisis management structure". The other three 
organizations have no crisis management structure or other "formal" 
arrangements to deal with crisis apart from contracts with public relations 
companies. Even here there are some differences as to how the organizations 
address and conduct their "media" effort. While two organizations relied solely 
on an external contract with a public relations company to take care of 
corporate communications in the event of a crisis, another organization had 
an internal communication officerthat was responsible for this function. While 
the latter organization expanded its media training to other management level 
employees (not only top executives), the other two organizations had no 
intention of investing management time and effort in media training. 
Another example of the difference of approach is that while organization "A" 
has a crisis management structure for the whole organization (at all levels), 
another organization which also has a "crisis management structure" has 
individual plans for individual properties and the management of this business 
function is left to the discretion of individual managers. The researcher 
believes that although individual properties need a specific crisis 
management approach that would address its peculiarities and environment, 
a certain degree of control (not centralization) by head office is important, if not 
only for the reasons given in Chapter 6 (i. e., when a serious crisis happens 
inevitably the top executive at corporate level is the one that not only will be 
asked to answer questions, but also will be the person that will be judged and 
associated with the organization's performance prior to, during, and, if it 
survives, after the crisis). It is worth reinforcing here that organization "A" is 
more "advanced" in the field of crisis management and in some issues it 
cannot be compared directly with others that also fall into the "prepared" end 
of the continuum. 
By contrast, organizations on the other extreme of the continuum showed a 
reactive attitude towards crisis and crisis management. Although all 
respondents in the "not prepared" organizations acknowledged that crisis 
management is an important issue, not much has been done towards it. Only 
one organization on the "not prepared" side of the continuum considered that 
they had a "crisis management structure". For the other four organizations in 
this side of the continuum no training whatsoever is provided for crisis 
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purposes, apart from what the law requires (i. e., fire drills, etc. ). It appears that 
crisis management is something that is not of high priority for those 
organizations, even though they conceded that it is "an important issue". For 
instance, one executive revealed that, "unless a crisis happens, and it should 
be a severe one, nothing will be done". This view is furthered explained when 
the following question was put to the same executive: "What do you consider 
to be a crisis status for your organization? " The executive replied that, "if it is 
not earth shattering it is not a crisis". Similar views (a crisis is a crisis if it only 
seriously threat the survival of the organization) were found in other "not 
prepared" organizations. The answer to this question by executives in 
"prepared" organizations were quite different. Executives in "prepared" 
organizations tended to consider, or label something as a crisis, in far less 
dramatic situations. The difference between "prepared" and "'not prepared" 
organizations here again is that one is pro-active and the other is reactive. 
"Prepared" organizations tend to consider or label an event as a crisis by 
looking, evaluating, and measuring its potential effect and impact on their 
business if the issue or event is not addressed. They do not wait for an issue 
to grow out of proportion and control, engulf parts of, or the whole 
organization, to decide whether the issue is a crisis or not, and only then 
decide to act. Another difference of this emphasis of approach can be seen yet 
again in employee training. One executive of a "prepared" organization said 
that crisis management is an integral part of their business, and emphasized 
that in employee training, at any level, they are not only introduced to their 
own duties and responsibilities but also to the disastrous effects of their 
potential errors. 
There is however, a worrying observation. Apart from organization "A", all 
other organizations in this research, both "prepared" and "not prepared", have 
shown a tendency to consider or relate crises to physical issues (i. e., fire, 
floodings, plant defect, etc. ) or health-related issues. Those issues are to 
some extent regulated by law. The researcher was hoping to identify others, 
more subtle issues that the hotel industry, like any other, is susceptible to, 
such as employee boycott, white collar crime, media exposure, etc. This point 
leads again to the essential aspect of simulation in crisis management. Apart 
from organization "A" in the "prepared" extreme of the continuum, and one 
organization in the "not prepared" extreme that has a "crisis management 
structure" (from now on organization "B"), not one organization has any kind of 
simulation exercises apart from media training and for what the law requires, 
such as fire drills. As already mentioned above, only very recently other types 
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of crisis training (apart from media training) had been put into place. Another 
organization had only plans to make use of crisis training and was waiting for 
the budget. It gives the impression that if left by themselves, those 
organizations will do nothing to try to avert crises or prepare for them. 
Simulation exercises, as already expressed above, are a fundamental issue 
not only in crisis prevention and preparation but also for the management of 
crises, should they occur, and for the recovery period. Organizations "A" and 
"B" simulate a number of other situations (apart from simulation for the media), 
such as suicides on their properties and procedures to deal with relatives, 
foreign embassies and consulates; crime; natural disasters; potential 
situations related to their shareholders (the "City", for example); and even an 
airplane crashing into one of their hotels; among others. 
Stakeholders play a great part in all stages of crisis management. As seen in 
Chapters 2,3,4, and 5, a crisis affects not only the organization where it 
occurs, but also a great number of other interested parties are affected directly 
or indirectly. A good relationship and set of business practices with 
stakeholders can mean survival and prosperity when the issue is crises. 
Stakeholders can help an organization avoid crisis, prevent and prepare for 
those that are unavoidable, and can play a central role in the recovery of any 
crisis sufferer. As argued by Booth (1993, pp. 86), "Crisis can be seen as an 
opportunity as much as a threat for many involved in a crisis. Crisis often 
opens up new possibilities and liberates innovatory ideas. " Rationalizations 
A22 ("There is no need to involve employees and the community in the crisis 
planning of our organization. ") and A27 ("The establishment of relationship 
with interest-groups is a futile effort. They do not understand our business. ") 
address this issue. As already mentioned, "prepared" organizations have a 
greater regard to their "social partners" than those organizations that are "not 
prepared" for crisis. 
A good example of the importance and relevance of stakeholder involvement 
and participation in crisis management was experienced by an organization 
on the "prepared" extreme of the continuum. This organization is the annual 
sponsor of a major international sporting event in the UK, which gets a 
worldwide media coverage. The managing director of this organization gave 
the example of one particular situation in that if it were not for their investment 
both in crisis management and stakeholder relationship for crisis prevention 
and management, they would have been in a very serious situation. For this 
particular sporting event the organization, conjointly with a set of stakeholders 
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and interest parties, developed and implemented a system for crisis 
monitoring, identification, and classification. This specifically designed system 
for this event provided them with some disturbing information which was 
filtered to some stakeholders which in turn acted together to solve the 
potential crisis. A major crisis was avoided. The executive was very keen to 
stress that the only reason they could "defuse" the problem and avoid a major 
crisis was because of their combined high investment in crisis management 
and their very good and extensive relationship with their business/social 
partners. Another important point in this particular situation was that several 
meetings took place following the incident so that the organization and other 
stakeholders could learn the lessons and evaluate their actions and be 
prepared for more preventive actions for future events. 
In contrast, "not prepared" organizations generally firmly believe that 
stakeholders, apart from stockholders and other groups "essential" to their 
operations, have nothing to do with their business. This attitude is clearly 
reflected where crisis management is concerned. For instance, and as 
mentioned above, crisis training in most of the organizations is very limited 
and restricted to public relations only. This fact leads to the conclusion that 
even the employees (a stakeholder) are neglected by "not prepared" 
organizations. Apart from organization "B", no other organization carries out 
any kind of simulation exercises, what in effect means that stakeholders are 
not considered in any way for any potential threatening situation apart from 
those that the law requires (fire, health and safety). Those organizations are 
then not only missing the opportunity to be in a better position should a crisis 
strike but are also neglecting their responsibilities to the potential victims of 
their crises. 
Without a doubt, one of the most difficult issues in the whole area of crisis 
management is the amount of resources (financial/material and human) that 
should be allocated to crisis management efforts. Although this study did not 
investigate this area specifically, it was clear from the responses that this is a 
paramount issue. For those organizations that are involved in crisis 
management no mention of budget allocation or similar information could be 
gained. Even the situation above, where the organization is actively involved 
in crisis prevention/preparation, dealing with stakeholders, etc., no information 
whatsoever in this regard was possible to obtain. Although the managing 
director involved was helpful and willing to describe their approach and 
strategy to crisis and crisis management, he was unwilling to discuss the issue 
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of investment or budget allocation for those purposes, apart from saying that it 
was "substantial". The area of financing for crisis prevention/preparation is a 
very weak one and more research into the "cost benefit" analysis of how much 
financial or other efforts an organization should spend on crisis management 
is needed. As mentioned before, the fact that crisis management is a very 
secretive business, also contributes to lack of information on this issue. 
Some experiences, however, point to how one ought to think about this 
matter. For example, three years before the World Trade Center bomb attack 
in New York, Fiduciary Trust International, an investment firm that at the time 
had US$ 291 million in assets and an empty office on the 94th floor of the 
World Trade Center Tower Two, carried out an assessment of its own 
vulnerabilities. The outcome of this assessment indicated that Lower 
Manhattan was a highly probable target for terrorism attack and that bombing 
was the most likely attack. By planning ahead, Fiduciary Trust International 
had 400 of its 500 New York employees back at work on Monday, March 1, 
1993, one short weekend after the February 26 bomb attack. An employee 
arriving to work that Monday in back-up office space in a 155,000 square-foot 
warehouse in New Jersey, commented that their clients did not notice any 
interruption (Tetzeli, 1993). In another instance, one company spent US$ 
600,000 backing up its extensive telecommunications and computer facilities 
prior to the fire that disrupted a major telephone switching station of Illinois 
Bell in the Chicago area. Six hundred thousand U. S. dollars is certainly a 
considerable amount of money. However, as a result of this investment, the 
company did not lose US$ 20 million in business as a result of the fire. From 
this standpoint 3% (or US$ 600,000) is a wise investment against US$ 20 
million. Further, the company was able to make a significant increase in its 
share of the market since it was able to conduct business while its competitors 
were not. 
The issue of investment is a very delicate one. Different industries require 
different approaches and indeed, in this case, each individual hotel property 
might have its own requirements. As only one organization (organization "A") 
in this research has a "true" crisis management structure in place, it has been 
difficult to assess the issue of investment. Moreover, as mentioned before, 
crisis management appears to be an issue of great secrecy in the hotel 
industry, and consequently, the financing that goes with it is hard to dicover. 
Having said that, it was not the aim of this research to get into this area, but 
nevertheless, it is an important issue and an area that needs more attention. 
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It is important to stress here that although the expression "not prepared 
organizations" is used here extensively, it is not the intention to conceptualize 
the organization as an entity that exists independently of those who manage it. 
The fundamental difference between the two sets of organizations in each 
extreme of the continuum lies in the concept of responsibility. The concept of 
responsibility serves to reinforce the notion that it is only the individuals 
present inside and outside of an organization who can feel, think and act. 
Being "prepared" means first and foremost being responsible for one's own 
acts. 
The proper way to think about crisis management is not as insurance or a 
luxury that one indulges in if one has the time and money to spend. Rather, 
crisis management cannot really be separated from the day-to-day ongoing 
conduct of one's business. Crisis management is central to the conduct of 
everyday business in that a major crisis can seriously derail any business. 
This does not mean that crisis management does not involve special training 
or skills. Rather, these kinds of skills need to become part of the new skills that 
are necessary to compete in the global economy. 
Having said that, there appears to exist a correlation between the beliefs of 
organizations in relation to crisis and crisis management and the practical 
actions they take towards those issues. Organizations that are "prepared" for 
crisis, in general, have a pro-active approach to crisis and crisis management. 
They invest in crisis preventive and preparation capabilities, their training 
programme involves different layers of employees in the organization and 
goes well beyond the common media training. Crisis "prepared" organizations 
views and concepts of crises are broad ones, they consider or label an issue 
as a crisis by first identifying, monitoring, and evaluating an issue or event's 
impact on their business and on their operating environment (stakeholders). In 
their planning and training, relevant stakeholders are considered and 
involved. In contrast, "not prepared" organizations only consider an issue to 
be a crisis if it seriously threatens the survival of the organization. The main 
difference here between the two sets of organizations is that "prepared" 
organizations do not wait for a crisis to happen for them to act, or to decide 
whether an issue is indeed a crisis and what kind of attention should be given 
to the problem. "Not prepared" organization have a typically reactive approach 
to crisis and crisis management. They believe, erroneously, that any effort 
towards crisis management is a waste of time and financial resources. 
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Therefore, their investment in crisis management is negligible and not 
focused. Their training is very limited, and in general is narrowed to media 
training. 
7.4.2.2 - "i l" 
Denial is a defense mechanism and is the expressed refusal to acknowledge 
a threatening reality or realities. The main purpose of a defense mechanism is 
to help people avoid having to deal with complex, potentially threatening 
situations that, if acknowledged, would overwhelm their ability to cope 
(Pauchant and Mitroff , 1992). According to Allcorn (1995, pp. 76), denial is "an 
out of awareness process that involves the loss of awareness of some 
undesirable aspect of self, others, or events. " 
All individuals in all organizations (well-prepared or not) use this mechanism 
from time to time, the difference is in its degree, the extent, and the frequency 
with which they use it. Factor 2 has to do, in contrast, with factor 1 which is 
directly related to action in relation to crisis and crisis management, with 
executives avoiding every crisis management responsibility. For example, 
executives in "not prepared" organizations downplay (as in rationalization Al 1 
- "In the end, most crises turn out to be not very important") the 
seriousness/importance of a potential situation. In another example, 
rationalization A29 ("Environmental issue is a matter for politicians. We do not 
have to worry about it"), executives in "not prepared" organizations effectively 
claimed that crisis management responsibility is a matter for others. This 
rationalization is false, since, and specifically in the tourism/hotel industry, the 
environment is one of the most treasured assets. Furthermore, in an 
interdependent world (as noted in Chapter 4), anyone's crisis is everyone's 
crisis. In this sense, this rationalization also shows that "not prepared" 
organizations by denying their responsibility to crisis management are also 
denying their responsibility to all other stakeholders. In effect, executives on 
this side of the continuum are claiming that if a crisis occurs it will happen only 
to themselves and not to any other players in the social system. It is more or 
less trying to convince the families living in Bhopal that the gas leak 
"happened" only to Union Carbide. 
it is worth contrasting here the opinions of executives in "prepared" and "not 
prepared" hotel organizations in relation to the issue of responsibility. As seen 
in previous chapters, a crisis never happens only to one organization, it does 
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not occur in isolation. It was observed in this study that for crisis "not prepared" 
organizations, a crisis not only happens to them only, but also is caused by 
external forces. For example, when asked about the relationship between the 
hotel industry and crisis ("What relationship do you think the industry has to 
crises? Is it a vulnerable one? "), one executive replied that the industry is 
vulnerable to crisis and completed that the crises experienced by the hotel 
industry were "all caused by things like wars, recession, governmental issues, 
national and international politics. " Previous researches, as can be seen in 
Chapter 2, revealed that most of industrial and commercial crises to date 
(more than 80%) are self-induced crisis. Indeed, work by Pauchant and Mitroff 
(1988), Mitroff etal (1989), Fink (1986), Perrow (1984), Shrivastava (1992), 
and others, revealed that the culture of an organization can be its worst enemy 
in creating crises. Yet, those organizations still believe that crises belong to 
the world outside of their organizations. Those organizations, as is discussed 
below, are the same ones that also believe that crises do not occur in their 
organizations. In another instance, when asked about their own organizations' 
main concerns should a major crisis strike, it was also interesting (but not a 
surprise) to observe that their ("not prepared") considerations are only related 
to their own direct interests, for example, "safety of guests", "damage to 
property", "profitability", "long term survival", and "bad press". In contrast, 
organizations on the "prepared" side of the continuum have a more broader 
understanding and view of their responsibility not only with their direct 
interests but also with the larger environment in which they operate. As 
mentioned in the previous section, "prepared" organizations are actually 
actively involving stakeholders in their crisis planning, and working with 
stakeholders in preparing for and preventing crisis. 
To the question of vulnerability to crisis of the hotel industry, the majority of the 
response by both "prepared" and "not prepared" organizations was that "yes", 
the hotel industry is more vulnerable to crisis then other industries. The main 
reason given for that vulnerability was the fact that a hotel is basically dealing 
with people all the time. In the words of one executive from a crisis "prepared" 
organization, "people create a great deal of uncertainties". However, this 
executive emphasized that it is the executive's responsibility to anticipate 
guests' anxieties and at the same time provide the service their guests 
deserve. Another executive explained that , "people by nature are 
undisciplined, they create problems, and those problems should be 
anticipated and prepared for" (this executive also belongs to a "prepared" 
organization). To the question of their main concern should a major crisis 
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strike, executives in the "prepared" side agreed in that their concern is "to the 
way it is handled", that "people should know what to do". This is a very 
interesting point. They not only acknowledge the fact that a crisis may occur, 
but they also prepare for it and evaluate their organizations' performance in 
dealing with it. One executive expressed that preparation is essential because 
"one can account for many of the impacts of a crisis and in this sense one can 
secure the safety of guests, staff, and the survival of the business". Having 
said that, both "prepared" and "not prepared" organizations mentioned as their 
first major concern, the safety of their guests. Here again, it can be observed 
that the industry relates crises to issues like fire, or health-related problems. 
The prospect of a different kind of crisis was. never mentioned when this 
question was asked. 
Another example of denial behaviour can be observed in relation to 
rationalizations A9 ("Past experience has shown us that with time most crises 
resolve themselves"), A10 ("If a crisis occurs, our management and technical 
people can fix it. Nothing special is required"), and again All ("In the end, 
most crises turn out to be not very important"). It is a known fact that crises 
need a timely and decisive response, and special requirements (such as 
planning, training, etc. ) is paramount to succeed in a crisis situation. A 
problem, if left unattended, tends to grow and not disappear. Again, 
"prepared" and "not prepared" organizations not only disagree fundamentally 
on those believes but their practical actions also differ considerably in relation 
to the above issues. For example, "prepared" organizations put a 
considerable effort in prevention and preparation and regard any crisis as 
having a potentially detrimental effect on their business. Not that "not 
prepared" organizations see crises as not detrimental, but "prepared" 
organizations do something about it prior to its occurrence, as discussed in 
the previous section. An element of disavowal (acknowledgment of a 
threatening reality but downplaying its importance) can also be observed in 
those rationalizations. This is. a defense mechanism by which the mind sees 
the danger in front of it but downgrades its importance. Pauchant and Mitroff 
(1992, pp. 75 - quoting May, 1950) give an example of these defensive 
mechanisms in that the stress of battle can be so great that some soldiers 
react by behaving as if there were no war at all, or believing that they are 
immortal. Similarly, one can conclude that "not prepared" organizations are 
also making use of this defensive mechanism since they agree and believe in 
the rationalizations above. 
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Although "prepared" and "not prepared" organizations regard crisis as 
something related to the physical aspect of their business (i. e., fire, flooding, 
computer breakdown, etc. ), there is a fundamental difference between the two 
sets of organizations in relation to what they consider to be a crisis status, or a 
crisis situation. "Not prepared" organizations only consider their organization 
to be in crisis status when its very existence is at stake. In contrast, "prepared" 
organizations not only consider a less dramatic event to be a crisis, but a crisis 
for those organizations is, in general, any potential situation that would have a 
negative impact on their business. They do not need to see their hotels in 
flames to act or acknowledge that they have a problem. It can also be said that 
the "not prepared" organizations seem to suffer from "technophilia" (Roszak, 
T., 1986, in Pauchant and Mitroff, 1992, pp. 99). It consists of applying to a 
problem a limited and fragmented number of solutions that all 'too often make 
things worse (as in rationalization A10). 
Having said that, all individuals in all organizations use the defensive 
mechanism of "denial". What separates "prepared" and "not prepared" 
organizations is the extent and frequency with which this mechanism is used. 
While "prepared" organizations meticulously monitor potentially threatening 
issues and effectively create and implement crisis programmes to deal with a 
threat, "not prepared" organizations treasure believes that downgrade and 
downplay the seriousness of a potential problem. It has also been observed 
that "not prepared" organizations tend to shift responsibility for crisis 
management, neglecting not only their own interests but more importantly 
ignoring the potential impact on their stakeholders. For "not prepared" 
organizations a crisis only happens to themselves alone. "Not prepared" 
organizations also believe that crises belong to the world outside of their 
organizations and is caused solely by external forces over which they cannot 
exercise any control. Finally, very little, if any, effort is put into crisis planning 
and training by "not prepared" organizations. "Not prepared" organizations 
rely on their own past experience and believe that no special requirement is 
needed for crisis prevention and preparation. 
7.4.2.3 - "Fatalism/Hopelessness" 
In the first two rationalizations, A7 and A6 (respectively, "Crises do not occur! n 
our organization" and "The locations of our hotels make them immune to 
crisis"), there is a desire by "not prepared" organizations to find a special 
property of the organization that would guarantee protection from major crisis. 
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As mentioned in this and previous chapters, no one organization is immune to 
crises. The location issue invokes the illusion that the geographical area in 
which the company operates is immune to crises. The mistaken belief of 
limited vulnerability also suggests that one does not have to worry about 
special kinds of crises, such as, for example, product tampering, because one 
is not in the kind of business (hotel industry) that would be affected. All these 
rationalizations are quite divorced from reality. Rationalization A7 suggests 
that a company is immune to crises, and one of the reasons why executives of 
"not prepared" organizations subscribed to this rationalizations is because 
they think that their organization is well managed. The researcher is not 
disputing this fact. However, as the case of Tylenol showed the world, the 
notion that only poorly managed companies have major crises is completely 
false. Johnson&Johnson has long been regarded as an enlightened, ethical, 
well-managed, and respected company. This was, unfortunately, no protection 
against a major crisis. Indeed, one may argue that one of the paradoxes that 
every successful company has to face in today's world is that its very success 
makes it a more tempting target. 
In the same way, there is no reason to believe that only small companies have 
major crises, as evidenced by the Exxon crisis. As argued in Chapter 6, "size" 
is not a reliable measure to crisis preparedness. In fact, Booth (1993, pp. 112) 
argues that the larger organizations become the more they have to develop 
crisis management systems in order to survive. Size is no indication 
whatsoever of survivability. This study has, in accordance with the works of 
Willianson (1975), Kanter (1983), Mitroff and Pauchant (1990), Booth (1993), 
and Hannan and Freeman (1977), found no correlation between size and 
crisis preparedness. If the whole sample is compared, the largest organization 
in term of rooms in the UK (over 30,000) was positioned in the middle zone of 
the continuum. Another measurement of size might be revenue, and again, 
the two organizations with the highest annual revenue (over £2 billion, and 
over US$ 2 billion) were both positioned in the middle zone of the continuum. 
The "prepared" organization which has the largest number of rooms in the UK 
has just over 3050 rooms. On the other side of the continuum ("not prepared"), 
the organization with the greatest number of rooms has about 3500 rooms. 
The location issue and its influence on the perception of executives of crisis 
vulnerability or immunity is an interesting one. Yet again "prepared" and "not 
prepared" organizations differ in their opinions, believes, and approaches. 
When talking about vulnerability in relation to location, "prepared" executives 
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tend to consider their vulnerability in context. That is, executives consider 
other major factors such as the culture of the inhabitants, their concerns, 
environmental issues of the location, market, and so forth, and address these 
issues in their strategic plans and the daily operation of their business. One 
"prepared" organization, for instance, has a manual to guide managers and 
employees in different cultures. In some cases, before being sent to another 
country, executives, and in some cases their families, undergo training on the 
culture they are going to face, how to conduct business in that place, 
acceptable behaviour, and so forth. The same kinds of concern and strategic 
and practical approaches were also observed in another international group. 
As the executive of this group put it, "what we do here can and will somehow 
impact our operations anywhere in the world in one way or another". Another 
organization was planning (at the time of the interview) to develop closer 
relationships with stakeholders, specially in the area of crime prevention, in 
their international operation, as already mentioned in previous sections. It has 
to be said, however, that not all organizations in this study have an 
international operation. Nevertheless, it is important to show that some 
organizations do consider this issue and train their staff when considering 
crisis vulnerability in relation to the specific geographical location of their 
operation. 
In contrast, one executive of a "not prepared" organization when posed with 
the question of his industry vulnerability suggested that "... that is why we pay 
insurance. It is to cover all risks of our operations anywhere we operate. " 
Unfortunately, buying an insurance policy has no effect whatsoever on the 
odds of a crisis occurring; it only protects financial interests when something 
does occur. Other interests, such as reputation, image, market share, etc. (the 
"soft dollars"), which makes an organization great or mediocre, are not 
covered by insurance, and unfortunately, are more valuable, to some extent, 
than the property value of hotels. Again, the issue of shifting responsibility 
comes to the surface in "not prepared" organizations. The Salman Rushdie 
case - threats of terrorism directed against the author and publisher of 'The 
Satanic Verses" - is enough to dispel the notion that geographical locations 
has anything to do with immunity, or that certain locations make one exempt. 
"The Satanic Verses", a controversial book, was published by a company that 
is headquartered in New York City. New York City is the largest city in a highly 
civilized country. 
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It has been identified in other "not prepared" organizations that they deal with 
the issue of vulnerability by looking at probability (risk management). In fact, 
one executive of an organization replied to this question by saying that "we 
have specialist risk management personnel to do exactly this job and take this 
worry away. " There is however, a big difference between crisis management 
and risk management. Risk management involves evaluating the cost of a risk 
after multipying by its probability of occurrence (Ritchie and Marshall, 1993; 
Pauchant and Mitroff, 1992). In this sense, one can assume that a disaster 
with a high cost but a low probability of occurrence will not be taken into 
consideration. In fact, this explains one reason why Exxon was not prepared 
for a crisis such as the Valdez. According to Stevens (1989, in Pauchant and 
Mitroff, 1992), Exxon's top management had evaluated the probability of such 
event as one chance out of one million. Thus, the probable cost of a disaster 
such as the Valdez, that in 1991, two year after the disaster, was already 
running over US$ 2 billion could have been evaluated at US$ 2,000 ($2 
billion X 1/1,000,000). However, and as mentioned in Chapter 2, the Exxon 
crisis is not yet over and the costs are reported to have more than doubled 
since. Moreover, there are also the "soft dollars" costs, such as the damage to 
reputation, the traumatic emotional and psychological effects not only on 
Exxon's employees but also on those that were directly and indirectly involved 
(the population, clean up operation personnel, and others), the immense 
damage to the environment, and the destruction of the way of life of a 
community. Having said that, in contrast, crisis management involves focusing 
not only on the most probable events but also on the event with the greatest 
impact on its environment regardless of its probability of occurrence. As 
mentioned before, a crisis never happens in isolation. 
Virtually all organizations are now subject to every kind of crisis imaginable 
and there is no room for complacency. For example, the publishers of 
"Encyclopedia Britannica" considered themselves as not vulnerable to product 
tampering until someone broke into their computer networks and dumped 
phony information into the system, which was then printed out in the pages of 
the volumes. 
Rationalization Al 9 ("We do not regard the media as an important issue. It is 
easy to manipulate it. "), reflects one of the most important issues in crisis 
management: communication. The power of the media is indisputable. One of 
the most advanced fields within crisis management is in relation to media and 
communication during a crisis. This issue takes one back in this chapter to the 
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situations in which some organizations believe that they have a "crisis 
management structure" (and are crises-prepared) by having a contract with a 
public relations firm. These organizations are in fact relying on false 
assumptions. Crisis management is not a public relations exercise. By 
focusing on the manipulation of the media those organizations are neglecting 
all other efforts that constitute good crisis management. Moreover, by 
believing that crisis management is primarily a public relations exercise, those 
organization are in effect prioritizing to get good press from bad situations 
rather than concentrating on reducing the effect and impact of crisis on their 
business, on the stakeholders, and on the environment. Another alarming 
finding of this research (and one that is discussed later in this chapter in the 
crisis situations analysis - Stakeholders Relations Analysis), is that the media 
is perceived by some executives of "not prepared" organizations as "enemies" 
or "villains", regardless of the situation. This fact explains the reaction of those 
executives to the question of crisis communication. One executive of an 
international group ("not prepared"), for example, suggested that "the media is 
in the business of creating bad news". This executive also argued that the only 
requirement needed for getting a sympathetic line of the media is by 
employing a good public relations company. By stating that, this organization 
is reducing crisis management to just one variable in what is a comprehensive 
and complex business function. 
Manipulation of the media is an almost impossible task, and if someone thinks 
that he/she has manipulated the media this will be short-lived. Journalists, 
unlike managers and executives, are trained professionals who are adept at 
gathering information quickly, often with greater speed than corporate 
executives at the heat of the incident (Barton, 1993). To suggest that honesty 
is the best policy is an understatement in crisis relations (Fink, 1986; Small, 
1991; Reilly; 1991; Gonzalez-Herrero and Pratt, 1995; Williams and Olaniran, 
1994). The reality of modern business is that most of the public, consumers or 
investors, judge corporate behaviour from interpretation of news events, and 
the electronic and printed press has considerable leverage in how they "rate" 
individual performance by leading executives. The case of British Airways and 
Virgin Atlantic (the so called "dirty tricks campaign") illustrate this issue clearly 
(Gregory, 1994). 
Effective media relations begins by telling the company's story quickly, openly, 
and honestly. Reporters need to be assured that pertinent information will be 
shared as soon as it is available and the facts are better known. Executives 
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need to consider every stakeholders group: the media, community, 
employees, suppliers, investors, competitors, etc. However, this is all very well 
when the crisis has already happened and the organization needs to put its 
version of the situation. Effective media relations, and for that matter any other 
stakeholder relations, begin well before a crisis strikes. Effective relations are 
a build-up effort of cooperation and interaction. 
Apart from organization "A", in all other organizations, both "prepared" and 
"not prepared", there is an alarming sign that communication is not getting the 
attention it deserves. Organization "A" has a very pro-active approach to 
communication. They not only have an open line of communication between 
levels for crisis purpose, but also all employees are introduced to their 
"crisis/media manual" which contains special telephone numbers, such us all 
the emergencies numbers, management numbers, and the telephone 
numbers of the top executive of the company (who is on call 24 hours a day). 
Senior executives and managers are sent regularly to public relations courses 
to learn how "to handle the media". They have a ready press statement for 
different situations, so that only special adjustments are required (according to 
an executive of this organization, "you cannot invent things in the heat of the 
moment"). In the case of any crisis, be it small or large, the unit manager 
meets as soon as possible with the regional manager and as soon as they 
have briefed each other the crisis management team assemble to discuss the 
situation. In contrast, apart from organization "B" that has an open line of 
communication for crisis purposes, the others on the "not prepared" side 
revealed that communication (both external and internal) is very poor in their 
companies. 
Having said all that, this factor is concerned with the inevitability of crisis. No 
organization, regardless of its size, structure, location, management style, 
financial status, and so forth, is immune to crisis. The range of crisis, 
unfortunately, is on the increase and not decrease. The way both sets of 
organizations under investigation here face this reality is clearly distinct and 
evident. This factor also reflects one of the basic elements of the foundation of 
effective crisis management: communication. Communication, both internal 
and external, is a vital ingredient in an information driven society and it plays a 
major part in crisis management. Again, there are distinct differences in the 
ways "prepared" and "not prepared" organizations perceive and approach the 
communication issue. Unfortunately, there are still organizations that believe, 
erroneously, that crisis management is simply a public relations exercise. 
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7.4.2.4 - "Technical Dimensions" 
This factor has to do with executives, who believed and subscribed to 
rationalizations A17 and A18 (respectively, "Most of the crises have a 
technical solution. " and "Whenever a crisis strikes, the application of technical 
and financial quick-fixes would resolve it. "), reducing and narrowing crisis and 
crisis management to a mere technical perspective. Also, this factor has to do 
with management believing that individual employees should not be 
concerned with crisis management (A26 - "Safety is the responsibility of top 
management, not of individual employees. "). In, this sense, those executives 
are in effect believing that they can anticipate every conceivable variable in a 
crisis and thus idealize their contingency planning. 
As mentioned previously, a crisis seldom has a sole technical side. It can have 
its origin in a technical failure but its repercussions usually are all but 
technical. Research by Perrow (1984) suggests that engineers more than 
often subscribe to the "technology" rationalizations and assumptions. 
However, given the sample under investigation here, it is interesting to notice 
that executives of "not prepared" organizations subscribed to those 
rationalizations. Although the researcher does not posses this data, one can 
almost certainly assume that whenever a crisis management structure is 
mounted, the responsible person will most certainly come from a 
technical/engineering background. One reason for that might be the fact that 
most of the organizations under investigation relate crisis to a malfunction or 
disruption of some part of its hard core (i. e., physical structure/assets, such as 
power cut, flooding, computer breakdown, etc. ). In principle, there is nothing 
wrong with the appointment of engineers to head a crisis management team, 
indeed, as noted by many researchers (and explained in Chapter 2), crisis 
management falls under a broad range of professions. The important thing to 
remember is that crises are highly complex problems, accompanied by a high 
emotional and psychological toll, and more than often, as mentioned above, 
having consequences well beyond the technical spectrum. Seldom can one 
individual alone analyze, understand and remedy a complex situation by 
itself. As research by Weick (1987) revealed, crises occur, in the first place, 
because the humans who operate and manage complex systems are 
themselves not sufficiently complex to sense and anticipate the problems 
generated by those systems. He goes further to suggest that this is a problem 
of "requisite variety", because the variety that exists in the system to be 
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managed exceeds the variety in the people who regulate it. Thus, when 
people have less variety than is requisite to cope with the system, they miss 
important information, their diagnoses are incomplete, and their remedies are 
short-sighted and can magnify rather than reduce a problem. 
The problem of human resource diversity (in terms of expertise and 
experience) and their employment in crisis management efforts is a major one 
and highlights once again the difference between "prepared" and "not 
prepared" organizations. The "prepared" groups analyzed here not only 
employ a variety of expertise from their own business in their crisis team 
(given the complexity of crises mentioned above), but they also out-source, 
apart from PR firms, consultants from different areas (such as security, 
psychologists, finance, personnel, etc. ), and crisis management consultants to 
update their crisis management capacity. In contrast, "not prepared" 
organizations employ very limited resource in crisis management and the 
outsourcing of consultants for crisis management purpose is a non-existent 
practice. It is also interesting to notice that even though organization "B" has a 
crisis management structure, there is just one person (that is in fact their "crisis 
management team") responsible for their crisis management plan, and no 
other experts from within the organization or from outside (apart from PR firms) 
are used. 
Previous research revealed that most of the current knowledge in designing 
innovative and performing organizations tends to increase their degree of 
complexity and fragility (Pauchant and Douville, 1993). With all the 
complexities and uncertainties, it is apparent that any intervention in a crisis 
situation will have the potential for creating other problems. As noted and 
revealed by Weick (1988, pp. 308), in another of his researches, "our actions 
are always a little further than is our understanding of those situations, which 
means we can intensify crises literally before we know what we are doing. " 
Therefore, the clear conclusion here is that not only one needs to be well 
prepared for crisis but also it is necessary to have a broad support of 
knowledge, expertise, and experience to help in the prevention, preparation, 
containment, and recovery periods of a crisis. 
An example of a crisis that had a technical origin but had its consequences 
and perception revealed in another area can be illustrated, to some extent, by 
the Hyatt Regency crisis. As mentioned above and in Chapter 2, the 
consequences of a crisis can be very traumatic. The Hyatt skywalk disaster 
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(1981), a technical failure, still has enormous repercussions, not technically, 
but both psychologically and emotionally. Wilkinson's (1983) research on 
psychiatric symptoms reported by 102 persons who had experienced the 
collapse of two skywalks in the lobby of the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Kansas 
City, revealed that all subjects had psychiatric symptoms; only slight 
differences were found between those who were victims, observers, or 
rescuers. Here it also shows that the victims of a disaster are not only those 
directly involved. 
This factor also highlights one of the most crucial aspects of effective crisis 
management and one that is very often compromised by not only the internal 
organizational structure of some organizations but also by the false belief that 
in times of crisis only the external public deserve to' be informed. 
Comprehensive and effective internal communication is essential in crisis 
prevention and preparation, not just after the eruption of a crisis. Indeed, it is 
essential in all aspects of organizational life. Rationalization A17 
("Communication is not an issue here. We understand each other. ") 
addresses this very important element. Communication (both internal and 
external) is directly correlated with crisis preparedness and crisis 
management (Reilly, 1993). Restrictions (of any kind) in communication and 
information dissemination processes, as well as content, can endanger an 
organization's crisis readiness (Mirvis and Marks, 1986; Staw et al, 1981). 
Moreover, and as noted by Turner (1976), if management and other key 
employees have limited knowledge of the resources and tools allocated for 
crisis response, they cannot be ready to deal with the occurrence of 
unanticipated threats. The efforts of managers and employees to respond to a 
crisis situation can be short-circuited by the unavailability of necessary 
information, which can be as basic as the home telephone numbers of key 
managers or legal counsel. In Chapter 2 there is an extensive discussion on 
decision making in crisis situations. The literature review in the topic reveals 
that one of the characteristics of a crisis is information overload and the high 
stress and psychological burden that a crisis unleashes on the crisis sufferer. 
The quality of decision depends greatly upon the quality of information into the 
decision process (Smart and Vertinsky, 1977; Dutton et at, 1983; Dutton and 
Duncan, 1987; Janis, 1989; Mulder etw, 1971; Dutton, 1986; Janis and Mann, 
1977; Staw, Sandelands and Dutton, 1981; Booth, 1993). However, as 
mentioned above a typical feature of crisis is information overload (Janis, 
1989; Stubbart, 1987; Dutton, 1986; Williams and Olaniran, 1994; Nunamaker 
gam, 1989). Information overload can only be prevented if a crisis information 
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system is effectively implemented and able to absorb the increased flow of 
information. Only then can quality information be guaranteed and then be 
inputed into the decision process. In the absense of such a system and crisis 
capability, information overload results in dysfunctional selective attention, 
retention of information, and delays and subversion of communication flows 
(Smart and Vertinsky, 1977). 
Information overload and the need to act quickly also cause decision makers 
to use fewer communications channels for the collection and dissemination of 
information (Nunamaker et al, 1989). Limiting the search for information can 
be disastrous. Divergent search increases the variety and quantity of 
alternative solutions, and is essential in poorly structured circumstances in 
which fluency and flexibility of thought are vital. Even on those occasions 
when the search for information is increased, decision makers rarely learn 
something new because of their reliance on standard operating procedures, 
previous ways of understanding, and communication that are relatively low in 
complexity (Smart and Vertinsky, 1977; Booth, 1993; Janis, 1989). At the 
same time, the information content of the messages received is frequently 
distorted, with intermediate message-handling units omitting, delaying, 
filtering, and sometimes processing incorrect information (Nunamaker et al. 
1989). As a result, the decision group not only has fewer creative solutions 
available to it, but it is also more likely to fashion flawed solutions from the 
information they have. However, even if the complex issue of information 
discussed above is resolved, the ability of management to act (decision 
making) upon them is questionable. Stubbart (1987, pp. 90) suggested that 
"thinking about a crisis rapidly becomes enormously complex. " As also 
discussed earlier and in previous chapters, decision makers in a crisis 
experience a high level of emotional and physical stress which promotes 
dysfunctional behaviour (Smart and Vertinsky, 1977). Due to the stress 
caused by crisis, fewer environmental cues are perceived by decision makers. 
When a crisis deepens, decision makers become more concerned with 
immediate tactical problems than with long term issues. They lose the 
strategic dimension and increasingly becomes obsessed with the detail of day 
to day decisions (Holsti, 1978). Fewer options are considered (Staw et a!, 
1981; Dutton, 1986; Stubbart, 1987). Decision makers find it harder to reason 
abstractly (Nunamaker et p1,1989). Decision makers may also be less able to 
predict the consequences of various alternative courses of action (Janis, 
1989; Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth, 1979). All this contributes to a restricted 
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and distorted understanding of the decision situation. As a result, unaided 
crisis decision makers tend to make and implement inferior decisions. 
These two characteristics alone, information overload and the emotional toll in 
crisis situations, are enough to prompt any responsible organization to create 
and implement effective information and communication systems for crisis 
purposes in their organizations. 
It has already been mentioned in the previous factor 
("Fatalism/Hopelessness") that apart from organization "A" that has a good 
crisis communication programme, the others, both on the "prepared" and "not 
prepared" side of the continuum revealed that communication is poor in their 
organizations. The researcher, in questionnaire 2, analyzed the responses of 
the executives concerning the internal flow of communication in their 
organizations in general and in relation to crisis and crisis management. The 
result suggests, in accordance with the discussion above, that "prepared" 
organizations have a better internal flow of communication than "not 
prepared" ones. Below are some "communications" questions from 
questionnaire 2 posed to executives: 
1- Do people at the top get important information from lower levels? 
2- Do people on the lower levels understand communication that comes from 
the top? 
3- Do people that have different responsibilities talk to each other? 
4- Is the subject "crises" a welcome subject for discussion? 
5- Do people feel free to talk about "bad things" in your organization? 
13 - Do you encourage debate and discussion in decision making? 
In general, "not prepared" organizations scored very low in all questions, that 
is, in those organizations any of the situations above seldom occur. In 
contrast, in "prepared" organizations, all the situations are part of their routine. 
This factor, in line with all previous factors, also provided interesting insights 
into the cultural and practical differences between the two sets of 
organizations. While "prepared" organizations have a broader understanding 
of both the nature and causes of crisis, "not prepared" organizations reduce 
and narrow crisis and crisis management to a technical perspective only. As a 
result, "not prepared" organizations do not carry planning programmes for 
crisis and believe, erroneously, that whenever a crisis strikes, the application 
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of technical and financial quick fixes are enough. Crisis training is centralized 
to top executives only, leaving the rest of organization unaware of crisis 
management resources and is concerned with the media and public relations 
only. Information and communication processes are also routinized and no 
special capability is in place for crisis purposes. In contrast, "prepared" 
organizations have an expanded training programme involving employees at 
all levels. "Prepared" organizations also tend to employ consultants for their 
crisis planning and training. Crisis "prepared" organizations also create and 
implement special information process systems to absorb the flow, process, 
and disseminate quality information into the decision process. 
7.4.3 - Defining Crisis -A "Prepared" Vs "Not prepared" Perspective 
As noted, there are many striking differences between "crisis prepared" and 
"crisis not prepared" organizations. These differences have some very direct 
and real consequences for crisis management. In general, the very definition 
of what is a crisis varies considerably between these two different kinds of 
organization. For a crisis "not prepared" organization, as identified above, a 
crisis is something which happens mainly to them (i. e., product, plants, their 
top executives, etc. ). That is, a crisis is equated with them and their structure, 
and not with the outer environment. Conversely, for an organization which is 
crisis "prepared" a crisis is something that not only happens to them but also 
to their stakeholders (i. e., customers, all their employees at all levels, and their 
general environment). 
One of the most interesting findings in this study was in relation to the 
definitions of "what is a crisis" by executives. The researcher experienced 
some very peculiar situations when posing this question to executives. In one 
occasion, the researcher was received by the managing director of an 
international hotel chain, who in an almost defiant and intimidating manner 
suggested that the researcher "should not be saying that crisis management is 
a 'new' subject". In his words, "all I have done in my life is managing crises. All 
business, specially ours, are driven by crises. " The researcher immediately 
asked the executive to define "crises", and was surprised to hear in reply: 
"what do you mean"? This very executive was unable to define "crises" 
although he spent all his life "managing" them. Mitroff et al (1989, pp. 275) 
argued that 
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"... definitions are not only social instruments in that they spell out (specify 
the characteristics and the boundaries of) some phenomenon of interest, 
but they are also the expressions of the social character of an organization". 
Definitions, therefore, tell us as much about the nature of the definer as they 
do about the thing being defined. Below is a list of the definitions provided by 
the executives interviewed: 
1- "Anything that can adversely affect the business, despite, perhaps, our best 
effort to prevent it happening, has happened and has had a detrimental effect 
on the business either in the short or long term. " 
2- "A series of exceptional circumstances which are such that require 
exceptional and very rapid response, frequently and primarily in the public 
domain. " 
3- "Something that would affect the day to day operation, profitability, or the 
welfare of anyone that comes into contact with any one of our hotels. " 
4- "Something that is unplanned for - negative event - which puts part of our 
organization into chaos. " 
5- "Unplanned panic. " 
6- "Something that prevents you from delivering the promise you must be 
able to deliver. " 
7- "Is an event that happens quite unexpectedly, and it could be very serious, 
or not so serious. We can get a phone call now saying that we have a problem 
in one of our hotels. Potentially a crisis will blow out of that, depending on how 
serious the event is. " 
8- "Is a constellation of events that occurs, which bring us out a situation 
which is not intended. " 
9- "Anything that could implicate or affect the company within their public or 
stakeholders. " 
. 10 - "A legal situation that 
has a strong negative effect in our business which is 
unexpected. " 
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11 and 12 - "Anything that affects people - related to health and safety. 
Urgency! Where you can apply the word 'urgency' we need to classify crisis. " 
13 - "Something that threatens the well being of the business. " 
14 - "Anything that can affect the company and its employees that needs some 
sort of action from the management level. " 
15 - "Anything that might bring about adverse media comment - Anything that 
happens in our hotels that hits the media, we would regard it as a crisis. Injury, 
threat, etc. " 
16 - "Something that you need to respond to immediately, and that you 
haven't planned for, that invariable causes damage to people and property. " 
17 - "Is something that forces you to become aware of specific parts of your 
activities, or business, or the way you do it, that you normally take for granted. " 
18 - "Anything that can put life or property at stake. " 
19 - "Something that would impact some other people apart from your own 
organization. " 
20 - "Anything that disrupt operations, either day to day or part of building over 
long period. " 
21 - "Something that would potentially cause bad publicity. " 
22 - "An unforeseen event that interrupts the normal flow of your business. 
Something that is critical in nature. " 
23 - "Something that you are not certain how to solve. " 
24 - "Something that threatens the continuity of business and would ask for 
immediate action. " 
25 - "Is something that involves top management - not people at unit level. Is 
something that escalates. " 
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26 - "Something that damages the property (flood, fire). " 
27 - "Something that is out of the ordinary and needs special attention. " 
28 - "Chaos! Something that we have no control over. " 
29 - "Something happening in our service area that affects guests and 
employees - e. g., food poisoning" 
30 - "Depends - something that could affect customers, staff, property. " 
As one can see, many of the definitions reflect the factors obtained. Some can 
be classified as a technical related definition, others as a fatalistic ones 
(chaos), while others as media oriented. 
The interesting point is the contrast of understanding of crisis between 
"prepared" and "not prepared" organization. "Not prepared" organizations 
tend to believe that a crisis only happens to them and to their immediate 
interests. They also related crisis to the outside world, something that is 
created by alien forces and that they have no control of whatsoever, thus the 
tendency of shifting responsibility for crisis management. Some of the 
definitions of crisis provided by executives of "not prepared" organizations 
clearly justify their believes. Below are some examples of crisis definitions that 
reflect their organizational beliefs: 
" "Unplanned panic. " 
" "A legal situation that has a strong negative effect in our business which is 
unexpected. " 
" "Anything that might bring about adverse media comment - Anything that 
happens in our hotels that hits the media, we would regard it as a crisis. Injury, 
threat, etc. " 
" "Is something that involves top management - not people at unit level. Is 
something that escalates. " 
" "Chaos! Something that we have no control over. " 
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In contrast, "prepared" organizations tend to view crisis as something that has 
the potential to affect not only themselves but also other people or 
organizations well beyond their normal daily routine. For "prepared" 
organizations a crisis is something that must be managed or controlled. 
Planning and training for crisis are essential elements in effective crisis 
management and these aspects are also reflected in their definition of crisis. 
Below are some example of crisis definitions by executives of "prepared" 
organizations that clearly show the more pro-active and responsible approach 
of this set of organizations to crisis and crisis management: 
" "Something that would impact some other people apart from your own 
organization. " 
" "Something that threatens the continuity of business and would ask for 
immediate action. " 
" "Anything that could implicate or affect the company within their public or 
stakeholders. " 
" "Something that is out of the ordinary and needs special attention. " 
7.4.4 - Experience of Crisis - Gift or Tragedy 
Crisis does not have only a negative side. On the contrary, crisis provides an 
organization and its stakeholders with many opportunities that would not be 
open to them if not by a crisis. In fact, some organizations are making use of 
crisis (they are creating/inducing their own crisis) for different management or 
organizational purposes. This issue has already been discussed in previous 
chapters. This research provides another interesting finding with regard to the 
views of executives on crisis experiences and what a crisis may mean or bring 
to them and their organizations. Interview data reveals that on the surface, this 
is one of the rarest points where both sets of organizations seem to agree in 
any issue in the whole research. The interview question of "What, if anything, 
can a crisis bring to your organization? ", showed an interesting side of those 
organizations. Below are a sample of the answers of both "prepared" and "not 
prepared" organization. 
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"Not prepared" answers: 
" "Highlight strength and weakness within the system. " 
" "Learning. If you suffer one, you get more aware of crisis management for the 
future. " 
of Pepared" answers: 
" "Focus, team spirit, understanding of how vulnerable we are if we had not 
planned for it. Planning for the future so that it never happens again. " 
" "Awareness of what that situation could have caused. " 
" "Bring us closer together in serious situations. It would make people make an 
extra effort -a learning opportunity. " 
It is important to notice that in two answers of the "prepared" organizations it is 
implicit, in a sense, the variable "planning". They have planned for it. 
Although it may seem that both "prepared" and "not prepared" organizations 
agreed in this issue, a closer look at previous statements and answers to 
some other questions, points to a different reality. Although the first response 
above acknowledged that a crisis "would highlight the strength and 
weakness" of their organization, it does not mean that they will act upon it. By 
the findings of this very research, the culture of this organization is one that is 
"reactive" and not a "pro-active" one. This is the very organization that 
believes, among other things, that "if it is not earth-shattering it is not a crisis", 
and that subscribed to the rationalization "Any effort in relation to crisis before 
it happens (such as prevention) is a waste of time and money. " Learning is 
one of the fundamental issues in crisis management. Learning does not have 
to be from your own mistakes, or "fate". Being crisis "prepared" means that one 
learns from other organizations' crises, other industries' crises, and so on. 
Learning from others' mistakes is an effective principle in crisis management 
(Gonzalez-Herrero and Pratt, 1995). As put by Nadler (1989), "At the core of 
effective organizational learning is a mind-set that enables learning-efficient 
companies to recognize the value of productive failure as contrasted with 
unproductive success. " One cannot disassociate the fact that organizational 
capacity to learn is inherently linked with people's capacity to act in the 
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organization. Research by Argyris and Schön (1978), Hedberg (1981), 
Hedberg et al. (1976), Schein (1983), Schein (1990a), Shrivastava and Mitroff 
(1983), Starbuck (1983), Starbuck et al (1978), Makridakis (1991), Garvin 
(1993), Gonzalez-Herrero and Pratt (1995), Rosenthal and Pijnenburg (1990), 
Nunamaker et al (1989), Jarman and Kouzmin (1990), Starbuck, Greve, and 
Hedberg (1978), Booth (1993), and others, are part of an ever growing body of 
knowledge that address the issue of organizational learning available and 
that support this view. Going back to this research, how then can, an 
organization that believes that a crisis is something that only happens to them, 
learn from others. Moreover, most of the "not prepared" organizations 
subscribed heavily to the rationalization "Crises do not happen in our 
organization". Where, then, are the lessons going to come from. Having said 
that, they do not contradict themselves in any occasion. 
It can be concluded, then, that without exception, all factors above, even 
though each is a distinct and independent factor, raised the issues of 
responsibility, stakeholders relationship, and most importantly the issues of 
planning, prevention and preparation for crises. The fundamental differences 
that exist between the two sets of organizations became clear and in most 
cases supported previous studies. More research in the hospitality industry is 
fundamental, so that crises can be prevented and those that occur can be 
better managed. As mentioned in Chapter 2, crises also have a very positive 
side and with proper planning the hospitality industry will be able and better 
equipped to make the most of the opportunities brought about by crises. 
7.4.5 - Summary of Contrasting Behavioural Nature of "Prepared" Vs "Not 
Prepared" Organizations 
Figure 7.7 below provides a general brief account of the contrasting nature of 
crisis "prepared" and crisis "not prepared" organizations in terms of 
organizational systems to deal with crises. It has to be emphasized that the 
points in Figure 7.7 are just a summary of some of the issues identified in this 
study. Nevertheless, they represent some of the most important aspects of 
organizational believes and behaviour in relation to crisis and crisis 
management. 
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Fig. 7.7 - Contrasting Nature of "Prepared" Vs "Not Prepared" 
A General Profile Account of "Prepared" and "Not Prepared" Organizations 
"Pre aR red" "Not Prepared" 
Pro-active Approach to Crisis and Reactive 
Crisis Management 
Urgency Attitude to Crisis and Crisis Complacency 
Management 
High Investment In Crisis Management Low 
Training, Scenario Crisis Prevention/Preparation Media 






High Stakeholder Involvement In Low 
Crisis Planning 
High Employee Involvement In Crisis Low 
Planning 
High Outsourcing for Crisis Management Low 
Ours Responsibility for Crisis Management Someone Else's 
High Development of Special Management Low 
Capability to Deal with Potential 
Threatening Situations 
High Organizational Learning Low 
Low Belief in an "Act of God" High 
Low Downgrading of Crisis Importance High 
Low Adoption and Application of the High 
Technical and Financial Quick-Fixes 
Approach to Problems 
Low Belief In Crisis Immunity High 
Low Belief in Location Immunity High 
Low Belief In Media Manipulation Low 
Low Belief that Crises are of a High 
Technical Nature 
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7.4.6 - Summary of Contrasting Formal Issues and Structure of "Prepared" Vs 
Prepared" ganizations 
With regard to hotel group structure, some interesting patterns have also been 
identified. The patterns in "Prepared" and "Not. Prepared" organizations are 
very consistent in both groups and indicate some well defined characteristics 
in those groups. For example, and in accordance with previous research, the 
results of this analysis revealed that indeed size is not synonymous with crisis 
preparedness or immunity. "Not Prepared" hotel groups have, together, 
approximately 300 hotels whereas "Prepared" groups have among them less 
than 100 hotels. However, even though "Not Prepared" organizations have 
three times as many hotels, when a comparison of hotel groups annual sales 
is made it is interesting to observe that the combined "Prepared" organizations 
annual sales are considerably larger than those of "Not Prepared" 
organizations (£1.2 billion and £800 million respectively) - figures were 
rounded. 
It was also interesting to observe the ratio of employees to hotels in the UK. 
"Prepared" organizations have 40 hotels in the UK and 6,850 employees (171 
employee per hotel). "Not Prepared" groups have 96 hotels operating in the 
UK and 8,050 employees (84 employees per hotel). Given that all hotels in 
both "Prepared" and "Not Prepared" categories represent 4-star to luxury 
properties in the UK, it is surprising to see that "Not Prepared" organizations 
have on average less than half the number of employee per hotel than 
"Prepared" organizations. 
As the examples above indicate, the organizations on both sides of the 
continuum are not the largest ones in terms of size (number of hotels and 
sales). It has been noticed that the largest organizations were all positioned in 
the middle zone of the continuum, as already mentioned previously. It was 
also interesting to notice that the organizations, both "Prepared" and "Not 
Prepared" are predominantly European. 
A final observation was that respondents in "Prepared" organizations were 
very consistent in their answers and opinions. By contrast, when more than 
one executive was interviewed in the same "Not Prepared" organization their 
opinions were mostly divergent. 
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As a matter of illustration, the figures below show an example of a "Prepared" 
and a "Not Prepared" company profile. The companies here are the smallest 
ones in each extreme of the continuum (smallest in terms of number of hotels 
in the group). Although the intention here is not to generalize in any form the 
characteristics of any category (if only for the fact that in the light of this 
research crisis preparedness is seen in relation to organizational culture) it 
nevertheless reinforces the view that formal structure bears little influence on 
crisis preparedness. For example, the size, location, etc., of an organization is 
no guarantee of crisis immunity. The information in Figures 7.8 and 7.9 below 
were derived from both primary and secondary data and all figures are 1994 
results. The secondary sources used were Graham Todd and Sue Mather, 
"The International Hotel Industry, Corporate Strategies and Global 
Opportunities", The Economist Intelligence Unity Research Report, 1995, and 
"Quoted Hotel Companies", by Kleinwort Benson (Research), March, 1995. 
C 
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Figure 7.8 - Company Profile - "Prepared" Vs "Not Prepared" Organizations 
Company Profile: an example of a "Prepared" vs a "Not Prepared" Organization 
"Prepared" - Group X 
"Not Prepared" - Group Y 
Hotel Portfolio 
N° of Hotels N° of Room s 
Group Y- 93 14,390 
Group X-5 726 
Representation by Regi 
Group Y- 10 Countries 
on 
Group X-2 Countries 
N° o f Hotels N° of Rooms 
Group Y 
Austria 2 543 
Belgium 1 204 
Denmark 15 1,711 
Finland 1 146 
Iceland 2 372 
Netherlands 1 120 
Germany 11 2,258 
Norway 9 1,307 
Sweden 47 6,744 
UK 4 985 
Group X 
United Kingdom 4 663 
France 1 63 
Representation by Grad 
Mid Range - 3-star 
e- 1995 
N° o f Hotels 
Group Y 53 
Group X 0 
4-star to Luxury 
Group Y 24 
Group X 5 
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Figure 7.9 - Company Profile - "Prepared" Vs "Not Prepared" Organizations 
Company Profile: an example of a "Prepared" vs a "Not Prepared" Organization 
"Prepared" - Group X 
"Not Prepared" - Group Y 
Operating Results 
Group Y- £2m 
Group X-£7,3 m 
Number of Worldwide Sales Offices 
Group Y-5 
Group X-1 
Group Y- Yes 
Group X- Yes 
Group Y- In-house sales and collaboration 
with airlines and other hotel 
groups in Europe 
Group X- In house sales only 
Company/Group Strategy 
Group Y- Expansion in Europe 
Introduction of environmental 
programme 
Group X-£ 62 million refurbishment 
programme 
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7.5 - Stakeholders Analysis - Crisis Situations 
"Prepared" Vs "Not Prepared" organization's Views of Stakeholders' Role and 
Behaviour in a Given Crisis Situation - The Consistency Measure 
7.5.1 - Introduction 
The research question of this study is concerned with the relationship 
between organizational culture of hotel organizations and the consistency of 
their executives expressed views of "functional stakeholders". That is, given 
hotels' organizational cultures, is there any consistency in their view 
("archetypal images") of stakeholders in crisis situations? The proposition of 
this research goes further to state that "The higher the 
readiness/preparedness of organizations to crisis, the higher the consistency 
of those organizations in viewing the behaviour and role of their functional 
stakeholders in crisis situations". The research so far has dealt with the first 
part of the question (organizational culture in relation to crisis and crisis 
management) and has produced a set of "prepared" and "not prepared" hotel 
organizations in relation to crisis and crisis management. Now, the research 
addresses the second half of the question. 
The same sample of 5 (five) organizations from each extreme of the 
continuum used above to explore their characteristics were also selected to 
satisfy and test the second stage of the research. The objective was to see 
whether the "prepared" organizations were more consistent in their view of 
functional stakeholder's role and behaviour in distinct crisis situations than 
those organizations that have a culture that makes them "less prepared" to 
crisis. As mentioned in this Chapter 6, "functional stakeholders" are all those 
vested interest groups, parties, associations, institutions, and individuals who 
exert a hold and a claim on organizations. Functional stakeholders are all 
those who either affect or who are affected by an organization and its policies 
(i. e., its behaviour). 
For the purpose of this research, "consistency" occurs when organizations 
conform to a regular pattern of opinion with regard to a functional stakeholder. 
The measure of consistency is obtained by observing where "prepared" or 
"not prepared" organizations subscribe to an "archetypal stakeholder" at a 
level of at least 60%. That is, consistency will only be considered where at 
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least 3 (three) or more organizations subscribe to the same "archetypal 
stakeholder" in any individual "functional stakeholders". 
Before going into details of the analysis, there are two points that need 
clarification. First, the pilot study on this section of the research suggested that 
apart from one functional stakeholder ("International Community") all others 
should be retained, and a few more should be added to reflect more 
realistically the social partners of a hotel groups' operations. "Union" was 
among those "functional stakeholders". Although the pilot study supported it, a 
great number of respondents did not consider it relevant to their operations 
(as a stakeholder). In many cases the respondents simply commented "N/A" 
(not applicable). Given that only some groups considered "Union" as a 
relevant stakeholder, an analysis of this "functional stakeholder" proved 
impossible and is not considered here. Second, the analysis of the data also 
showed that in the "Victim" situation there could not be found any pattern of 
consistency in respondents' opinion with regard to the "functional stakeholder" 
"Financial Institutions". Therefore, in the "Victim" situation analysis this 
"functional stakeholder" is also not considered. 
7.5.2 - Consistency Data Analysis 
One of the objectives of this research was to measure whether there was any 
consistency in hotel organization executives' view of stakeholders 
("Archetypal Images") during crisis situations. In another words, to see 
whether the image perceived by "crisis-prepared" organizations of its 
stakeholders ("Archetypal Image") - and their role - in crisis situations are 
more consistent than those organizations that are "not prepared". For that, two 
approaches were required. One that would give the subjects two distinct crisis 
situations (one in which the host organization was the "victim" of a crisis; and 
the other where the host organization was "guilty" of a crisis), and another that 
would present the subjects with a set of "functional stakeholders" and a set of 
"archetypal stakeholders" so that respondents could relate them to given 
different crisis statuses. Below are the results of the analysis of respondents' 
ratings on each individual crisis situation. 
7.5.2.1 - "Guilty" Situation 
Respondents were presented with a crisis situation in which their organization 
created the crisis. In another words, the organization was "Guilty" (refer to 
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Chapter 6 for the crisis situations). With this scenario in mind ("Guilty"), the 
researcher presented the respondent a matrix containing a set of "Functional 
Organizational Stakeholders" as well as a set of "Archetypal Organizational 
Stakeholders". The respondents were then asked to rate/relate the expected 
"Functional" stakeholders' role and behaviour ("Archetypal Image") in a 
"Guilty" situation. 
A frequency analysis of the whole obtained data was carried out in an attempt 
to see whether there were any significant patterns of response in the data. The 
results of the frequency analysis revealed that in the "Guilty" situation only on 
two occasions did more than 50% of respondents subscribe to the same 
variable ("Archetypal Stakeholder"). In one of the cases, respondents judged 
that "consumers" were the "victims" in a crisis situation where the organization 
created the crisis. That is, the majority of respondents (31) have rated the 
"consumers" to be the main "victim" in the situation where a serious crisis 
occurred, and where this crisis was a product of the organizations' wrong 
doing. The second highest rate of agreement among respondents (30) was 
identified where respondents regarded that the "Management" was the 
"Villain" in a "Guilty" situation. Having said that, a closer look at the frequency 
analysis on the whole "Guilty" situation revealed that overall the pattern of 
response was quite well balanced. 
Table 7.15 below shows the frequency analysis of the two cases described 
above and two more other examples. For full frequency results of the whole 
"Guilty" data please refer to Appendix 15. 
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Table 7.15 - Examples of Frequency Analysis on "Guilty-' Situation 
CS. V. G - "Consumers Victms - 'Guilty' Situation" 
Value Frequency Percentage 
1 31 57.4 
0 23 42.6 
Total 54 100.0 
M. V. G - "Management Victims -'Guilty' Situation" 
Value Frequency Percentage 
17 13.0 
0 47 87.0 
Total 54 100.0 
M. VI. G - "Management Villains -'Guilty' Situation" 
Value Frequency Percentage 
1 30 55.6 
0 24 44.4 
Total 54 100.0 
ME. E. G - "Media Enemies -'Guilty' Situation" 
Value Frequency Percentage 
1 24 44.4 
0 30 55.6 
Total 54 100.0 
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The examples above give some interesting insights into one of the problems 
being investigated in this study: organizational culture. For example, it is 
interesting to notice that even though the organization has created its own 
crisis (they are clearly "GUILTY"), 13% of executives believe that they 
("Management") are the "Victim". Another interesting finding is that, in the 
same situation, 44.4% of respondents regarded the media as "Enemy" in a 
"Guilty" situation and 22.2% regarded the media as "Ally". 
Although some pattern could be identified in the frequency analysis, the most 
important and relevant finding to this research would be to identify whether 
there exist any pattern of response among "prepared" and "not prepared" 
organizations. For that, a crosstabulation analysis was carried out. As 
mentioned above, five organizations from each extreme of the continuum of 
crisis preparedness were selected and are used here. The results indicated 
that indeed there are some patterns. Table 7.16 below shows some examples 
of the crosstabulation analysis for the "Guilty" situation. For full crosstabulation 
analysis results on the whole "Guilty" data refer to Appendix 16. 
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Table 7.16 - Examples of Crosstabulation Analysis on "Guilty" Situation 
"Prepared" Vs "Not Prepared" Organizations 
M. VLG - "Management Villains - 'Guilty' Situation" 
Ticked Row Total Value 
"Prepared" 44 
"Not Prepared" 33 
Column Total -ap- 7 
"Prepared" 4 
"Not Prepared" 3 
"Prepared" Vs "Not Prepared" Organizations 
ME. E. G - "Media Enemies - 'Guilty' Situation" 
Ticked Row Total Value .. ý 
["Prepared" 
44 
"Not Prepared" 11 
Column Total $. 
"Prepared" 4 
"Not Prepared" 1 
"Prepared" Vs "Not Prepared" Organizations 





"Not Prepared" 33 
Column Total ;. Z 
"Prepared" 4 
"Not Prepared" 3 
"Prepared" Vs "Not Prepared" Organizations 
W. VLG - "Workers Villains -'Guilty' Situation" 
Ticked Row Total Value 
.. ý 
"Prepared" 44 
"Not Prepared" 00 
Column Total .4 
"Prepared" 4 
"Not Prepared" 0 
441 
G. Santana Ch. 7- Data Analysis, Findings and Discussion 
Figure 7.10 below shows the relevant Crosstabulation results in the "Guilty" 
situation. 
Figure 7.10 - "Guilty" Situation - Crosstabulation Results 
SITUATIO N ONE - "GUILT Y" 
Stakeholders "Prepared" "Not Prepared" 
"Archetypal Stakeholder" 
"Prepared" "Not Prepared" 
1- Management II © il I Villains 
2- Stockholders II ® j- II 
' Victim 
3- Workers II © ill in 
4- Media II © 
5- Suppliers II © 
ue 
6- Competitors II ® Ili s 
II 
7- Special Interest Groups © © Allie 
II 
8- Regulators (official bodies) I © Alljg I 
II 
9- Consumers II © i t' Vi im 












13 - Nation (wider community) 
© F 41 lie ii 
Although the minimum score to be considered "consistent" is 60% (or at least 
3 subscribers in any one "archetypal stakeholder"), the maximum scores 
obtained by "prepared" and "not prepared" organizations in all "archetypal 
stakeholders" have been inserted in the score table above as a matter of 
illustration. However, on the other columns only the "archetypal stakeholders" 
that were subscribed to by at least 60% of respondents are stated. Figure 7.11 
below shows a graphical representation of the score lines of both "prepared" 
and "not prepared" organizations. 
it is interesting to notice that on two occasions ("Management" and 
"Consumers"), the majority of both "prepared" and "not prepared" executives 
subscribed to the same "Archetypal" stakeholder: "victims". However, it has to 
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be emphasized that the "prepared" executives were more consistent in both 
cases. 
Figure 7.11 - Graphical Representation of Consistency - "Guilty" Situation 












123456789 10 11 12 13 
"Functional Stakeholders" 
In the "Guilty" situation, apart from in two "functional stakeholders" ("Local 
Community", and "Nation"), "prepared" organizations were more consistent 
than "not prepared" organizations as with regard to the expected role and 
behaviour of their "functional stakeholders" in a situation were the 
organization is "Guilty" of a crisis. "Prepared" organization were 84.61 % more 
consistent than "not prepared" organizations. 
7.5.2.2 - "Victim" Situation 
Similarly, as with the "Guilty" situation, respondents were presented with a 
crisis situation in which their organization was, in this case, the "Victim" of a 
crisis. In another words, the crisis was created by forces totally outside the 
control of the organization (refer to Chapter 6 for the crisis situations). With this 
scenario in mind ("Victim"), the researcher presented the respondent a matrix 
containing a set of "Functional Organizational Stakeholders" as well as a set 
of "Archetypal Organizational Stakeholders". The respondents were then 
asked to rate/relate the expected "Functional" stakeholders' role and 
behaviour ("Archetypal Image") in a "Victim" situation. 
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The same procedure of frequency analysis of the whole obtained data was 
carried out in the "Victim" situation. The purpose here was again to see 
whether there were any significant patterns of response in the data. The 
results of the frequency analysis revealed that in the "Victim" situation the 
frequency of response was not as balanced and spread out as in the "Guilty" 
situation. It was identified a higher number of high percentage ratings in some 
few stakeholders. For example, 35 respondents judged the "Media" to be their 
"Ally" in a situation where their organizations were the "Victim" of a crisis. In 
the same line, 32 respondents answered that "Stockholders" and 
"Consumers" alike would be also the "Victims" in a situation where a crisis 
was caused by external forces. 
It is interesting to notice and compare the expected behaviour of "Functional 
Stakeholders" by hotel organizations in different crisis situations. For instance, 
in a situation where the organizations were "Guilty" of a crisis, a substantial 
number of executives, twenty four, would see the behaviour and role of the 
"Media" as "Villain". In a situation where they were the "Victim" of crisis, the 
expected behaviour of the "Media" by the great majority of executives (thirty 
five) was just the opposite, "Ally". 
Table 7.17 below contains the examples of the frequency analysis of the 
situations described above and another example. For full detailed frequency 
results of the whole "Victim" data refer to Appendix 17. 
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Table 7.17 - Examples of Frequency Analysis on "Victim" Situation 
ME. E. V - "Media Enemies -'Victim' Situation" 
Value Frequency Percentage 
16 11.1 
0 48 88.9 
Total 54 100.0 
ME. A. V - "Media Allies -'Victim' Situation" 
Value Frequency Percentage 
1 35 64.8 
0 19 35.2 
Total 54 100.0 
ST. V. V - "Stockholders Victims -'Victim' Situation" 
Value Frequency Percentage 
1 32 59.3 
0 22 40.7 
Total 54 100.0 
CS. V. V - "Consumers Victims -'Victim' Situation" 
Value Frequency Percentage 
1 32 59.3 
0 22 40.7 
Total 54 100.0 
As in the "Guilty" situation, the important issue here is to identify the patterns, if 
any, among "prepared" and "not prepared" organizations. For that, a 
crosstabulation analysis was also carried out using the five organizations from 
each extreme of the continuum of crisis preparedness selected for previous 
analyses. The results indicated that indeed there are some patterns. 
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Table 7.18 below shows some examples of the crosstabulation analysis for 
the "Victim" situation. For full crosstabulation analysis results on the whole 
"Victim" data refer to Appendix 18. 
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Table 7.18 - Examples of Crosstabulation Analysis on "Victim" Situation 
"Prepared" Vs "Not Prepared" Organizations 
ME. A. V - "Media Allies -'Victim' Situation" 
Ticked Row Total Value 
"Prepared" 55 
"Not Prepared" 22 
Column Total 
"Prepared" 5 
"Not Prepared" 2 
"Prepared" Vs "Not Prepared" Organizations 
CP. A. V - "Competitors Allies -'Victim' Situation" 
Ticked Row Total Value 
Prepared" 44 
"Not Prepared" 22 
Column Total _. ý 
5 
"Prepared" 4 
"Not Prepared" 2 
"Prepared" Vs "Not Prepared" Organizations 
LC. V. V - "Local Community Victims -'Victim' Situation" 
Ticked Row Total Value 
"Prepared" 22 
"Not Prepared" 44 
Column Total fi 
"Prepared" 2 
"Not Prepared" 4 
"Prepared" Vs "Not Prepared" Organizations 





"Not Prepared" 00 
Column Total -401- 
4 
"Prepared" 4 
"Not Prepared" 0 
447 
G. Santana Ch. 7- Data Analysis, Findings and Discussion 
Figure 7.12 below shows the relevant Crosstabulation results in the "Victim" 
situation. 
Figure 7.12 - "Victim" Situation - Crosstabulation Results 
SITUATIO N TWO - "VICT IM" 





1- Management © © Victims 
2- Stockholders © © Victims 
3- Workers © © Victims 
II 
4- Media © © Allies II 




6- Competitors II © Allies 
II 
7- Special Interest Groups f 4- F -1 II' 
II 
8- Regulators (official bodies) I © Allies 
II 
9- Consumers © © Victims 
II 
10 - Insurance Companies 
© © 
Rescuers 
11 - Local Community 
© 
Allies Victims 
12 - Nation (wider community) 
I © 
Allies Victims 
As with the "Guilty" situation, the maximum score obtained by "prepared" and 
"not prepared" organizations in all "archetypal stakeholders" were inserted in 
the score table for illustration purpose. Similarly, in the other columns only the 
"archetypal stakeholders" that were subscribed at least by 60% of 
respondents are stated. Figure 7.13 below shows a graphical representation 
of the score lines of both "prepared" and "not prepared" organizations in a 
"Victim" situation. 
In the "Victim" situation both "prepared" and "not prepared" executives 
subscribed to the same "Archetypal" stakeholder only on one occasion: 
"Stockholders". In this case, the number of subscribers was the same for both 
"prepared" and "not prepared" executives. 
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Figure 7.13 - Graphical Representation of Consistency - "Victim" Situation 









3 11 - 




1 23456789 10 11 12 
"Functional Stakeholders" 
The same consistency result was found in the "Victim" situation. Apart from in 
three "functional stakeholders" ("Management", "Insurance Companies", and 
"Local Community"), "prepared" organizations were more consistent than "not 
prepared" organizations as with regard to the expected role and behaviour of 
their "functional stakeholders" in a situation were the organization was "Victim" 
of a crisis. However, the respondents' scores were level at the "functional 
stakeholder" "Stockholders", where both sets of respondents subscribed by 
60%. "Prepared" organizations were overall 72.72% more consistent than "not 
prepared" organizations. 
The only time in both situations ("Guilty" and "Victim"), where there was any 
one hundred percent agreement in opinion among the subscribers was in the 
stakeholder "Media" in the "Victim" situation, and it was on the "prepared" side. 
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7.5.3 - Consistency - An Overview 
As the results revealed above, the "prepared" set of organizations was indeed 
more consistent than the "not prepared" organizations. This confirms both the 
research question and the research proposition, in that there is indeed a 
correlation between preparedness to crisis and crisis management and a 
consistent pattern of opinion of those "prepared" organizations as to the 
expected behaviour and role of their "functional stakeholders" in crisis 
situation. The two crisis situations presented here have two contrasting 
characteristics, one in which the host organization created their own crisis, 
and the other where the host organization is the "victim" of a crisis created by 
outside forces. It was interesting to notice that in both circumstances the 
"prepared" set of organizations were more consistent than those that are "not 
prepared" for crisis. 
Although the researcher does not possess any hard evidence to explain 
precisely this factor, information obtained in the interviews and questionnaires 
provided, nevertheless, some insights into this issue. One explanation for the 
consistency of opinion among "prepared" organizations might be because of 
their regard for their stakeholders in crisis situations (as seen in the "cultural 
profile" presented earlier). A crisis, when it occurs, for the "prepared" 
organizations also impacts and affects their stakeholders. By preparing for 
crisis, "prepared" organizations consider, in one away or another, their 
stakeholders. They might consider a stakeholder, or a group of stakeholders, 
as part of their crisis plans; or as being a stakeholder that a particular crisis 
might affect more than it would affect other(s) of its social partners; or perhaps 
as a partner in crisis prevention; or in another manner or combinations of 
manners. The fact is that there seems, then, to have a correlation between 
preparing to crisis and being able to anticipate stakeholders' roles and 
behaviour. 
Another explanation might be that because "prepared" organizations have a 
greater concern and involvement with their stakeholders (as some examples 
given before shows), somehow they might be more "intimate", that is, they 
might share more information with other organizations, such as their 
operations, processes, financial status, etc. In another words, they might have 
a deeper knowledge than "not prepared" organizations of their stakeholders, 
allowing "prepared" organizations to judge more precisely the impact a given 
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crisis might have on a particular or each individual stakeholder. Thus, 
"prepared" organizations can more easily anticipate their role and behaviour. 
One can also explore the view that by creating crisis scenarios, simulation 
exercises on crisis, etc., "prepared" organizations may also have to deal and 
envisage the crisis repercussions beyond their own organizations and this 
might prompt "prepared" organizations to suppose or assume the reactions 
they might expect from stakeholders. 
At this level, the researcher can only speculate as to the precise reasons that 
make "prepared" organizations conform to a consistent pattern of opinions in 
relation to their stakeholders in crisis situations. This issue is well beyond the 
scope of this research but, nevertheless, provides a fertile ground for further 
and systematic investigation into the subject. 
7.6 - Summary 
This chapter discussed and elaborated upon the results obtained from the 
methodology applied in this study. One of the main conclusions that can be 
derived from the findings is that the methodology applied was successful in 
achieving the objectives of the research. 
The results of the frequency and crosstabulation analysis of questionnaire 1 
data provided the researcher with insights into the data as well as directions to 
more sophisticated statistical methods to use. Given the objectives of the 
research, the most obvious method to use was factor analysis. Factor analysis 
proved a very successful method. The results of factor analysis provided the 
researcher with four new dimensions (factors): "Pro-activeness", "Denial", 
"Fatalism/Hopelessness", and 'Technical Dimensions". Further analysis, using 
those new sets of dimensions, resulted in a continuum of "crisis prepared" and 
"crisis not prepared" organizations. Using those dimensions, a cultural profile 
of the organizations at each extreme of the continuum was then derived. 
It can then be said that there are indeed organizations with cultural traits that 
make them "crisis prepared" and other organizations that have a culture that 
makes them "less prepared to crisis". As mentioned above, those 
characteristics (behaviour) were clearly identified and discussed. The result of 
this analysis provided the basis for the second stage of the research. 
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The other objective of the research was to observe whether those 
organizations that are "prepared" to crisis are more consistent in their views of 
stakeholders during distinct crisis situations than those organizations that are 
"not prepared" to crisis. Two crisis situations were developed to test the 
research proposition. One in which hotel organizations would be "Guilty" of a 
crisis, and one in which the organization would be the "Victim" of a crisis. 
Again, frequency analysis was applied and provided some indications of the 
patterns of response for both crisis situations. Further analysis using 
crosstabulation analysis revealed that indeed "prepared" organizations were 
more consistent in their view of stakeholders' roles and behaviour during both 
crisis situations. 
Having said that, the results of the analysis confirmed both the research 
question and the research proposition. 
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CONCLUSION 
8.1 -Introduction 
This study has analyzed the preparedness of hotels to crisis and examined 
the perceived image that hotel organizations have of their stakeholders in 
crisis situations. 
Preparedness to crisis was measured in relation to organizational culture. A 
thorough review of literature on all fields used in this research (specially crisis 
management, organizational culture, stakeholder theory, and of course, in 
relation to the methodology applied) has been done. The research required 
sophisticated statistical data analysis to achieve its objectives. Factor analysis 
was employed and the analysis of the results obtained was satisfactory to 
confirm both the research question and research proposition. 
As mentioned previously, advancing a new field of research is not a simple 
task. Some of the issues discussed in this research are very recent areas and 
present all the characteristics of a new area of investigation, such as the lack 
of a widely accepted definition (both operational and conceptual), lack of 
enough implementation results that could consistently support theoretical 
arguments (mainly because they are emerging fields), both conceptual and 
practical arguments are surrounded by controversy, and so forth. 
The issue of definition is a serious one. In fact, throughout this research the 
problem of definition of the concepts used was highlighted and discussed. For 
example, definitions of crisis, organizational culture, stakeholder, and even 
hotel, are not widely accepted. All subjects have been the focus of attention 
but the issues of concept and implementation surrounding the subjects have 
been largely overlooked. Most works in those fields are concerned with the 
applicability of the fields in specific contexts. In the case of crisis management, 
this research proposes an operational definition. 
Results of the examination of hotels operating in the UK suggest that the 
industry in general is not prepared for crisis. There is a real lack of 
understanding of the topic (both conceptual and practical). More research in 
the area of crisis management in the hotel industry is needed. 
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8.2 - An Overview of Main Points and Results 
8.2.1 - Crisis Management and the Hotel Industry 
Hotels play an important role in the economic and social spheres of the 
systems in which they operate. The benefits to society and to the economy 
have been discussed in Chapter 5. The contribution to revenues, employment 
and the tax base of a country (local, regional, or national) is very significant. 
This is specially true for places where tourism represents a major share of the 
income. 
Given that the tourism industry is growing ("the biggest industry in the world") 
hotels are acquiring an even more prominent role for both the industry and the 
context in which they operate. Having said that, hotels operate in a very 
dynamic and ever-changing environment. The forces that shape and influence 
the industry are many and are increasingly diversified. It is argued that the 
hotel industry, given its operating environment, the characteristics of hotel 
operations, and the long established management thinking and practices in 
the industry (which are influenced by tradition), is one of the most vulnerable 
to crisis. Previous research has shown that in the hospitality industry 
uncertainty is the norm. If one considers the context in which the hotel industry 
operates (the tourism industry), other researches have also revealed that the 
industry not only is vulnerable to crisis but it also provides the right setting for 
some activities that inevitably lead to crises (such as crime, terrorism, etc. ) to 
take place. 
In this context, the hotel industry has an increased responsibility to its own 
survivability and to those that directly or indirectly depend on the industry's 
growth and prosperity. 
8.2.1.1 - Hotels and Crisis Management 
Crisis management is a very recent field of research. Very little work has been 
done in the service industry and the literature is dominated by industrial 
crisis/disasters. Having said that, valuable concepts can be applied to any 
sector of the economy, and since the interest in this study is concerned with 
organizational systems (culture) and not with end products or production 
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processes in themselves, those studies are the most valuable source of 
information available. Moreover, valuable lessons can be learned from other 
people's management of crisis and their experiences can be applied to any 
sector. 
As discussed throughout this study, there is clear evidence to suggest that 
crises are on the increase and not, unfortunately, on the decrease. The range 
of crisis an organization is vulnerable to is growing by the day. Crisis today is 
a fact of life. No business, regardless of its structure, financial history, size, 
nature of operation, management style, etc., is immune to crisis. Indeed, some 
authors suggest that crises are built into the very fabric of our time. Moreover, 
most of the current knowledge in designing innovative and performing 
organizations tends to increase their degree of complexity and fragility. With 
all the complexities and uncertainties, it is apparent that any intervention in a 
crisis situation has the potential for creating other problems. Given the current 
operational cultural and educational systems approach to business, our ability 
to manage crisis is very limited. Indeed, previous researches suggest that 
managers are not prepared technically, psychologically, and emotionally to 
deal with the challenges posed by a potential crisis. 
The causes of crises are many, and in many cases crises are the result of a 
combination of events that conspire and escalate to an uncontrollable level. 
Human error, lack of anticipation, greed, mechanical failure, etc., are all 
elements commonly associated with recent major commercial and industrial 
crisis. It is important to emphasize that this research is mainly concerned with 
man-made crisis. Today, man-made crises have the potential to rival natural 
disasters in both scope and magnitude. Previous chapters elucidated the 
devastation of some industrial crisis that had not only affected large parts of 
the globe but also had transgenerational implications. Commercial crises 
have left whole communities unstructured, both economically and socially. 
The environment has been the victim of many crises (tourism examples are 
many). 
The consequences of crisis are diverse and can be traumatic. Indeed, one of 
the worst consequences of a crisis is the emotional toll that is exacted, not 
only on the organization, but also on the individuals involved. This study has 
discussed the many consequences of crisis and the potential effects a crisis 
can have on both the crisis sufferer and on the stakeholders. Different crises 
have different outcomes. One reason for that is that a crisis never happens as 
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it has been planned for, therefore, even if preparation is in place the outcome 
can be very different. Crisis carry a degree of -uniqueness, as discussed in 
Chapter 2. Having said that, crisis training and preparation is essential, since 
preparation alone cannot cover all the surprises presented by a major crisis. 
There is, however, antagonism between the concepts of tourism and crisis (at 
least perceptual). Tourism activities are usually associated with relaxation, 
pleasure, enjoyment and safety; while distress, trauma, anxiety, fear and panic 
are all embodied in the concept of crisis. However, and as discussed 
extensively in this study, crisis is indeed a part of life today and cannot be 
disassociated from any business activity. Ironically, this is even more 
important for the tourism industry (and for all those that make up the industry). 
Crises are not only increasing in number and types but 'are becoming 
increasingly more complex and difficult to anticipate and resolve, given that 
advancements in technology and other fields allow the development of 
increasingly fragile and complex systems and organizations. Having said that, 
hotel organizations need to acknowledge that crises are part of their "normal" 
operations and need to plan in an orderly and systematic fashion for the 
inevitable. Only with proper advance planning there can be a positive side to 
a crisis. 
The hotel industry, due to its operating nature and environment, is indeed one 
of the most vulnerable industries to crisis. The hotel industry is characterized 
by its fragmented structure, dynamic operating environment, and high levels of 
uncertainty. Some researchers suggested that few other organizations 
experience such a high degree of continuous uncertainty. Others suggest that 
management practices in the industry are heavily influenced by long 
established traditions and that the industry is typically a re-active one (slow to 
anticipate and adapt to changes). Indeed, Lewis (1994) pointed out that the 
hotel industry leads the way in business failure. Crisis in the hotel industry can 
take many forms and shapes. Recent events suggest that the range of crisis 
that the hotel industry is vulnerable to is very large indeed. Most of the crisis 
discussed in this study can be applied to the hotel industry. Crisis in the 
industry can range from employee theft to an airplane crashing onto the hotel, 
from rape to executive crime, from food poisoning to terrorist attack. Although it 
was never the intention of this study to enumerate or classify specific crises 
that the industry might experience, Chapter 5 discussed some of the most 
common ones and highlighted the vulnerability of the industry in general to 
crises. The issues of crime and safety (issues that have been a continuous 
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struggle for the industry) have been discussed. There is evidence to suggest 
that the tourism industry provides the "right" setting for criminal activities to 
take place. 
As mentioned briefly above, the revision of the literature for this study has 
been marked by the lack of widely accepted conceptual and operational 
definitions of the subjects used in the study. Chapter 2 discussed extensively 
the problems of definition surrounding crisis and crisis management. The 
concept of crisis has evolved historically and has been used and applied in a 
number of fields and disciplines. Of more and direct relevance to this 
research, the fact that crisis management is a new field of research has also 
some implications for defining itself. Crisis research to date has relied heavily 
on a single method of study, the case study. While single case studies provide 
substantial depth of analysis, they are difficult to compare. Where additional 
concepts were introduced they have sometimes been of a controversial nature 
based on interpretation of evidence (as also discussed in Chapters 3 and 4). 
Crisis management is undoubtedly one of the most multi and interdisciplinary 
fields that exist. Crisis management draws on research in the fields of 
economics, sociology, political science, demography, philosophy of science, 
psychology, psychiatry, theology, management, ecology, biology, physics, 
social theory, history, and others. The term is often quite differently defined 
depending on the academic context- in which it is used. It has been argued 
that in the management science, unfortunately, most writers do not embrace a 
multifaceted view of crisis. Many authors still use "narrow" or conceptually 
"limited" definitions. Many concepts used in definitions have not received 
empirical support in further studies. It is also argued that the most erroneous 
misconception in the management science is the refusal to see a crisis as a 
positive force, as a factor itself contributing to the existence of an organization. 
As Pauchant and Mitroff (1992) posit, by acknowledging that a crisis has both 
a positive and a negative side, one is not only saying that a crisis is both a 
danger and a opportunity; one is also saying that the destructive side of a 
crisis is itself a sine qua non condition for the development of an organization. 
Very few authors in management emphasize this critical paradox. 
This study also focused on other dynamics of crisis definitions (that influence 
the definition of the term) such as the nature of a crisis, the source, and the 
causes of crisis. In general, the literature does not provide a widely accepted 
definition of crisis and attempts to categorize types or forms of crises have 
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been sparse. While some authors have explored multi forms of crises, others 
have examined crises as a single phenomenon, and others have 
concentrated in only one manifestation of crisis. Moreover, the problem is 
aggravated by the extensive use of synonyms in the literature, such as jolt, 
problem, disaster, turning point, catastrophe, etc. 
The problem of definition and the misconception of the term hampers 
development in the field of crisis management. It is argued that this fact may 
be responsible for the lack of preparedness of some organizations. 
This research has identified and confirmed those problems of definition in the 
hotel industry. Hotel executives could not agree on a definition of what 
consists a crisis. Some executives could not define crisis at all, as discussed 
in Chapter 7. This fact clearly reflects their practices, or attempts, in crisis 
management. 
The research also confirms findings by other researchers in that crisis 
management responsibility falls under different responsibilities. in the hotel 
industry responsibility for crisis management ranges from being the 
responsibility of chief security officers to managing directors, from financial 
directors to marketing executives. This reflects the view that each organization 
sees crisis differently, regarding some areas (or fields) as more vulnerable 
than others. It would be interesting to observe whether this perception 
changes over time. That is, whether crisis management responsibility is 
delegated to other functions or if it is kept consistently under the responsibility 
of one given area. 
Defining crisis management (operationally) has also been a difficult task. This 
has been specially true for the hotel industry. Some attempts to define crisis 
management have been made but as with crisis have not gained wide 
acceptance. The results of this research emphasized that in general hotel 
executives equate crisis with physical damage or structural problems or 
shortcomings. Brewton's (1987) definition of crisis management clearly 
reflects this perception in that it is concerned with "avoiding or minimizing 
injury to guest and danger to hotel assets". This kind of definition, as 
extensively discussed throughout this study, is clearly limited since it does not 
consider the broad array of hotel stakeholders and overlooks conceptual and 
implementation issues. 
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Having said all that, an operational crisis management definition is proposed: 
Crisis management is an ongoing integrated and comprehensive 
effort that organizations effectively put into place in an attempt to 
first and foremost understand and prevent crisis, and to manage 
effectively those that occur, taking into account in each and every 
step of their planning and training activities, the interest of their 
stakeholders. 
Figure 8.1 below summarizes the operational definition of crisis management. 
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Figure 8.1 - Crisis Management - An Operational Definition 
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This research also explored other dynamics of crisis, such as typology 
(already mentioned above) and crisis anatomy (phases). Crises evolve in an 
orderly pattern and the understanding of each individual phase of a crisis is 
paramount for the effective management of crisis. Those issues, and 
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strategies to deal with crisis in each individual phase have also been 
discussed. 
Studies in crisis management indicate clearly that the phenomenon of crisis is 
articulated from different phases or stages (Fink, 1986; Mitroff, 1988a, 
Pauchant and Mitroff, 1992, Shrivastava, 1992, Booth, 1993). Specifically, 
most crises move through five essential phases. Failure to manage any one of 
these phases well may be responsible for the occurrence of a crisis in the first 
place and then for its escalation. Organizations can only increase their ability 
to manage crisis if they properly understand and manage each phase of this 
process. 
The phases consist of "Signal Detection", "Prevention/Preparation", which 
could be labeled "proactive types" of crisis management. If the management of 
those phases are done properly, these activities can prevent many crises from 
occurring in the first place. "Containment/Damage Limitation" and "Recovery" 
are the "reactive types" - activities done after a crisis has happened, in an 
attempt to contain its damage and recover from its effects. The "Learning" 
phase can be seen as an "interactive type" of crisis management. It can either 
be a part of crisis management plans in the absence of crisis or a result of the 
experience of a crisis. Together these phases constitute the total scoreboard 
by which an organization and its managers will be judged. 
Considering all the discussion in this study, a crisis management model is 
also proposed. The model is derived from the proposed definition of crisis 
management presented above. 
Figure 8.2 - Crisis Management Model 
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The crisis management model proposed here is a reflection of all the main 
points discussed in this research. It addresses the fundamental issues of crisis 
management such as crisis typology, anatomy (phases), as well as 
introducing some new topics such as stakeholder management and crisis 
resource management. The model also highlights and specifies the distinct 
crisis management functions in each phase. It is clear from the model that 
crisis management takes place, or at least should, prior to the occurence of a 
crisis (Crisis Management Knowledge Base). It is important to emphasize that 
in today's world if one is not in a crisis one is in a pre-crisis situation. A crisis 
provides more opportunities than threats if one is crisis-prepared. 
8.2.1.1.1 - Hotel Industry Preparedness to Crisis 
Previous researches revealed that variables such as size, structure, etc., are 
little indication of crisis immunity, preparedness, and survivability. Therefore, 
crisis preparedness in this research has been analyzed from the 
organizational culture perspective. The culture of an organization is the most 
important element in directing organizational behaviour and actions. It 
determines organizational ability to anticipate, prevent, and manage crisis. 
The problem of definition is also encountered in relation to organizational 
culture, as discussed in Chapter 3. As a concept, organizational culture is 
relatively new. Confusion and controversy also surround the concept, as with 
crisis. Many definitions of the concept, each reflecting a particular point of view 
have been proposed. The term has been used indiscriminately in 
organizational culture research, referring basically to two different meanings. 
First, to the coherent system of assumptions and the basic values 
distinguishing a group and directing its choices; and second, to a group's 
distinct set of features or traits, which does not only mean its basic values but 
its beliefs, models of behaviour, technology, symbols, and artifacts. However, 
as proposed by Schein (1990), the term "culture" should be reserved for the 
deeper level of basic assumptions and beliefs that are shared by members of 
an organization, that operate unconsciously, and that define in a basic "taken- 
for-granted" fashion an organization's view of itself and its environment. 
Organizational culture is the most important variable in crisis management. As 
evidenced in previous chapters, apart from the most conscious factors that 
influence organization's behaviour, such as the firm's environment, the 
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structure of the industry in which it competes, its financial history, its capital 
requirement, and so forth, - there are more unconscious factors (less 
observable) that exert a strong, decisive, effect on the behaviour of 
organizations. 
Having said that, the way in which organizations anticipate and respond to an 
impending crisis does not depend on, nor is it determined by, the personality 
and/or intellectual capacity of its leaders. In addition, organizational 
responsiveness to crisis does not primarily depend on, nor is it determined by, 
the structure of the organization, organizational business policies, etc., which 
make up an organization's visible features. Rather, the ability to anticipate and 
respond effectively to crisis is determined by the culture of an organization. 
The culture of an organization is more "powerful" than the dictates of any one 
person or any formal management system. Organizational culture is the sole 
determinant of crisis preparedness. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the culture of an organization represents both an 
opportunity and a threat for crisis management. There is enough evidence to 
support the view that on the one hand the culture of an organization can serve 
to precipitate a crisis by providing the environment within which a crisis can 
originate and escalate. On the other hand, the culture of an organization can 
be central to an organization's ability to cope with threatening situations 
(anticipate, prevent and manage a crisis effectively). 
Considering the environment in which hotels operate, the ability to change 
and adapt to new realities is essential for hotel survival and prosperity. 
Organizations undergo significant strategic change for a number of reasons. 
Regardless of the need for change, it is important to observe that culture plays 
a decisive role not only in the choice of strategies, but also on the success of 
their implementation, overall performance, and indeed survival of the 
organization. 
Change requires sound strategic decisions. However, implementing it is not a 
simple task. Schein (1986) demonstrates that whenever an organization that 
has been successful in its mastery of a given technology changes the 
technology used, the organization not only must learn new practices but must 
also redefine itself in ways that involve deep cultural assumptions. Indeed, 
and as noted before, even where organizations are able to devise strategies 
to cope with rapidly changing environments (strategies that makes financial, 
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product, marketing, etc., sense), they are unable to implement those strategies 
because they require assumptions, values and ways of working that differ from 
the organization's prior assumptions. An existing culture may be very 
supportive of an organization's mission and success at a particular point, but 
may be not at all appropriate when significant strategic change becomes 
necessary (Klein et al, 1995). In another words, either the existing culture is 
complementary to the changes imposed by new strategies or some cultural 
change may be deemed necessary in order to affect and maintain 
organizational effectiveness (Bennett eLW, 1994). 
Change requires that an organization not only learns new practices but that it 
also redefines itself in ways that involve deep cultural assumptions. The 
culture of an organization governs and directs all aspects of organizational 
life. It influences the decision making process (what strategy to follow), the 
success of their implementation, and it dictates whether an organization is 
able or not to adapt and respond to changes emanated both in the internal 
and in the external environment. Organizational culture also influences the 
long-term effectiveness and performance of organizations, and determines 
organizational well-being. Thus, organizational culture is central for crisis 
management. It dictates whether an organization is prepared or not for crisis. 
Previous researches have identified fundamental cultural differences between 
an organization that is "prepared" for crisis and one that is not. They display 
very contrasting cultural traits and assumptions, which reflect in their ability to 
anticipate and manage crisis effectively. 
From the discussion in previous chapters it is clear that organizations with a 
long and successful history and relatively permanent personnel, which have 
shared external threats and internal problems of adaptation together, tend to 
have a strong culture based- on shared basic assumptions. These kinds of 
deeply-rooted, shared basic assumptions are difficult to change. These 
strongly held assumptions while holding the organization together may also 
hinder the organization's ability to change and adapt. It has been argued that 
people in an organization sometimes embrace and protect the norms 
developed in an organization, even if they lead to crises. In crisis prone 
organizations, managers and employees are very skilled at developing 
rationalizations that will validate their day-to-day actions, disregarding the fact 
that these actions can lead, after a while, to crises. Therefore, what holds 
organizations together, that forms the culture of such organizations, that is at 
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the basis of decisions and actions, is the set of sometimes faulty assumptions 
or rationalizations that members of the organizations have developed. As 
discussed in Chapter 7, such an assumption as "any effort in relation to crisis 
before it happens - such as prevention - is a waste of time and money", may 
persist despite strong historical evidence to the contrary (e. g., poor 
performance in prior crises). Several researchers, as discussed above and in 
previous chapters, have argued that organizational actions are characterized 
by those very rigid underlying assumptions which are difficult to change. 
This research utilized a number of rationalizations managers use in relation to 
crisis and crisis management to identify hotel groups preparedness to crisis. 
Organizational culture was operationalized in terms of rationalizations. As 
discussed in Chapter 6, while not reducing the culture of an organization to 
the phenomenon of rationalization, rationalization represents one dimension 
through which organizational culture is manifested, and thus influences 
individuals and groups and behaviour. 
By employing factor analysis on the data obtained from the survey, 4 major 
factors were derived. The factor solution revealed that crisis preparedness in 
the hotel industry can be explained in terms of several dimensions. The 
dimensions identified were "Pro-activeness", "Denial", 
"Fatalism/Hopelessness", and "Technical". The "pro-activeness" factor has to 
do with organizations being aware of potential implications of a crisis and 
organizing themselves (preparing) for the inevitable, taking into account their 
outside environment (stakeholders). The importance of being pro-active in 
relation to a potentially threatening situation is highlighted in this factor. The 
"Denial" factor, in direct contrast with the "pro-activeness" factor, has to do 
basically with executives denying and rejecting their responsibilities in 
relation to crisis and crisis management. This factor also evidences defensive 
mechanisms such as the downplay of the importance and seriousness of 
potential situations. The "Fatalism/Hopelessness" factor is concerned with the 
inevitability of crises. It has to do with organizations that have a stale culture 
(those that believe in crisis immunity) and those that have given up hope 
completely. This factor basically addresses the issues of crisis inevitability, 
highlights the power of the media, and stresses the inability of management to 
deal effectively with those issues. Finally, the "Technical" factor reflects the 
view of executives in that crisis is only a "material" or "physical" phenomenon. 
This factor has to do with management reducing crises and crisis 
management issues and procedures to a technical perspective. As mentioned 
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previously, the subjects examined in this research had a tendency to 
associate crisis and crisis management with the material or physical aspects 
of the business they manage. 
Those dimensions were explored further and resulted in a continuum of crisis 
preparedness including all hotel groups investigated. In order to develop the 
cultural profile of organizations at both extremes of the crisis preparedness 
continuum, interview data and data from questionnaire 2 were used to 
complement, support, and better illustrate the findings in this research. 
8.2.1.1.2 - Hotels, Stakeholders, and Crisis Management 
The issue of stakeholder theory and management was also discussed in this 
study. The concept of stakeholder is central to crisis management. However, 
as with crisis and organizational culture, there are still basic fundamental 
problems such as conceptual and operational definitions of stakeholders, 
problems in relation to stakeholders identification, and managerial 
implications for the effective implementation of the concept. 
Again, the literature in the field of stakeholders is fragmented and sometimes 
confused and controversial. This, however, has been viewed by the 
researcher to be beneficial to the development of the concept and contributes 
directly to important issues surrounding the concept such as the issue of 
implementation. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, stakeholder theory is based on the principle of 
extending recognition to a broader range of individuals or groups that have a 
"morally valid claim" on the organization, as opposed to commonly previous 
views about claims and stake (the stockholder theory). 
In this study, stakeholder theory has been linked to crisis management. 
Previous discussions suggest that anyone (individual or group) has the 
potential to affect or be affected by organizational action or inaction. 
Therefore, understanding stakeholder systems and dynamics is an essential 
element in crisis management. This study also introduced and discussed 
(apart from the traditional set of stakeholders discussed in the literature that 
represents the impact of impersonal institutional forces external to the 
organization) another set of stakeholders that emanate from the sociophathic 
behaviour that has been directed at the modern organizations (such as 
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executive kidnapping, sabotage, terrorism, executive crime, poisoning, etc. ). 
This new set of stakeholders has been introduced to complement the more 
traditional one. Quoting Freeman (1984, pp. 53) again, 
"Some groups may have as an objective simply to interfere with the smooth 
operations of our business. For instance, some corporations must count 
'terrorist groups' as stakeholders. As unsavory as it is to admit that such 
'illegitimate' groups have a stake in our business, from the standpoint of 
strategic management, it must be done. " 
The discussion in previous chapters supports the view that those two sets of 
stakeholders are inseparable: In principle they are in constant contact with 
one another. Given this perspective, it is essential that organizations 
acknowledge in a practical manner the interconnectedness and 
interdependence of their operations and understand the fundamentals and 
dynamics of the behaviour and actions of the potential forces that act upon the 
organization. 
Organizational activities have a number of potentially damaging side-effects 
on their stakeholders and on the environment. When the issue is crisis, those 
effects take on another dimension. The impact of crisis may change important 
contextual factors, as discussed previously. The effects of crisis on the 
organization and on their stakeholders has also been extensively discussed 
in previous chapters. Crises are both organizational and inter-organizational 
phenomena. Crises are also characterized by the presence of multiple 
stakeholders, inevitably involved in causing, communicating, and mitigating 
the effects of crises. From the point of view of crisis management, stakeholders 
are also key elements in crisis prevention. Therefore, understanding 
stakeholders is paramount to crisis management. 
Discussions in previous chapters suggest that survival and prosperity depend 
on the effective management of the relationships within the total system. It has 
been argued that by adopting a stakeholders approach to business, risks and 
uncertainties are reduced and the chances of crises developing are lessened. 
The issue of stakeholder theory is particularly important to the hotel industry. 
As discussed in previous chapters, the hotel industry operates in a higly 
interconnected and interdependent system. There is substantial evidence to 
suggest that stakeholder management in becoming a critical issue on the 
successful operation of business. Some leading organizations are utilizing 
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stakeholder management as a measure of performance. There is evidence to 
suggest that stakeholder management improves organizational performance 
at all levels. Examples of the dangers inherent in disregading stakeholders' 
interests in business decision making are many. In the tourism industry, if only 
those at the destination are considered, for instance, where key stakeholders 
have been left out of planning and decision making, deprived from resources, 
and/or alienated from development, the results have been regrettable. Some 
stakeholders invariably resort to actions that can very easily ruin a whole 
destination. Neglecting and disregarding stakeholders' claims can lead to, 
amongst other things, resentment, xenophobia, protests, violent acts against 
tourists and tourism organizations, terrorism, and so fourth. 
However, very little has been done specifically with regard to the hotel 
industry. It is argued that where the concept of stakeholder management has 
been discussed in the context of the tourism industry the concept has been 
introduced from a practical perspective, without outlining some of the critical 
issues surrounding its conception and implementation. 
Given the interconnectedness and interdependence that characterize the 
operating enviroment of the hotel industry, stakeholder management becomes 
increasingly important. That is, failure to understand and manage 
stakeholders interests can lead to devastating results for the organization and 
its stakeholders alike. Actions, and for that matter, inactions, of any one player 
in the system have the inherent potential to affect all in the system. As 
repeatedly mentioned throughout this study, the hotel industry is very 
vulnerable to crisis. Stakeholder management then takes on another 
dimension. 
While hotels represent undoubtedly a predominant position in local, regional, 
and national development (hotels are providers of employment, contribute to 
tax, are major buyers of local goods, and generate a great number of indirect 
jobs, apart from being in most cases a large capital investment), whenever a 
crisis occurs invariably a great number of stakeholders are directly and 
indirectly affected to a varying degree. Where local economies depend 
heavily on the tourism industry, as in many parts of developing countries, the 
issue of stakeholder management becomes correspondingly important. 
Having said that, hotel organizations cannot continue to consider in isolation 
their own crisis interests. 
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This research examined stakeholder relationships in the hotel industry in 
relation to crisis and crisis management. Specifically, the study focused on 
how the hotel industry perceives (expectation) stakeholders' roles and 
behaviour in periods of crisis. Two crisis situations were developed (one in 
which the hotel organization was "Guilty" of a crisis, and another in which the 
hotel organization was the "Victim" of a crisis). The results of both analysie 
revealed that there is indeed a correlation between crisis preparedness and 
expected role and behaviour of stakeholders in a given crisis situation. That is, 
the research revealed that, organizations that are "prepared" for crisis are 
more consistent than those that are "not prepared" for crisis in their opinions 
regarding the expected role and behaviour of their functional stakeholders in 
crisis situations. In both cases ("Guilty" and "Victim"), "prepared" organizations 
were more consistent than "not prepared" organizations. 
8.2.1.2 -A Summary of Main Findings 
The results of this study suggest that in general the hotel industry is not 
prepared for crisis. The issue of crisis management is a new one to hotel 
executives and it clearly reflects their practices. Apart from one hotel 
organization that has a comprehensive crisis management programme most 
of the others in this study are still in a very early stage of development as far a 
crisis management is concerned. Having said that, it can be argued that there 
is not much available (either from the academic or the practical - 
consultancies, etc. - fields) for the hotel organizations to develop from. That is, 
there are very few training facilities in the UK (the majority are only PR 
training), there are very few text books (none relating specific to the hotel 
industry), very few articles are available in relation to the industry (and as 
discussed previously, they lack conceptual and implementation evidence). 
Hotels associations and other bodies are also not fully aware of this business 
function and as a result do not promote it to their members. 
The study revealed that hotel groups displayed different types of behaviour in 
relation to crisis and crisis management. "Prepared" organizations were in 
general pro-active in relation to crisis and crisis management. They 
acknowledge that crises are inevitable and that it can affect people beyond 
the domain of their operations. Crisis today, given the interdependence of 
business operations, very seldom happens in isolation. Rather, modern crises 
have the potential to set off a chain reaction of other crises as part of the initial 
one. Being pro-active, planning for crises, is the only way crises can be 
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averted and managed effectively, should they occur. Among the "prepared" 
organizations there is a particular hotel group that has in place a 
comprehensive and sophisticated formal crisis management programme, 
which includes crisis training, simulation, scenario building, stakeholder 
management, issue management, etc. 
The other group on the continuum of crisis preparedness, "not prepared", 
revealed a different approach to crisis and crisis management. In most cases 
crisis is denied as an issue and nothing is done towards it unless a severe 
crisis strikes the organizations. Efforts in crisis management for those 
organizations in general are reduced to a PR contract with external firms. 
Training for crisis purposes is very limited and formal planning is virtually non- 
existent. For crisis "not prepared" organizations a crisis only exists if it 
seriously threatens the existence of the company. For those organizations, 
then, an issue has to escalate and take a whole new proportion to have their 
attention, even though it may be too late. Invariably, those organizations are 
reactive. They believe erroneously, that investment (or any effort) towards 
crisis management is a waste of time and resources. 
It has been noticed, however, that apart from one organization in the sample, 
all other organizations (from both sets of "prepared" and "not prepared") have 
a tendency to relate crisis to "physical" issues, such as plant defects, fire, 
structural damage as a result of bomb attack, etc., and the consequences 
associated with those events. Other types of crisis such as the ones discussed 
in previous chapters (and those displayed in the crisis typology section in 
Chapter 2) were not considered by executives in any manner. 
The results also revealed that "not prepared" organizations make use of 
defensive mechanisms more often than "prepared" organizations. In most 
cases, "not prepared" organizations deny that a threat exists or that the 
organization may experience a crisis. While "prepared" organizations invest 
time and resources in monitoring their operating environment (internal and 
external) and effectively create and implement crisis programmes for any 
impending issue, "not prepared" organizations treasure believes that 
downgrade and downplay the seriousness of a potential crisis. Another 
displayed behaviour of "not prepared" organizations is that they have a 
tendency to shift responsibility for crisis management, neglecting their own 
interests and those of their network of relationships. Moreover, for "not 
prepared" organizations a crisis only and exclusively happens to them alone, 
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and crisis are invariably the consequence of some external forces. As 
mentioned before, with this set of believes it is not surprising that crisis training 
and planning is negligible. "Not prepared" organizations also routinize 
information and communication processes. Having said that, "not prepared" 
organizations believe, mistakenly, that no special requirement is needed for 
crisis management (prevention, preparation, resolution). 
The concept of stakeholder is an important one in modern business 
management and one that is very important for crisis management. 
Stakeholder theory has been growing in importance in the last few years. 
Increasingly business organizations are adopting the concept of stakeholders 
in their practices and objectives. Considering the importance of stakeholders 
in responsible business management, this study also examined how the hotel 
industry perceives (expectation) stakeholders' roles and behaviour in crisis 
situations. The results of the research has been inspiring. 
Again, "prepared" and "not prepared" organizations differ in relation to 
stakeholder management. As extensively discussed in previous chapters, 
stakeholders are central to crisis management. Whenever a crisis strikes an 
organization, it has the inherent potential to affect all those interested parties 
with whom an organization directly or indirectly deals. However, stakeholders 
are essential for crisis prevention and management (although historically 
stakeholders have been seen only from the perspective of potential "victims"). 
A good relationship with stakeholders may mean survival and prosperity when 
the issue is crisis. Stakeholders can help an organization avoid crisis, prevent 
and prepare for those that are unavoidable and can play a central role in the 
recovery of any crisis sufferer. However, the results of this study have shown 
that "not prepared" organizations do not regard stakeholders in any way when 
the issue is crisis or crisis management. In general, "not prepared" 
organizations believe that stakeholders (apart from stockholders and others 
considered to be essential to their operations) have nothing to do with their 
business. 
In contrast, "prepared" organizations not only consider stakeholders in their 
crisis planning but also actively involve stakeholders in their planning and 
training. 
The perception that hotel executives have of their stakeholders in crisis 
situations was examined as an objective of this study. The research 
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proposition is that "The higher the readiness/preparedness of organizations to 
crisis, the higher the consistency of those organizations in viewing the 
behaviour and role of their functional stakeholders in crisis situations". The 
results of this study indeed confirmed the research proposition. 
In both crisis situations ("Guilty" and "Victim"), "prepared" organizations were 
more consistent than "not prepared" organizations in their view of 
stakeholders' behaviour and role. Having said that, there is indeed a 
correlation between preparedness for crisis and a consistent pattern of 
opinion of "prepared" organizations as to the expected behaviour and role of 
functional stakeholders in crisis situations. 
8.3 - Methodological Limitations and other problems 
The main statistical method used in this research was factor analysis. Factor 
analysis assist investigators in making sense of large amounts of interrelated 
data. In the case of this research, the employment of factor analysis was very 
satisfactory, pointing to interesting relationships that would have been 
impossible to identify by examining the raw data alone or even a correlation 
matrix, as discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. Factor analysis has been growing in 
importance in management science contributing directly to problem solving 
and research. 
As with any other statistical procedure the problem of reliability is a real one, 
since factor analysis starts with a set of imperfect data. As also discussed in 
previous chapters, when the data changes because of changes in the sample, 
the data-gathering process orthe various measurements errors, the results of 
the analysis also changes. 
Although there are other limitations relating to factor analysis (factor analysis 
is not perfect), the most relevant for this research is the fact that factor analysis 
is in the end a subjective method. That is, deciding on the number of factors to 
extract, the rotation technique, and the factor loading, are all subjective to 
many diverging opinions. Moreover, the interpretation of factors is left to the 
subjective discretion of the analyst. Having said that, the method was used 
successfully and contributed to the overall objective of the research. 
The lack of literature and relevant works on all major topics addressed in this 
research have also been a limitation, specifically in relation to the hotel 
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industry. Problems such as the confusion and controversy surrounding 
conceptual and operational definitions of the concepts under investigation 
were encountered. However, those problems are typical of new and evolving 
subjects and were seen as contributing to the overall development of the 
topics. 
8.4 - The Contribution of this Research 
The major topics of this research are relatively new areas of research (crisis 
management, organizational culture, and stakeholder theory). As concepts, 
they show signs of the early stages of development such as a lack of widely 
accepted conceptual and operational definitions. In the case of crisis 
management, many definitions of crisis have been proposed by the different 
fields that use and apply the term and concept. Every scientific field has its 
own definition and concept of crisis. An in-depth review of this abundant 
literature highlights the complexity of crisis as a phenomenon and suggests 
the need for a theory in crisis management that addresses this complexity. In 
management science, which is the case in this research, the definitions 
proposed so far have not received enough empirical support. This research 
reviewed the relevant literature on the topic and has proposed an operational 
definition for crisis management. 
The justification for the relevance of this research, as discussed in Chapter 1, 
rests on distinct, but complementary, pillars. Researching crisis management, 
per se, is in itself a good enough reason. In addition, within the body of 
knowledge of crisis management theory this research moves into the largely 
uncharted waters of measuring crisis preparedness in the contexts of the hotel 
industry. This research also attempts to combine crisis management and 
stakeholder theory. It examines and establishes a relationship between crisis 
management and stakeholder relationships in crisis situations. 
In analyzing crisis preparedness in the hotel industry, this research searches 
for more reliable measurement tools and realizes and formulates new ways 
and techniques to evaluate crisis preparedness, leaving aside the more 
conventional methods. For. that, organizational culture was operationalized in 
terms of rationalizations. 
Given the complexity of business operations today, this research also 
introduces a new set of stakeholders, one that realistically reflects the forces 
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that now affect the modem organization. This set of stakeholders represents 
the bizarre and abnormal characters that affect organizations today. They are 
introduced to complement the more traditional set of stakeholders that 
represent the impact of impersonal forces external to the organization. The 
objective was to emphasize that they (the two sets of stakeholders) are 
inseparable. As justified in Chapter 4, the traditional set is not wrong, it is just 
incomplete. For the assessment of stakeholder relationships in crisis 
situations innovative approaches were also required. 
This research can also be justified by attempting to expand the knowledge 
within hotel management theory to include the concept of crisis and crisis 
management. There is negligible evidence on the topic in the hotel 
management literature (and also in the tourism literature' as a whole). 
Therefore, and as mentioned in Chapter 1, in terms of research on hotel 
management this research represents an attempt at grafting factors onto a 
mode of thinking about crisis and crisis management in the industry which has 
been perceptualized by tradition and the insularity of the industry. There is 
evidence to support the view that the hotel industry is particularly vulnerable to 
crisis but very little has been done towards understanding crisis and crisis 
management as a whole. 
Finally, its is important to emphasize that crisis management analysis and 
research is not purely for academic interest. As evidenced throughout this 
research, crises are a real part of life today and the number and types of crises 
a business is exposed to today are on the increase. Crises are becoming 
increasingly more complex and difficult to anticipate and manage effectively. 
Moreover, current trends in designing performing organizations seems to 
increase their degree of complexity and fragility. Previous researches have 
also revealed that in general management are not prepared psychologically, 
emotionally, and technically to deal with the threat of an impending crisis. 
Crises today are highly complex issues that invariably require highly complex 
solutions. 
Considering all the issues discussed and applied in this research, a crisis 
management model that can be applied in any business and a model that 
addresses crises of different time frames and degree of severity was 
developed, as seen earlier in this chapter. 
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It is hoped that this study can contribute to both theory building and to the 
much needed practice of crisis management in the hotel industry. 
8.5 - Specific Issues for Future Research Arising from the Analysis 
Considering that crisis management is a recent field, as well as other 
concepts described in this study (e. g., stakeholders and organizational 
culture), the ground for future research is very fertile. However, and as 
mentioned throughout this study, there are still fundamental problems that 
need to be addressed, such as conceptual definitions, operational definitions, 
and implementation issues. Those are problems that require immediate 
attention if those field are to contribute to the industry. The present research, 
nevertheless, is hoped to be a small contribution towards the advancement of 
those research areas. This research identified cultural traits that contribute 
towards (or hinder) crisis management effort. Given the sample under 
investigation and the structure of the hotel industry, the results can be 
regarded as a general pattern in the industry in relation to crisis and crisis 
management. 
Having said that, much research in crisis management is needed specifically 
for the hotel industry. For example, the issue of crisis typology in the hotel 
industry is an important one. The range of crisis that the industry is potentially 
vulnerable to is very wide. Crisis clustering or groupings by types could be a 
contribution to crisis managers, planners, researchers, and educators alike. 
Given that the industry is very fragmented, it would be interesting to know 
whether there is a difference in this vulnerability. That is, is there a difference 
between the vulnerability to crisis between the different grades that form the 
whole sector? What is the extent of this difference? Why is there this 
difference, and what are the implications for research and crisis 
management? 
Another area that needs more investigation is crisis training. It is important to 
know what is really available specifically for the hotel industry, the level of 
effectiveness of training programmes, and what should be done to improve 
the effectiveness of crisis training. The researcher could not identify any 
specific training programme or institution that provides crisis training or 
assistance for the hotel industry. It is important to understand that the hotel 
industry has many particularities that need to be addressed. In fact, those 
particularities and nuances in operations contribute to crisis vulnerability. This 
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is even more relevant when crisis training is considered. Specific training 
programmes for the hotel industry should address those very distinct and 
other needs of the industry. For example, the high mobility of the workforce at 
all levels in the industry is a very important issue. As discussed previously, 
culture is central to crisis management. However, the culture of an 
organization is formed primarily by shared experience. What are the 
implications of this mobility for culture formation and consequently to crisis 
management? What are the implications for crisis training? How does it affect 
the effectiveness of crisis training? These are just a few areas that need 
urgent attention in the hotel industry. In general, crisis training is reduced to 
PR exercises, should bad things happen and dealing with the media becomes 
unavoidable. This clearly does not serve the purpose of modern business 
requirements as far as crisis management is concerned. 
This research also identified that crisis management is a matter of secrecy, 
specifically with regard to levels of investments. The cost-benefit analysis of 
crisis management is an area that has received little attention so far. In the 
hotel industry it is believed to be non-existent. Thus, more research into this 
area can highlight those aspects and contribute to raise awareness and 
interest in crisis management in the industry. 
More study that could evaluate crisis preparedness across the industry is also 
desirable. This would involve the development of new methodological tools, 
investigative methods and so forth. As mentioned before, although case 
studies provide in-depth richness of analysis it is difficult to compare and to 
have a broad picture of the industry, or a sector within the industry. 
As discussed previously, crises have properties that impair rational decision 
making. The effects of crisis on the individuals within the organization disrupt 
their functions, making quality decision making a difficult task. Crises are ill- 
structured situations. The emotional impact that a crisis unleashes is such that 
it promotes dysfunctional behaviour. Under the stress of a crisis decision 
makers have their abilities impaired. Decision makers perceive fewer 
environmental cues, lose the strategic dimension and increasingly becomes 
obsessed with immediate tactical problems; the range of options for 
consideration is narrowed; and decision makers find it harder to reason 
abstractly, amongst other consequences of crisis. Crisis decision making in 
the hotel industry is a whole new field that deserves attention. 
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As also discussed, the quality of decisions depends on the quality of the 
information that is filtered into the decision making process. However, one of 
the characteristics of crisis is information overload. Information overload 
invariably results in dysfunctional selective attention, retention of key 
information, and delays and subversion of information flow, contributing to a 
distorted understanding of a decision situation. This research identified that 
communication in the hotels under investigation is relatively poor. Yet, 
communication is a key factor in crisis management. Research is needed in 
the area of crisis communication in the hotel industry. There are some specific 
characteristics of the industry that might contribute to communication 
constraints in information systems, such as widely dispersed properties, 
different technologies and approach to communication, language barriers, 
cultural perception of issues (what may be regarded as a crisis by an English 
manager may not be regard as a crisis by a Spanish manager - some cultures 
are more tolerant than others), international properties have the problem of 
different time zones, environmental conditions that affect communications, etc. 
Stakeholder theory in the hospitality industry has received negligible 
attention. It would be interesting to know more about the dynamics of the 
interactions for crisis purposes and how hotel executives formally address 
stakeholder management. It is correspondingly important to investigate how 
the hotel industry stakeholders perceive the industry in relation to crisis and 
crisis management and their strategies to deal with the industry. 
The results of this research revealed that there is indeed a correlation 
between crisis preparedness and consistency of opinion in relation to 
expected stakeholder behaviour in crisis situations. However, the reasons 
behind this consistency have yet to be fully investigated. 
The discussion in previous chapters suggested that crisis management 
should be an integral part of the overall strategic plan of organizations. Again 
more research into this area is needed. 
8.6 - Concluding Remarks 
The long list of potential crises presents considerable difficulties to 
organizations in formulating 'strategies and dedicating resources, precisely 
because no one can predict which events or situations will or will not escalate 
into major crises. It is also true that every crisis involves an element of 
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uniqueness. However, this does not mean that there are no general or generic 
features of crises or effective procedures for handling them whatsoever. The 
hotel industry is indeed one of the most vulnerable to crisis. Considering all 
the evidences presented and the discussions of research findings and results 
in this study, it is clear that the hotel industry needs urgently to be more pro- 
active and plan for crisis. Crises are inevitable. 
It is also important to notice that, regarding public perception, there are also 
considerable differences between human-induced crisis and natural 
disasters. The public generally reacts more negatively to the effects of man- 
made crisis then to natural disasters. While organizations may have little 
control over natural catastrophes, and it is understood by the public, man- 
made crisis can devastate the long-standing reputation of an organization. In 
principle, this type of crisis is preventable. For this reason, man-made crisis 
receives severe condemnation. The consequences of crisis can be 
devastating for the host organization and its stakeholders. 
Finally, it is important to realize, as discussed throughout this study, that crises 
have both a positive and a negative side and that crises provide more 
opportunities than threats. It is then important to be prepared for crises to 
maximize the opportunities presented. 
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Stakeholders have different properties which can be divided into two 
categories: intrinsic and extrinsic. Those properties that are independent of 
other stakeholders are said to be intrinsic. On the other hand, extrinsic 
properties are those properties that arise as a consequence of the interaction 
and relationships with other stakeholders. The importance of the extrinsic 
properties becomes more significant when one stakeholder attempts to 
influence and change another stakeholder. 
Mitroff (1989) offers a number of key propositions of stakeholders and their 
associated properties which are summarized below: 
1- An organization or social system is an organized collection of internal and 
external stakeholders. The word 'organized' implies that at least one critical 
property of a stakeholder will be influenced by the property of at least one 
other stakeholder. Assumptions naturally come into play because parties will 
differ as to which stakeholder influences which other. 
2- Each stakeholder is a distinct and distinguishable entity that has resources, 
purposes, and a will of its own. Thus, it is capable of volitional or purposeful 
behaviour. The properties that characterize a stakeholder's behaviour may be 
subdivided as follows. Each stakeholder has at least one important property in 
at least one of the following categories: 
a. The purpose and motivations of a stakeholder. 
b. The beliefs that a stakeholder has or that can be ascribed to it. 
c. The resources a stakeholder commands; among these are: 
(1) Material resources 
(2) Symbolic resources (for example, those pertaining to political 
office). 
(3) Physical resources. 
(4) Positional resources (for example, privileged position in a 
social or informational network). 
(5) Informational resources (for example, access to special or 
privileged sources). 
(6) Skill. 
d. Special knowledge and opinions. 
e. Commitments, legal and otherwise. 
2 





Disagreements among the proponents of different policies usually occur 
because they typically ascribe or impute very different properties to the same 
stakeholders. 
3- There is a network of interdependent relationships among all stakeholders. 
Some relationships are supporting in that they provide movement toward the 
organization's purposes. Some relationships are resisting in that they serve 
as barriers or encourage movements away from the organization's purposes. 
(See the properties listed earlier under item 2 f. ). This is the minimal sense in 
which an organization or social system is an organized collection of 
stakeholders. 
4-A new strategy, that is, a change in strategy for an organization, changes 
one or more of the relationships among the stakeholders. Hence, every action 
is dependent on stakeholder properties and vice versa. 
5- Relationships with each stakeholder (that is, stakeholder properties) may 
be changed in one or more of the following ways. Note that whether a 
stakeholder is susceptible to a particular means of change is itself an 
additional property of a stakeholder: 
a. Convert (change) the stakeholder by means of: 
(1) Commanding him or her through the exercise of power and 
authority. 
(2) Persuading him or her by appealing to reason, values, and 
emotion. 
(3) Bargaining with him or her by means of economic exchange. 
(4) Negotiating with him or her to reach "give and take" 
compromises. 
(5) Problem solving with him or her by means of sharing, 
debating, and arriving at agreed upon mutual perceptions. 
3 
b. Fight the stakeholder and politic to overpower him or her by means 
of: 
(1) Securing and marshaling the organization's resources. 
(2) Forming coalitions with other stakeholders. 
(3) Destroying the stakeholder. 
c. Absorb aspects of a stakeholder's demands by incorporating them by 
means of co-optation. 
d. Coalesce with the stakeholder by forming a coalition with joint 
decision-making powers. 
e. Avoid or ignore the stakeholder. 
f. Appease the stakeholder by giving in to some of his or her demands. 
g. Surrender to the stakeholder. 
h. Love the stakeholder by forming an intense emotional bond or 
special relationship with him or her. 
i. Be or become the stakeholder by transforming the organization into 
the stakeholder through merger, imitation, idolatry, or role modeling. 
Any strategy must be implemented through one or more of these ways of 
affecting change. Hence, all strategies presuppose power, that is, the ability to 
employ a relevant set of methods for bringing about change. Little wonder, 
having identified these different ways of changing stakeholders, that analysts 
of a social system and policy makers often advocate such different policies. All 
of the properties regarding stakeholders and their ability to change through a 
certain means are highly volatile, changing, and subjective to debate. It is 
exceedingly easy to assume very different capabilities with regard to each 
stakeholder's ability to change. 
6. The state of an organization at a certain point in time will be the result of the 
interaction of the behaviour of all the organization's stakeholders from the 
beginning of its history up to a particular point in time. This extended history 
may be referred to as the "culture" of the organization or of the extended set of 
stakeholders. 
7-A strategy undertaken at one point in time to achieve outcomes at a later 
point must be based on one or more assumptions about (a) the properties 
and behaviour of the stakeholders, (b) the network of relationships that binds 
them to the organization, and (c) the organization's power to change relevant 
relationships. Assumptions must be made because (a), (b), and (c) taken by 
4 
themselves, or even collectively, are too complex for any person (that is, 
stakeholder) to have complete, perfect, or certain knowledge about them. 
Obs.: It is vitally important to appreciate that the theory of stakeholder 
presented holds only for surface social system stakeholders, that is, those 
stakeholders conceived of a rational, calculating devices. It does not hold for 
stakeholders endowed with highly complex, emotional makeups. To treat this 
emotionality - even to acknowledge it - necessitates that we penetrate 
beneath the surface of stakeholders rationally conceived and rationally 
endowed (Mitroff, 1989, pp. 44) 
Source: Ian I. Mitroff - (1989), Stakeholders of the Organizational Mind: 
Towards a New View of Organizational Policy Making, London, Jossey-Bass 







a- Contact Name: 
b- Address: 
c- Tel. Fax: 
1- Company Name: 
2- Age of the Company: 
3- Number of Hotels in the UK: 
4- Number of Hotels outside the UK: 
5- Number of Employees in the UK: 
6- Number of Rooms in the UK: 
7- Number of Beds in the UK: 
8- Annual Sales (whole group): 
B- Interviewee 
1- Number of years with the company: 
2- Position in the company: 
3- Number of years in the position: 
4- Actual title: 
C -PROPERTIES OF THE . 
ORGANIZATION 
1- What do you think about crisis management? 
- Is it something essential? 
- Yes 
- No 
- Don't Know 
- Why? 
- How would you rank crisis management in terms of your priorities? 
Low Priority High Priority 
1234567 
7 
2- What do you consider to be a crisis status for your organization? 
- What would be the consequences? 
1- Existential 
2- Less dramatic 
3- What is a crisis? How would you define it? 
- who and what does it affect? 
4- What type of crisis would do more damage to your organization? 
- Why? 
4.1- Are you prepared for that eventuality? 
Not at All Not Really Somewhat Very Well Prepared 
1234567 
5- Do you have a crisis management plan? 
- Yes 
- No 
- Don't Know 
- what does it consist of? 
- who are responsible 
6- Is there an open line of communication between levels for crisis purpose? 
- Yes 
- No 
- Don't Know 
7- Do you have simulation exercises? 
- Yes 
- No 
- Don't Know 




- Don't Know 
- In what sense? 
- What should be done about that? 
8 
9- How do you see the environment in which you operate? 
10 - Do the changes in the environment prompt you to plan for crisis? 
- Yes 
- No 
- What would it take in the environment to prompt you to prepare 
for crisis? 
11 - What, if anything, can a crisis bring to your organization? 
12 - Do you prepare for any type of crisis? 
- Yes 
- No 
- Don't Know 
why? 




- Don't Know 
why? 
13 - Do you have any established procedure for any eventuality? 
- Yes 
- No 
- Don't Know 
- for what? 
14 - What would be your main concerns should a major crisis strikes? 




To what degree would you agree with each of the statements that follows. The 
extent of your agreement may range from VERY TRUE to NOT TRUE at 
ALL. Please circle the appropriate number. 
0 
1- The bigger the organization, the less 
vulnerable it is to crises. 
2- Any accident is regarded as part of the nature 
of our operations. 
3- We just consider something to be a crisis if it 
happens to or hurts us. 
4- We do not have to be preocupied with crisis 
management. It is somebody else's responsibility. 
5- Only organizations that are badly managed have 
crises. 
6- The locations of our hotels make them immune 
to crises. 
7- Crises do not happen in our organization. 
8- Security is an issue that concerns security 
personnel alone. Not every single employee. 
9- Past experiences has shown us that with time 
most crises resolve themselves. 
10 - If a crisis occurs, our management and technical 
people can fix it. Nothing special is required. 
11 - In the end, most crises turn out not to be very 
important. 
12 - Any effort in relation to crisis before it happens 
(such as prevention) is a waste of time and money. 
13 - Whenever a major crisis occur, there will be 
always people that will rescue us. 
14 - Our clients are always very understanding 
15 - The range of crisis is so vast that it makes it 
impossible to make preparations. 
16 - There is nothing to do in relation to crises 
before it happens. 
17 - Most of the crises have a technical solution. 
18 - Whenever a crisis strikes, the application of 
technical and financial quick-fixes would resolve it. 
19 - We do not regard the media as an important issue. 
It is easy to manipulate it. 
20 - In our organization we all work in a rational and 
objective way, therefore, we can handle any crises. 
21 - Crises are isolated. 
22 - There is no need to involve employees and the 







1 2 3 45 6 7 
1 2 3 45 6 7 
1 2 3 45 6 7 
1 2 3 45 6 7 
1 2 3 45 6 7 
1 2 3 45 6 7 
1 2 3 45 6 7 
1 2 3 45 6 7 
1 2 3 45 6 7 
1 2 3 45 6 7 
1 2 3 45 6 7 
1 2 3 45 6 7 
1 2 3 45 6 7 
1 2 3 45 6 7 
1 2 3 45 6 7 
1 2 3 45 6 7 
1 2 3 45 6 7 
1 2 3 45 6 7 
1 2 3 45 6 7 
1 2 3 45 6 7 
1 2 3 45 6 7 
1 2 3 45 6 7 
11 
Very Neither True Not True 
True nor False at all 
23 - Only top management should be involved in 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
decision-making. 
24 - There is no need to worry about morale around 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
here. In our organization it is always high. 
25 - Communication is not an important issue here. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
We understand each other. 
26 - Safety is the responsibility of top management, not 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
of individual employees. 
27 - The establishment of relationship with interst-groups 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
is a futile effort. They do not understand our business. 
28 - What happens in other industries does not teach 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
us anything. 
29 - Environmental issue is a matter for politicians. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
We do not have to worry about it. 




In relation to your organization, please answer the following questions by 
circling the appropriate number. 
1- Do people at the top get important 
information from lower levels? 
2- Do people on the lower levels understand 
communication that comes from the top? 
3- Do people that have different responsibilities 
talk to each other? 
4- Is the subject "crises" a welcome subject for 
discussion? 
5- Do people feel free to talk about "bad things" in 
your organization? 
6- Do you reward people who bring bad news to 
you? 
7- Do you encourage people to look for danger? 
a- Do you encourage people to evaluate the risks 
involved in any aspect of the business? 
9- Are people rewarded when something potentially 
dangerous to the organization is spotted? 
10 - Do you encourage new ideas in your 
organization? 
11 - Do you encourage employees to innovate in 
your organization? 
12 - Do you compensate employees to innovate, even 
if the innovation is not successful? 
13 - Do you encourage debate and discussion in 
decision-making? 
Never Sometimes Always 
12 3 45 6 7 
12 3 45 6 7 
12 3 45 6 7 
12 3 45 6 7 
12 3 45 6 7 
12 3 45 6 7 
12 3 45 6 7 
12 3 45 6 7 
12 3 45 6 7 
12 3 45 6 7 
12 3 45 6 7 
12 3 45 6 7 




OBLIQUE ROTATION - LOADING ± 0.50 
-----------FACT0RANALYSIS----------- 
Analysis number 1 Listwise deletion of cases with missing values 
Extraction 1 for analysis 1, Principal Axis Factoring (PAF) 
Initial Statistics: 
Variable Communality * 
* 
Factor Eigenvalue Pct of Var Cum Pct 
Al , 65568 * 1 9,95671 33,2 33,2 
A2 , 62012 * 2 2,10563 7,0 40,2 
A3 , 83818 * 3 1,97496 6,6 46,8 
A4 , 72068 * 4 1,76933 5,9 52,7 
A5 , 80792 5 1,71931 5,7 58,4 
A6 , 82925 * 6 1,44031 4,8 63,2 
A7 , 83124 * 7 1,19184 4,0 67,2 
A8 , 72227 * 8 1,10378 3,7 70,9 
A9 , 68516 9 , 92818 3,1 74,0 
A10 , 64681 * 10 , 91110 3,0 77,0 
All , 59620 * 11 , 87205 2,9 79,9 
A12 , 85941 * 12 , 72961 2,4 82,3 
A13 , 71442 * 13 , 70145 2,3 84,7 
A14 , 51556 * 14 , 57378 1,9 86,6 
p, ß, 5 , 57069 * 15 , 56045 1,9 88,5 
A16 , 71526 * 16 , 54401 1,8 90,3 
A17 , 80891 * 17 , 47936 1,6 91,9 
A1ß , 81264 * 18 , 37755 1,3 93,1 
A19 , 74567 * 19 , 31692 1,1 94,2 
A20 , 66623 * 20 , 28134 ,9 95,1 
A21 , 71200 * 21 , 26848 19 96,0 
A22 , 79276 * 22 , 22942 ,8 96,8 
A23 , 68845 * 23 , 21485 ,7 97,5 
A24 , 83663 * 24 , 16842 ,6 98,1 
A25 , 76287 * 25 , 14728 ,5 98,6 
A26 , 74730 * 26 , 14023 ,5 99,0 
A27 , 63793 * 27 , 10297 ,3 99,4 
A28 , 81495 * 28 , 08644 ,3 99,7 
A29 , 77669 * 29 , 06865 ,2 99,9 
A30 , 81092 * 30 , 03561 ,1 100,0 




Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
A28 77139 
A30 , 72333 
A5 . 68475 
AS , 67532 
A22 , 66954 
A12 , 66770 -, 58922 
A27 , 66405 
A18 , 65968 
A4 , 65250 
A16 , 63298 
A3 , 62411 
A13 , 60958 
A26 , 60125 
A17 , 58973 
A23 , 57580 
Al0 57544 
A29 , 56561 
A6 , 56239 
A15 , 54969 






A24 , 60477 
All 
A21 -, 52976 
A2 , 51430 
A14 



































Variable Communality * 
* 
Factor Eigenvalue Pct of Var Cum Pct 
Al , 38810 * 1 
9,58562 32,0 32,0 
A2 , 50386 * 2 1,77930 
5,9 37,9 
A3 , 57286 * 3 1,59169 
5,3 43,2 
A4 , 60540 * 4 
1,38100 4,6 47,8 
A5 , 79171 * 5 
1,34317 4,5 52,3 
A6 , 71429 * 6 
1,05409 3,5 55,8 
A7 , 74932 * 7 , 
73940 2,5 58,2 
A8 , 59380 * 8 , 
72900 2,4 60,7 
A9 , 53832 
A10 , 54022 
All , 54074 * 
A12 , 89251 
A13 , 51465 
A14 , 35125 
A15 , 43729 
P16 , 64767 * 
A17 , 63449 
A18 , 57129 
A19 , 53085 * 
A20 , 52533 * 
A21 , 77897 * 
A22 , 72400 * 
A23 , 48151 * 
A24 , 73504 * 
A25 , 57217 * 
A26 , 56972 
A27 , 52257 * 
A28 , 70322 * 
A29 , 79516 * 
A30 , 67694 * 
17 
OBLIMIN rotation 1 for extraction 1 in analysis 1- Kaiser Normalization. 

























































































































































































Factor Correlation Matrix: 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
Factor 1 1,00000 
Factor 2 , 27990 1,00000 
Factor 3 , 30831 , 13884 1,00000 
Factor 4 , 15740 , 07141 , 17363 1,00000 
Factor 5 , 13529 , 09246 , 22385 , 07004 1,00000 
Factor 6 , 31919 , 23182 , 25022 , 07284 , 15749 
Factor 7 -, 29445 -, 24346 -, 17575 -, 14364 -, 19919 
Factor 8 , 36874 , 15579 , 22251 , 13054 , 10213 
Factor 6 Factor 7 Factor 8 
Factor 6 1,00000 
Factor 7 -, 25872 1,00000 




FREQUENCY - QUESTIONNAIRE 1 
Al 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent 
2.00 1 1.9 
3.00 5 9.3 
4.00 14 25.9 
5.00 3 5.6 
6.00 11 20.4 
7.00 20 37.0 
------- ------- 
Total 54 100.0 











Valid - Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
1.00 1 1.9 1.9 1.9 
2.00 1 1.9 1.9 3.7 
3.00 9 16.7 16.7 20.4 
4.00 14 25.9 25.9 46.3 
5.00 8 14.8 14.8 61.1 
6.00 6 11.1 11.1 72.2 
7.00 15 27.8 27.8 100.0 
------- ------- ------- 
Total 54 100.0 100.0 




Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
2.00 2 3.7 3.7 3.7 
3.00 8 14.8 14.8 18.5 
4.00 7 13.0 13.0 31.5 
5.00 10 18.5 18.5 50.0 
6.00 11 20.4 20.4 70.4 
7.00 16 
------- 













------ ---- ----- --- -- 
A4 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
2.00 1 1.9 1.9 1.9 
3.00 8 14.8 14.8 16.7 
4.00 9 16.7 16.7 33.3 
5.00 8 14.8 14.8 48.1 








Total 54 100.0 
--- 
100.0 




Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
2.00 3 5.6 5.6 5.6 
3.00 4 7.4 7.4 13.0 
4.00 10 18.5 18.5 31.5 
5.00 5 9.3 9.3 40.7 
6.00 5 9.3 9.3 50.0 








Valid cases 54 Missing 
----------------- 
cases 0 
------ ---- ----- --- 
A6 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
3.00 3 5.6 5.6 5.6 
4.00 8 14.8 14.8 20.4 
5.00 11 20.4 20.4 40.7 
6.00 6 11.1 11.1 51.9 
7.00 26 
------- 










Missing cases 0 
------------ ---- ----- --- -- 
A7 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
2.00 1 1.9 1.9 1.9 
3.00 4 7.4 7.4 9.3 
4.00 7 13.0 13.0 22.2 
5.00 7 13.0 13.0 35.2 
6.00 8 14.8 14.8 50.0 
7.00 27 
------- 













------ ---- ----- --- 
AS 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
2.00 1 1.9 1.9 1.9 
3.00 3 5.6 5.6 7.4 
4.00 6 11.1 11.1 18.5 
5.00 12 22.2 22.2 40.7 















Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
1.00 2 3.7 3.7 3.7 
2.00 5 9.3 9.3 13.0 
3.00 9 16.7 16.7 29.6 
4.00 12 22.2 22.2 51.9 
5.00 5 9.3 9.3 61.1 
6.00 9 16.7 16.7 77.8 
7.00 12 
------- 













------ ---- ----- --- --- 
A10 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
2.00 6 11.1 11.1 11.1 
3.00 7 13.0 13.0 24.1 
4.00 12 22.2 22.2 46.3 
5.00 11 20.4 20.4 66.7 
6.00 7 13.0 13.0 79.6 
7.00 11 
------- 















------ ---- ----- --- -- 
All 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
1.00 1 1.9 1.9 1.9 
2.00 2 3.7 3.7 5.6 
3.00 2 3.7 3.7 9.3 
4.00 14 25.9 25.9 35.2 
5.00 12 22.2 22.2 57.4 
6.00 10 18.5 18.5 75.9 
7.00 13 
------- 












Missing cases 0 
------------ ---- ----- --- -- 
A12 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
2.00 2 3.7 3.7 3.7 
3.00 3 5.6 5.6 9.3 
4.00 10 18.5 18.5 27.8 
5.00 13 24.1 24.1 51.9 















Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
1.00 2 3.7 3.7 3.7 
2.00 3 5.6 5.6 9.3 
3.00 11 20.4 20.4 29.6 
4.00 9 16.7 16.7 46.3 
5.00 10 18.5 18.5 64.8 
6.00 6 11.1 11.1 75.9 








Valid cases 54 Missing 
----------------- 
cases 0 
------ ---- ----- --- 
A14 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
2.00 1 1.9 1.9 1.9 
3.00 8 14.8 14.8 16.7 
4.00 9 16.7 16.7 33.3 
5.00 10 18.5 18.5 51.9 
6.00 8 14.8 14.8 66.7 
7.00 18 33.3 33.3 100.0 
------- ------- ------- 
Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 54 Missing cases 0 
----------------------------------- 
A15 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent 
2.00 7 13.0 
3.00 11 20.4 
4.00 5 9.3 
5.00 10 18.5 
6.00 6 11.1 
7.00 15 27.8 
------- ------- 
Total 54 100.0 
Valid cases 54 Missing cases 0 
--------------------------- 
A16 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent 
1.00 1 1.9 
2.00 3 5.6 
3.00 3 5.6 
4.00 8 14.8 
5.00 8 14.8 
6.00 11 20.4 
7.00 20 37.0 
------- ------- 
Total 54 100.0 


























Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
1.00 1 1.9 1.9 1.9 
2.00 4 7.4 7.4 9.3 
3.00 6 11.1 11.1 20.4 
4.00 14 25.9 25.9 46.3 
5.00 13 24.1 24.1 70.4 
6.00 6 11.1 11.1 81.5 








54 Missing cases 0 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
1.00 1 1.9 1.9 1.9 
2.00 2 3.7 3.7 5.6 
3.00 6 11.1 11.1 16.7 
4.00 14 25.9 25.9 42.6 
5.00 10 18.5 18.5 61.1 











Valid cases 54 Missing c 
----------------- 
ases 0 
------ ---- ----- --- 
A19 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
2.00 1 1.9 1.9 1.9 
3.00 3 5.6 5.6 7.4 
4.00 5 9.3 9.3 16.7 
5.00 9 16.7 16.7 33.3 
6.00 10 18.5 18.5 51.9 
7.00 26 
------- 






Valid cases 54 Missing c 
----------------- 
ases 0 
------ ---- ----- --- 
Ago 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
1.00 1 1.9 1.9 1.9 
2.00 7 13.0 13.0 14.8 
3.00 10 18.5 18.5 33.3 
4.00 9 16.7 16.7 50.0 
5.00 8 14.8 14.8 64.8 






Total 54 100.0 
------- 
100.0 







Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
1.00 1 1.9 1.9 1.9 
2.00 7 13.0 13.0 14.8 
3.00 11 20.4 20.4 35.2 
4.00 16 29.6 29.6 64.8 
5.00 7 13.0 13.0 77.8 
6.00 6 11.1 11.1 88.9 








54 Missing cases 0 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
2.00 1 1.9 1.9 1.9 
3.00 9 16.7 16.7 18.5 
4.00 13 24.1 24.1 42.6 
5.00 9 16.7 16.7 59.3 
6.00 6 11.1 11.1 70.4 










54 Missing c 
---------- 
ases 0 
------ ---- ----- --- --- 
A23 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
2.00 2 3.7 3.7 3.7 
3.00 5 9.3 9.3 13.0 
4.00 13 24.1 24.1 37.0 
5.00 10 18.5 18.5 55.6 
6.00 10 18.5 18.5 74.1 










54 Missing c 
---------- 
ases 0 
------ ---- ----- --- --- 
A24 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
3.00 7 13.0 13.0 13.0 
4.00 15 27.8 27.8 40.7 
5.00 11 20.4 20.4 61.1 






Total 54 100.0 
------- 
100.0 




Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
2.00 2 3.7 3.7 3.7 
3.00 4 7.4 7.4 11.1 
4.00 11 20.4 20.4 31.5 
5.00 13 24.1 24.1 55.6 




















Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
3.00 6 11.1 11.1 11.1 
4.00 12 22.2 22.2 33.3 
5.00 5 9.3 9.3 42.6 











Valid cases 54 Missing cases 0 
A27 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent 
1.00 1 1.9 
2.00 3 5.6 
3.00 11 20.4 
4.00 14 25.9 
5.00 3 5.6 
6.00 7 13.0 
7.00 15 27.8 
------- ------- 
Total 54 100.0 
Valid cases 54 Missing cases 0 
--------------------------- 
A28 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent 
2.00 4 7.4 
3.00 9 16.7 
4.00 5 9.3 
5.00 8 14.8 
6.00 10 18.5 
7.00 18 33.3 
------- ------- 
Total 54 100.0 























Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
2.00 1 1.9 1.9 1.9 
3.00 6 11.1 11.1 13.0 
4.00 7 13.0 13.0 25.9 
5.00 11 20.4 20.4 46.3 






Total 54 100.0 
------- 
100.0 
Valid cases 54 Missing cases 0 
A3o 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
2.00 3 5.6 5.6 5.6 
3.00 6 11.1 11.1 16.7 
4.00 10 18.5 18.5 35.2 
5.00 5 9.3 9.3 44.4 















CROSSTABULATION - QUESTIONNAIRE 1 
PQSTTICN Positiaz by Al 
Al Page 1 of 1 
co mt 
Row Pct 
col Pct I Rar 
Tot Pct I 2,001 3,001 4,001 5,001 6,001 7,001 Total 
PO6ITICN + I I F i i 
1,00 1 I 1I 51 21 21 81 18 
MD/CEO I I 5,6 I 27,8 I 11,1 I 11,1 I 44,4 I 33,3 
20,0 I 35,7 I 66,7 I 18,2 I 40,0 I 
1,9 I 9,3 1 3,7 I 3,7 I 14,8 I 
2,00 1 I 31 51 I 4I 91 21 
pgaG I 1 14,3 1 23,8 1 1 19,0 1 42,9 1 38,9 
60,0 I 35,7 1 I 36,4 I 1 45,0 
5,6 I 9,3 I I 7,4 1 16,7 1 
3,00 1 1I 11 41 11 51 31 15 
OPEPATICNS I 6,7 I 6,7 I 26,7 I 6,7 I 33,3 I 20,0 I 27,8 
100,0 I 20,0 I 28,6 I 33,3 1 45,5 I 15,0 1 
1,9 I 1,9 I 7,4 I 1,9 I 9,3 I 5,6 1 
Colutn 1 5 14 3 11 20 54 
(Ccntinued) Total 1,9 9,3 25,9 5,6 20,4 37,0 100,0 
Nunber of Missing Obsezvatia)s: 0 
posITra Position by A2 
A2 Page 1 of 1 
coxamt 
Pcw Pct 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 2,001 3,001 4,001 5,001 6,001 7,001 Total 
POSITIM 
1,00 1 I 1( 41 31 21 11 71 18 
MD/CEO I I 5,6 I 22,2 I 16,7 I 11,1 I 5,6 I 38,9 I 33,3 
100,0 I 44,4 I 21,4 I 25,0 I 16,7 I 46,7 
1,9 I 7,4 I 5,6 I 3,7 I 1,9 I 13,0 
2,00 1 11 I 51 61 21 31 41 21 
NFTG I 4,8 I I 23,8 I 28,6 1 9,5 1 14,3 I 19,0 I 38,9 
10010 I I 55,6 I 42,9 I 25,0 I 50,0 1 26,7 I 
119 I I 9,3 1 11,1 I 3t7 I 5,6 I 7,4 
3,00 1 I I I 51 41 21 41 15 
oPERATIM5I I I 1 33,3 1 26,7 1 13,3 1 26,7 1 27,8 
35,7 I 50,0 I 33,3 I 26,7 
1 9,3 1 7,4 1 3,7 1 7,4 1 
Colum 1 1 9 14 8 6 15 54 
(cntinued) Total 1,9 1,9 16,7 25,9 14,8 11,1 27,8 100,0 
jaanber of Missing Cbservaticrns: 0 
31 
PosITICK Positim by A3 
Pº3 Page 1 of 1 
count 
Row Pct I 
Col Pct I Pcw 
Tot Pct I 2,001 3,001 4,001 5,001 6,001 7,001 Total 
POSITICK 
1,00 I 1 21 31 3I 51 51 18 
M/CEO I I 11,1 I 16,7 I 16,7 I 27,8 I 27,8 I 33,3 
25,0 I 42,9 1 30,0 I 45,5 I 31,3 
i I 3,7 I 5,6 I 5,6 I 9,3 I 9,3 I 
2,00 I 1I 31 21 31 41 81 21 
WPG I 4,8 I 14,3 I 9,5 I 14,3 I 19,0 I 38,1 I 38,9 
50,0 1 37,5 I 28,6 1 30,0 I 36,4 1 50,0 
1,9 I 5,6 I 3,7 I 5,6 I 7,4 I 14,8 I 
3,00 1 11 31 21 41 21 31 15 
OPERATIMLS I 6,7 I 20,0 I 13,3 I 26,7 I 13,3 I 20,0 I 27,8 
1 50,0 I 37,5 I 28,6 1 40,0 I 18,2 I 18,8 
1,9 I 5,6 I 3,7 I 7,4 I 3,7 1 5,6 1 
Columcn 2 8 7 10 11 16 54 
(Ccntirnied) Total 3,7 14,8 13,0 18,5 20,4 29,6 100,0 
Number of Missing (servaticxs: 0 
Pp3ITICN Position by A4 
A4 Page l of 1 
Carat 
Roar Pct 
Col Pct I Roar 
Tot Pct I 2,001 3,001 4,001 5,001 6,001 7,001 Total 
PQSITI0DT 
1100 1 11 21 31 31 31 61 18 
M/CEO I 5,6 I 11,1 I 16,7 I 16,7 I 16,7 I 33,3 I 33,3 
100,0 I 25,0 I 33,3 I 37,5 I 50,0 I 27,3 
1,9 I 3,7 I 5,6 I 5,6 I 5,6 I 11,1 
2,00 1 I 51 31 2I 1I 10 1 21 
WrG I 1 23,8 1 14,3 1 9,5 1 4,8 1 47,6 1 38,9 
62,5 I 33,3 1 25,0 I 16,7 I 45,5 
9,3 I 5,6 1 3,7 I 1,9 I 18,5 I 
3,00 1 I 11 31 31 21 61 15 
OPERATICN3 I I 6,7 I 20,0 I 20,0 I 13,3 I 40,0 I 27,8 
12,5 I 33,3 I 37,5 I 33,3 I 27,3 I 
1,9 I 5,6 I 5,6 I 3,7 I 11,1 
Column 1 8 9 8 6 22 54 
(continued) Total 1,9 14,8 16,7 14,8 11,1 40,7 100,0 
NLr±er of Missing Cbsezvatirns: 0 
32 
POSI=C J Position by AS 
A5 Page 1 of 1 
Count º 
Raw Pct 1 
Col Pct I Raw 
Tot Pct I 2,001 3,001 4,001 5,001 6,001 7,001 Total 
PQSITICN 
1100 1 11 21 41 11 21 81 18 
MD/CEO I 5,6 I 11,1 I 22,2 I 5,6 I 11,1 I 44,4 I 33,3 
1 33,3 I 50,0 I 40,0 I 20,0 I 40,0 I 29,6 I 
1,9 I 3,7 I 7,4 I 1,9 I 3,7 I 14,8 I 
2,00 1 1I I 41 21 1I 13 1 21 
Mqr i 4,8 I I 19,0 I 9,5 I 4,8 I 61,9 I 38,9 
33,3 I º 40,0 I 40,0 I 20,0 I 48,1 I 
º 1,9 I I 7,4 º 3,7 I 1,9 º 24,1 
3,00 1 11 21 21 21 21 61 15 
OPEPATIMS I 6,7 I 13,3 I 13,3 º 13,3 I 13,3 I 40,0 º 27,8 
33,3 I 50,0 I 20,0 º 40,0 I 40,0 I 22,2 
º 1,9 I 3,7 I 3,7 º 3,7 I 3,7 1 11,1 
Coles 3 4 10 5 5 27 54 
(Ccntirued) Total 5,6 7,4 18,5 9,3 9,3 50,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Ubsezvatims: 0 
PosITICN Positiai by A6 
A6 Page 1 of 1 
carat I 
Row Pct 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 3,001 4,001 5,001 6,001 7,001 Total 
POSITION I - i I T 
1,00 I 2I 4I 5I I 7I 18 
MD/CEO I 11,1 I 22,2 I 27,8 I I 38,9 I 33,3 
66,7 I 50,0 I 45,5 I I 26,9 
1 3,7 I 7,4 I 9,3 1 I 13,0 I 
2,00 I I 2I 4I 3I 12 1 21 
MKrG I I 9,5 I 19,0 1 14,3 I 57,1 I 38,9 
25,0 I 36,4 1 50,0 I 46,2 
3,7 I 7,4 I 5,6 1 22,2 
3,00 1 11 21 21 31 71 15 
OPERATIONS I 6,7 I 13,3 I 13,3 I 20,0 I 46,7 I 27,8 
33,3 I 25,0 I 18,2 I 50,0 I 26,9 
1,9 I 3,7 I 3,7 I 5,6 I 13,0 
Colum 3 8 11 6 26 54 
Total 5,6 14,8 20,4 11,1 48,1 100,0 
NUrber of Missing Cbsezvaticns: 0 
33 
p ITICN Position by A7 
A7 Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct I 
Co]. Pct I Row 
Tot Pct 1 2,001 3,001 4,001 5,001 6,001 7,001 Total 
POSITIa 
1100 1 11 11 41 21 I 10 1 18 
MD/CEO I 5,6 1 5,6 I 22,2 I 11,1 I I 55,6 1 33,3 
1 100,0 I 25,0 I 57,1 I 28,6 I I I 37,0 
º 1,9 I 1,9 I 7,4 I 3,7 I I 18,5 
2,00 1 I 1I 31 21 21 13 1 21 
pgT I 1 4,8 I 14,3 I 9,5 I 9,5 I 61,9 I 38,9 
25,0 I 42,9 I 28,6 I 25,0 I 48,1 
1,9 I 5,6 I 3,7 I 3,7 I 24,1 
3,00 1 I 21 I 31 61 41 15 
OPERATICSI 1 13,3 1 1 20,01 40,01 26,71 27,8 
50,0 I I 42,9 I 75,0 I 14,8 
3,7 I I 5,6 I 11,1 I 7,4 
Column 1 4 7 7 8 27 54 
(Continued) Total 1,9 7,4 13,0 13,0 14,8 50,0 100,0 
Nt. zrber of Missing cbsezvatirns: 0 
PasITICN Positiva by As 
AS Page 1 of 1 
Count 
Row Pct 
Col Pct Row 
Tot Pct I 2,001 3,001 4,001 5,001 6,001 7,001 Total 
POSSITIQN t ----i ý 1 1- --ýT 
1,00 1 I I 21 81 41 41 18 
MD/CEO I I I 11,1 1 44,4 1 22,2 1 22,2 I 33,3 
33,3 I 66,7 I 44,4 I 17,4 
3,7 I 14,8 I 7,4 I 7,4 
2,00 1 11 21 31 21 41 91 21 
H<Ir. I 4,8 I 9's I 14,3 I 9's I 19,0 I 42,9 I 38,9 
100,0 I 66,7 I 50,0 I 16,7 I 44,4 I 39,1 
1,9 I 3,7 I 5,6 I 3,7 I 7,4 I 16,7 
3,00 1 I 1I 1I 21 1I 10 1 15 
OPETZCrs I I 6,7 I 6,7 I 13,3 I 6,7 I 66,7 I 27,8 
33,3 I 16,7 I 16,7 I 11,1 I 43,5 
1,9 I 1,9 I 3,7 I 1,9 I 18,5 I 
Colutn 1 3 6 12 9 23 54 
(C. cxitinued) Total 1,9 S, 6 11,1 22,2 16,7 42,6 100,0 
nber of Missing Cbsezvaticns: 0 
34 
POSITIaN Position by A9 
A9 Page 1 of 1 
carat 
Rar Pct 
col Pct I gcw 
Tot Pct I 1,001 2,001 3,001 4,001 5,001 6,001 7,001 Total 
PciTia 
1100 º 1I 21 41 31 11 31 4i 18 
ND/CEO I 5,6 I 11,1 I 22,2 I 16,7 I 5,6 I 16,7 I 22,2 I 33,3 
º 50,0 I 40,0 º 44,4 º 25,0 º 20,0 º 33,3 I 33,3 
1,9 I 3,7 I 7,4 I 5,6 º 1,9 I 5,6 º 7,4 º 
2,00 1 1I 21 41 51 31 1I 51 21 
MG I 4,8 I 9's º 19,0 1 23,8 I 14,3 I 4,8 I 23,8 1 38,9 
50,0 I 40,0 I 44,4 º 41,7 I 60,0 I 11,1 I 41,7 
1,9 I 3,7 I 7,4 I 9,3 I 5,6 º 1,9 I 9,3 I 
3,00 1 I 1I 1I 41 11 51 31 15 
OPERATICS 6,7 6,7 26,7 6,7 33,31 20,01 27,8 
20,0 I 11,1 I 33,3 I 20,0 I 55,6 I 25,0 
1,9 I 1,9 º 7,4 I 1,9 º 9,3 I 5,6 º 
coltm 2 5 9 12 5 9 12 54 
(Continued) Total 3,7 9,3 16,7 22,2 9,3 16,7 22,2 100,0 
Umber of Missing cbsezvatiais: 0 
p ITICN Positim by A10 
10 Page 1 of 1 
I count 
Row Pct 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 2,001 3,001 4,001 5,001 6,001 7,001 Total 
POSITIa 
1,00 1 31 41 3I 2I 2I 4I 18 
ND/CEO 1 16,7 I 22,2 I 16,7 I 11,1 I 11,1 I 22,2 I 33,3 
1 50,0 I 57,1 I 25,0 1 18,2 I 28,6 I 36,4 
5,6 I 7,4 I 5,6 1 3,7 I 3,7 I 7,4 
2,00 1 2I 2I 41 51 2I 61 21 
HaG 9,5 1 9,5 I 19,0 I 23,8 I 9,5 I 28,6 I 38,9 
33,3 I 28,6 I 33,3 I 45,5 I 28,6 I 54,5 1 
3,7 I 3,7 I 7,4 I 9,3 I 3,7 I 11,1 
3,00 I 1I 1I 5I 41 31 1I 15 
OPERATICS 6,7 I 6,7 I 33,3 I 26,7 1 20,0 I 6,7 I 27,8 
16,7 I 14,3 I 41,7 I 36,4 1 42,9 I 9,1 I 
1,9 I 1,9 I 9,3 I 7,4 1 5,6 I 1,9 I 
column 6 7 12 11 7 11 54 
(Ccntinued) Total 11,1 13,0 22,2 20,4 13,0 20,4 100,0 
fiber of Missing Observations: 0 
35 
?c ITIa Positicn by All 
All Page 1 of 1 
c xt I 
Row Pct I 
col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct 1 1,001 2,001 3,001 4,001 5,001 6,001 7,001 Total 
POSITICK 
1100 I 11 21 I 51 21 41 41 18 
1D/CEO I 5,6 I 11,1 I I 27,8 I 11,1 I 22,2 I 22,2 I 33,3 
100,0 1 100,0 I I 35,7 I 16,7 1 40,0 I 30,8 
1,9 I 3,7 I I 9,3 I 3,7 I 7,4 I 7,4 
2,00 I I I iI 61 4I 31 71 21 
IKL'G I I I 4,8 I 28,6 I 19,0 I 14,3 I 33,3 I 38,9 
50,0 I 42,9 I 33,3 1 30,0 I 53,8 
1,9 1 11,1 1 7,4 1 5,6 1 13,0 1 
3,00 I I I 1I 3I 6I 31 21 15 
OPERATIONS I i I 6,7 I 20,0 I 40,0 I 20,0 I 13,3 I 27,8 
50,0 I 21,4 I 50,0 I 30,0 I 15,4 
1,9 I 5,6 1 11,1 1 5,6 I 3,7 1 
Column 1 2 2 14 12 10 13 54 
(Continued) Total 1,9 3,7 3,7 25,9 22,2 18,5 24,1 100,0 
NUrber of Missing Obsezvaticrns: 0 
POS= Positicl by All 
Page I of 1 
Cunt 
Row Pct 
col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 2,001 3,001 4,001 5,001 6,001 7,001 Total 
POSITIa 
1100 1 1I I 31 61 21 6 18 
M/C90 I 5,6 I I 16,7 I 33,3 I 11,1 I 33,3 I 33,3 
50,0 I I 30,0 I 46,2 I 22,2 I 35,3 I 
119 1 I 5,6 1 11,1 I 3,7 I 11,1 I 
2,00 1 1I 21 61 31 31 61 21 
WrG I 4,8 I 9,5 I 28,6 I 14,3 I 14,3 I 28,6 I 38,9 
50,0 I 66,7 I 60,0 I 23,1 I 33,3 I 35,3 I 
1,9 I 3,7 1 11,1 1 5,6 I 5,6 1 11,1 I 
3,00 1 I 1I 1I 41 41 51 15 
OPERATIONS I I 6,7 I 6,7 1 26,7 1 26,7 I 33,3 I 27,8 
33,3 I 10,0 I 30,8 I 44,4 I I 29,4 
1,9 1 1,9 1 7,4 1 7,4 1 9,3 1 
Coliarn 2 3 10 13 9 17 54 
(ctitnied) Total 3,7 5,6 18,5 24,1 16,7 31,5 100,0 
Number of Missing Observaticzs: 0 
36 
POSITION Position by Ala 
Page 1 of 1 
Count 
Row Pct 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 2,001 3,001 4,001 5,001 6,001 7,001 Total 
POSITIQJ 
1100 1 11 11 31 4I 21 31 41 18 
M/C. EO I 5,6 I 5,6 I 16,7 I 22,2 I 11,1 I 16,7 I 22,2 I 33,3 
50,0 I 33,3 I 27,3 I 44,4 I 20,0 I 50,0 I 30,8 
1,9 I 1,9 I 5,6 I 7,4 I 3,7 I 5,6 I 7,4 
2,00 1 I iI 51 41 41 1I 61 21 
M-crG I I 4,8 I 23,8 I 19,0 1 19,0 1 4,8 I 28,6 I 38,9 
33,3 I 45,5 I 44,4 I 40,0 I 16,7 I 46,2 
1,9 I 9,3 I 7,4 I 7,4 I 1,9 I 11,1 
3,00 1 11 11 31 11 41 21 31 15 
OPE PATIMS I 6,7 I 6,7 I 20,0 I 6,7 I 26,7 I 13,3 I 20,0 I 27,8 
50,0 I 33,3 I 27,3 I 11,1 I 40,0 I 33,3 I 23,1 
119 I 1F9 I 5#6 I 1,9 I 7,4 I 3,7 I 5,6 
Coli, mn 2. 3 11 9 10 6 13 54 
(continued) Total 3,7 5,6 20,4 16,7 18,5 11,1 24,1 100,0 
NuTber of missing thsexvaticns: 0 
pOSITIa Position by A14 
M4 Page 1 of 1 
Cant 
Row Pct 
Col Pct I Rcw 
Tot Pct I 2,001 3,001 4,001" 5,001 6,001 7,001 Total 
POSITIa 
1,00 1 1º 21 31 41 2º 6º 18 
1.10/CDO º 5,6 º 11,1 I 16,7 º 22,2 I 11,1 º 33,3 I 33,3 
100,0 º 25,0 I 33,3 I 40,0 1 25,0 I 33,3 º 
º 1,9 º 3,7 I 5,6 º 7,4 1 3,7 º 11,1 I 
2,00 1 º 31 51 21 3º 81 21 
WIG I 1 14,3 1 23,8 1 9,5 º 14,3 1 38,1 1 38,9 
37,5 1 55,6 1 20,0 1 37,5 I 44,4 I 
5,6 º 9,3 I 3,7 º 5,6 I 14,8 
3,00 1 I 31 11 41 3º 41 15 
OPmATIaü º º 20,0 I 6,7 I 26,7 1 20,0 1 26,7 I 27,8 
37,5 I 11,1 1 40,0 I 37,5 I 22,2 º 
5,6 1 1,9 1 7,4 1 5,6 1 7,4 1 
Column 1 8 9 10 8 18 54 
(Ccntimied) Total 1,9 14,8 16,7 18's 14,8 33,3 100,0 
NLAbez of Missing Observatirns: 0 
37 
Pc ITIa1 Position by A15 
M5 Page 1 of 1 
Count 
Raw Pct I 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct 1 2,001 3,001 4,001 5,001 6,001 7,001 Total 
POSITION 
1,00 1 21 21 I 51 1I 8º 18 
M/CFA I 11,1 I 11,1 I I 27,8 1 5,6 I 44,4 I 33,3 
28,6 I 18,2 I I 50,0 1 16,7 I 53,3 
3,7 I 3,7 I I 9,3 I 1,9 I 14,8 I 
2,00 1 31 61 41 21 21 41 21 
MLG I 14,3 I 28,6 I 19,0 I 9,5 I 9,5 I 19,0 I 38,9 
42,9 I 54,5 1 80,0 1 20,0 1 33,3 I 26,7 
I 5,6 I 11,1 1 7,4 1 3,7 1 3,7 I 7,4 I 
3,00 1 21 31 11 31 31 31 15 
OPERATICS I 13,3 I 20,0 I 6,7 I 20,0 I 20,0 I 20,0 1 27,8 
28,6 I 27,3 I 20,0 1 30,0 1 50,0 I 20,0 I 
3,7 1 5,6 I 1,9 I 5,6 1 5,6 I 5,6 1 
Column 7 11 5 10 6 15 54 
(Continued) Total 13,0 20,4 9,3 18,5 11,1 27,8 100,0 
Nli±er of missing Obsezvatirns: 0 
PoSITIa'r Position by A16 
P16 Page lofl 
Count 
Roar Pct 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 2,001 3,001 4,001 5,001 6,001 7,001 Total 
p06ITIGi 
1,00 1 I 11 31 21 11 41 71 18 
M/CEO I I 5,6 I 16,7 I 11,1 I 5,6 I 22,2 I 38,9 I 33,3 
33,3 1 100,0 1 25,0 1 12,5 1 36,4 I 35,0 I 
1,9 I 5,6 I 3,7 I 1,9 I 7,4 I 13,0 1 
2,00 I 1I 2I I 41 31 31 81 21 
MrG I 4,8 I 9,5 I I 19,0 1 14,3 I 14,3 I 38,1 I 38,9 
100,0 I 66,7 I I 50,0 I 37,5 I 27,3 1 40,0 
1,9 I 3,7 I I 7,4 I 5,6 I 5,6 I 14,8 I 
3,00 1 I I I 21 41 41 51 15 
OPERATICS I I I 1 13,3 1 26,7 1 26,7 1 33,3 1 27,8 
25,0 I 50,0 I 36,4 I 25,0 
3,7 1 7,4 1 7,4 1 9,3 1 
Column 1 3 3 8 8 11 20 54 
(continued) Total 1,9 5,6 5,6 14,8 14,8 20,4 37,0 100,0 
Iiiriber of Missing Obsezvatims: 0 
38 
pcsiTIcU Positivsi by A17 
A17 Pacelof l 
c x1t I 
Row Pct 
Col Pct I Roar 
Tot Pct I 1,001 2,001 3,001 4,001 5,001 6,001 7,001 Total 
PCISITIQJ 
1100 1 I 2 31 51 51 11 21 18 
M/C, EO I I 11,1 I 16,7 I 27,8 I 27,8 I 5,6 I 11,1 I 33,3 
50,0 I 50,0 I 35,7 1 38,5 I 16,7 1 20,0 
3,7 I 5,6 I 9,3 I 9,3 I 1,9 I 3,7 
2,00 1 1I 21 1I 51 2I 41 61 21 
MCDG I 4,8 I 9,5 I 4,8 I 23,8 I 9,5 I 19,0 I 28,6 I 38,9 
100,0 I 50,0 I 16,7 I 35,7 I 15,4 I 66,7 I 60,0 
1,9 I 3,7 I 1,9 I 9,3 I 3,7 I 7,4 I 11,1 
3,00 1 I I 2I 41 61 11 2I 15 
OPERATIONS I I 1 13,3 1 26,7 1 40,0 1 6,7 1 13,3 ( 27,8 
1 33,31 28,61 46,21 16,71 20,01 
3,7 I 7,4 I 11,1 I 1,9 I 3,7 
Colima 1 4 6 14 13 6 10 54 
(Caitinued) Total 1,9 7,4 11,1 25,9 24,1 11,1 is' s 100,0 
Marter of Missing cbservaticns: 0 
posITIc Position by A18 
A18 Page 1 of 1 
t1 
Row Pct 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 2,001 3,001 4,001 5,001 6,001 7,001 Total 
POSITICN 
1,00 1 I I 31 71 31 1º 41 18 
MD/CEO I I 16,7 38,91 16,7 5,6 1 22,2 1 33,3 
I 50,0 1 50,0 1 30,0 I 16,7 I 26,7 
5,6 1 13,0 I 5,6 I 1,9 I 7,4 
2,00 1 I 21 21 51 31 21 71 21 
MaG I I 9,5 I 9,5 1 23,8 1 14,3 1 9,5 1 33,3 I 38,9 
100,0 º 33,3 I 35,7 I 30,0 I 33,3 1 46,7 I 
3,7 I 3,7 I 9,3 I 5,6 1 3,7 1 13,0 1 
3,00 1 1I I 11 21 41 31 41 15 
OPE ATIczs I 6,7 I 1 6,7 I 13,3 1 26,7 1 20,0 I 26,7 I 27,8 
1 100,0 1 I 16,7 I 14,3 1 40,0 I 50,0 I 26,7 
1,9 I I 1,9 I 3,7 I 7,4 1 5,6 I 7,4 
Coltam 1 2 6 14 10 6 15 54 
(Crntiruied) Total 1,9 3,7 11,1 25,9 le' s 11,1 27,8 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 0 
39 
POSITION Position by A19 
A19 Page 1 of 1 
carat 
Row Pct 
Col Pct I Rcw 
Tot Pct I 2,001 3,001 4,001 5,001 6,001 7,001 Total 
PosITICN 
1100 1 I I 31 21 31 10 1 18 
M/CE0 I I I 16,7 I 11,1 I 16,7 I 55,6 I 33,3 
60,0 I 22,2 I 30,0 1 38,5 I 
5,6 I 3,7 I S, 6 1 18,5 I 
2100 1 1I iI 11 51 31 10 1 21 
mm I 4,8 I 4,8 I 4,8 I 23,8 1 14,3 I 47,6 I 38,9 
100,0 1 33,3 I 20,0 1 55,6 I 30,0 I 38,5 I 
1,9 I 1,9 I 1,9 1 9,3 I 5,6 1 18,5 I 
3,00 1 I 21 1I 21 41 61 15 
oPERATICa' I I 13,3 I 6,7 I 13,3 I 26,7 I 40,0 I 27,8 
66,7 I 20,0 1 22,2 I 40,0 I 23,1 1 
3,7 I 1,9 1 3,7 I 7,4 I 11,1 I 
Coltxm 1 3 5 9 10 26 54 
(Cc ntiruLed) Total 1,9 5,6 9,3 16,7 18,5 48,1 100,0 
Mmiber of Missing cbsezvaticris: 0 
POSITION Position by A20 
A20 Page I of 1 
Can1t I 
Rat Pct I 
Co]. Pct I Raw 
Tot Pct I 1,001 2,001 3,001 4,001 5,001 6,001 7,001 Total 
£ ITICN 
1,00 1 I 31 41 31 31 11 41 18 
M/CFO 1 I 16,7 I 22,2 I 16,7 I 16,7 I 5,6 I 22,2 I 33,3 
42,9 I 40,0 I 33,3 1 37,5 1 11,1 I 40,0 I 
5,6 I 7,4 I 5,6 1 5,6 1 1,9 1 7,4 
2,00 1 1I 1I 41 31 31 41 51 21 
WrG I 4,8 I 4,8 I 19,0 I 14,3 I 14,3 I 19,0 1 23,8 1 38,9 
1 100,0 14,3 40,01 33,31 37,5 44,4 50,0 
119 1 1,9 1 7,4 1 5,6 I 5,6 I 7,4 I 9,3 
3,00 I I 3I 21 3I 21 41 1I 15 
OPERPTIa I I 20,0 I 13,3 I 20,0 I 13,3 1 26,7 I 6,7 1 27,8 
I 42,9 1 20,0 I 33,3 I 25,0 I 44,4 I 10,0 1 
5,6 I 3,7 I 5,6 I 3,7 I 7,4 1 1,9 I 
Column 1 7 10 9 8 9 10 54 
(C itirnzed) Total 1,9 13,0 le' s 16,7 14,8 16,7 18,5 100,0 
NLanber of Missing Cbservaticns: 0 
40 
PosrTIa Positirn by A21 
A21 Page 1 of 1 
Cant I 
Row Pct 
col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 2,001 3,001 4,001 5,001 6,001 7,001 Total 
POSITION 
1,00 1 11 21 11 81 31 11 21 18 
M/CEO 1 5F6 I 11,1 I S, 6 I 44,4 I 16,7 I 5,6 I 11,1 I 33,3 
100,0 I 28,6 I 9,1 I 50,0 I 42,9 I 16,7 I 33,3 
1,9 I 3,7 I 1,9 I 14,8 I 5,6 I 1,9 I 3,7 
2,00 1 I 31 41 51 3I 21 41 21 
NIICL'G 1 I 14,3 I 19,0 1 23,8 I 14,3 I 9,5 I 19,0 I 38,9 
42,9 I 36,4 I 31,3 I 42,9 I 33,3 I 66,7 I 
1 5,6 I 7,4 I 9,3 I 5,6 I 3,7 I 7,4 
3,00 1 I 21 6I 31 11 31 I 15 
OPERATI I I 13,3 I 40,0 I 20,0 I 6,7 I 20,0 I I 27,8 
1 28,6 I 54,5 I 18,8 I 14,3 I 50,0 I I 
1 3,7 1 11,1 1 5,6 1 1,9 I 5,6 I I 
Colima 1 7 11 16 7 6 6 54 
(Crntiraied) Total 1,9 13,0 20,4 29,6 13,0 11,1 11,1 100,0 
Nla±er of Missing cbsezvations: 0 
paSITION Position by A22 
Page l of l 
C it 
Row Pct 
col Pet I gCW 
Tot Pct I 2,001 3,001 4,001 5,001 6,001 7,001 Total 
POSITION 
1100 1 I 31 51 51 21 31 18 
M/CEO I I 16,7 1 27,8 I 27,8 I 11,1 I 16,7 I 33,3 
33,3 I 38,5 I 55,6 I 33,3 I 18,8 1 
5,6 I 9,3 1 9,3 I 3,7 I 5,6 I 
2,00 1 1I 31 61 31 1I 71 21 
NFIG I 4,8 1 14,3 I 28,6 I 14,3 I 4,8 I 33,3 I 38,9 
100,0 I 33,3 I 46,2 I 33,3 I 16,7 1 43,8 1 
1,9 1 5,6 I 11,1 I 5,6 I 1,9 I 13,0 1 
3,00 1 I 31 21 1I 31 61 15 
OPERATIONS I I 20,0 I 13,3 1 6,7 I 20,0 1 40,0 I 27,8 
33,3 I 15,4 1 11,1 I 50,0 I 37,5 I 
5,6 I 3,7 I 1,9 I 5,6 1 11,1 I 
Colmn 1 9 13 9 6 16 54 
(Ccntirx eed) Total 1,9 16,7 24,1 16,7 11,1 29,6 100,0 
Number of Missing Qbservaticns: 0 
41 
PosITIa Position by A23 
A23 Page 1 of 1 
Count 
Rcw Pct 
col Pct I ROW 
Tot Pct I 2,001 3,001 4,001 5,001 6,001 7,00 1 Total 
POSITIIN 
1,00 1 I 11 71 31 21 5 1 18 
1D/CEO I º 5,6 º 38,9 º 16,7 º 11,1 º 27,8 I 33,3 
20,0 I 53,8 1 30,0 I 20,0 I 35,7 I 
1,9 I 13,0 I 5,6 I 3,7 I 9,3 
2,00 1 1I 3I 51 31 3I 6 1 21 
KCG I 4,8 I 14,3 I 23,8 I 14,3 I 14,3 I 28,6 º 38,9 
50,0 I 60,0 I 38,5 I 30,0 I 30,0 I 42,9 º 
1 1,9 º 5,6 I 9,3 º 5,6 I 5,6 1 11,1 I 
3,00 I 1I 1º 11 41 5I 3 1 15 
OPERATIMS I 6,7 I 6,7 I 6,7 1 26,7 1 33,3 I 20,0 I 27,8 














Column 2 5 13 10 10 14 54 
(Contizaned) Total 3,7 9,3 24,1 18,5 18,5 25,9 100,0 
Duner of Iissing Cbsezvaticns: 0 
pCSITIa Positiai by A24 
A24 Page 1 of 1 
canit 
Raw Pct 
col Pct I Raw 
Tot Pct I 3,001 4,001 5,001 6,001 7,001 Total 
PosITIa 
1,00 1 31 41 51 21 4 1 18 
M/CEO I 16,7 I 22,2 I 27,8 I 11,1 I 22,2 I 33,3 
42,9 I 26,7 I 45,5 I 28,6 I 28,6 
5,6 I 7,4 I 9,3 I 3,7 I 7,4 I 
2,00 1 21 71 41 21 6 1 21 
NKM I 9,5 33,3 I 19,0 1 9,5 I 28,6 I 38,9 
28,6 I 46,7 1 36,4 I 28,6 1 42,9 
3,7 I 13,0 I 7,4 I 3,7 I 11,1 
3,00 1 21 4º 21 31 4 1 15 
OPER IMS I 13,3 I 26,7 I 13,3 I 20,0 I 26,7 I 27,8 
28,6 I 26,7 I 18,2 I 42,9 I 28,6 
3,7 I 7,4 I 3,7 I 5,6 I 7,4 I 
Coltmn 7 15 11 7 14 54 
Total 13,0 27,8 20,4 13,0 25,9 100,0 
giber of Missing observatims: 0 
42 
PoSTTICSJ Positicr by A25 
25 Page 1 of 1 
Count 1 
Row Pct I 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct 1 2,001 3,001 4,001 5,001 6,001 7,001 Total 
POS= 
1,00 1 I 21 5I 51 31 31 18 
M/CEO I I 11,1 I 27,8 I 27,8 1 16,7 I 16,7 I 33,3 
50,0 I 45,5 I 38,5 I 25,0 I 25,0 I 
3,7 I 9,3 I 9,3 I 5,6 I 5,6 I 
2,00 I I 21 21 61 41 71 21 
mm I 1 9,5 1 9,5 1 28,6 I 19,0 1 33,3 1 38,9 
50,0 I 18,2 I 46,2 I 33,3 I 58,3 
3,7 I 3,7 I 11,1 I 7,4 I I 13,0 
3,00 1 21 1 41 21 5I 21 15 
OPERATICS 1 13,3 1 1 26,7 1 13,3 1 33,3 1 13,3 1 27,8 
1 100,0 I I 36,4 I 15,4 I 41,7 I 16,7 
3,7 I I 7,4 I 3,7 I 9,3 I 3,7 
Column 2 4 11 13 12 12 54 
(Crntinued) Total 3,7 7,4 20,4 24,1 22,2 22,2 100,0 
Msrber of Missing Obsezvatirns: 0 
POSITIa' Position by A26 
A26 Page 1 of 1 
count 
Rcw Pct 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 3,001 4,001 5,001 6,001 7,001 Total 
POSITIM 
1,00 1 41 41 21 1I 71 18 
M/C, EO I 22,2 I 22,2 I 11,1 I 5,6 I 38,9 I 33,3 
66,7 I 33,3 I 40,0 I 16,7 I 28,0 
7,4 I 7,4 I 3,7 I 1,9 I 13,0 1 
2,00 1 1I 51 2I 2I 11 I 21 
MaG I 4,8 I 23,8 I 9,5 I 9,5 I 52,4 I 38,9 
16,7 I 41,7 I 40,0 I 33,3 I 44,0 I 
1,9 I 9,3 I 3,7 I 3,7 I 20,4 I 
3,00 º 1I 31 11 3I 7I 15 
oPERATIC'15 I 6,7 I 20,0 I 6,7 I 20,0 I 46,7 I 27,8 
16,7 º 25,0 I 20,0 I 50,0 I 28,0 I 
1,9 º 5,6 I 1,9 I 5,6 I 13,0 
Column 6 12 5 6 25 54 
Total 11,1 22,2 9,3 11,1 46,3 100,0 
Number of Missing Cbsezvaticns: 0 
43 
POSITICK Position by A27 
P27 Page 1 of 1 
ca. ait 
PwPct 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 2,001 3,001 4,001 5,001 6,001 7,001 Total 
POSTTICK I I I I I }- -F 
1,00 1 I 21 41 51 1I I 61 18 
MD/CEO I I 11,1 I 22,2 I 27,8 I 516 I I 33,3 I 33,3 
66,7 1 36,4 1 35,7 1 33,3 1 ( 40,0 1 
3,7 I 7,4 I 9,3 I 1,9 I I 11,1 I 
2,00 1 1I 11 4I 5I 1I 3I 61 21 
MKrG I 4,8 I 4,8 I 19,0 I 23,8 I 4,8 I 14,3 28,6 I 38,9 
100,0 I 33,3 I 36,4 I 35,7 I 33,3 I 42,9 I 40,0 I 
I 1,9 I 1,9 I 7,4 I 9,3 I 1,9 I 5,6 I 11,1 I 
3,00 1 I I 3I 4I 1I 4I 31 15 
OPEPATICNS I I 1 20,0 I 26,7 I 6,7 I 26,7 1 20,0 1 27,8 
27,3 1 28,6 I 33,3 1 57,1 I 20,0 











Column 1 3 11 14 3 7 
i 
15 54 
(Ccntirnled) Total 1,9 5,6 20,4 25,9 5,6 13,0 27,8 100,0 
I ixber of Missing Obsesvatims: 0 
PQsITICSJ Positicn by A28 
A28 Page 1 of 1 
comt 
Row Pet 
Col. Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 2,001 3,001 4,001 5,001 6,001 7,001 Total 
p ITIa I I I F I I 
1100 1 I 21 21 41 41 61 18 
M/CE0 I I 11,1 I 11,1 I 22,2 I 22,2 I 33,3 1 33,3 
22,2 I 40,0 I 50,0 I 40,0 I 33,3 I 
3,7 I 3,7 I 7,4 I 7,4 I 11,1 I 
2,00 1 21 41 21 31 21 81 21 
WrG I 9,5 I 19,0 I 9,5 I 14,3 I 9,5 I 38,1 I 38,9 
50,0 I 44,4 I 40,0 I 37,5 I 20,0 I 44,4 
3,7 I 7,4 I 3,7 I 5,6 I 3,7 I 14,8 I 
3,00 1 21 31 1I 1I 41 41 15 
OPERATIa15 I 13,3 I 20,0 I 6,7 I 6,7 I 26,7 I 26,7 I 27,8 
50,0 I 33,3 I 20,0 I 12,5 I 40,0 I 22,2 
3,7 I 5,6 I 1,9 I 1,9 I 7,4 I 7,4 
cola m 4 9 5 8 10 18 54 
(Ccnt'ued) Total 7,4 16,7 9,3 14,8 18,5 33,3 100,0 
NLaaber of Missing Observaticns: 0 
44 
POSITIa Positiai by A29 
A29 Pagelof 1 
Count I 
Rcx Pct 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 2,001 3,001 4,001 5,001 6,001 7,001 Total 
POSITIQT 
1100 I I 1I 41 51 31 5I 18 
MD/CEO I I 5,6 I 22,2 I 27,8 1 16,7 I 27,8 I 33,3 
16,7 I 57,1 I 45,5 I 23,1 I 31,3 I 
1,9 I 7,4 I 9,3 I 5,6 I 9,3 I 
2,00 I 1I 4I 1I 3( 41 81 21 
Mü'G I 4,8 I 19,0 I 4,8 I 14,3 I 19,0 I 38,1 I 38,9 
100,0 I 66,7 I 14,3 I 27,3 I 30,8 I 50,0 I 
1,9 I 7,4 I 1,9 I 5,6 I 7,4 I 14,8 I 
3,00 I I 1I 21 31 61 31 15 
OPE=CSV. S I I 6,7 I 13,3 I 20,0 I 40,0 I 20,0 I 27,8 
16,7 I 28,6 I 27,3 I 46,2 I 18,8 
1,9 I 3,7 I 5,6 I 11,1 I S, 6 I 
Column 1 6 7 11 13 16 54 
(Continued) Total 1,9 11,1 13,0 20,4 24,1 29,6 100,0 
Number of Ntissing obsezvatirns :0 
POSITZCN Positicn by A30 
A30 Page 1 of 1 
Count 
Roar Pct 1 
Col. Pct I Rcw 
Tot Pct I 2,001 3,001 4,001 5,001 6,001 7,00 1 Total 
PosITICN 
1100 1 1I 1I 51 31 3I 5 1 18 
MD/CEO I 5,6 I 5,6 I 27,8 I 16,7 I 16,7 I 27,8 I 33,3 
33,3 I 16,7 I 50,0 I 60,0 I 25,0 I 27,8 
1,9 I 1,9 I 9,3 I 5,6 I 5,6 I 9,3 I 
2,00 1 1I 31 31 11 4I 9 1 21 
IIICLiG I 4,8 I 14,3 I 14,3 I 4,8 I 19,0 I 42,9 I 38,9 
33,3 I 50,0 I 30,0 I 20,0 I 33,3 I 50,0 I 
1,9 I 5,6 I 5,6 I 1,9 I 7,4 I 16,7 I 
3,00 I 11 21 21 1I 5I 4 I 15 
OPERATICS I 6,7 1 13,3 I 13,3 I 6,7 I 33,3 I 26,7 I 27,8 
33,3 I 33,3 I 20,0 I 20,0 I 41,7 I 22,2 I 
1,9 I 3,7 I 3,7 I 1,9 I 9,3 I 7,4 I 
Coltam 3 6 10 5 12 18 54 
(Conti lied) Total 5,6 11,1 18's 9,3 22,2 33,3 100,0 




PRINCIPAL AXIS FACTORING - LOADING ± 0.50 
-----------FACTORANALYSIS----------- 
Analysis number 1 Listwise deletion of cases with missing values 
Extraction 1 for analysis 1, Principal Axis Factoring (PAF) 
Initial Statistics: 
Variable Communality * Factor Eigenvalue Pct of Var Cum Pct 
A . 65568 1 9.95671 33.2 33.2 
A2 . 62012 * 2 2.10563 7.0 40.2 
A3 . 83818 * 3 1.97496 6.6 46.8 
A4 . 72068 * 4 1.76933 5.9 52.7 
A5 . 80792 * 5 1.71931 5.7 58.4 
A6 . 82925 * 6 1.44031 4.8 63.2 
A7 . 83124 * 7 1.19184 4.0 67.2 
A8 . 72227 * 8 1.10378 3.7 70.9 
A9 . 68516 * 9 . 92818 3.1 74.0 
A10 . 64681 10 . 91110 3.0 77.0 
All . 59620 * 11 . 87205 2.9 79.9 
A12 . 85941 * 12 . 72961 2.4 82.3 
A13 . 71442 * 13 . 70145 2.3 84.7 
A14 . 51556 * 14 . 57378 1.9 86.6 
p, 15 . 57069 * 15 . 56045 1.9 88.5 
A16 . 71526 * 16 . 54401 1.8 90.3 
A17 . 80891 * 17 . 47936 1.6 91.9 
A18 . 81264 * 18 . 37755 1.3 93.1 
A19 . 74567 * 19 . 31692 1.1 94.2 
A20 . 66623 * 20 . 28134 .9 95.1 
A21 . 71200 * 21 . 26848 .9 96.0 
A22 . 79276 * 22 . 22942 .8 96.8 
A23 . 68845 * 23 . 21485 .7 97.5 
A24 . 83663 * 24 . 16842 .6 98.1 
A25 . 76287 * 25 . 14728 .5 98.6 
A26 . 74730 * 26 . 14023 .5 99.0 
A27 . 63793 * 27 . 10297 .3 99.4 
A28 . 81495 * 28 . 08644 .3 99.7 
A29 . 77669 * 29 . 06865 .2 99.9 
A30 . 81092 * 30 . 03561 .1 100.0 





Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
A28 . 77139 
A30 . 72333 
A5 . 68475 
AS . 67532 
A22 . 66954 
A12 . 66770 -. 58922 
A27 . 66405 
A18 . 65968 
A4 . 65250 
A16 . 63298 
A3 . 62411 
A13 . 60958 
A26 . 60125 
A17 . 58973 
A23 . 57580 
A10 . 57544 
A29 . 56561 
A6 . 56239 
A15 . 54969 
A25 . 53895 





A24 . 60477 
All 
A21 -. 52976 
A2 . 51430 
A14 




































Variable Communality * Factor Eigenvalue Pct of Var Cum Pct 
Al . 38810 * 1 9.58562 32.0 32.0 
A2 . 50386 * 2 1.77930 5.9 37.9 
A3 . 57286 * 3 1.59169 5.3 43.2 
A4 . 60540 * 4 1.38100 4.6 47.8 
A5 . 79171 * 5 1.34317 4.5 52.3 
A6 . 71429 * 6 1.05409 3.5 55.8 
A7 . 74932 * 7 . 73940 2.5 58.2 
AS . 59380 * 8 . 72900 2.4 60.7 
A9 . 53832 
A10 . 54022 
All . 54074 * 
A12 . 89251 * 
A13 . 51465 
A14 . 35125 
A15 . 43729 * 
A16 . 64767 * 
A17 . 63449 * 
A18 . 57129 * 
A19 . 53085 * 
A20 . 52533 * 
A21 . 77897 * 
A22 . 72400 * 
A23 . 48151 * 
A24 . 73504 * 
A25 . 57217 * 
A26 . 56972 * 
A27 . 52257 * 
A28 . 70322 * 
A29 . 79516 * 
A30 . 67694 * 
49 
VARIMAX rotation 1 for extraction 1 in analysis 1- Kaiser Normalization. 
VARIMAX converged in 11 iterations. 
Rotated Factor Matrix: 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
A12 . 88140 
A22 . 66882 
A16 . 58660 
A15 . 57429 
A27 . 53032 
A3 . 50557 
A30 
Al 
A29 . 73286 
A9 . 67352 
A10 . 56346 
All . 53084 
A7 . 72731 
A6 . 70845 
A19 . 62349 
A8 
A17 . 57026 
A26 . 55116 
A18 . 53373 
A25 . 51127 
A23 




































A21 . 79825 
A20 . 66735 
A24 . 71044 
A14 . 57317 
A2 . 68644 
Factor Transformation Matrix: 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
Factor 1 . 55671 . 38880 . 36490 . 39266 . 35007 Factor 2 -. 66132 . 02872 . 50485 . 19475 -. 08878 Factor 3 -. 02343 . 60375 -. 56134 -. 10428 -. 16140 
Factor 4 -. 12261 . 16841 -. 03595 . 22065 -. 18490 Factor 5 . 25851 -. 61072 -. 27038 . 48067 -. 17123 Factor 6 -. 12995 -. 12393 -. 28937 -. 01124 -. 08995 
Factor 7 -. 07232 -. 23867 -. 09735 -. 42969 . 71670 Factor 8 . 38497 -. 09911 . 35954 -. 57665 -. 50820 
Factor 6 Factor 7 Factor 8 
Factor 1 . 27239 . 17788 . 15228 
Factor 2 . 26045 . 42225 -. 12258 
Factor 3 . 13617 . 45289 -. 24343 
Factor 4 -. 57439 . 25386 . 69142 
Factor 5 . 02909 . 44790 -. 15893 
Factor 6 . 70530 -. 12293 . 60269 
Factor 7 -. 06203 . 45063 . 15204 




PRINCIPAL AXIS FACTORING - LOADING ± 0.30 
-----------FACTORANALYSIS----------- 
Analysis number 1 Listwise deletion of cases with missing values 
Extraction 1 for analysis 1, Principal Axis Factoring (PAF) 
Initial statistics: 
Variable Communality * 
* 
Factor Eigenvalue Pct of Var Cum Pct 
Al , 65568 * 1 9,95671 33,2 33,2 
A2 , 62012 2 2,10563 7,0 40,2 
A3 , 83818 * 3 1,97496 6,6 46,8 
A4 , 72068 * 4 1,76933 5,9 52,7 
A5 , 80792 * 5 1,71931 5,7 58,4 
A6 , 82925 * 6 1,44031 4,8 63,2 
A7 , 83124 * 7 1,19184 4,0 67,2 
A8 , 72227 * 8 1,10378 3,7 70,9 
A9 , 68516 9 , 92818 3,1 74,0 
A10 , 64681 * 10 , 91110 3,0 77,0 
All , 59620 * 11 , 87205 2,9 79,9 
A12 , 85941 * 12 , 72961 2,4 82,3 
A13 , 71442 * 13 , 70145 2,3 84,7 
A14 , 51556 * 14 , 57378 1,9 86,6 
A15 , 57069 * 15 , 56045 1,9 88,5 
A16 0,71526 16 , 54401 1,8 90,3 
A17 , 80891 * 17 , 47936 1,6 91,9 
A18 , 81264 * 18 , 37755 1,3 93,1 
A19 , 74567 * 19 , 31692 1,1 94,2 
A20 , 66623 * 20 , 28134 ,9 95,1 
A21 , 71200 * 21 , 26848 ,9 96,0 
A22 , 79276 * 22 , 22942 ,8 96,8 
A23 , 68845 * 23 , 21485 ,7 97,5 
A24 , 83663 * 24 , 16842 ,6 98,1 
p25 , 76287 * 25 , 14728 ,5 98,6 
A26 , 74730 * 26 , 14023 ,5 99,0 
A27 , 63793 * 27 , 10297 ,3 99,4 
A28 , 81495 * 28 , 08644 ,3 99,7 
A29 , 77669 * 29 , 06865 ,2 99,9 
A30 , 81092 * 30 , 03561 ,1 100,0 




Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
A28 , 77139 
A30 , 72333 
AS , 68475 -, 30058 
AS , 67532 
A22 , 66954 
A12 , 66770 -, 58922 
A27 , 66405 
Als , 65968 
A4 , 65250 
A16 , 63298 , 32549 
A3 , 62411 
A13 , 60958 
A26 , 60125 
A17 , 58973 , 43216 
A23 , 57580 
A10 , 57544 -, 34721 
A29 , 56561 , 35980 -, 45301 
A6 , 56239 , 44453 -, 34543 
A15 , 54969 
A25 , 53895 40901 
A7 , 53577 , 38182 -, 39603 
Al , 46628 
A9 , 45529 , 34714 
A20 , 38703 -, 36510 
A19 , 38289 , 34171 
A24 , 35535 , 60477 , 31595 , 33823 
All , 36888 , 46511 , 30267 
A21 , 48291 -, 52976 
A2 , 51430 
A14 
Factor 6 Factor 7 Factor 8 
A29 
A30 -, 30383 




































Variable Communality * Factor Eigenvalue 
Al , 38810 * 1 9,58562 
A2 , 50386 * 2 1,77930 
A3 , 57286 * 3 1,59169 
A4 , 60540 * 4 1,38100 
A5 , 79171 * 5 1,34317 
A6 , 71429 * 6 1,05409 
A7 , 74932 * 7 , 73940 
AS , 59380 * 8 , 72900 
A9 , 53832 
AlO , 54022 











Variable Communality * Factor Eigenvalue Pct of Var Cum Pct 
All 54074 * 
A12 , 89251 * 
A13 , 51465 * 
A14 , 35125 * 
A15 43729 * 
A16 , 64767 * 
A17 , 63449 * 
A18 , 57129 * 
A19 , 53085 * 
A20 , 52533 * 
A21 77897 * 
A22 , 72400 * 
A23 , 48151 * 
A24 , 73504 * 
A25 , 57217 * 
A26 , 56972 * 
A27 , 52257 * 
A28 , 70322 * 
A29 , 79516 * 
A30 , 67694 * 
VARIMAX rotation 1 for extraction 1 in analysis 1- Kaiser Normalization. 
VARIMAX converged in 11 iterations. 
Rotated Factor Matrix: 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
A12 , 88140 
A22 , 66882 , 38184 
A16 , 58660 , 42205 
A15 , 57429 
A27 , 53032 , 30883 
A3 , 50557 
A30 , 46766 , 45205 
Al , 30623 , 30577 
A29 , 33634 , 73286 
A9 , 67352 
A10 , 56346 
All , 53084 
A7 , 72731 
A6 , 70845 
A19 , 62349 
AS , 35548 , 37330 , 46902 , 31792 
A17 , 57026 
A26 , 34973 , 34172 , 55116 
A18 , 53373 , 32499 
A25 , 51127 
A23 , 30070 , 41801 
A5 , 67908 
A4 , 37554 , 37344 , 51667 
A28 , 45593 , 33262 , 30569 , 47810 



































A21 , 79825 A20 
, 66735 
A24 
, 71044 A14 
, 57317 
A2 
Factor Transformation Matrix: 
Factor 1 Factor 2 
Factor 1 , 55671 . 028 Factor 2 -, 66132 , 02872 72 Factor 3 -, 02343 60375 Factor 4 -112261 , 16841 Factor 5 , 25851 - 93 Factor 6 -, 12995 -, 12312393 Factor 7 -, 07232 -, 23867 Factor 8 , 38497 -009911 
Factor 6 Factor 7 














































PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS - LOADING ± 0.50 
-----------FACT0RANALYSIS----------- 
Analysis number 1 Listwise deletion of cases with missing values 
Extraction 1 for analysis 1, Principal Components Analysis (PC) 
Initial statistics: 
Variable Communality * 
* 
Factor Eigenvalue Pct of Var Cum Pct 
Al 1,00000 * 1 '9,95671 33,2 33,2 
A2 1,00000 * 2 2,10563 7,0 40,2 
A3 1,00000 * 3 1,97496 6,6 46,8 
A4 1,00000 * 4 1,76933 5,9 52,7 
A5 1,00000 5 1,71931 5,7 58,4 
A6 1,00000 * 6 1,44031 4,8 63,2 
A7 1,00000 * 7 1,19184 4,0 67,2 
A8 1,00000 * 8 1,10378 3,7 70,9 
A9 1,00000 * 9 , 92818 3,1 74,0 
AlO 1,00000 * 10 , 91110 3,0 77,0 
All 1,00000 * 11 , 87205 2,9 79,9 
A12 1,00000 * 12 , 72961 2,4 82,3 
A13 1,00000 * 13 , 70145 2,3 84,7 
A14 1,00000 * 14 , 57378 1,9 86,6 
A15 1,00000 * 15 , 56045 1,9 88,5 
A16 1,00000 * 16 , 54401 1,8 90,3 
A17 1,00000 * 17 , 47936 1,6 91,9 
A18 1,00000 * 18 , 37755 1,3 93,1 
A19 1,00000 * 19 , 31692 1,1 94,2 
A20 1,00000 * 20 , 28134 ,9 95,1 
A21 1,00000 * 21 , 26848 ,9 96,0 
A22 1,00000 * 22 , 22942 ,8 96,8 
A23 1,00000 * 23 , 21485 ,7 97,5 
A24 1,00000 * 24 , 16842 ,6 98,1 
A25 1,00000 * 25 , 14728 ,5 98,6 
A26 1,00000 * 26 , 14023 ,5 99,0 
A27 1,00000 * 27 , 10297 ,3 99,4 
A28 1,00000 + 28 , 08644 ,3 99,7 
A29 1,00000 * 29 , 06865 ,2 99,9 
A30 1,00000 * 30 , 03561 ,1 100,0 




























































































A20 , 53764 
A14 
Final Statistics: 
Variable Communality * Factor Eigenvalue Pct of Var Cum Pct 
Al , 59829 * 1 9,95671 33,2 33,2 
A2 , 73021 * 2 2,10563 7,0 40,2 
A3 , 66470 * 3 1,97496 6,6 46,8 
A4 , 71110 * 4 1,76933 5,9 52,7 
AS , 80973 5 1,71931 5,7 58,4 
A6 . 77579 * 6 1,44031 4,8 63,2 
A7 , 77806 * 7 1,19184 4,0 67,2 
A8 , 67988 * 8 1,10378 3,7 70,9 
A9 , 70080 * 
A10 , 63239 * 
All , 69575 * 
A12 , 84939 * 
A13 , 64411 * 
A14 , 66723 
A15 , 55501 * 
A16 , 71425 
A17 , 73785 
A18 , 63491 * 
A19 , 73244 * 
A20 73337 * 
A21 , 80549 * 
A22 , 77122 * 
A23 , 62740 * 
A24 , 77819 * 
A25 , 67310 * 
A26 , 69388 * 
A27 , 59724 * 
A28 , 73867 * 
A29 , 81033 * 
A30 , 72107 * 
61 
VARIMAX rotation 1 for extraction 1 in analysis 1- Kaiser Normalization. 
VARIMAX converged in 10 iterations. 
Rotated Factor Matrix: 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
A12 , 84060 
A22 , 71005 
A15 , 66237 
A16 , 61389 
A27 , 58135 
A3 , 53243 
Al 
A9 , 78202 
A29 . 72078 
A10 , 61001 
All , 57624 
A17 , 66193 
A26 , 61943 
A25 , 57566 
A18 , 57412 
A19 , 74512 
A7 , 72444 
A6 71962 
A8 , 51130 
AS , 71486 
A4 , 62574 
A28 . 53809 
A13 , 51669 




































, 81145 A21 
, 80216 A23 
A14 




Factor Transformation Matrix: 
Factor 
Factor 1 , 54365 Factor 2 -, 62357 
Factor 3 , 03819 Factor 4 -, 23770 
Factor 5 , 25350 Factor 6 -, 10206 



















Factor 4 Factor 5 
, 34831 , 40342 
, 39909 -, 12988 
-, 63251 -, 12052 
, 18367 -, 08798 
-, 25141 -, 22220 
-, 27924 -, 13201 
. 21981 , 09933 
, 31000 -, 84938 
Factor 6 Factor 7 Factor 8 
Factor 1 , 26516 , 15855 15021 Factor 2 , 28256 50311 " 21193 - Factor 3 -, 04033 . 91139 
. 
- , 01413 Factor 4 - , 48823 , 05964 
1 
79046 Factor 5 -, 15872 , 48040 
, 
00114 Factor 6 , 76015 26 -'5 1 52647 Factor 7 
, 04710 , 54 4267 7 
, 




MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD - LOADING ± 0.50 
-----------FACTORANALYSIS----------- 
Analysis number 1 Listwise deletion of cases with missing values 
Extraction 1 for analysis 1, Maximum Likelihood (ML) 
Initial Statistics: 
Variable Communality * Factor Eigenvalue Pct of Var Cum Pct 
Al , 65568 * 1 9,95671 33,2 33,2 
A2 , 62012 * 2 2,10563 7,0 40,2 
A3 , 83818 * 3 1,97496 6,6 46,8 
A4 , 72068 * 4 1,76933 5,9 52,7 
A5 , 80792 * 5 1,71931 5,7 58,4 
A6 , 82925 * 6 1,44031 4,8 63,2 
A7 , 83124 * 7 1,19184 4,0 67,2 
A8 , 72227 * 8 1,10378 3,7 70,9 
A9 , 68516 * 9 , 92818 3,1 74,0 
A10 , 64681 * 10 , 91110 3,0 77,0 All , 59620 * 11 , 87205 2,9 79,9 
A12 , 85941 * 12 , 72961 2,4 82,3 
A13 , 71442 * 13 , 70145 2,3 84,7 A14 , 51556 * 14 , 57378 1,9 86,6 
A15 , 57069 * 15 , 56045 1,9 88,5 
A16 , 71526 * 16 , 54401 1,8 90,3 
A17 , 80891 * 17 , 47936 1,6 91,9 A18 , 81264 18 , 37755 1,3 93,1 
A19 , 74567 * 19 , 31692 1,1 94,2 A20 , 66623 * 20 , 28134 ,9 95,1 A21 , 71200 * 21 , 26848 ,9 96,0 A22 , 79276 * 22 , 22942 ,8 96,8 A23 , 68845 * 23 , 21485 ,7 97,5 A24 , 83663 * 24 , 16842 ,6 98,1 A25 , 76287 * 25 , 14728 ,5 98,6 A26 , 74730 * 26 , 14023 ,5 99,0 A27 , 63793 * 27 , 10297 ,3 99,4 A28 , 81495 * 28 , 08644 ,3 99,7 A29 , 77669 * 29 , 06865 ,2 99,9 A30 , 81092 * 30 , 03561 ,1 100,0 
65 
-----------FACT0RANALYSIS----------- 
ML extracted 8 factors. 18 iterations required. 
Test of fit of the 8-factor model: 
Chi-square statistic: 226,4280, D. F.: 223, Significance: 
, 4235 
Factor Matrix: 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
A7 , 75711 , 65245 
A21 , 75567 -, 65408 
A6 , 65526 
A20 , 53393 








A12 , 89845 A22 , 62819 





, 56117 A18 
, 58670 A29 





































A2 , 53176 
Final Statistics: 
Variable Communality * Factor SS Loadings Pct of Var Cum Pct 
Al , 31580 * 1 5,33411 17,8 17,8 
A2 , 50972 * 2 1,53008 5,1 22,9 
A3 , 53983 * 3 4,83022 16,1 39,0 
A4 , 60887 * 4 1,84228 6,1 45,1 
AS , 68986 * 5 1,48206 4,9 50,1 
A6 , 70213 + 6 1,37451 4,6 54,6 
A7 , 99900 * 7 1,14211 3,8 58,5 
A8 , 62487 * 8 , 75806 2,5 61,0 
A9 , 54905 * 
AlO , 57669 
All , 65895 * 
A12 , 95716 + 
A13 , 46909 * 
A14 , 32213 
A15 , 38293 
A16 , 60037 
A17 , 56318 
A18 , 73392 
A19 , 37805 * 
A20 44817 * 
A21 , 99900 * 
A22 , 76312 * 
A23 , 47114 * 
A24 55555 * 
A25 , 66734 * 
A26 , 46453 * 
A27 , 49806 * 
A28 , 68732 * 
A29 , 85688 * 
A30 , 70069 * 
67 
VARIMAX rotation 1 for extraction 1 in analysis 1- Kaiser Normalization. 
VARIMAX converged in 18 iterations. 
Rotated Factor Matrix: 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
A12 , 91078 
A22 , 70450 
A16 , 62485 
A27 , 55981 
A15 , 53617 
A3 
A26 
A7 , 90248 
A6 , 71611 
A8 
A19 
A29 , 73822 
A9 , 68115 
A10 , 56503 
A5 58086 





















































Factor Transformation Matrix: 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
Factor 1 , 24906 , 61053 , 10406 19296 66216 Factor 2 -, 07449 , 67300 -, 04049 -, 09519 
, 
- 95 Factor 3 , 83344 -, 16952 . 25502 , 29572 
, 
22944 45 - Factor 4 
5 
- 36519 , 09700 , 73466 , 01973 
, 
- 387 Factor -, 00820 -, 01524 -, 49290 , 01973 
, 
12 12387 Factor 6 
7 
-, 03017 -, 26401 , 14556 -, 39519 00630 ' Factor -, 15145 -, 23216 , 25481 , 18708 
. 
12733 Factor 8 , 28377 , 11113 . 23174 -, 80981 
, 
, 14261 
Factor 6 Factor 7 Factor 8 




ALPHA FACTORING - LOADING ± 0.50 
-----------FACT0RANALYSIS----------- 
Analysis number 1 Listwise deletion of cases with missing values 
Extraction 1 for analysis 1, Alpha Factoring (ALPHA) 
Initial Statistics: 
Variable Communality * Factor Eigenvalue Pct of Var Cum Pct 
Al , 65568 * 1 9,95671 33,2 33,2 
A2 , 62012 * 2 2,10563 7,0 40,2 
A3 , 83818 * 3 1,97496 6,6 46,8 
A4 , 72068 * 4 1,76933 5,9 52,7 
A5 , 80792 * 5 1,71931 5,7 58,4 
A6 , 82925 * 6 1,44031 4,8 63,2 
A7 , 83124 * 7 1,19184 4,0 67,2 
A8 , 72227 * 8 1,10378 3,7 70,9 
A9 , 68516 * 9 , 92818 3,1 74,0 
A10 , 64681 * 10 , 91110 3,0 77,0 
All , 59620 * 11 , 87205 2,9 79,9 
A12 , 85941 * 12 , 72961 2,4 82,3 
A13 , 71442 * 13 , 70145 2,3 84,7 
A14 , 51556 * 14 , 57378 1,9 86,6 
A15 , 57069 * 15 , 56045 1,9 88,5 
A16 , 71526 * 16 , 54401 1,8 90,3 
A17 , 80891 17 , 47936 1,6 91,9 
A18 , 81264 * 18 , 37755 1,3 93,1 
A19 , 74567 * 19 , 31692 1,1 94,2 
A20 , 66623 * 20 , 28134 ,9 95,1 
A21 , 71200 * 21 , 26848 ,9 96,0 
A22 079276 * 22 , 22942 ,8 96,8 
A23 , 68845 * 23 , 21485 ,7 97,5 
A24 , 83663 * 24 , 16842 ,6 98,1 
A25 , 76287 * 25 , 14728 ,5 98,6 
A26 , 74730 * 26 , 14023 ,5 99,0 
A27 , 63793 * 27 , 10297 ,3 99,4 
A28 , 81495 * 28 , 08644 ,3 99,7 
A29 , 77669 * 29 , 06865 ,2 99,9 
A30 , 81092 * 30 , 03561 ,1 100,0 




Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
A28 , 75801 
A30 , 72071 
A8 , 67073 
A22 , 66932 
AS , 66662 
A18 , 66628 
A27 , 66535 
A12 , 66100 
A4 , 63709 
A16 , 63406 
A3 , 62872 
A13 , 61225 
A26 , 59876 
All , 59723 
A23 , 58386 
A10 , 57745 
A6 , 55741 
A29 , 55388 , 53475 A15 , 54901 
A25 , 54608 




A24 , 65949 
All 
A14 
A19 , 53855 
A2 
A20 

































Variable Communality * 
* 
Factor SS Loadings Pct of Var Cum Pct 
Al , 38438 * 1 9,56914 31,9 31,9 
A2 , 52742 * 2 1,66335 5,5 37,4 
A3 , 59032 * 3 1,63051 5,4 42,9 
A4 , 60662 * 4 1,40850 4,7 47,6 
A5 , 82927 * 5 1,37919 4,6 52,2 
A6 , 70957 * 6 1,07254 3,6 55,7 
A7 , 69834 * 7 , 75876 2,5 58,3 
A8 , 58512 * 8 , 74287 2,5 60,7 A9 , 54222 * 
A10 , 52074 
All , 53842 
A12 , 87648 * 
A13 , 51542 
A14 , 32804 
A15 , 44025 
A16 , 65409 
A17 , 63498 
A18 , 55876 
A19 , 58029 * 
A20 , 50559 * 
A21 , 79416 * 
A22 , 70045 * 
A23 , 49416 * 
A24 , 77847 * 
A25 , 55223 * 
A26 , 58279 * 
A27 , 53051 * 
A28 , 70537 * 
A29 , 79073 * 
A30 , 66967 * 
73 
VARIMAX rotation 1 for extraction 1 in analysis i- Kaiser Normalization. 
VARIMAX converged in 9 iterations. 
Rotated Factor Matrix: 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
A12 , 88659 
A22 , 65004 
A16 , 60322 
A15 , 59121 
A27 , 55080 
A30 , 51862 
A3 , 51531 
A28 
A29 , 74616 
A9 , 66770 
A10 , 55151 
All , 53574 
Al 
A6 , 68543 
A19 67454 
A7 , 67348 
A8 
A17 , 59302 
A26 , 55089 
A18 















































Factor Transformation Matrix: 
Factor I Factor 2 Factor 3 Facto 
Factor 1 , 57678 39765 
r4 Factor $ 
Factor 2 -, 46837 , , 42822 
. 34994 
- 07495 , 
37912 





- 41368 91368 









-, 04790 , 
28739 
- 25934 Factor 6 -, 14849 -. 23760 . 
03644 
- 27986 






-, 16931 . "26170 
. 05824 
- 81490 , 
76880 
-, 15410 - , 24380 1 - 06084 , 
07964 
, -, 05639 
Factor 6 Factor 7 Factor 8 






73769 . -. 05322 
Factor 4 , , 05924 
. 25 
-24470 60 
- . 65 
Factor 5 , 16143 -., 44 2467 
414 , 36 61 
Factor 6 -, 11226 -, 05293 
-, 367 761 
Factor 7 -, 01456 35609 , 
48304 
Factor 8 , 90967 
, 




QUARTIMAX ROTATION - LOADING ± 0.50 
-----------FACT0RANALYSIS----------- 
Analysis number 1 Listwise deletion of cases with missing values 
Extraction 1 for analysis 1, Principal Axis Factoring (PAF) 
Initial statistics: 
Variable Communality * Factor Eigenvalue Pct of Var Cum Pct 
Al , 65568 * 1 9,95671 33,2 33,2 
A2 , 62012 * 2 2,10563 7,0 40,2 
A3 , 83818 * 3 1,97496 6,6 46,8 
A4 , 72068 * 4 1,76933 5,9 52,7 
A5 , 80792 * 5 1,71931 5,7 58,4 
A6 , 82925 * 6 1,44031 4,8 63,2 
A7 , 83124 * 7 1,19184 4,0 67,2 
AS . 72227 * 8 1,10378 3,7 70,9 
A9 , 68516 * 9 , 92818 3,1 74,0 
A10 , 64681 * 10 , 91110 3,0 77,0 
All , 59620 * 11 , 87205 2,9 79,9 
A12 , 85941 * 12 , 72961 2,4 82,3 
A13 , 71442 * 13 , 70145 2,3 84,7 
A14 , 51556 * 14 , 57378 1,9 86,6 
A15 , 57069 * 15 , 56045 1,9 88,5 
A16 , 71526 * 16 , 54401 1,8 90,3 
A17 , 80891 * 17 , 47936 1,6 91,9 
A18 , 81264 * 18 , 37755 1,3 93,1 
A19 , 74567 * 19 , 31692 1,1 94,2 
A20 , 66623 * 20 , 28134 ,9 95,1 
A21 , 71200 * 21 , 26848 ,9 96,0 
A22 , 79276 * 22 , 22942 ,8 96,8 
A23 , 68845 * 23 , 21485 ,7 97,5 
A24 , 83663 * 24 , 16842 ,6 98,1 
A25 , 76287 * 25 , 14728 ,5 98,6 
A26 , 74730 * 26 , 14023 ,5 99,0 
A27 , 63793 * 27 , 10297 ,3 99,4 
A28 , 81495 * 28 , 08644 ,3 99,7 
A29 , 77669 * 29 , 06865 ,2 99,9 
A30 , 81092 * 30 , 03561 ,1 100,0 




Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
P28 , 77139 
A30 , 72333 
A5 , 68475 
A8 , 67532 
A22 , 66954 
A12 , 66770 -, 58922 
A27 , 66405 
A18 , 65968 
A4 , 65250 
A16 , 63298 
A3 , 62411 
A13 , 60958 
A26 , 60125 
A17 , 58973 
A23 , 57580 
A10 57544 
A29 , 56561 
A6 , 56239 
A15 , 54969 
A25 , 53895 





A24 , 60477 
All 
A21 -, 52976 
A2 , 51430 
A14 



































Variable Communality * 
* 
Factor Eigenvalue Pct of Var Cum Pct 
Al , 38810 * 1 9,58562 32,0 32,0 
A2 , 50386 * 2 1,77930 5,9 
37,9 
A3 , 57286 * 3 1,59169 5,3 43,2 
A4 , 60540 * 4 1,38100 4,6 47,8 
A5 , 79171 * 5 1,34317 4,5 52,3 
A6 . 71429 * 6 1,05409 3,5 55,8 
A7 , 74932 * 7 , 73940 2,5 58,2 
A8 , 59380 * 8 , 72900 2,4 60,7 
A9 , 53832 * 
A10 , 54022 * 
All , 54074 * 
A12 , 89251 * 
A13 , 51465 * 
A14 , 35125 * 
A15 , 43729 * 
A16 , 64767 * 
A17 , 63449 * 
A18 , 57129 * 
A19 , 53085 * 
A20 , 52533 * 
A21 , 77897 * 
A22 , 72400 * 
A23 , 48151 * 
A24 , 73504 * 
A25 , 57217 * 
A26 , 56972 * 
A27 , 52257 * 
A28 , 70322 * 
A29 , 79516 * 
A30 , 67694 * 
79 
QUARTIMAX rotation 1 for extraction 1 in analysis 1- Kaiser Normalization. 
QUARTIMAX converged in 7 iterations. 
Rotated Factor Matrix: 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
A12 , 79190 
A28 , 75832 
A30 , 73233 
A16 , 70738 
A22 , 69910 
A27 , 69595 
A5 , 67382 
A18 , 66400 
A3 , 63987 
A4 , 62556 
A8 , 61778 
A26 , 61721 
A15 , 61352 
A13 , 58367 
A23 , 55743 
A17 , 53131 
A25 , 52972 
Al 
p7 , 69879 
A6 , 69336 
A19 53594 
A29 , 61359 
A9 , 60786 
All , 53081 
A10 
A24 , 72282 
A14 , 56589 
A21 , 75259 
A20 , 62407 
A2 

































A2 , 66973 
Factor Transformation Matrix: 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
Factor 1 , 94950 , 18660 , 18343 . 485 0 18653 Factor 2 -, 24746 64866 , 13967 , 4857 70 
, 
28654 Factor 3 -, 06941 -, 56158 , 63392 , 43780 
, 
16462 Factor 4 -, 03979 , 03451 , 21161 , 27829 
, 
- 57936 Factor 5 , 15213 -, 35468 -, 67502 . 100 
, 
- 2 49 Factor 6 -, 06406 -, 18842 . 06726 - -, 1044880 
, 
72449 Factor 7 -, 02548 -, 05000 -, 14320 , 36185 
, 
11854 - Factor 8 -, 05394 , 25309 -, 13980 , 30170 
. 
, 11854 
Factor 6 Factor 7 Factor 8 
Factor 1 , 04480 , 01729 , 02941 Factor 2 -, 19361 , 36892 , 08307 Factor 3 -, 19704 -, 08022 -, 11802 
Factor 4 , 66907 , 28818 -, 09294 
Factor 5 -, 14496 , 30581 -, 17403 




EQUIMAX ROTATION - LOADING ± 0.50 
- -- -------FACT0RANALYSIS----------- 
Analysis number 1 Listwise deletion of cases with missing 
values 
Extraction 1 for analysis 1, Principal 
Axis Factoring (PAF) 
Initial Statistics: 
Variable Communality * Factor 
Eigenvalue Pct of Var Cum Pct 
Al , 65568 * 
1 9,95671 33,2 33,2 
A2 , 62012 * 
2 2,10563 7,0 40,2 
A3 , 83818 * 
3 1,97496 6,6 46,8 
A4 , 72068 * 
4 1,76933 5,9 52,7 
AS , 80792 * 
5 1,71931 5,7 58,4 
A6 , 82925 * 
6 1,44031 4,8 63,2 
A7 , 83124 * 
7 1,19184 4,0 67,2 
A8 . 72227 * 
8 1,10378 3,7 70,9 
, 68516 * 
9 , 92818 3,1 
74,0 
A9 
Al0 , 64681 * 
10 , 91110 3,0 
77,0 
All , 59620 * 
11 , 87205 2,9 
79,9 
A12 , 85941 * 
12 , 72961 2,4 
82,3 
A13 , 71442 * 
13 , 70145 2,3 
84,7 
A14 , 51556 * 
14 , 57378 1,9 
86,6 
A15 , 57069 * 
15 , 56045 1,9 
88,5 
A16 , 71526 * 
16 , 54401 1,8 
90,3 
A17 , 80891 * 
17 , 47936 1,6 
91,9 
A18 , 81264 * 
18 , 37755 1,3 
93,1 
A19 , 74567 * 
19 , 31692 1,1 
94,2 
A2 , 66623 * 
20 , 28134 ,9 
95,1 
A21 2 , 71200 * 
21 , 26848 ,9 96,0 
A23 , 79276 * 
22 , 22942 ,8 
96,8 
A23 , 68845 * 
23 , 21485 ,7 97,5 
p24 , 83663 * 
24 , 16842 16. 
98,1 
A5 , 76287 * 
25 , 14728 ,5 
98,6 
A26 '79730 * 
26 , 14023 ,5 
99,0 
A7 , 63793 * 27 , 
10297 ,3 99,4 
A28 , 81495 * 
28 , 08644 ,3 
99,7 
A9 , 77669 * 
29 , 06865 ,2 99,9 
A30 , 81092 * 
30 , 03561 ,1 
100,0 
PAF extracted 8 factors. 




Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
A28 77139 
P30 v72333 
A5 , 68475 
A8 , 67532 
A22 , 66954 
A12 , 66770 -, 
58922 
A27 , 66405 
A18 , 65968 
A4 , 65250 
A16 , 63298 
A3 , 62411 
A13 , 60958 
A26 , 60125 
A17 , 58973 
A23 , 57580 
AlO 57544 
A29 , 56561 
A6 , 56239 
A15 , 54969 
A25 , 53895 















































Variable Communality * 
* 
Factor Eigenvalue Pct of Var Cum Pct 
Al , 38810 1 9,58562 32,0 32,0 
A2 , 50386 * 2 1,77930 5,9 37,9 
A3 , 57286 * 3 1,59169 5,3 43,2 
A4 , 60540 * 4 1,38100 4,6 47,8 
A5 1,79171 5 1,34317 4,5 52,3 
A6 , 71429 * 6 1,05409 3,5 55,8 
A7 , 74932 * 7 , 73940 2,5 58,2 
A8 , 59380 * 8 , 72900 2,4 60,7 
A9 , 53832 
A10 , 54022 
All , 54074 * 
A12 , 89251 
A13 , 51465 
A14 , 35125 
A15 , 43729 
A16 f64767 
All , 63449 * 
A18 , 57129 
A19 , 53085 * 
A20 , 52533 * 
A21 77897 * 
A22 , 72400 * 
A23 , 48151 * 
A24 , 73504 * 
A25 , 57217 * 
A26 , 56972 * 
A27 , 52257 * 
A28 , 70322 * 
A2g , 79516 * 
A30 , 67694 * 
85 
EQUAMAX rotation 1 for extraction 1 in analysis 1- Kaiser Normalization. 
EQUAMAX converged in 29 iterations. 
Rotated Factor Matrix: 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
A12 , 80703 




AS , 71414 
A4 , 57216 
A28 , 55565 










, 68918 A6 
, 63039 A19 
A8 
, 58024 A26 
, 53871 A17 

















































Factor Transformation Matrix: 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Factor 1 40412 
Factor 4 Factor 5 
Factor 2 , -, 66671 
, 43526 








-, 15284 -, 21286 " "14648 
-, 54795 -, 12647 
Factor 6 , 
24668 
-, 19331 
-, 14268 -"61755 
-, 06184 
- 25722 0-18401 







- 07244 Factor 8 149992 -, 46589 
-, 28128116 
-, 11017 , 
11931 , 
-1 
. 37744 -, 53375 53375 









Factor 3 , , 13396 
--24963 
-, 24963 , 
42999 
Factor 4 -158112 . 68402 . 
46899 
Factor 5 
, 03498 -, 15310 
25807 #25807 
Factor 6 , 68488 , 56198 
, 44881 
Factor 7 -, 07917 , 12902 
-. 13120 







Weighted -+ score/6.1 
1- 33.2/33.2-1 
33.2 - Amount of Variance Factor 1 
FACTOR 1 
PRO-ACTIVE SCORES Weighted 
A-12 A-22 A-16 A-15 A-27 A-3 
1 7 7 7 4 4 7 36 6.00 
2 5 5 6 6 4 5 31 5.17 
3 7 6 7 7 7 4 38 6.33 
4 7 6 6 6 6 6 37 6.17 
5 5 6 7 3 3 6 30 5.00 
6 6 7 6 5 7 5 36 6.00 
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 42 7.00 
8 7 7 7 7 7 7 42 7.00 
9 5 4 7 3 6 5 30 5.00 
10 6 6 7 7 7 5 38 6.33 
11 7 7 7 7 7 7 42 7.00 
12 7 7 7 7 7 7 42 7.00 
13 5 4 6 7 4 4 30 5.00 
14 6 7 4 4 4 7 32 5.33 
15 4 5 5 2 4 3 23 3.83 
16 6 4 7 5 5 5 32 5.33 
17 7 7 7 3 7 3 34 5.67 
18 7 7 7 7 7 7 42 7.00 
19 4 4 7 5 4 7 31 5.17 
20 7 6 7 6 6 7 39 6.50 
21 5 3 3 3 3 3 20 3.33 
22 7 7 7 7 7 7 42 7.00 
23 4 3 4 3 6 5 25 4.17 
24 6 6 6 5 4 6 33 5.50 
25 7 6 7 7 7 6 40 6.67 
26 7 7 6 6 6 3 35 5.83 
27 6 3 6 5 4 5 29 4.83 
28 3 3 6 5 6 6 29 4.83 
29 2 2 2 2 2 2 12 2.00 
30 7 7 7 7 7 7 42 7.00 
31 3 5 5 3 4 5 25 4.17 
32 5 5 3 3 3 6 25 4.17 
33 4 5 2 3 3 6 23 3.83 
34 7 4 7 6 3 6 33 5.50 
35 5 5 4 4 7 7 32 5.33 
36 5 5 6 7 3 7 33 5.50 
37 3 4 5 3 4 3 22 3.67 
38 4 4 4 7 4 4 27 4.50 
39 6 7 4 3 4 3 27 4.50 
40 2 4 4 2 3 3 18 3.00 
41 4 4 1 4 5 3 21 3.50 
42 7 7 5 5 7 5 36 6.00 
43 5 3 4 4 4 3 23 3.83 
44 5 4 2 2 5 4 22 3.67 
45 4 5 7 7 4 6 33 5.50 
46 7 4 7 7 7 6 38 6.33 
47 6 3 6 2 3 7 27 4.50 
48 6 5 4 5 2 7 29 4.83 
49 4 6 5 2 3 4 24 4.00 
50 5 4 5 5 3 5 27 4.50 
51 4 3 3 5 2 6 23 3.83 
52 4 4 5 6 1 4 24 4.00 
53 5 3 6 3 6 4 27 4.50 
54 5 3 5 2 3 2 20 3.33 
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Appenaix i '+ 
Weighted -+ score/4.21 /100 
21 - 7.0/33.2-0.21 
7.0 - Amount of Variance Factor 2 
FACTOR 2 
DENIA L SCORES Weighted 
A-29 A-9 A-10 A-11 
5 1 4 4 14 0.74 
7 6 5 6 24 1.26 
7 7 7 4 25 1.31 
6 4 3 5 18 0.95 
7 3 3 4 17 0.89 
6 2 4 4 16 0.84 
7 7 4 7 25 1.31 
7 7 7 7 28 1.47 
5 4 2 3 14 0.74 
7 6 6 6 25 1.31 
7 7 7 6 27 1.42 
7 7 7 7 28 1.47 
4 3 2 4 13 0.68 
7 5 7 6 25 1.31 
3 4 5 4 16 0.84 
6 5 5 6 22 1.16 
7 7 7 6 27 1.42 
7 6 5 4 22 1.16 
5 5 7 1 18 0.95 
6 6 6 5 23 1.21 
4 1 3 5 13 0.68 
7 7 7 7 28 1.47 
5 6 6 5 22 1.16 
6 6 4 5 21 1.10 
6 2 3 2 13 0.68 
6 6 6 7 25 1.31 
6 2 4 6 18 0.95 
2 3 5 5 15 0.79 
7 7 2 7 23 1.21 
7 7 7 7 28 1.47 
5 7 4 5 21 1.10 
4 6 2 2 14 0.74 
6 3 6 7 22 1.16 
3 3 3 5 14 0.74 
4 5 5 7 21 1.10 
6 7 6 7 26 1.37 
3 5 5 7 20 1.05 
6 4 5 5 20 1.05 
6 7 5 6 24 1.26 
5 4 3 4 16 0.84 
7 4 4 4 19 1.00 













3 3 3 4 13 0.68 
5 4 4 7 20 1.05 
6 4 7 6 23 1.21 
4 4 4 16 0.84 






















4 2 4 5 15 0.79 
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Appenaix i, + 
Weighted -+ score/3.20/ 100 
20 - 6.6/33.2-0.198-0.20 
6.6 - Amount of Variance Factor 3 
FACTOR 3 
FATALISM SCORES Weighted 
A-7 I A-6 A-19 
5 7 7 19 1.27 
7 7 7 21 1.40 
4 4 4 12 0.80 
6 7 6 19 1.27 
7 5 7 19 1.27 
7 7 6 20 1.33 
6 7 7 20 1.33 
7 7 7 21 1.40 
7 7 5 19 1.27 
7 7 7 21 1.40 
7 7 7 21 1.40 
7 7 7 21 1.40 
7 5 5 17 1.13 
7 7 7 21 1.40 
6 5 7 18 1.20 
7 7 7 21 1.40 
7 7 7 21 1.40 
5 5 7 17 1.13 
7 7 7 21 1.40 
7 7 4 18 1.20 
2 4 7 13 0.87 
7 7 7 21 1.40 
7 7 3 17 1.13 
5 7 6 18 1.20 
5 4 7 16 1.07 
7 7 7 21 1.40 
4 5 5 14 0.93 
7 7 6 20 1.33 
7 7 7 21 1.40 
7 7 7 21 1.40 
3 4 6 13 0.87 
4 4 7 15 1.00 
4 4 4 12 0.80 
6 4 2 12 0.80 
7 6 7 20 1.33 
7 7 7 21 1.40 
4 5 5 14 0.93 
4 4 5 13 0.87 
3 3 3 9 0.60 
7 7 7 21 1.40 
6 6 17 1.13 
3 4 11 0.73 
6 7 17 1.13 
5 3 4 12 0.80 
5 5 6 16 1.07 
7 5 6 18 1.20 
7 7 5 19 1.27 
5 7 19 1.27 
6 3 15 1.00 
6 5 17 1.13 
5 7 6 18 1.20 
2 3 5 10 0.67 
5 5 15 1.00 
6 6 17 1.13 
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Weighted -+ score/4.17/ 100 
17 - 5.9/33.2-0.17 
5.9 - Amount of Variance Factor 4 
FACTOR 4 
TECHNICA L SCORES Weighted 
A-17 JA-26 A-18 A-25 
4 7 7 7 25 1.06 
5 7 5 6 23 0.98 
4 7 4 5 20 0.85 
4 7 6 5 22 0.94 
6 7 5 5 23 0.98 
4 7 4 7 22 0.94 
7 6 6 7 26 1.11 
7 7 7 7 28 1.19 
6 4 5 4 19 0.81 
5 7 5 7 24 1.02 
7 7 7 7 28 1.19 
7 7 7 7 28 1.19 
5 6 6 6 23 0.98 
4 4 6 6 20 0.85 
2 6 5 5 18 0.77 
5 6 6 4 21 0.89 
7 7 7 7 28 1.19 
5 7 7 6 25 1.06 
4 4 7 4 19 0.81 
7 7 5 6 25 1.06 
3 4 7 7 21 0.89 
7 7 7 5 26 1.11 
6 7 6 6 25 1.06 
7 7 6 4 24 1.02 
2 7 4 5 18 0.77 
5 7 5 7 24 1.02 
5 3 5 6 19 0.81 
7 7 7 6 27 1.15 
5 7 2 7 21 0.89 
7 7 7 7 28 1.19 
4 6 7 6 23 0.98 
4 3 4 5 16 0.68 
7 5 3 4 19 0.81 
5 4 4 7 20 0.85 
4 7 7 5 23 0.98 
4 4 4 4 16 0.68 
6 5 4 5 20 0.85 
3 4 4 3 14 0.60 
4 4 4 6 18 0.77 
3 3 3 3 12 0.51 
1 3 2 3 9 0.38 
3 3 3 3 12 0.51 
3 4 7 5 19 0.81 
2 3 4 3 12 0.51 
5 5 4 5 19 0.81 
6 7 5 5 23 0.98 
4 4 4 5 17 0.72 
5 7 3 4 19 0.81 
4 5 5 4 18 0.77 
3 4 3 2 12 0.51 











5 6 1 2 14 0.60 
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Hppenaix 
TOTAL FACTORS TOTAL FACTORS 
SCORES SCORES TOTAL Ascending - Scores 
Rounded Numbers CASES SCORES 
9.06 9 1 9 6 
8.80 9 2 9 6 
9.30 9 *3 9 6 
9.31 9 4 9 6 
8.14 8 "5 8 6 
9.11 9 6 9 6 
10.75 11 7 11 6 
11.06 11 8 11 6 
7.81 8 "9 8 7 
10.07 10 10 10 7 
11.01 11 11 11 7 
11.06 11 * 12 11 7 
7.79 8 ' 13 8 7 
8.90 9 14 9 7 
6.64 7 + 15 7 7 
8.78 9 16 9 7 
9.67 10 17 10 7 
10.35 10 18 10 7 
8.32 8 19 8 7 
9.97 10 20 10 8 
5.78 6 21 6 8 
10.98 11 " 22 11 8 
7.52 8 23 8 8 
8.82 9 24 9 8 
9.18 9 25 9 8 
9.57 10 26 10 8 
7.52 8 27 8 8 
8.10 8 28 8 8 
5.50 6 29 6 8 
11.06 11 30 11 8 
7.11 7 31 7 8 
6.58 7 32 7 9 
6.60 7 33 7 9 
7.89 8 34 8 9 
8.75 9 35 9 9 
8.95 9 36 9 9 
6.50 7 37 7 9 
7.01 7 38 7 9 
7.13 7 39 7 9 
5.75 6 " 40 6 9 
6.01 6 41 6 9 
8.14 8 42 8 9 
6.40 6 43 6 10 
6.29 6 44 6 10 
8.06 8 45 8 10 
9.56 10 46 10 10 
7.70 8 47 8 10 
7.75 8 48 8 10 
6.71 7 49 7 11 
6.98 7 50 7 11 
6.66 7 51 7 11 
6.07 6 52 6 11 
7.07 7 53 7 11 
5.85 6 54 6 11 
"" Organizations with a formal Crisis Management Structure 
" Only 8 organizations 
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Nppenuix i -+ 
i 
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FREQUENCY ANALYSIS OF "GUILTY" SITUATION 
M. V. G management victims - "guilty" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
ticked 1.00 7 13.0 100.0 100.0 
47 87.0 Missing 
------ ------- ------- 
Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 7 Missing cases 47 
M. H. G management heroes - "guilty" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
54 100.0 Missing 
------- ------- ------- 
Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 0 Missing cases 54 
----------------------------------- 
M. R. G management rescuers - "guilty" 
Value Label Value Frequency 
ticked 1.00 10 
44 
Total 54 
Valid cases 10 Missing cases 44 
M. E. G management enemies - "guilty" 
Valid Cum 
Percent Percent Percent 





Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
ticked 1.00 3 5.6 100.0 100.0 
51 94.4 Missing 
------- ------- ------- 
Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 3 Missing cases 51 
M. A. G management allies - "guilty" 
Value Label Value Frequency 
ticked 1.00 1 53 
Total 54 
Valid cases 1 Missing cases 53 
Valid Cum 
Percent Percent Percent 





M. P. G management protectors - "guilty" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 











Valid cases 1 
-- 
Missing cases 53 
------ --------- 
M. VL. G management villains -" 
------ 
guilty" 
---- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Total 54 100.0 100.0 






ST. V. G stockholders victims - 
---- 
"guilty" 
---- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 

















ST. H. G stokholders 
---- 
heroes - "guilty" 
---- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 

















ST. R. G stokholders rescuers - 
- 
"guilty" 
---- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Total 54 100.0 -- 100.0 
Valid cases 7 Missing cases 47 
97 
ST. E. G stokholders enemies - "guilty" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 4 
- 
Missing cases 50 
---------- ---------- 
ST. A. G stokholders 
-- 
allies - "guilty" 
---- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 14 
----- 
Missing cases 40 
----------- ------ 
ST. P. G stokholders 
- 
protectors - "guilty" 
-- --- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 1 
---- 
Missing cases 53 
---------- ------- 
ST. VL. G stokholders 
-- 
villains - "guilty" 
---- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
ticked 1.00 5 9.3 100.0 100.0 







Valid cases 5 
------ 
Missing cases 49 
------------ - - ----- 
W. V. G workers victims - "guilty" 
--- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Total 54 100.0 
---- 
100.0 
Valid cases 13 Missing cases 41 
98 
W. H. G workers heroes - "guilty" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
ticked 1.00 1 1.9 100.0 100.0 







Valid cases 1 
---- 
Missing cases 53 
---------- ---- ----- --- --------- 
W. R. G workers rescuers - "guilty" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
















Missing cases 43 
----------- ---- ----- --- ------- 
W. E. G workers enemies - "guilty" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 













Missing cases 48 
----------- ---- ----- --- ------- 
W. A. G workers allies - "guilty" 
Valid cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 













Missing cases 51 
----------- ---- ----- --- ------- 
W. P. G workers protec tors - "guilty" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 






Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 4 Missing cases 50 
99 
W. VL. G workers villains "guilty" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
ticked 1.00 14 25.9 100.0 100.0 
40 74.1 Missing 
------- ------- ------- 
Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 14 Missing cases 40 
U. V. G union victims - "guilty" 
Value Label Value Frequency 
ticked 1.00 1 
53 
Total 54 
Valid cases 1 Missing cases 53 
U. H. G union heroes - "guilty" 
Valid Cum 
Percent Percent Percent 





Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
54 100.0 Missing 
------- ------- ------- 
Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 0 Missing cases 54 
----------------------------------- 
U. R. G union rescuers - "guilty" 
Value Label Value Frequency 
ticked 1.00 5 
49 
Total 54 
Valid cases 5 Missing cases 49 
U. E. G union enemies - "guilty" 
Valid Cum 
Percent Percent Percent 





Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
ticked 1.00 22 40.7 100.0 100.0 
32 59.3 Missing 
------- ------- ------- Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 22 Missing cases 32 
100 
U. A. G union allies - "guilty" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 












Missing cases 45 
---------- - ----- 
U. P. G union 
- 
protectors - "guilty" 
--- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 






-- - -- 







Missing cases 49 
-------- ------- 
U. VL. G union villains 
--- 
- "guilty" 
---- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 














Missing cases 52 
------- - ----- 
ME. V. G media victims 
-- - 
- "guilty" 
---- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 














Missing cases 54 
------- ------ 
ME. H. G media heroes - 
---- 
"guilty" 
---- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Total 54 100.0 
-- 
100.0 
Valid cases 1 Missing cases 53 
101 
ME. R. G media rescuers - "guilty" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 2 Missing cases 52 
---- -------- 





---- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 












Missing cases 30 
-------- ------ 
ME. A. G media allies - 
--- 
"guilty" 
---- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 












Missing cases 42 
------ ------- 
ME. P. G media 
----- 
protectors - "guilty" 
---- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 














Missing cases S3 
----- ------ 
ME. VL. G media villains 
------ 
- "guilty" 
---- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 






-- Total 54 100.0 
----- 
100.0 
Valid cases 11 Missing cases 43 
102 
SU. V. G suppliers victims - "guilty" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 11 Missing cases 43 
----------------------------------- 
SU. H. G suppliers heroes - "guilty" 
Valid Cum 







Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 0 
--- 
Missing cases 54 
--------- ------- 
SU. R. G suppliers 
---- 
rescuers - "guilty" 
---- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 6 
-- 
Missing cases 48 
--------- -------- 
SU. E. G suppliers 
---- 
enemies - "guilty" 
---- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 










Valid cases 5 Missing cases 49 
SU. A. G suppliers allies - "guilty" 
Value Label Value Frequency 
ticked 1.00 26 
28 
Total 54 
Valid cases 26 Missing cases 28 
Valid Cum 
Percent Percent Percent 





SU. P. G suppliers protectors - "guilty" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 










Valid cases 3 
---- 
Missing cases 51 
---------- -- ------- 
SU. VL. G suppliers villains - "guilty" 
---- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 










Valid cases 1 
---- 
Missing cases 53 
------- ------- 
cP. V. G competitors 
----- 
victims - "guilty" 
---- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Valid cases 0 
---- 
Missing cases 54 
--------- ------- 
CP. H. G competitors 
--- 
heroes - "guilty" 
---- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 2 
----- 
Missing cases 52 
--------- ------ 
CP. R. G competitors 
--- 
rescuers - "guilty" 
---- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 






----- Total 54 100.0 
-- 
100.0 
Valid cases 5 Missing cases 49 
104 
CP. E. G competitors enemies - "guilty" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 19 
--- 
Missing cases 35 
------------ ---- ----- --- -------- 
CP. A. G competitors allies - "guilty" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 










Valid cases 22 
----- 
Missing cases 32 
------------ -- - ------ 
CP. P. G competitors protectors - "guilty" 
-- ----- -- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 2 
----- 
Missing cases 52 
------------ ---- ----- --- ------ 
Cp. VL. G competitors villains - "guilty" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 






------- Total 54 100.0 100.0 
valid cases 2 
----- 
Missing cases 52 
------------ - ------ 
SIG. V. G sp. int. gr oups victims - "guilty" 
--- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Total 54 100.0 
- 
100.0 
Valid cases 2 Missing cases 52 
105 
SIG. H. G sp. int. groups heroes - "guilty" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 2 Missing cases 52 
----------------------------------- 
SIG. R. G sp. int. groups rescuers - "guilty" 
Value Label Value Frequency 
ticked 1.00 1 
53 
Total 54 
Valid cases 1 Missing cases 53 
SZG. E. G sp. int. groups enemies - "guilty" 
Valid Cum 
Percent Percent Percent 





Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
ticked 1.00 23 42.6 100.0 100.0 
31 57.4 Missing 
------- ------- ------- Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 23 Missing cases 31 
----------------------------------- 
SIG. A. G sp. int. groups allies - "guilty" 
Value Label Value Frequency 
ticked 1.00 9 
45 
Total 54 
Valid cases 9 Missing cases 45 
Valid Cum 
Percent Percent Percent 




SIG. P. G sp. int. groups protectors - "guilty" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
ticked 1.00 5 9.3 100.0 100.0 
" 49 90.7 Missing 
------- ------- ------- Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 5 Missing cases 49 
106 
SIG. VL. G sp. int. groups villains - "guilty" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
ticked 1.00 10 18.5 100.0 100.0 







Valid cases 10 Missing cases 44 
----- ---------- 
R. V. G regulators 
- ------- 
victims - "guilty" 
---- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 1 
----- 
Missing cases 53 
----------- ----- 
R. H. G regulators 
-- 
heroes - "guilty" 
---- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 










Valid cases 3 
--- 
Missing cases 51 
------- ------- 
R. R. G regulators 
------ 
rescuers - "guilty" 
---- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Total 54 100.0 
- 
100.0 
Valid cases 5 
---- 
Missing cases 49 
--------- ------ 
R. E. G regulators 
---- 
enemies - "guilty" 
---- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Total 54 100.0 
-- 
100.0 
Valid cases 14 Missing cases 40 
107 
R. A. G regulators allies - "guilty" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 17 Missing cases 37 
---------- ---------- 
R. P. G regulators 
--- 
protectors - "guilty" 
---- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 11 
---- 
Missing cases 43 
----------- ------ 
R. VL. G regulators 
-- 
villains - "guilty" 
---- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 









Valid cases 1 
--- 
Missing cases 53 
------ ------- 
CS. V. G consumers 
------- 
victims - "guilty" 
---- ----- --- 
Valid Cum, 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 










Valid cases 31 
---- 
Missing cases 23 
---------- ------ 
CS. H. G consumers 
--- 
heroes - "guilty" 
---- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Total 54 100.0 
--- 
100.0 
Valid cases 1 Missing cases 53 
108 
CS. R. G consumers rescuers - "guilty" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 










Valid cases 4 
-- 
Missing cases 50 
-------- - -------- 
CS. E. G consumers 
- --- 
enemies - "guilty" 
---- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 










Valid cases 4 
---- 
Missing cases 50 
--------- ------ 
CS. A. G consumers 
---- 
allies - "guilty" 
---- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 8 
----- 
Missing cases 46 
----------- ----- 
cS. P. G consumers 
-- 
protectors - "guilty" 
---- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 






----- Total 54 100.0 -- 100.0 
Valid cases 3 
-- 
Missing cases 51 
- - -------- 
CS. VL. G consumers 
- ---------- 
villains - "guilty" 
---- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 






-- Total 54 100.0 
----- 
100.0 
Valid cases 1 Missing cases 53 
109 
FI. V. G financial institutions victims 
Value Label Value Frequ 
ticked 1.00 
Total 













FI. H. G financial institutions heroes - "guilty" 
Valid Cum 







Total 54 100.0 100.0 













Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Total 54 100.0 100.0 






FI. E. G financial institutions 
------- 
enemies - "guilty 
----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Total 54 100.0 100.0 






FI. A. G financial institutions 
------ 
allies - "guilty" 
----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Total 54 100.0 
---- 
100.0 
Valid cases 6 Missing cases 48 
110 
FI. P. G financial institutions protectors - "gui 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
ticked 1.00 6 11.1 100.0 100.0 







Valid cases 6 Missing cases 48 
----------------------------------- 
FI. VL. G financial institutions villains - "guilt 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
ticked 1.00 1 1.9 100.0 100.0 
53 98.1 Missing 
------- ------- ------- 
Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 1 Missing cases 53 
IC. V. G insurance companies victims - "guilty" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 

















--- --- -- ------ 





Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 








Total 54 100.0 100.0 











Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 








Total 54 100.0 
-- 
100.0 
Valid cases 15 Missing cases 39 
111 
IC. E. G insurance companies enemies - "guilty" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
ticked 1.00 5 9.3 100.0 100.0 








Valid cases 5 Missing cases 49 
------------- ---- ----- --- ---------- 
IC. A. G insurance companies allies - "guilty" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 











Valid cases 8 
--- 
Missing cases 46 
------------- ---- ----- --- ------- 
IC. P. G insurance companies protectors - "guilty 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 






Total 54 100.0 100.0 





------ ---- --- - -- -------- 
IC. VL. G insurance companies vil lains - "guilty" 
- - 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
















------ ---- -- ------ 
LC. V. G local community victims - "guilty" 
--- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 






Total 54 100.0 
--- 
100.0 
Valid cases 17 Missing cases 37 
112 
LC. H. G local community heroes - "guilty" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 1 Missing cases 53 
----------- -------- 





---- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 
- 
7 Missing cases 47 
------------- ------- 
LC. E. G local community enemies 
-- 
- "guilty" 
---- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 
- 




LC. A. G local community allies - 
--- 
"guilty" 
---- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 












13 Missing cases 41 
------------ ------ 
LC. P. G local comminity protecto 
------- 
rs - "guilty" 
----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Total 54 100.0 
--- 
100.0 
Valid cases 2 Missing cases 52 
113 
LC. VL. G local community villains - "guilty" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 










Valid cases 3 
-- 
Missing cases 51 
---------- -- -------- 
NC. V. G national 
--- 





Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 17 
---- 
Missing cases 37 
---------- ------ 
NC. H. G national 
--- 





Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 










Valid cases 1 
--- 
Missing cases 53 
---- ------- 
NC. R. G national 
--------- 





Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Total 54 100.0 
- - 
100.0 
Valid cases 5 
--- 
Missing cases 49 
---- ------- 
NC. E. G national 
--------- 





Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 






-- Total 54 100.0 
----- 
100.0 
Valid cases 9 Missing cases 45 
114 
NC. A. G national (wider community) allies - "gui 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 11 Missing cases 43 
----- ---------- 
NC. P. G national 
- ----------- 
(wider community) protectors - 
----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 4 
--- 
Missing cases 50 
-------- ------- 
NC. VL. G national 
----- 





Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 3 
---------- 
Missing cases 51 




CROSSTABULATION ANALYSIS OF "GUILTY" SITUATION 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by M. V. G management victims - "guilty" 
M. V. G Page 1 of 1 
Count 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
2,00 11I1 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 53 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by M. R. G management rescuers - "guilty" 
M. R. G Page 1 of 1 
Count 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct 1 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO ------------------ 
1,00 I1I1 










Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 52 
pREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by M. VL. G management villains - "guilty" 
M. VL. G Page 1 of 1 
Count 
Row Pct (ticked 
Col Pct Row 
Tot Pct 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO ------------------ 
1,00 4I4 










Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 47 
117 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by ST. V. G stockholders victims - "guilty" 
ST. V. G Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
1,00 I3I3 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 51 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by ST. H. G stokholders heroes - "guilty" 
Count I 
ST. H. G Page 1 of 1 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO ------------------ 
2,00 I111 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing observations: 53 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by ST. R. G stokholders rescuers - "guilty" 
ST. R. G Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO ------------------ 
2,00 I2I2 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 52 
118 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by ST. A. G stokholder3 allies - "guilty" 
ST. A. G Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col. Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
2,00 I1I1 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing observations: 53 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by ST. VL. G stokholdera villain3 - "guilty" 
ST. VL. G Page 1 of 1 
Count 
Row Pct (ticked 
Col Pct Row 
Tot Pct 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
1,00 I2I2 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 52 
pREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. by W. V. G workers victims - "guilty" 
W. V. G Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO ------------------ 
1,00 I1I1 
Prepared 1100,0 1 33,3 
33,3 
I 33,3 1 
---------- 
2,00 I2I2 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing observations: 51 
119 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. by W. R. G workers rescuers - 
"guilty" 
W. R. G Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
2,00 I2I2 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing observations: 52 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by W. P. G workers protectors - "guilty" 
W. P. G Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO ------------------ 
2,00 11(1 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 53 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. by W. VL. G workers villains 
"guilty" 
W. VL. G Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO ------------------ 
1100 I4I4 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 50 
120 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. by U. R. G union rescuers - 
"guilty" 
U. R. G Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct 1 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
2,00 I2I2 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 52 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. by U. E. G union enemies - 
"guilty" 
U. E. G Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
1,00 I1I1 
Prepared 1100,0 I 50,0 
50,0 I 
I 50,0 I 
---------- 
2,00 I111 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 52 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. by U. A. G union allies - "guilty" 
U. A. G Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO ------------------ 
2,00 I1I1 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 53 
121 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. by U. P. G union protectors - 
"guilty" 
U. P. G Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
2,00 I1I1 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing observations: 53 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. by ME. R. G media rezcuer3 - 
"guilty" 
ME. R. G Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
2,00 I1I1 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing observations: 53 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. by ME. E. G media enemies - 
"guilty" 
ME. E. G Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO ------------------ 
1100 I414 










Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 49 
122 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. by ME. A. G media allies 
"guilty" 
ME. A. G Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct (ticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct 1 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO ------------------ 
1,00 I1I 1 
Prepared 1100,0 1 100,0 
I 100,0 
I 100,0 I 
---------- 
Column 1 1 
Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 53 
pREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. by ME. VL. G media villains - 
"guilty" 
ME. VL. G Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
2,00 I3I 3 
Not Prepared 1 100,0 1 100,0 
I 100,0 I 
I 100,0 I 
---------- 
Column 3 3 
Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing observations: 51 
pREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by SU. V. G suppliers victims - "guilty" 
SU. V. G Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
1,00 I1I 1 




2,00 11I 1 
Not Prepared 1100,0 I 50,0 
50,0 I 
I 50,0 I 
---------- 
Column 2 2 
Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 52 
123 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by SU. R. G suppliers rezcuers - "guilty" 
SU. R. G Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
2,00 I3I3 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 51 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by SU. A. G suppliers allies - "guilty" 
SU. A. G Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
1,00 I4I4 
Prepared 1100,0 I 80,0 
80,0 I 
80,0 I 
+--------+ 2,00 I1I1 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing observations: 49 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by CP. R. G competitors rescuers - "guilty" 
CP. R. G Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
2,00 I1I1 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 53 
124 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by CP. E. G competitors enemies - "guilty" 
CP. E. G Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO ------------------ 
1,00 I1I1 










Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 51 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by CP. A. G competitors allies - "guilty" 
CP. A. G Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
1,00 I4I4 










Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 49 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by CP. VL. G competitors villains - "guilty" 
CP. VL. G Page 1 of 1 
Count 
Row Pct (ticked 
Col Pct 1 Row 














Number of Missing Observations: 53 
125 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by SIG. E. G sp. int. groups enemies - "guilty" 
SIG. E. G Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
1,00 I2I2 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 52 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by SIG. A. G sp. int. groups allies - "guilty" 
SIG. A. G Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO ------------------ 
1,00 I3I3 










Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing observations: 50 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by SIG. P. G sp. int. groups protectors - "guilty" 
SIG. P. G Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
2,00 I2I2 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 52 
126 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by SIG. VL. G sp. int. groups villains - "guilty" 
SIG. VL. G Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct (ticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
2,00 I2I2 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 52 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by R. H. G regulators heroes - "guilty" 
R. H. G Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
2,00 I111 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 53 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by R. E. G regulators enemies - "guilty" 
R. E. G Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct 1 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO ------------------ 
1,00 11I1 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of missing observations: 53 
127 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by R. A. G regulators allies - "guilty" 
R. A. G Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct (ticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
1,00 I4I4 









Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing observations: 48 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by R. P. G regulators protectors - "guilty" 
R. P. G Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
2,00 I2I2 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 52 
pREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by CS. V. G consumers victims - "guilty" 
CS. V. G Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO ------------------ 
1,00 I4I4 





Not Prepared 1100,0 I 42,9 




Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 47 
128 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by CS. E. G consumers enemies - "guilty" 
CS. E. G Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO ------------------ 
1100 I1I1 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 53 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by CS. A. G consumers allies - "guilty" 
CS. A. G Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
2,00 1I1 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 53 
pREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by CS. P. G consumers protectors - "guilty" 
CS. P. G Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
2,00 I1I1 
Not Prepared 1100,0 1100,0 




Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 53 
129 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by FI. V. G financial institutions victims - "guilty 
FI. V. G Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
1,00 I3I3 










Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 49 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by FI. R. G financial institutions rescuers - "guilt 
FI. R. G Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
1,00 I2I2 










Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 51 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by FI. P. G financial institutions protectors - "gui 
FI. P. G Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO ------------------ 
2,00 I1I1 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 53 
130 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by FI. VL. G financial institutions villainz - "guilt 
FI. VL. G Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
2,00 11I1 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 53 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by IC. V. G insurance companies victims - "guilty" 
IC. V. G Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO ------------------ 
1100 4I4 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 50 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by IC. H. G insurance companies heroes - "guilty" 
IC. H. G Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
2,00 I1I1 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 53 
131 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by IC. R. G insurance companies rescuers - "guilty" 
IC. R. G Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct 1 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO ------------------ 
1,00 11I1 










Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 51 
PPEPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by IC. P. G insurance companies protectors - "guilty 
IC. P. G Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct ( 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
2,00 I111 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 53 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by IC. VL. G insurance companies villains - "guilty" 
IC. VL. G Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
2,00 I1I1 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 53 
132 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by LC. V. G local community victims - "guilty" 
LC. V. G Page 1 of 1 
Count 
Row Pct ticked 
Col Pct Row 
Tot Pct 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
1,00 I2I2 










Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing observations: 49 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by LC. E. G local co=unity enemies - "guilty" 
LC. E. G Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
1,00 I1I1 
Prepared 1100,0 I 50,0 
I 50,0 I 
I 50,0 I 
---------- 
2,00 I1I1 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 52 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by LC. A. G local community allies - "guilty" 
LC. A. G Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
1,00 I2I2 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing observations: 52 
133 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by LC. VL. G local community villains - "guilty" 
LC. VL. G Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
2,00 I1I1 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 53 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by NC. V. G national (wider community) villains - "q 
NC. V. G Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
2,00 I4I4 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 50 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by NC. E. G national (wider community) enemie3 - "gu 
NC. E. G Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct 1 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
1,00 I1I1 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing observations: 53 
134 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by NC. A. G national (wider community) allies - "qui. 
NC. A. G Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
1,00 I3I3 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing observations: 5l 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by NC. P. G national (wider community) protectors - 
NC. P. G Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO ------------------ 
1,00 I1I1 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 53 
pREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by NC. VL. G national (wider community) villains - "q 
NC. VL. G Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
2,00 I1I1 





Total 100,0 100,0 




FREQUENCY ANALYSIS OF "VICTIM" SITUATION 
M. V. V management victims - "victim" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
ticked 1.00 29 53.7 100.0 100.0 
25 46.3 Missing 
------- ------- ------- 
Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 29 Missing cases 25 
M. H. V management heroes - "victim" 
Value Label Value Frequency 
ticked 1.00 6 
48 
Total 54 
Valid cases 6 Missing cases 48 
M. R. V management rescuers - "victim" 
Valid Cum 
Percent Percent Percent 





Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
ticked 1.00 11 20.4 100.0 100.0 
43 79.6 Missing 
------- ------- ------- 
Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 11 Missing cases 43 
M. E. V management enemies - "victim" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
54 100.0 Missing 
------- ------- ------- 
Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 0 Missing cases 54 
----------------------------------- 
M. A. V management allies - "victim" 
Value Label Value Frequency 
ticked 1.00 3 
51 
Total 54 
Valid cases 3 Missing cases 51 
Valid Cum 
Percent Percent Percent 





M. P. V management protectors - "victim" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
ticked 1.00 3 5.6 100.0 100.0 
51 94.4 Missing 
------- ------- ------- 
Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 3 Missing cases 51 
M. VL. V management villains - "villains" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
54 100.0 Missing 
------- ------- ------- 
Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 0 Missing cases 54 
----------------------------------- 
ST. V. V stockholders victims - "victim" 
Value Label Value Frequency 
ticked 1.00 32 
22 
Total 54 
Valid cases 32 Missing cases 22 
ST. H. V stokholders heroes - "victim" 
Valid Cum 
Percent Percent Percent 





Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
ticked 1.00 4 7.4 100.0 100.0 
50 92.6 Missing 
------- ------- ------- 
Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 4 Missing cases 50 
ST. R. V stokholders rescuers - "victim" 
Value Label Value Frequency 
ticked 1.00 7 
47 
Total 54 
Valid cases 7 Missing cases 47 
Valid Cum 
Percent Percent Percent 





ST. E. V stokholders enemies - "victim" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
54 100.0 Missing 
------- ------- ------- 
Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 0 Missing cases 54 
----------------------------------- 
ST. A. V stokholders allies - "victim" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
ticked 1.00 6 11.1 100.0 100.0 
48 88.9 Missing 
------- ------- ------- 
Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 6 Missing cases 48 
ST. P. V stokholders protectors - "victim" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
ticked 1.00 3 5.6 100.0 100.0 51 94.4 Missing 
------- ------- ------- 
Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 3 Missing cases 51 
ST. VL. V stokholders villains - "victim" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
54 100.0 Missing 
------- ------- ------- 
Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 0 Missing cases 54 
----------------------------------- 
W. V. V workers victims - "victim" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
ticked 1.00 29 53.7 100.0 100.0 25 46.3 Missing 
------- ------- ------- 
Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 29 Missing cases 25 
139 
W. H. V workers heroes - "victim" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 












Missing cases 47 
---- --- 




rescuers - "victim" 
---- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 














Missing cases 40 
---- --- 




enemies - "victim" 
---- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 













Missing cases 53 
--- -- --- 





---- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 












Missing cases 53 
--- --- 




protectors - "victim" 
---- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 







Total 54 100.0 
-- 
100.0 
Valid cases 0 Missing cases 54 
140 
W. VL. V workers villains "victim" 
Valid Cum 

















Missing cases 54 
----------- - -- --- 
U. V. V 
---- 
union victims - "victim" 
--- ----- - 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 















Missing cases 45 
--- --- 
U. H. V 
---- 
union heroes - 
-- 
"victim" 
------ ---- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 







Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 0 Missing cases 54 
--- 







---- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 












Missing cases 47 
-- --- 





------ ---- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Total 54 100.0 ---- 100.0 
Valid cases 1 Missing cases 53 
141 
U. A. V union allies - "victim" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
ticked 1.00 22 40.7 100.0 100.0 







Valid cases 22 
--- 
Missing cases 32 
----------- ---- ----- --- -------- 
U. P. V union 
- 
protectors - "victim" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
ticked 1.00 4 7.4 100.0 100.0 











Missing cases 50 
----------- ---- ----- --- ------ 
U. VL. V union villains - "victim" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 














Missing cases 53 
----------- ---- ----- --- ------- 
ME. V. V media victims - "victim" 
Valid Cum 














Missing cases 54 
----------- -- - ------ 
ME. H. V media heroes - "victim" 
-- ----- -- 
Valid Cum 







Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 0 Missing cases 54 
142 
ME. R. V media rescuers - "victim" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
ticked 1.00 4 7.4 100.0 100.0 
50 92.6 Missing 
------- ------- ------- 
Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 4 Missing cases 50 
ME. E. V media enemies - "victim" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
ticked 1.00 6 11.1 100.0 100.0 
48 88.9 Missing 
------- ------- ------- 
Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 6 Missing cases 48 
ME. A. V media allies - "victim" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
ticked 1.00 35 64.8 100.0 100.0 
19 35.2 Missing 
------- ------- ------- 
Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 35 Missing cases 19 
ME. P. V media protectors - "victim" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
ticked 1.00 3 5.6 100.0 100.0 
51 94.4 Missing 
------- ------- ------- 
Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 3 Missing cases 51 
ME. VL. V media villains - "victim" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
ticked 1.00 4 7.4 100.0 100.0 
50 92.6 Missing 
------- ------- ------- 
Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 4. Missing cases 50 
143 
SU. V. V suppliers victims - "victim" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 










Valid cases 9 Missing cases 45 
----------------------------------- 
SU. H. V suppliers heroes - "victim" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
54 100.0 Missing 
------- ------- ------- 
Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 0 Missing cases 54 
----------------------------------- 
SU. R. V suppliers rescuers - "victim" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
ticked 1.00 8 14.8 100.0 100.0 
46 85.2 Missing 
------- ------- ------- 
Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 8 Missing cases 46 
SU. E. V suppliers enemies - "victim" 
Value Label Value Frequency 
ticked 1.00 1 
53 
Total 54 
Valid cases 1 Missing cases 53 
SU. A. V suppliers allies - "victim" 
Valid Cum 
Percent Percent Percent 





Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
ticked 1.00 27 50.0 100.0 100.0 
27 50.0 Missing 
------- ------- ------- 
Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 27 Missing cases 27 
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SU. P. V suppliers protectors - "victim" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 










Valid cases 7 Missing cases 47 
-- --- - --- ---- --- ----------- 
SU. VL. V suppliers villains - "victim" 
---- ---- 
Valid Cum 










Valid cases 0 
- 
Missing cases 54 
-- ---------- 
CP. V. V competitors 
---------- 
victims - "victim" 
---- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Valid cases 0 
---- 
Missing cases 54 
---- ------- 
CP. H. V competitors 
-------- 
heroes - "victim" 
---- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 










Valid cases 1 
------ 
Missing cases 53 
---- -- ----- 
CP. R. V competitors 
- ----- 
rescuers - "victim" 
---- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 5 Missing cases 49 
145 
CP. E. V competitors enemies - "victim" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 










Valid cases 10 Missing cases 44 
----------------------------------- 
CP. A. V competitors allies - "victim" 
Valid Cunt 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
ticked 1.00 32 59.3 100.0 100.0 
22 40.7 Missing 
------- ------- ------- 
Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 32 Missing cases 22 
CP. P. V competitors protectors - "victim" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
ticked 1.00 4 7.4 100.0 100.0 
50 92.6 Missing 
------- ------- ------- 
Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 4 Missing cases 50 
----------------------------------- 
CP. VL. V competitors villains - "victim" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
54 100.0 Missing 
------- ------- ------- 
Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 0 Missing cases 54 
----------------------------------- 
SIG. V. V sp. int. groups victims - "victim" 
Value Label Value Frequency 
ticked 1.00 1 
53 
Total 54 
Valid cases 1 Missing cases 53 
Valid Cum 
Percent Percent Percent 





SIG. H. V sp. int. groups heroes - "victim" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 









Valid cases 0 Missing cases 54 
-------------- ---- ----- --- ------- 
SIG. R. V sp. 
-- 
in, groups rescuers - "victim" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 









Valid cases 4 Missing c 
--------- 
ases 50 
---- - - ----- --- ------- 
SIG. E. V sp. 
- 





Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 












Valid cases 10 Missing cases 44 
---------------- ---- ----- --- ------- 
SIG. A. V sp. int. groups allies - "victim" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 













25 Missing cases 29 
-------------- - -- - ------ 
SIG. P. V sp. 
- -- 
int. groups protectors - "victim" 
----- -- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 9 Missing cases 45 
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SIG. VL. V sp. int. groups villains - "victim" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
ticked 1.00 3 5.6 100.0 100.0 







Valid cases 3 
-- 
Missing cases 51 
------------ ---- ----- --- --- 
R. V. V 
------ 
regulators victims - "victim" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Valid cases 0 
-- 
Missing cases 54 
------------- ---- ----- --- --- 
R. H. V 
----- 
regulators heroes - "victim" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 





Valid cases 0 
- 
Missing cases 54 
------------- ---- ----- --- --- 
R. R. V 
------ 
regulators rescuers - "victim" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 










Valid cases 5 
-- 
Missing cases 49 
----------- - - --- --- 




enemies - "victim" 
--- ---- 
Valid Cum 







Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 0 Missing cases 54 
148 
R. A. V regulators allies - "victim" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 28 Missing cases 26 
--- -- - - ---------- 
R. P. V regulators 
- - - - -- 
protectors - "victim" 
---- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 18 
--- 
Missing cases 36 
------------- - ------- 
R. VL. V regulators villains - "victim" 
- -- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 1 Missing cases 53 
----------- ---------- 
CS. V. V consumers 
-- 
victims - "victim" 
---- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Total 54 100.0 
-- --- 
100.0 
Valid cases 32 Missing cases 22 
----------- ---------- 
CS. H. V consumers 
-- 
heroes - "victim" 
---- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 






Total 54 100.0 
-- 
100.0 
Valid cases 2 Missing cases 52 
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CS. R. V consumers rescuers - "victim" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 











Valid cases 4 Missing cases 50 
------------ --- ---------- 
CS. E. V consumers 
- 
enemies - "victim" 
- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 







Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 0 
-- 
Missing cases 54 
------------- - -------- 
CS. A. V consumers allies - "victim" 
--- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 11 
- 
Missing cases 43 
----------- --------- 
CS. P. V consumers 
-- 
protectors - "victim" 
---- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 










Valid cases 3 
-- 
Missing cases 51 
------------- -------- 
CS. VL. V consumers villains - "victim" 
---- ----- --- 
Valid Cum 







Total 54 100.0 
-- 
100.0 
Valid cases 0 Missing cases 54 
150 
FI. V. V financial institutions victims - "victim 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Total 54 100.0 100.0 













Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Total 54 100.0 100.0 













Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Total 54 100.0 100.0 






FI. E. V financial institutions 
-- 





Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 






Total 54 100.0 
------- 
100.0 






FI. A. V financial institutions 
------- 
allies - "victim" 
----- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Total 54 100.0 
---- 
100.0 
Valid cases 11 Missing cases 43 
151 
FI. P. V financial institutions protectors - "vic 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
ticked 1.00 6 11.1 100.0 100.0 
48 88.9 Missing 
------- ------- ------- 
Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 6 Missing cases 48 
----------------------------------- 
FI. VL. V financial institutions villains - "victi 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
ticked 1.00 1 1.9 100.0 100.0 
53 98.1 Missing 
------- ------- ------ 
Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 1 Missing cases 53 
---------------------------------- 
IC. V. V insurance companies victims - "victim" 
Valid cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
ticked 1.00 15 27.8 100.0 100.0 39 72.2 Missing 
------- ------- ------- 
Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 15 Missing cases 39 
----------------------------------- 
IC. H. V insurance companies heroes - "victim" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
54 100.0 Missing 
------- ------- ------- 
Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 0 Missing cases 54 
----------------------------------- 
IC. R. V insurance companies rescuers - "victim" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
ticked 1.00 19 35.2 100.0 100.0 35 64.8 Missing 
------- ------- ------- 
Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 19 Missing cases 35 
152 
IC. E. V insurance companies enemies - "victim" 
Valid cum 
value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Valid cases 2 Missing cases 52 
----------- ---- ----- --- ---------- 
IC. A. V insurance 
-- 
companies allies - "victim" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Valid cases 10 Missing cases 44 
------------- ---- ----- --- ---------- 
IC. P. V insurance companies protectors - "victim 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Valid cases 6 
- 
Missing cases 48 
------------- ---- ----- --- --------- 
IC. VL. V insurance companies villains - "victim" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Valid cases 0 Missing cases 54 
------------- ---- ----- --- ---------- 
LC. V. V local community victims - "victim" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 






Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 23 Missing cases 31 
153 
LC. H. V local community heroes - "victim" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
ticked 1.00 6 11.1 100.0 100.0 
48 











Valid cases 6 Missing cases 48 
---------- ---- - -------- 
LC. R. V local 
----- 
community rescuers - "victim" 
--- - --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 











Valid cases 5 Missing cases 49 
-------------- -- - -------- 
LC. E. V local 
- 
community enemies - "victim" 
- ----- --- 
Valid cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
ticked 1.00 1 1.9 100.0 100.0 










1 Missing cases 53 
--------------- ---- -- ------- 
LC. A. V local co=unity allies - "victim" 
--- --- 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 













17 Missing cases 37 
--------------- --- ------- 
LC. P. V local 
- 
community protectors - "victim" 
----- --- 
Valid Cum 







Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 0 Missing cases 54 
154 
LC. VL. V local community villains - "victim" 
Valid Cum 







Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 0 
-- 
Missing cases 54 
------------- --- -------- 





Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 19 
- 
Missing cases 35 
------------- --------- 





Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 









Valid cases 3 
-- 
Missing cases 51 
------------- -------- 





Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 5 
-- 
Missing cases 49 
------------ -------- 
NC. E. V national 
- 












Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 0 Missing cases 54 
155 
NC. A. V national (wider commu ity) allies - "vic 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 







Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 19 Missing cases 35 
NC. P. V national (wider community) protectors - 
Value Label Value Frequency 
ticked 1.00 4 
50 
Total 54 
Valid cases 4 Missing cases 50 
Valid Cum 
Percent Percent Percent 




NC. VL. V national (wider co -pity) villains - "v 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
ticked 1.00 1 1.9 100.0 100.0 
53 98.1 Missing 
------- ------- ------- 
Total 54 100.0 100.0 




CROSSTABULATION ANALYSIS OF "VICTIM" SITUATION 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by M. V. V management victims - "victim" 
M. V. V Page 1 of 1 
Count 
Row Pct (ticked 
Col Pct Row 
Tot Pct 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO ------------------ 
1,00 I1I1 










Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 50 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by M. R. V management rescuers - "victim" 
M. R. V Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct 1 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO ------------------ 
1100 I111 
Prepared 1100,0 I 50,0 
50,0 I 
1 50,0 1 
---------- 
2,00 I1I1 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing observations: 52 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by M. A. V management allies - "victim" 
M. A. V Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct (ticked 
Col Pct Row 
Tot Pct 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO ------------------ 
1,00 1I1 





Not Prepared 1100,0 I 50,0 
I 50,0 I 
I 50,0" I 
---------- 
Column 22 
Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Mi » ing Ob3ervation3: 52 
158 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by M. P. V management protector' - "victim" 
M. P. V Page 1 of 1 
Count 
Row Pct (ticked 
Col Pct Row 
Tot Pct 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO ------------------ 
1,00 I2I2 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing observations: 52 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by ST. V. V stockholders victims - "victim" 
ST. V. V Page 1 of 1 
Count 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct Row 
Tot Pct 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO ------------------ 
1,00 I3I3 










Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing observations: 48 
pREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by ST. R. V stokholders rescuers - "victim" 
ST. R. V Page 1 of 1 
Count 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
2,00 I2I2 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 52 
N 
159 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by ST. A. V stokholders allies - "victim" 
ST. A. V Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct 1 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
1,00 I1I1 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing observations: 53 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by ST. P. V stokholders protectors - "victim" 
ST. P. V Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
1,00 I1I1 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Obzervation3: 53 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. by W. V. V workers victims - "victim" 
W. V. V Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO ------------------ 
1,00 I2I2 










Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing observations: 49 
160 
pREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. by W. H. V workers heroes - 
"victim" 
W. H. V Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO ------------------ 
1100 I1I1 





" Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 53 
pREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. by W. R. V workers rescuers - 
"victim" 
W. R. V Page 1 of 1 
Count 
Row Pct (ticked 
Col Pct Row 
Tot Pct 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
1,00 I2I2 










Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 51 
pREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. by W. E. V workers enemies - 
"victim" 
W. E. V Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
2,00 I1I1 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing observations: 53 
161 
pREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. by U. V. V union victims - 
"victim" 
U. V. V Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct (ticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
2,00 I2I2 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 52 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. by U. R. V union rescuers - 
"victim" 
U. R. V Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO ------------------ 
2,00 I2I2 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 52 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. by U. A. V union allies - "victim" 
U. A. V Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
1,00 I1I1 










Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 52 
162 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. by ME. E. V media enemies - 
"victim" 
ME. E. V Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct (ticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO ------------------ 
2,00 I1I1 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 53 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. by ME. A. V media allies - "victim" 
ME. A. V Page I of 1 
Count 
Row Pct (ticked 
Col Pct Row 
Tot Pct 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO ------------------ 
1,00 I5I5 




2,00 I2I 2- 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 47 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by ME. P. V media protectors - "victim" 
ME. P. V Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
2,00 11I1 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 53 
163 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. by ME. VL. V media villains - "victim" 
ME. VL. V Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct (ticked 
Col Pct Row 
Tot Pct 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
2,00 I1I1 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 53 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by SU. V. V suppliers victims - "victim" 
SU. V. V Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
2,00 I1I1 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 53 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by SU. R. V suppliers rescuers - "victim" 
SU. R. V Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
1,00 1I1 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 53 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by SU. E. V suppliers enemies - "victim" 
SU. E. V Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
2,00 I1I1 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 53 
pREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
164 
by SU. A. V suppliers allies - "victim" 
SU. A. V Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO ------------------ 
1,00 I4I4 










Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 49 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by SU. P. V suppliers protectors - "victim" 
SU. P. V Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
2,00 I2I2 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 52 
pREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by CP. R. V competitors rescuers - "victim" 
CP. R. V Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct (ticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO ------------------ 
1,00 I1I1 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 53 
165 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by CP. E. V competitors enemies - "victim" 
CP. E. V Page 1 of 1 
Count 
Row Pct (ticked 
Col Pct Row 
Tot Pct 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO ------------------ 
2,00 I2I2 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing observations: 52 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by CP. A. V competitors allies - "victim" 
CP. A. V Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,00( Total 
PREPORNO ------------------ 
1100 I4I4 










Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 48 
pREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by CP. P. V competitors protectors - "victim" 
CP. P. V Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
2,00 I1I1 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 53 
166 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by SIG. V. V sp. int. groups victims - "victim" 
SIG. V. V Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
2,00 I1I1 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 53 
pREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by SIG. R. V sp. int. groups rescuers - "victim" 
SIG. R. V Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO ------------------ 
2,00 I1I1 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 53 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by SIG. E. V sp. int. groups enemies - "victim" 
SIG. E. V Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
2,00 I1I1 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 53 
167 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by SIG. A. V sp. int. groups allies - "victim" 
SIG. A. V Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO ------------------ 
1100 I4I4 
Prepared 1100,0 I 80,0 









Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of missing observations: 49 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by SIG. P. V sp. int. groups protectors - "victim" 
SIG. P. V Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
1,00 I1I1 
Prepared 1100,0 I 50,0 




Not Prepared 1100,0 I 50,0 
I 50,0 I 
I 50,0 I 
---------- 
column 22 
Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 52 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by R. R. V regulators rescuers - "victim" 
R. R. V Page 1 of I 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
2,00 I2I 2 




Column 2 2 
Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing observations: 52 
168 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by R. A. V regulators allies - "victim" 
R. A. V Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
1,00 I4I4 
Prepared 1100,0 I 80,0 
80,0 
I 80,0 I 
---------- 
2,00 I1I1 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 49 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by R. P. V regulators protectors - "victim" 
R. P. V Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct 1 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO ------------------ 
1100 I1I1 










Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing observations: 51 
pREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by CS. V. V consumers victims - "victim" 
CS. V. V Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct 1 1,001 Total- 
PREPORNO ------------------ 
1,00 I3I3 










Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 49 
169 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by CS. H. V consumers heroes - "victim" 
CS. H. V Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct 1 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO ------------------ 
2,00 11I1 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 53 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by CS. R. V consumers rescuers - "victim" 
CS. R. V Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO ------------------ 
2,00 1111 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 53 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by CS. A. V consumers allies - "victim" 
CS. A. V Page 1 of 1 
Count 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
1,00 I2I2 










Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 51 
170 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by FI. V. V financial institutions victims - "victim 
FI. V. V Page 1 of 1 
Count 
Row Pct (ticked 
Col Pct Row 
Tot Pct 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
1,00 1111 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 53 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by FI. H. V financial institutions heroes - "victim" 
FI. H. V Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col. Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
2,00 I111 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 53 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by FI. R. V financial institutions rescuers - "victi 
FI. R. V Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct 1 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO ------------------ 
1,00 I2I2 










Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 50 
171 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by FI. A. V financial institutions allies - "victim" 
FI. A. V Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
2,00 I1I1 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing observations: 53 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by FI. P. V financial institutions protectors - "vic 
FI. P. V Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
1,00 2I2 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing observations: 52 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by FI. VL. V financial institutions villains - "victi 
FI. VL. V Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
2,00 I1I1 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 53 
4 
172 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by IC. V. V insurance companies victims - "victim" 
IC. V. V Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct 1 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
1,00 I1I1 










Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing observations: 52 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by IC. R. V insurance companies rescuers - "victim" 
IC. R. V Page 1 of 1 
Count 
Row Pct (ticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct 1 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO ------------------ 
1100 I2I2 










Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 49 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by IC. A. V insurance companies allies - "victim" 
IC. A. V Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct 1 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
2,00 I1I1 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 53 
173 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by IC. P. V insurance companies protectors - "victim 
IC. P. V Page 1 of 1 
Count 
Row Pct (ticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct 1 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
1,00 I2I2 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 52 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by LC. V. V local community victims - "victim" 
LC. V. V Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
1,00 I2I2 










Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing observations: 48 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by LC. E. V local community enemies - "victim" 
LC. E. V Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I- 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO ------------------ 
2,00 I1I1 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing observations: 53 
174 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by LC. A. V local community allies - "victim" 
LC. A. V Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO ------------------ 
1,00 I3I3 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of missing observations: 51 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by NC. V. V national (wider community) villains - "v 
NC. V. V Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct (ticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO ------------------ 
1,00 I1I1 










Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing observations: 50 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by NC. A. V national (wider community) allies - "vic 
NC. A. V Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
1,00 I4I4 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 50 
175 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by NC. P. V national (wider community) protectors - 
NC. P. V Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
2,00 I1I1 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 53 
PREPORNO Prepared and Not Prepared Org. 
by NC. VL. V national (wider community) villains - "v 
NC. VL. V Page 1 of 1 
Count I 
Row Pct Iticked 
Col Pct I Row 
Tot Pct I 1,001 Total 
PREPORNO --------+--------+ 
2,00 I1I1 





Total 100,0 100,0 
Number of Missing Observations: 53 
176 
